

NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (NIJPSIR) NOUN

VOL 1, NO.1, April, 2024

ISSN: 0795- 8552

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (NIJPSIR)

VOL 1, NO.1, APRIL, 2024

A Publication of
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
National Open University of Nigeria

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transferred in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, or stored in any retrieval system of any nature, without the written permission of the copyright owner.

DISCLAIMER:
The views expressed in this book are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Political Science, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja. Authors are owners of their respective copyrights and are therefore ultimately responsible for any infringements their articles may cause.

ISSN: 0795- 8552

Published by:
Department of Political Science
National Open University of Nigeria
University Village, Plot 91, Cadastral Zone,
Nnamdi Azikiwe Expressway, Jabi, Abuja

- April, 2024

.

EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Dr. Matthew Enenche Ogwuche
(HOD, Political Science and International Relations)
National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja
Tel (WhatsApp): 07082191270
Email: mogwuche@noun.edu.ng

MANAGING EDITOR

Dr. Maureen Ifeyinwa- Nwaogu
Department of Political Science
National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja
Email: mnwaogu@noun.edu.ng

EDITOR

Dr. Ikenna Amanchukwu
Department of Political Science
National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Dr. Moses Etila Shaibu Department of Political Science National Open University of Nigeria	**Dr. Basil O. Ibebunjo** Department of Peace Studies & Conflict Resolution, National Open University of Nigeria

EDITORIAL ADVISERS

Prof. Pita Ogaba Agbese Department of Political Science University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Fall, USA	**Prof. Moses Ebe Ochonu** Department of History University of Vanderbilt, USA
Prof. Kamal Bello Department of Political Science National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja	**Dr. Ebele Angela Udeoji** Department of Political Science, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja
Prof. Abdullahi Nuhu Liman Department of Political Science Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria	**Dr. Moses Etila Shaibu** Department of Political Science National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja
Dr. Aminu Umar Department of Political Science National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja	**Prof. Ologbenla Kolawole** Department of Political Science University of Lagos Lagos, Nigeria
Prof. Frank Collins- Okafor Department of Political Science Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka, Nigeria	**Prof. Sadequee Abba Abubakar** Department of Political Science University of Abuja Abuja, Nigeria
Prof. Robert Dode Department of Political Science University of Uyo Uyo, Nigeria	**Prof. Umar Ubandawaki** Department of Political Science Sokoto State University Sokoto, Nigeria

NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (NIJPSIR)

CALL FOR PAPERS

The **NOUN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (NIJPSIR)** is a semi-annual peer-reviewed and research oriented scholarly journal of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja. The Editorial Board hereby calls for scholarly, empirical and theoretical based original articles for the Vol.1, No.1, Aprıı, 2024 Maiden Edition of the Journal (which will be online and offline) in the underlisted areas of academic interest:

- Politics
- Leadership and Governance
- Political Theory and Political Philosophy
- Political Economy and Development Studies
- Comparative Politics

- Public Policy and Public Administration
- International Relations
- Security and Strategic Studies
- Migration and Global Studies
- Political Sociology
- Political History
- Defence and War Studies
- Democratic and Electoral Studies
- Political Methodology
- Political Communication
- Political Ecology and Local Government Studies
- Public Law
- Gender and Development

Publication Guidelines:

Paper submissions are welcome in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution any relative areas and they should adhere to the following guidelines.

Submission of Articles must comply with the following guidelines:

- Times New Roman ’12 Font size including references, and manuscripts should be formatted using 2.0 or double line spacing
- Referencing format is the American Psychological Association (APA) 7th Edition
- Abstract should not be more than a maximum of 250 words with at least three or four (3 or 4) key words clearly stated

- The entire article including ***references*** and ***footnotes*** (where applicable) should NOT be more than a maximum of eighteen (18) pages
- Manuscripts should bear author(s) name(s), affiliated institution(s), current addresses, GSM Numbers and email addresses
- Articles sent for consideration must be accompanied by **a non-refundable assessment fee of N7,500 only**. Only articles accepted for publication after a meticulous blind peer- review will be expected to pay the **publication fee of N25,000 only.** (***NOTE: Articles accepted for final publication will be expected to pay the publication fee within a week of the offer of the letter of acceptance)***

SUBMISSION OF PAPERS AND DATELINES

Completed articles should be sent as an attachment to the Editor-in-Chief via the following email address: mogwuche@noun.edu.ng or matogwuche@yahoo.com on or before March 25, 2024 with evidence of payment via the Journal's Temporary Account: Matthew Ogwuche, Acc. No; 2005596621, UBA. Evidence of payment of both assessment and publication fees can be posted to this WhatsApp No: 07082191270. For further enquiries: Dr. Matthew Ogwuche, HOD, Political Science/Editor-in-Chief (08051617647, 07082191270 (WhatsApp).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE i

COPYRIGHT PAGE iii

EDITORIAL BOARD iv

CALL FOR PAPERS vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

Nigeria Elections and Leadership Recruitment Process: Implications for National Development
Mike A. Igini & Joseph O. Aihie, PhD 1

Political Economy of Anti-Globalization Waves: A Review of the Washington Consensus under President Donald Trump
Iroro S. Izu, PhD, Comfort Fatimoh Sheidu, PhD & Gimba Abu Sule, PhD 19

Border Protection and Transborder Criminality: An Assessment of the Kuje Prison Jail Break, Abuja, Nigeria
Emmanuel Ugbedeojo Ameh, PhD 37

The Legislative Assembly in Africa's Democratic Space: Discount House or Praetorian Guard?
Ebele Angela Udeoji, PhD & Ikenna Amanchukwu, PhD 56

Ethnicity and Nation-building in the Nigerian Democratic Dispensation (1999-2023)
Adedoyin Adedayo, PhD & Okengwu Kelechi Okengwu 74

Problem-Solving Model of Community Policing as a Tool for Crime Prevention in Rigasa Ward in Igabi Local Government Area of Kaduna State, 2015- 2023
Mohammed Kabeer Garba, PhD & Prof. Usman Muhammed 90

Low-Income and Household Food Security: Empirical Evidences from Junior Civil Servants in Kwara State, Nigeria
Gabriel, Precious Olubunmi, PhD & Yusuf, Tawakalitu Bola, PhD 107

An Assessment of the Impact of Military Intervention in Armed Conflicts: A Study of Konduga LGA, Borno State, Nigeria, 2010–2015
Jibrin Ubale Yahaya, PhD & Adamu Abdullahi, PhD 122

Perspective on the Ceding of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and its Effect on Nigeria- Cameroon Diplomatic Relations
Matthew Enenche Ogwuche, PhD 138

An Empirical Discourse on the Relationship between Socio-Economic Development and Insecurity in Nigeria
Musa Mohammed Bello, PhD 156

Economic Diplomacy as a Driver of Nigeria's National Interest: Challenges

and Prospects
Matthew Ogwuche, PhD & Anthonia Okonye 171
Trends and Implications of Terrorism on National Development: A Conceptual Discourse
Arowona Abdulazeez Lekan & Ameen Abdulkadir, PhD 190
Challenges of National Security Strategy and Options for Policy Action
Silas Ayuba Samaila, Sani Ibrahim Sani & Idris Yakubu Haliru 204
Nigeria's Relations with the East amid the Russia-Ukraine War
Daupamowei Henry, ASANEBI, PhD, Adebisi Babatunde ADENUSI &
Ikechukwu Gerald OPARA 216
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Efforts in Peace Building Process in Jos Metropolis, Plateau State
Moses NWAN, Moses Etila SHAIBU, PhD and **Adeniyi T. ADEGOKE, PhD** 232
Socio-Economic Trends and Conflict Resolution in Nigeria's Industrial Relations in the Fourth Republic: Application of Non-violence Resolution Principles
Felix AYENI and **Adeyinka Samson ADENIJI** 249
Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria: Analysis of Herdsmen and Farmers' Conflict in Benue State: 2014-2016
Eze Marcel ONYEMA, PhD, Basil IBEBUNJO, PhD, Patrick
EKWUFE & Felix EBO 269
Relationship between Women in Politics and Corruption in Nigeria: A Perspective on Female Activism in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Nigeria
Chinenye Attracta IFIOK, PhD 283
Public Perception of Newspaper Coverage of Herdsmen and Farmers Conflict in Benue State, Nigeria
Chuks O. ODIEGWU-ENWEREM, PhD 299
Assessment of the Dominant Political Communication Tool in Use in Lagos State during the 2023 Presidential Election
Prof. Jonathan E. ALIEDE, PhD, Gloria E. NWODU, PhD, Ndidiamaka
OPARA, PhD, Chinelo OKOYE, PhD and Oyeyemi O. OYELAKUN 318
Independent National Electoral Commission's Handling of 2019 Elections and Public Opinion of Lagosians
Chuks O. ODIEGWU-ENWEREM, PhD 340
Assessment of a Decade of the Implementation of Safe School Initiative in Nigeria, 2014-2024
Yusuf Garba MANJO 359

NIGERIA ELECTIONS AND LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT PROCESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mike A. IGINI
Department of Political Science
University of Benin, Nigeria

and

Joseph O. AIHIE, PhD
Department of Political Science
University of Benin, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

The paper looked at Nigeria Elections and Leadership Recruitment Process: Implications for National Development. The paper used the Elite's theory and it states that political leaders consist of a core elite group in various institutions and strata of state that hold significant positions of power and influence to determine national agenda, framework for leadership recruitment process and outcome. Thus, there is a relation between the kind of leaders that emerge from leadership recruitment process and development of a country. The paper examined and analyzed Nigeria leadership recruitment framework between 1999-2023 in terms of processes and procedures, which are not self-executory but implemented by human agency. It maintained that electoral irregularities, mal-practices and fraud that bedevilled leadership recruitment process is largely on account of human agency refusal, failure or negligence to implement established statutory regulations and guidelines. The process does not encourage and promote the participation and emergence of development-oriented visionary, competent, focused and credible elites capable of tackling the challenge of development and its multi-dimensional poverty in Nigeria. The paper concluded that the nature of leadership recruitment process in Nigeria has implications for its state of development and lack of progress given that no society can develop outside the vision, values and orientation of its ruling elites. The study, recommended strong enforcement of electoral laws that govern leadership recruitment, punishment for electoral offenders in order to curb the growing culture of impunity and create electoral ambience for the participation of competent elites that can deal with the issue of development.

Keywords: *Election, Leadership, Recruitment Process, Implication National Development*

Introduction

Underpinning the notion of Constitutional and Representative Democracy is the process of conducting election by voting for, recruiting or selecting representatives. Unlike Classical democracy which tended to shun elections as a process of selecting representation, with the ancient Athenians preferring the allotment process (sortation), most contemporary Democracies are Representative Democracies that utilize selection more often by voting in election processes to provide representation.

Elections processes are often broadly undertaken in three key phases or cycles comprising pre-election, election day and post-election; each with particular activities leading to the intended outcome for elections, namely the selection of elected representatives to act as leaders of the government to govern on behalf of the people. Essentially, the primary and immediate outcome of Elections is to select the desired leadership of democratic societies by eligible citizens, with the secondary and main reason being to provide effectively leadership that will steer the ship of state for the attainment of the collective aspirations of the people for their development.

Leadership and its recruitment processes are intricately tied to and indeed the raison d'etre for representative democratic elections. There are various conceptions of leadership with a gradual consensus emerging that it is essentially the ability to be effective in influencing group members towards the attainment of their collective goals. Though this expectation sounds like a simple one, in the political arena where there are competing interests beyond influencing members towards a collective goal, this simple remit is not always easily achieved for many reasons, including the nature and dimensions involved in the recruitment of leadership by democratic elections. In the Nigerian context, the process of elections and election procedures as a framework for the recruitment of leadership intended to steer the affairs of state towards a collective aspiration of development and wellbeing of the citizens has been historically problematic.

This presentation will explain and describe the leadership recruitment process in Nigeria (1999-2023) using representative democratic elections and the implications for development by first defining elections and leadership, the electoral process, the experiences of the electoral process in Nigeria and the implications for development.

Conceptual Clarifications

Elections

Elections are the substantive process of voting to select leaders, this process has changed in diverse forms since the ancient processes first improved by Solon and later Cleisthenes in Athens, to processes as complicated as the 10-stage protocol for the election of the Doge of Venice. These improvements and modifications have culminated in the modern-day process of election which today involves a periodic cycle of pre-election, election day and post-election processes which have been summarized into twenty-two basic tasks (Elklit and Reynolds, 2005).

Leadership

Leadership is a combination of two nuanced words with varied meanings and perspectives, depending on ideological and cultural contexts of the definer. Ogbeide (2017) defines “leadership" as "a body of people who lead and direct the activities of a group towards a shared goal. It also denotes the ability to lead, direct and organize a group." Burns (2017) sees leadership as "leaders acting - as well as caring, inspiring and persuading others to act - for certain shared goals that represent the values - the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations – of themselves and the people they represent." From the Burns' definition, the attributes of leaders are discernible, which shows that a leader must be caring, inspire, persuade, must act at appropriate time and represent not on his own interest but the general or national interest.

Recruitment Process

Recruitment is the process of searching the candidates for employment and stimulating them to apply for jobs in the organization (Biswas, 2012). However, Gale (2008) described political

leadership recruitment as the institutional process by which political jobs beyond the citizenship level are filled. Gale argued for the value of political socialization in leadership recruitment process. Lending a voice to the debate of political recruitment, Villarreal (as cited in Shokoya, Nwogwugwu, & Nwaodike, 2020) revealed that it included the selection process aimed at filling vacancies in any political structure, which allowed upward mobility in the political careers or a change of role from a non-political to a politician. From the foregoing, leadership recruitment is the process of electing, selecting or appointing political candidates into the political leadership positions, whether at the local, state, or national levels.

National Development

According to Adagbabiri and Okolie (2016), national development entails a sustained improvement in a country's material and spiritual well-being, and this improvement must be achievable while upholding the dignity of all people. In order to enhance the nation's citizens' economic, social, political, and technical well-being, national development must involve the coordination of the nation's resources. According to Idike (2014), national development is the overall improvement of a nation-state; it entails the material well-being of a vast majority of the population, a decline in inequality and most importantly, the assurance of security of life and property within the nation-state. In this instance, the process of leadership recruitment and outcome in terms of legitimacy to govern effectively is relevant to the goal of national development of Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework: Elite Theory

The theoretical explanation of elitism is used to contextualize the relationship between the leadership recruitment process for the Nigerian elections and its effects on national development. Three of the most well-known proponents of the elitism theory, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Mitchel, assert that a small, cohesive group of powerful elites monopolize power and have extraordinary ability to influence the governed. These powerful, omnipresent elites are present in every society and possess the means to seize, retain, and exercise authority (Friedrich, 2016; Okonofua, 2018). Mosca hold the view that political

systems all over are unique through the recognition of their form and organization (Martinelli, 2009). The outcome of his postulations to identifying political systems gave provision to four types of possible government, two of which pertain to democracies; autocratic-democratic and liberal-democratic (Martinelli, 2009). In both types, Mosca argued that representative democracy is nothing but a façade. He also maintained that the coherent elites' rules over the unorganized masses.

The elites, according to (Diah, 2017) critique, are a core group of people who lack political will but occupy important positions of power and influence and set the national agenda. Nigeria's political and governing elites, especially those who came to power after the first Republic, have not made a substantial effort to solve the country's underdevelopment from the country's declaration of political independence until the current democratic regime. A shortage of competent leaders exists who can promote efficient administration and service delivery, accelerate economic progress, and provide quantifiable proof of poverty reduction that has gained more attention over time (Mkapa, 2018). However, because of the significant irregularities, rigging, manipulation, and results that produce leaders without the legitimacy to govern, the issue of the lack of committed leadership capable of starting socio-economic development programs aimed at national development has persisted as a challenge in Nigeria. Indeed, there are many problems with Nigeria's enthronement process that prevent the emergence of morally pure, capable, and visionary leaders (Ijewereme; Dunmade, 2015).

The influence and actions of the elite are so strong in Nigeria that election results are determined before the conclusion of a recruiting process or election, and in the event that the projected outcomes differ from the actual results, the elites attempt to manipulate the results by political and economic means. "Since the birth of the fourth republic in 1999, this was fairly widespread at the state and national levels." An instance that comes to mind is the political disagreement that led to the forcible removal of the previous PDP Party Chairman, Chief Audu Ogbeh, from office by former President Olusegun Obasanjo (Aleyomi, 2013). Party cross-carpeting and factional executives that eventually developed into two or more

executives within the same political party are examples of this. It follows that the political elites' immense power stems from their ability to manipulate elections in order to achieve political power or from their ability to connect with the general public. This explains the implication of leadership recruitment process on national development in Nigeria.

Leadership Recruitment Process and Elite Capture

In the opinion of Shokoya, Nwogwugwu, and Nwaodike (2020), they agreed that leadership recruitment is a blend of two words which could be seen regularly depending on the idea and cultural circumstances of the definer. In positioning these concepts in another form and bringing together the meaning they hold within their respective rights created the picture of leadership recruitment. Leadership is the ability of a people to lead and direct others towards attaining a defined goal (Ogbeidi, 2012). The idea of the ability to lead, organize and direct a group is integral in Ogbeidi's definition. To Burns (1997), leadership entails the ability of a leader to act, care, inspire and persuade others to act in accordance to their shared goals and self believe. With respect to burns definition, a leader must not be self-centered but must be able to represent the general interest of the nation. In reinforcing Ogbeidi and Burns' argument of leadership was the unanimity that leaders must act within a particular confine which at the long run must represent the group's interest. In addition to the argument, Abolurin (as cited in Shokya et al, 2020) posited that a leader must ensure the enabling environment for people to aspire and realize their aspirations. He averred that the leader-follower relationship should be based on democratic principles whereby people must be consulted before decisions are reached. Honesty, integrity, vision, communication, and self-confidence are classified as the essential qualities of leadership (Asaju, Arome, and Mukaila, 2014).

In Africa, there are increasing reports of decline in democratic practices in several countries. The recent occurrences of coups in Niger, Chad, Mali, Guinea and Sudan, fuelled by "Third Termism" similar to the 2007 failed attempt under president Obasanjo which is a euphemism for political actors resisting compliance to constitutional term limits through extra constitutional means, abuses of power and muzzling of opposition Political Parties. They all

provide justificatory nexus for the academic inquiry of leadership recruitment through elections and the real-life impact and consequences on development, the subject of this enquiry. While such cases of regression have occurred, there are also reports of improvements in elections and judicial interventions in protecting elections in Africa which generally led to better outcomes such as Kenya (2017) Malawi (2019), Tanzania, and Zambia (2021). But the case in Nigeria has often been fraught with issues around election irregularities in contestations within and between political parties during the process of leadership recruitment by democratic elections. A case in point is the outcome of the 2023 elections that its outcomes are now under judicial determination of the courts.

Thus, whether by elite capture of state institutions, democratic decay or constitutional erosive failures in Leadership, these anomalies are pervasive in Nigeria and significantly impacts development and are deeply rooted in the leadership recruitment processes during intra-party and inter-party leadership contestations through nomination and elections.

Leadership Recruitment by Elections in Nigeria (Intra and Inter- Party Elections)

The essence of Leadership recruitment through democratic elections is to have representation that will effectively meet the development aspirations and goals of the citizens. Constitutional democratic representation is the process by which the political power and influence of the entire citizenry (or a part of it) should have on governmental action, is exercised on their behalf by a small number among them, through their express or implied approval, with a binding effect upon the whole community (Okiror, 2011).

Bloom defines representation as a set of procedures or rules that select people to formulate and legislate in the public interest in an accountable way indicating that representation is the accountable aggregation of interests (Bloom in van de Bovenkamp & Hans Vollaaerd, 2018). The responsiveness of elected representatives to their electors or constituents is considered to be the determinant of the democratic quality of representation and includes the criteria of authorization (selection or direction of representatives) and accountability (a representative's sense of obligation to explain and justify their conduct to

those they represent). On the nature of Representatives, Pitkin (1967) argues that Representatives have been variously conceived as agents, trustees, deputies and delegates, reflecting language norms of the time.

Elections, the principal selection mechanism from which authorization is obtained for leaders to be recruited in most representative democracies is indeed vulnerable to manipulation for good or bad and in many instances for defective with significant cost to societies and their citizens. Identified vulnerabilities for manipulating the recruitment process through elections have been the subject of academic inquiry, with some of the devices for manipulation including; (a) Manipulating the design of the institutions governing elections through gerrymandering, malapportionment, over- restrictive franchise or candidacy regulations, campaign regulations that lead to inequalities among contestants, lack of observer access to electoral processes; (b) manipulation of voters and the choices they make through vote-buying and clientelistic transactions, or negative sanctions such as intimidation and coercion and (c) manipulation of the voting act through uneven implementation of the regulatory framework, the biasing of administrative decisions in favour of one or more electoral competitors, and, outright fraud (Birch, 2010; Ruiz ,2019; Kramon, 2013; Moniruzzaman , 2019 ; Norris ,2005, Stokes et al 2012; Ackerman, 2010 and Lehoucq, 1995)

For intra-party contested elections, Scarrow (2005) suggests that the main choice that a political party makes in intra party situations include; "selecting party candidates, selecting party leaders, and defining policy positions" and that in conducting these three processes the eligibility of members to exercise their voting rights as electors may experience challenges. In defense of the latter view, Matlosa (2004) writing on the Southern African context pointed out that serious challenges still remain for opening up within parties to allow some modicum of intra-party democracy and that the challenges revolve mainly around (a) party leadership, (b) primary elections(c) party funding, (d) gender equity, and (e) management of the internal affairs of parties. In the Nigerian context such manipulations of the recruitment processes through various devices including the structural capture and statute sabotage of the recruitment

processes can be instantiated further by the constraint elites are able to impose on voting rights. Voting rights generally are divided into two categories- active and passive voting. Active voting rights refer to the right of voters to cast a ballot in elections, whereas passive voting right refers to a person's right to stand for election. The next section will examine how constraints are imposed on active and passive voting rights in Intra-party contestations in Nigeria.

Intra-Party Leadership Recruitment (Party Nominations) and the Nigerian Experiences

In all the thematic activity areas of political parties that are involved with the leadership recruitment as outlined by Scarrow (2005) and Matlosa (2004) conducting party primary for "selecting party candidates, selecting party leaders, defining policy positions, party funding, gender equity, as well as management of the internal affairs of parties, only very minimal success has been achieved. In most cases anomalies and dysfunction often characterize such activities; a few illustrations will support this view.

For instance, selecting party candidate is often a herculean task, particularly for leading political parties. The reports of two political candidates of the then All Progressive Congress (APC) in Delta State in the 2019 election captures the experiences of many politicians around the country regarding their passive voting rights and the active voting rights of Party members as electors during intra-party contestations. One of the Candidates running for a Senate seat in the Central Constituency of Delta state in a letter conveying his withdrawal from the race described the whole exercise as "nothing but a sham that is packaged, rigged and concocted to favour' his opponent, insisting that electoral materials that were meant to be delivered and thereafter used to register party members were forcefully carted away to unknown destinations by thugs loyal to his opponents and even worse, the Committee that was supposed to supervise the process impartially, later the next day announced a result, using the register of members and election materials for the conduct of the party primary, that had been carted away by the thugs (Premium Times, 2013).

Similar irregularities led to the eventual annulment of the elections of the entire candidates of the APC after the 2019 Election primaries conducted by the party in Zamfara State in 2018. The exercise was declared invalid by the Court (Okakwu, 2019). In the same way, the Party's candidates in Rivers State were also disqualified following the nullification of the Party's primaries by Justice E.A Obile who held that the aggrieved members of the party were unlawfully shut out of the party primaries. Such irregular events in a recent party recruitment process shows that the political party recruitment process in Nigeria remains irreparably flawed and the politicians remain incorrigible. Nigeria has a long history of such irregularities from the first Republic where factional differences in the Action Group Party led to defections that led to the formation of alliance parties like the Nigerian New Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).

The conflict from the factional differences eventually led to the first military Coup and eventually the First Civil war in Nigeria which led to the loss of over four (4) million lives and destruction of properties. Apart from factionalization and defections, other challenges faced by political groups in intra party contestation to recruit leadership for elections and party leaders include, thuggery, godfatherism in which tribal, factional or other elites have an overbearing influence over party activities, as well as vote buying. Another challenge relates to the issue of vote buying, indicative of failure of regulation and control of campaign financing of party-political activities, this anomaly featured prominently in the 2023 Election primaries of the People's Democratic Party primaries (PDP), a candidate that withdrew from the race, Alhaji Mohammed Hayatu-Deen described it as "obscene monetization".

The structural capture of the intra-party leadership recruitment within political parties often begins with the erosion of the institutions for selecting party nominees. Many of these issues arose from the fact that those who make electoral laws are the ones to be regulated by these laws resulting in the making of nebulous and opaque laws guiding party primaries. For example, in the repealed 2010 electoral Act (S.87), the selection process was obfuscated by provisions such as (S.31) of the Electoral Act which provided that the Electoral Management

Body was obligated to accept candidates presented by Political Parties and cannot reject for "Any reason whatsoever" irrespective of how they emerged, effectively ousting the regulatory control of the election management body.

Inter-Party Leadership Recruitment (General Elections) and the Nigerian Experiences

Constitutional and statutory laws that are weakly enforced continue to promote a culture of impunity in the Nigerian polity, all the vices a perpetuated during intra-party nomination contestations are carried forward into the arena of inter-party national elections. For instance, Human Rights watch in describing the irregularities of the 2007 Presidential election in Nigeria reported that in Gombe and Katsina states the "electoral process denied large number of voters the opportunity to cast their votes and where voting did take place, they were marred by widespread intimidation of voters, the seizure of ballot boxes by gangs of thugs, vote buying and other irregularities" ((Human Rights Watch, 2007), the irregularities which marred the 2007 elections almost surpassed the NNA versus UPGA partisan violence in the first Republic as documented.

As the physical violence began to unfold, starting with the assassination of political opponents like one Dr Ayo Daramola a gubernatorial candidate in Ekiti State on 14 August 2006, high-profile candidates began to apply for police protection. The demands increased after the bombing in Delta State of the home of Senator Patrick Osakwe on 24 November 2006 and another bombing, also in Delta State, of the houses of two aspirants for House of Representatives (Ndudi Elumelu and Theodora Giwa-Amu). In Kano State, thugs brandishing cutlasses and swords invaded several polling booths, disrupted voting during the presidential election. In Katsina State, the INEC office in the Takai Local Government Area of Kano State was reportedly been burnt down (Muntari and Dada, 2023).

In Ondo state, When the result of the gubernatorial election was announced in Abuja and not in the state, declaring Governor Segun Agagu re-elected, supporters of the actual winner of that election reacted angrily and took to the streets to protest against the manipulation of the outcome of the election won by Dr. Olusegun Mimiko who later claimed

his electoral victory at the tribunal. But then Vehicles and houses, belonging to prominent politicians had been razed down completely.

In Osun State, the announcement of the result returning the incumbent Governor instead of the perceived winner of the election led to violence that resulted in the death of sixteen (16) people including an 8-years old little girl hit by stray bullets. Meanwhile, the campaign office of Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola, the AC gubernatorial candidate office, had been raided, ransacked and vital documents taken away. In 2011 Human Rights watch reported that post-election violence after the presidential elections in 12 Northern states resulted in the death of about 800 citizens (Human Rights watch May 16, 2011). From the first Republic up until recent elections, elections were often marred by irregularities with only a few exceptions and often stem from the same pattern of political activities, including;

1. Disregard for rule of law; refusal by politicians and other key stakeholders in the democratic praxis to adhere to the pristine principle of the rule of law;
2. Use of thugs by politicians enabled by statutory provision; heightened in 2007 by a deliberate insertion in the electoral law which allowed Politician during political campaigns to "keep or use a private security or individual for his personal protection during campaigns, rallies or procession".
3. Abusive Political Messages/Campaign Rallies.
4. Failure to deliver Ballot papers and Result sheets to Polling Units but to private homes by poll officials compromised by politicians.
5. Brazen acts of manipulation of election results such that a candidate who actually lost an election is declared the winner;
6. Near absence of prosecution of sponsors and perpetrators of election violence;
7. A toxic political culture driven by identity politics around ethnic and religious lines, ill-informed voters, decayed moral values, elite dissensus and bad socio-economic conditions.

All the negative factors that hamper democratization such as modernization and elite factors, intuitional decay and constitutional decay (Lipset 1959; Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels and extended by C. Wright Mills (1956); Linz (1978), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012); Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018); and Ginsburg and Huq (2018) all confluence in the Nigerian electoral recruitment process leading to very poor development indicators. These drivers of a dystopic political ambiance have continued to stoke the fire of electoral irregularities that mar political leadership recruitment at inter-party level, the same orgy of violence continued into the 2023 General Elections that the European Union reported a damning verdict of the opacity and gross irregularities that undermined the integrity of the election. Despite a protracted effort to ensure reforms with the introduction of technologies that had worked well in one hundred and five (105) off-seasons gubernatorial and other elections, a spate of successes that inspired many previously uninterested voters to turn out, the elections fell short of expectation both in implementation and outcome which are currently the subject of post-election litigations.

Implications for Nigerian Development

Political elites capture of intra-party and inter-party leadership recruitment processes have undermined the quality of representation, and rendered ineffective a process intended to confer authorization, legitimacy and democratic accountability vertically and horizontally. Vertical accountability focuses on mechanisms outside the state institutions and concerns the relationship between the citizens and their elected representatives; horizontal accountability focuses on the oversight exercised between different institutions in a political system (such as legislative committees and issue of separation of power). Democratic accountability broadly refers to "when elected leaders or public officials have to answer to the common citizens regarding their actions, decisions or indecisions during the time they are or were occupants of the public offices" (Okiror, 2011). This is achieved by citizens through periodic election otherwise called democratic accountability, the "ways that citizens can control its government and the mechanism for doing this" (Hanberger, 2006). Controversial outcomes of elections

that ended up in courts from one election cycle to another within the period (1999-2023) has led to sustained distrust and lack of confidence in the leadership recruitment process with its attendant implication on development of Nigeria.

Conclusion

The study interrogated the processes and procedures and found the Nigerian experience to be largely if not a completely, that of disregard for the rule of law, officials and non-officials do not adhere to regulations and guidelines that govern implementation process, non-state actors (thugs) sponsored by Political actors to foment violence seem to enjoy unparalleled impunity from prosecution by the state. Thus, competent individuals with integrity that can drive development agenda are disinterested in contesting and participating in the leadership recruitment process. In order to deal with the consequences of these anomalies arising from pernicious recruitment processes and its negative implication on development, the Nigerian state must fix its leadership recruitment process.

Recommendations

Designing election legal framework, If politicians that Election Legislative frameworks are intended to regulate (Ackerman, 2010) cannot be stopped from making election laws, they must be fettered with an interpretation Codex that explains key words and terminologies in the Election Management Body (EMB) legislative framework, such Codex should be made by Jurist (a pluralism device) so that tribunals judges may refer to the Codex for unequivocal and just determination of electoral disputes. Minimal equivocation for the certainty of electoral laws in the Electoral Act Regulation and Guidelines. Reduced ouster clauses in Election Management Body role to arbiter process such as the now repealed Electoral Act (2010) S.31 and S. 68. Non-Equivocal status of electoral technologies and their use in elections such as electronic transmission of results from polling units and use of Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) device.

Enforcement of election laws guiding elections and Election workers misconducts through prosecution. A serious commitment to the enforcement of electoral laws throughout

the three phases of election cycles viz Pre- Election, Election Day and Post-election. There should be a complimentary emphasis using life ban from participation in politics for serious election offenses committed by politicians such as falsification and announcement of fake election result etc.

References

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books.

Ackerman J.M. (2010) Towards an ontology of election law. International Association of constitutional Law VIII World Congress. Panel Submission Panel I: Electoral Systems and Constitutional principles.

Adagbabiri, M. M. & Okolie, U.C. (2015a). Party politics and democracy: The role of civil societies and struggle for democratization in Nigeria; American International Journal of Social Science, 4 (6), 1570163.

Aleyomi, M.B. (2013). Intra-party conflicts in Nigeria: The case study of Peoples Democratic Party. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 15(4), 281-296

Asaju, K., Arome, S., & Mukaila, I. (2014). Leadership crisis in Nigeria: The urgent need for moral education and value re-orientation. Public Administration Research, 3(1), 117-124.

Birch, S. (2005) Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter Turnout; Project on Electoral Malpractice in New and Semi-Democracies. Working Paper No 3; Available at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/government/electoralmalpractice/ (Accessed July 29, 2023).

Birch, S. (2010) Conceptualizing Electoral Malpractice: Project on Electoral Malpractice in New and Semi- Democracies; Working Paper No 1. Available at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/government/electoralmalpractice/ (Accessed July 28, 2023).

Biswas, N. (2012). Recruitment and selection process at Viyellatex group Retrieved from: file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/AReviewofrecruitmentandselectionprocess.pdf. (Accessed on July 30, 2023)

Bühlmann, M., Merkel,W; and Wessels, B. (2014) Challenges to Democracy (in collaboration with Lisa Müller NCCR Democracy), University of Zurich Social Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB) National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) in the 21st Century Working Paper No. 10

Burns, J. M. (1997). Leadership. In D.T. Phillips (Ed.), The founding fathers on leadership. New York: Warner Business Books.

Burns, W. (2017) Leadership: Nature and Pathways to Effectiveness. In Udegbe, I.B, et al (eds), Psychology: Perspectives in Human Behaviour, A Publication of Dept. of Psychology, University of Ibadan.

Courant, D. (2017). Thinking Sortition Modes of selection, deliberative frameworks and democratic principles. Available at: file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/Cahiers_IEPHI_68_Courant2017.pdf. (Accessed on April 19th, 2024).

Diah, A. M. (2017). The politics of patronage in intergovernmental financial transfer: the role of local elites in East Kalimantan Province, Indonesia (Doctoral dissertation, Victoria University).

Dunmade, B. (2015). Good Governance and Political Stability in Nigeria: An Assessment of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration. Available at: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2853510. or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2853510. (Accessed on April 19th, 2024).

Elklit, J. and Wreynolds, A. (2005). A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality. Democratization, 12(2), 147–162.

Frudrich (2016) A Typical Appraisal of Rural Poverty in Nigeria; Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/103-Article%20Text-242-1-10-20211205.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2013)

Gale, T. (2008) Political recruitment and careers; Retrieved from https://www.encyclopedia.com/socialsciences/applied-and-social-sciencesmagazines/political-recruitment-and-careers (Accessed July 30, 2023)

Ginsburg, T. and Huq, A. (2018) How to Save a Constitutional Democracy; University of Chicago Press: Human Rights Watch.

Hanberger, A. (2006). Democratic accountability in decentralized governance. Paper presented at the CONFERENCE ON THE INTERPRETIVE PRACTITIONER: From Critique to Practice in Public Policy Analysis, 8-10 JUNE 2006, Birmingham.

Human Right Watch (2007). Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/25/nigeria-presidential-election-marred-fraud-violence. (Accessed on April 20th, 2024).

IDEA (2017). Democratic accountability in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: lessons from the Pacific. Available at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/democratic-accountability-in-service-delivery-lessons-from-the-pacific.pdf. (Accessed on April 20th, 2024).

Idike, A. N. (2014). Local Government and sustainable national development in Nigeria.European Scientific Journal, 10 (25), 161-170

Igbinovia, P. E. (2017), The Criminal in All of Us: Whose Ox Have We Not Taken? A Professorial Inaugural Lecture Benin City: University of Benin.

Ijewereme, D. (2015) Governance Crisis and the Crisis of Leadership in Nigeria"; International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, (2)7: 185-191

Kramon, E. (2013) "Vote Buying and Accountability in Democratic Africa"; PhD Dissertation University of California, Los Angeles; Available at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1490x02z. (Accessed July 28, 2023)

Lehoucq, F. (1995). Institutional Change and Political Conflict: Evaluating Alternative Explanations of Electoral Reform in Costa Rica. Electoral Studies, 14(1), 23-45.

Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D. (2018) How Democracies Die. Viking p21–6;

Linz, J.J. (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration. Johns Hopkins: UP.

Linz, J. J. and Alfred, S. (Ed.) (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53 (1), 69-105.

Loughlin, M. (2019) The Contemporary Crisis of Constitutional Democracy. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 39(2), 435–454.

Lührmann, A., Mechkova, V., & Wilson, M. (2017). Is democracy on the decline? Not as much as some pundits want you to believe. Washington Post Monkey Cage.

Martinelli, C. (2009). Gaetano Mosca's Political Theories: A Key to Interpret the Dynamics of the Power. Italian Journal of Public Law, 1, 1-44.

Matlosa, K, (2004). Democracy, Hiv/Aids and Citizen Participation: Focus on the 2004 South African Election. Journal of African Election, 3(2), 77-96.

Mkapa, S. (2018) How Africa Underdeveloped Africa; Professional Publishers: Port-Harcourt.

Moniruzzaman, M. (2019). Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian Democracy in Bangladesh. In Ryan Merlin Yonk (ed.), Elections – A Global Perspective. London: Intech Open Limited.

Muntari, T. and Dada, P. (2023). INEC office burnt, two killed in Kano, Ondo. Punch Newspaper. Available at: https://punchng.com/inec-office-burnt-two-killed-in-kano-ondo/. (Accessed on April 20th, 2024).

National Bureau of Statistics (2022).Nigeria launches its most extensive national measure ofmultidimensional poverty. Retrieved from:https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/news/78. (Accessed July 30, 2023)

Noris, P. (2005). Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ober, J. (2015) The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece. Princeton University Press;

Ogbeidi, M. (2017) Political Leadership and Corruption in Nigeria Since 1960: A Social economic analysis; Journal of Nigeria Studies, 1(2), 1-25

Ogbeidi, M. M. (2012). Political leadership and corruption in Nigeria since 1960: A socio-economic analysis. Journal of Nigeria Studies, 1(2), 1-25.

Okaku, E. (2019). Why Supreme Court ruled against APC in Zamfara. Premium Times. Available at: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/331517-why-supreme-court-ruled-against-apc-in-zamfara.html. (Accessed on April 20th, 2024).

Okiror, G. (2011). Concepts and Principles of democratic governance and accountability. A guide for peer educators Published under the project: 'Action for Strengthening Good Governance and Accountability in Uganda' by the Uganda Office of the KonradAdenauer-Stiftung.

Okonofua (2018) Cultural Impediments to Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria: Lessons from the Chinese Economy. Journal of Sustainable Development, 5(7)127-136

Pareto, V. (2000). The Rise and fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Pitkin, H. (1967). The concept of representation. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Pitkin, H.F (1967) The concept of representation; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press p. 143

Scarrow, S. (2005). Political parties and democracy in theoretical and practical perspectives: Implementing intra-party democracy. Washington: National Democratic Institute.

Shokoya, R. O., Nwogwugwu, N., & Nwaodike, C. A. (2020) Leadership recruitment and poverty reduction at the grassroots level in Nigeria. Kampala International University Journal of Social Sciences, 6(2), 17-26.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTI-GLOBALIZATION WAVES: A REVIEW OF THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS UNDER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP

Iroro S. IZU, Ph.D
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
Baze University, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria
iroro.izu@bazeuniversity.edu.ng

Comfort Fatimoh SHEIDU, Ph.D
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
Baze University, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria
comfort.sheidu@bazeuniversity.edu.ng

and

Gimba Abu SULE, Ph.D
Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Abuja, FCT, Abuja

ABSTRACT
The thrust of this paper centers around an examination of the political economy of the anti-globalization waves across the world especially under the Presidency of Donald Trump and how it may re-emerge if he re-wins the presidential election in the United States of America (USA). This examination is done against the backdrop of an abandonment of the Washington Consensus, a long-standing ideological guide to America's and indeed Western international economic relations. It traces this anti-globalization movement to the push by third world countries (TWCs) to reinvent a new international economic order (NIEO) that would favour their economies and work within the ambit of import substitution industrialization and export promotion. The paper however situates the strongest drive for anti-globalization leanings in Trumpism – the body language, campaign assurances, executive orders and policies of President Trump – which explicitly and implicitly geared towards economic nationalism as against the previously propagated economic internationalism, a phenomenon which was at the heart of the Washington Consensus. The paper also succinctly shows how this anti-globalization wave has taken foothold in Europe a la Brexit. The study which adopts the political economy approach and documentary-data sourcing methodology concludes that this new consensus on economic nationalism will have favourable implications on the TWCs. To this end it recommends among other things that: the TWCs should be wary of receiving so much grants, loans and aids from China so that the tacit new form of imperialism China is unleashing on them can be curtailed.

Keywords: *Anti-Globalization, Brexit, Economic Nationalism, Trump, TWCs*

Introduction

The rise of anti-globalization signals in the world is not new. It has been a recurrent decimal in the international economic relations campaigns of most third world countries (TWCs) since the attainment of political independence in the 1960s and 1970s. This ultimately resulted in the push for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the early 1970s, two key objectives of which were import substitution industrialization and export promotion; as well as the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the early 1990s to replace the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) of the 1940s. The Washington Consensus of the late 1980s which essentially propagated free trade and free market as well as the implosion of the defunct Soviet Union, put paid to the continued anti-globalization campaigns of the TWCs. They then accepted their fate!

The arrival of the 21st century which has seen the terrorist attacks of the United States and most states in Europe; the global economic meltdown which started in the US in 2008; the exponential economic rise of China, the tremendous trade deficits America has experienced with China on the gaining side, and the unmitigated inflow of immigrants, goods and services into the US and Europe, especially Britain, have all combined to elicit a redefinition and exhaustion of the texture and stature of the Washington Consensus, an arrangement that was gleefully spearheaded by the US and the UK. This redefinition gained momentum in the protectionist policies of Donald Trump and in Britain's exit of the European Union. In the face of these trends, this study seeks to undertake an examination of the political economy of anti-globalization waves against the backdrop of the bankruptcy and fetishism of the Washington Consensus. It relies on documentary data-gathering methodology and political economy framework in its operationalization.

Conceptual Clarifications

Globalization: Philes and Phobes

Globalization has been the major character of the capitalist world economy under which policies and processes like privatization, deregulation, commercialization and liberalization

thrive (Izu, 2023, 2021). It is simply de-territorialization driven by technological explosion. In this case, it is an inevitably increasing interconnectedness, interrelatedness and intermingling of countries and continents of the world whereby traders or merchants do not just have to carry their goods and services through open or free borders (which is already guaranteed by liberalization) but would not even need to go at all, yet the business transaction is still done. This is because globalization represents the economy of the digital age, an economy that is massively driven by information and communication technology (ICT) – less human beings or human contacts, more of technologies.

Globalization could also be seen as transnationalism or trans-continentalism – the digital breaking down of countries and continents' boundaries for the unhindered movement of values, ideas, goods, labour, industries, services, and their accompaniments. Globalization thus goes beyond liberalization. It goes beyond the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers for labour, capital, services, and goods to flow. It is intensification of the internationalization of digital oneness whereby the whole world becomes a global village, global shopping center, global financial hub, global policy domain, etc. In fact, globalization is a spirit, an unseen force, driven by unspirited machines. That is, though it is a spirit yet its effects are rampant, seen everywhere in the policies and politics of nations (Izu, 2023).

Akpuru-Aja and Emeribe (2000) note that: "the engineering mechanism of globalization remains the revolution in science and technology, particularly as it affects transportation and electro-communication systems. The net result is the creation of a global village, a single market system, a global factory and a global office." Thus, Jean-Louis *et al* (1998) see globalization as "electro-communication driven in the facilitation of the flow and share of ideas, values, goods and services, banking and finance, science and technology, foreign investments and market integration" (cited in Akpuru-Aja, 2002). They assert further that globalization is a self-propelling networking process driven by heightened productive culture.

For a country not to fall prey to this danger, and indeed the *phobes* of globalization, it must strive to enhance the capability and capacity of its population. This is because no matter how open or liberalized a country's border is and no matter the density of its demographic configuration, it will not still be able to attract real investments or what is generally called foreign direct investments (FDI) if the people do not have the absorptive capacity in terms of know-how to assist investors to succeed in their enterprise. At best, the country will only be good as dumping ground for all manner of finished products, and with this its decline in partaking in the gains or benefits of the global age. This is why globalization appears to be favouring some countries and disfiguring others. One of the most crucial reasons why Japan, China, India and other Asian countries are basking in the euphoria of stupendous gains from the global economy is not just because they have large populations but more importantly because they have populations that are highly skilled in technical, practical and modern industrial knowledge. This makes them to naturally attract a high percentage of global FDI inflows. This also goes for frontline countries in Europe and the Americas (Izu, 2023).

More than that, it is instructive to state that the process of globalizing the world economy is not completely new. Its present structure…has its roots in the economic history of the past four centuries, particularly in the history of the development and expansion of capitalism…. The political and economic processes of the past centuries…created the conditions for the emergence of a single modern world economy now referred to as globalization partly because it signals a higher level of intensifying economic, political, financial, cultural, and social cross-border networks than before (Alapiki, 2005). The import of this is that globalization has been with us for centuries. But its current form became manifest in the post-war (World War Two) era which has chronically seen the invention of several time-tested technological feats in the following order:

1. Expansion of plastics and fiber: 1940s
2. Increased air transport: 1957-72
3. First person in space (Yuri Gagavin): 1961

4. First man in the moon (Neil Armstrong): 1969
5. Integrated circuita becomes commercially available: 1961
6. First line of Japan's high-speed train system (Shinkansen) opens: 1964
7. First single chip microprocessor (Intel 4004) is introduced: 1971
8. IB19 introduces first personal computer: 1981
9. Microsoft Windows introduced: 1985
10. Second Generation (2G) networks using digital tech increased the number of mobile phones: 1994
11. Invention of World Wide Web (WWW) by Tim Burners-Lee: 1989
12. First website put online: 1991
13. Number of internet users rises to 300 million: 2000
14. Number of internet users rises to 800 million: 2005 (Izu, 2023).

As expected, these technological feats have gone *pari passu* with several economic and political developments – reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe, independence of colonial territories, rise and fall of the Soviet Union, the Asian miracle, formation of international organizations to forge global openness and oneness: UN, IMF, IBRD, GATT and WTO. To this end, the major instruments or agents for the propagation and preservation of the doctrines and dogmas of globalization trends and frequencies are the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) or Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and other international financial firms like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) having all their activities midwifed by the massive explosion recently experienced in Information and Communication Technology (ICT). It is worth noting that it is this ICT midwifery attached to the MNCs of present times that actually differentiate MNCs of the 19th and early part of 20th centuries from the ones of contemporary times.

So, globalization is the process of homogenization in the political, economic and social realms. Homogenization conceives the world as one, but clearly identifies what is the centre and what constitutes the periphery. In this system the global power asserts its

domination over the other by locating itself as the economic, political and cultural centre of the universe. A globalized world is one in which political, economic, cultural and social events become more interconnected. In other words, societies are affected more and more deeply by events of other societies across the globe. These events are midwifed by the following apparatuses:

- The Wide World Web (www -internet services), YouTube, Facebook, Twitter (now X), and Instagram, Snapchat, Tiktok, WhatsApp, etc.
- Electronic Mail (Yahoo mail, Gmail, etc);
- World Wide T.V. Communications - BBC, CNN, ALJAZERRA, FRANCE 24, AP, Fox News, Sky News, etc;
- Global Newspapers e.g. Times International, the Economists, Wall Street Journals, etc.;
- International Social Movements e.g., Amnesty International, Green Peace Movement, Red Cross Society, Doctors Without Borders, etc;
- Global Franchises such as MacDonald, Coca Cola, Pizza Hut etc.;
- Global Risks e.g. Coronavirus, Ebola, SARS, Pollution, HIV/AIDS, Global Warming (Izu, 2021).

In addition, it should be noted that these globalization agents and instruments, MNCs, IMF, WB, and WTO are largely capitalist in their general orderings and orientations, a reality which inevitably makes globalization part and parcel of the whole trajectory of capitalist development (Izu, 2021).

Literature Review on Political Economy Schools: From Mercantilism to the Washington Consensus

Mercantilist Era

The crux of mercantilism or the school was to show the relationship between external or foreign trade policy and wealth of nations. This idea which originally generated by merchants (practical men), and which gained sway between the 15^{th} and 18^{th} centuries, has as its main propositions that:

1. Trade is supreme for it is by it that gold, diamond, and silver mines (hard currencies) are discovered and harnessed; and for this reason, all efforts must be oriented toward maximizing such supreme status;
2. A balance of trade 'in favour' of one's country is to be sought through direct promotion by the authorities of exports and restriction of import or by other measures which will operate indirectly in these directions;
3. Economic foreign policy and political foreign policy are to be pursued with constant attention to both 'plenty' and 'power' (including security under this latter term) as co-ordinate and generally mutually supporting national objectives, each capable of being used as a means to the attainment of the other (Akpakpan, 1999).

The idea of the mercantilist was what pushed many nations especially those of the Western or European hemisphere to engage in different dimensions of aggressive nationalism, protectionism and trade imperialism within this period of the reign of the mercantilists. Some of the proponents of this orientation were Sir Thomas Mun (1571-1641), Gerald Malynes (1586-1641), Edward Misselden (1608-1654), Antonio Serra; David Hume (1711-1776) and Sir James Steaurt (1712-1780) are regarded as the last mercantilists.

Physiocratic Era

On their part, the basic argument of the physiocrats was that the governance of economic and political activities in human society should be done in accordance with the laws implanted in nature by providence. To the physiocrats the most vital natural right is 'the right to enjoy the fruits of one's own labour'. This they put forward to defend the supremacy of agriculture because they believe that only those engaged in this sector's activities, that is, actual farming for the production of raw materials, are productive. To them, these are the people who produce the net product, that is, a surplus over the cost of production, the real wealth of the nation. To this end, real wealth was not to be found in trade to acquire gold, diamond or silver mines, not even in the industry, but in agriculture or in farms.

The major point of emphasis about the physiocratic scholars is that the continued feudal practice of making farmers to pay tax on both the land they used and the profits they made (while the land-owning class and the clergy paid no taxes), and the restriction of trade, especially grains trade, by both the guild system and the government, denied the farmers the opportunity to accumulate wealth and thus hindered the growth of agriculture. In addition, government regulation of activities was characterized by such a high level of corruption that government could no longer be trusted to act in the public interests. Farmers therefore should be allowed to perform their activities without unnecessary government disturbance. This to Akpakpan(1999) is the early appearance of 'laissez faire'.

The scholar considered as the father of this school is Francois Quesnay (1694-1774); other scholars in this school are Victor Requeti, marquis de Mirabeau, Nicolas Baudeau, Pierre Paul Mercier de la Riviere, Guillaume Francois Le Trosne, Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot. All these philosophers worked very hard to get French Government to introduce the kind of reforms that would transform the economy, particularly the reforms that would promote agriculture and, by so doing, promote the growth of the economy as a whole. Their success was very limited.

Classical Liberal Era

The classical liberal school is a successor to the physiocratic school of thought in political economy. Under this school attention had gradually shifted from emphasis on farm or agriculture to the budding industries and factories, all of which culminated in the industrial revolution of the 19th century. Yet, the central necessitating impulse of the physiocrats that government should not disturb the course of the farmers' affairs, that is, an introduction of a system of laissez faire, was not only maintained by the classical bourgeois scholars but was also amplified and contemporized in line with prevailing realities.

Adam Smith (1723-1790), believed to be one of the frontline scholars of this orientation, specifically asserted that "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard of their own interest". Smith

argued in his book entitled An Inquiry into The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, that the implication of the above statement is that as more and more people are made to engage in the pursuit of private interests an invisible hand propels them to inversely promote the interests of society as a whole. This is so because in order to realize the quest to sustain and maintain a viable status in the market place these individual business persons will compulsively try, by all means, to strategize so as to outsmart one another, and by this motive, innovation, technology, discreetness, zestfulness and more cordial and efficient customers' service mechanisms are introduced all of which positively impact the materiality of the larger society.

Scholars in this school also contend that the invisible hand effectively work through the market mechanism which has to do with the activities of the forces of demand and supply, and the factors that determine or condition both. So, the central contention of these scholars is that these forces will thrive better where the market is free from restrictions and regulations – that is, where people in the marketplace are left to pursue their own private interests both in production and in exchange without governmental encumbrances. To this end, the primary task of government will be to maintain law and order in society, protect the society from external attack, undertake and maintain public works and institutions (provision of social and non-profitable utilities like roads and bridges, canals and harbours, post offices, schools, hospitals, markets or commercial centers, etc), and to regulate the monetary system with regard to the issuance of paper money, coinage, and interest rates. Some of the major scholars in this school apart from Adam Smith are William Petty (1623-1684), John Locke (1632-1704), John Law (1671-1729), Richard Cantilion (1685-1734), David Ricardo (1772-1823), Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).

Keynesian Orientation

The central thrust of the Keynesian scholarship is to introduce the necessity for governmental intervention at given point in time, or periodically. While scholars in this school agree that private individuals and groups should be the major owners and managers of the means of

production, they do not share the classical aspiration of a minimalist contraption of the role of government in this system; so, the government should be interventionist to ward off macroeconomic inconsistencies, trade and investment imbalances, and arrest financial and banking uncertainties or upheavals.

Even though Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) attempted to introduce some governmental reforms to arrest the problems inherent in the laissez faire economic system, it was actually John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) whose first book was titled The End of Laissez-Faire in 1926, and who wrote extensively on the nature and causes of the Great Depression of 1929-1939, that clamoured for, and introduced the need for periodic government intervention in the economic relations of society. His ideas and beliefs form what is appropriately called the Keynesian school.

Neo-Liberal Orientation and the Washington Consensus

It is important to note here that when the practice of capitalism or the capitalist system meets with shocks and bursts or even slid into a state of self-destruction, the capitalists do not abandon it for other ideological leanings like socialism, etc. What they rather do is to revolutionize it thereby making its relevance sustained. To this end, when the economy is, for instance, experiencing deflation the state may intervene by pumping in money into the economy; when inflation is the reality it could also intervene to reduce the circulation of liquidity. It is the idea of revolutionizing capitalism that leads to the emergence of new schools of thought from time to time.

After the well-celebrated Keynesian school or orientation started witnessing some problems mainly from the 1960s, a new liberal orientation to salvage capitalism began to develop – and in the 1980s it became well-known to have taken the form of what is now called neo-liberalism or neo-classical school. It is so called because it is believed to be an orientation that sought to revive or reincarnate the doctrines of classical liberalism preceded Keynesianism. Th major frontline neo-liberal scholar was Milton Friedman alongside his Chicago School. Others whose body language or actual policy thrust gave impetus to this

neoliberal thinking were President Ronald Reagan of USA, Margaret Thatcher of UK and Deng Xiaoping of China.

To be sure, the major proposition of the neoliberals is that classical or laissez faire capitalism could be reincarnated through the policy of 'tax cuts, reduction in public spending, deregulation and privatization of government-owned enterprises. In this case, they advocated for the twin themes of free market (within countries) and free trade (among countries). What this implies is that government should have no business being in business; the invisible hand of the market driven by the market mechanism or the forces of demand and supply should be allowed to determine production, distribution and consumption.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts the political economy approach as its theoretical basis of analysis. Political economy is primarily concerned with how economic development influences political advancement and how political advancement influences economic development, that is, it is concerned with how the economy affects the state and how the state affects the economy. It x-rays the relationship between political and economic factors in society. It is clearly in attempting to eliminating this point that Apkuru-Aja (1998) posits that "political economy as an approach is a tool or framework for organizing concepts, theorems or hypothesis for interpreting the interplay of politics and economics in defining the structures of both domestic and international economic system". In this regard, Marx contented that any separation of economics from politics is an exercise in futility, that there is an unbreakable cord that binds the substructure (economy) to the superstructure (politics, etc).

There are two major theoretical orientations in political economy, the Mainstream (liberal) and the Marxist. Mainstream political economy generally explains how the material life or wealth of nations could be enhanced when those who pilot the affairs of the state consciously liberalize the production, distribution and consumption patterns or channels, to the end that the state pays very minimal role in the affairs of the economy. The scholars in this orientation like William Petty, Adam Smith, Richard Cantilon, David Ricardo, Thomas

Malthus and Quesnay are also called liberal, orthodox or bourgeois political economists. Adam Smith asserted in defence of the liberal orientation that "it is not from the benevolence of the baker, the butcher and the brewer that we expect our dinner but from the thought of their own self-interest".

On the other end, the Marxist political economists seek to explain that "it is not the consciousness of man that determines his social existence but that it is his social existence that determines is consciousness". What this implies is that the study of political economy must be such that should be done to bring about not just an increase in the wealth of nations but should be in a way that the overall material existence of the people is enhanced regardless of differences in strength, colour and status. The Marxist political economists explain that the best option for society's progress is to do away with all situations of inequality or disparity in the ownership of means of material survival, and instead of liberalizing these means the state should collectivize them, and no less.

Having explained the above points, it is now left for us to note that an attempt to use political economy as an approach to analyze political phenomena, forms and values, is actually an attempt to explain the economic motivations and attendant implications of political conditions. This attempt also requires that the analysis should involve or include an examination of how these political phenomena, forms and values help to aid or hinder the material progress or development of society. It is from this general conditioning perspective that the theory is employed in this research.

Anti-Globalization Waves, Economic Protectionism and Trade War

Writing on the necessity for 'embedded liberalism' to define the political economy of countries, Nwozor (2012) argues that "no matter the conceptualization of the state, it plays an important role, directly or indirectly, in setting the parameter for prosperity and macroeconomic stability in the economy…. There is innate symbiosis between the state and the market even in the system with the purest form of free market ideology." He adds: "the fact is that conflicts exist in the market and their resolution is paramount for the state and

survival of the market itself. This shows that the state can never be excluded from having a major role in the economy no matter the dominant economic theory."

It may be instructive to note that even though the current anti-globalization wave could be traced to the Donald Trump electioneering campaign statements, nuances and assurances, yet the 2008-2009 global financial/economic meltdown constitutes one of the remote triggers. The meltdown unleashed the reason why states must periodically intervene and get involved in the operations of their economies, hence the idea of embedded liberalism. The full-scale picture of the propensity for anti-globalization and economic protectionism came with the election of Donald Trump. Even during his campaign Trump minced no words as to what he was going to do with the American economy especially vis-à-vis their Chinese intruders, parasites and multinational firms. Among his promises were 35 to 45 percent tariffs on Chinese imports, an across-the-board border tax of 20 percent, sanctions on China for alleged currency manipulation, and a 15 percent tax on outward foreign investment. And so the victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election marked the victory of an economic nationalism that had long been far from the mainstream of American politics. Trump and his supporters expressed hostility to internationalist big business, to big finance, to the international economy more generally, to immigrants, and to many traditional foreign-policy commitments (Frieden, 2018).

Specifically, Trump proclaimed the inevitability of remedying America's trade deficits with China, a move which provoked a trade war between the two countries. To be sure, in 2017, the US trade deficit with China was 337.2 billion US dollars, accounting for 59.3% of the US deficit. Among them, the U.S. goods trade deficit with China was 375.7 billion US dollars, accounting for 46.3% of the US trade deficit, more than the aggregated deficits of the following nine economies (42.3%); the U.S. service trade surplus was 38.5 billion US dollars, increased by 1.2% compared to last year, accounting for 15.9% of US's service trade surplus with first ranking (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2018). Thus, the main cause of the trade war between China and the United States

was the large trade surplus gained by China over the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2015. 2016, 2017)

When Trump came to power, riding on the crest of 'America First' or 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA), he did not waste time in setting the stage for redirecting of America's economic order vis-à-vis the rest of the world especially China. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." Several Executive Orders were issued within a short time to scale up the US anti-China stance. Among these were:

i. Omnibus Report on Significant Trade Deficits (March 31, 2017).
ii. Buy American and Hire American (April 18, 2017).
iii. Trade Agreement Violations and Abuses (April 29, 2017).
iv. Establishment of Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (April 29, 2017).
v. Establishing Enhanced Collection and Enforcement of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties and Violations of Trade and Customs Laws (March 31, 2017).
vi. U.S.-China 100-Day Action Plan (April 7, 2017).
vii. Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements (January 25, 2017).
viii. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States (Jan. 27, 2017)
ix. Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth (March 28, 2017)
x. Promoting Agriculture and Rural Prosperity in America (April 25, 2017)
xi. Improving Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (April 27, 2017)
xii. Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy (April 28, 2017)
xiii. Proposed Acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation by China Venture Capital Fund Corporation Limited (September 13, 2017).

Table 4: U.S. TRADE IN GOODS WITH CHINA (2018)

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 2018	9,835.3	45,788.0	-35,952.8
February 2018	9,806.1	39,067.6	-29,261.5
March 2018	12,382.1	38,256.7	-25,874.6
April 2018	10,268.0	38,230.0	-27,962.0
May 2018	10,610.8	43,797.4	-33,186.6
June 2018	11,115.6	44,599.5	-33,483.8
July 2018	10,261.7	47,096.0	-36,834.3
August 2018	9,294.3	47,863.9	-38,569.6
TOTAL 2018	**83,573.9**	**344,699.1**	**-261,125.2**

Source: United States Census Bureau (2018)

NOTE: *All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding. Table reflects only those months for which there was trade.*

All these orders were deliberate attempt to gag China's continued dominance in America's marketplaces. China also retaliated but not without serious ripple effects. The Tables above however shows that the US still has a great deal of work to do as its trade deficit even till date is still very humungous. But it is not only Trump America that has put up this anti-globalization stance. There are certainly other countries in which similar trends are at work: Brexit in the UK and right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe are prominent examples – there have been far right activities and anti-globalization movements in countries like Italy, Hungary, Poland, Austria, France, Slovakia, Ukraine, and other parts of North Europe. But, the one in the US under Trump has been the main catalytic force.

The TWCs and the New Consensus

In the face of the ongoing developments across the globe, it is certain that globalization is under threat. Economic nationalism, rather than economic internationalism, has increasingly become the new consensus. One thing that is also certain is the fact that the Washington Consensus has no real place in the new market economy anymore, especially as it relates to liberalization and other cross-border transactions. Every country is now looking inwards, devising new ways on how to protect their citizens, industries so as to avert the possibility of any breakdown resulting from a global economic mismanagement.

To this end, the practice of competitive advantage has carefully supplanted that of comparative advantage, making it such that countries can now go into the production or manufacturing of as many things as possible, within their territories, so as not to be at the mercy of any other country again. This is no doubt a re-awakening of mercantilist doctrines and postulations which border on protectionism, or protection for the local economy.

What then would be the implication of this new consensus on the third world countries (TWCs)? It would mean several things. First, it will be an affirmation that they were right in pushing for the NIEO in the 1970s, and were wrong in backing down too soon. Second, it will mean that the autochthonous or auto centric clamour for a homegrown development, bordering on economic nationalism, can now squarely be pursued by the TWCs if they really want. Third, it will mean that the TWCs will be free to now diversify their economic mainstays as they are no longer tacitly coerced to be mono-cultural anymore – this is justified by the new reality of competitive rather comparative advantage gaining sway in the global economy now. Fourth, it will mean that the TWCs can no longer look up to the West or the East, Asia or America as standard-bearers of global best practices and doctrinaire supremacy. And fifth, the TWCs can now be more resolute in making laws, rules and regulations to checkmate or even gag the pernicious operations of foreign MNCs within their domains. The bottom line is that the new consensus is going to favour the TWCs if they are able to have the administrative discipline and political determination to harness it.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is clear that the new consensus which is a re-awakening of 16th century mercantilist disposition of economic nationalism or protectionism has gained its elixir from *Trumpism* – the body language, policy assurances and executive orders of former President Donald Trump of the US. This has also had corresponding or corroborative effects in other parts of the world, especially Europe *a la* Brexit. The study was able to show the tremendous trade deficits between the US and China as Trump's basis for unleashing a trade war on one of the most populous countries on earth. It concluded by indicating the favourable implications this new consensus will have on the TWCs.

Recommendations

The following suggestions are put forward on how the TWCs should conduct their affairs in the face of the new global consensus. African nations should be more interested in increasing their intra-continental trade volumes so as to bolster the market in Africa and take full advantage rather than being more interested in extra-African trade. By this, African nations through the African Union could sign and launch more free trade treaties to establish free trade zones to promote commerce among African countries.

The TWCs generally should be wary of receiving grants, loans and aids from China so that the tacit new form of imperialism China is unleashing on them can be curtailed. In other words, they should learn from the lesson of the US. The TWCs should embark on massive diversification, industrialization and innovation of their economies so as to be able to compete favourably with other countries in the West or Asia. The TWCs must consciously work towards improving their human rights record, democratic institutionalization and overall security situation so as to give confidence to both local and foreign investors to do business.

References

Ake, C. (1981). A Political Economy of Africa. London: Longman

Akpakpan, E. (1999). The Economy. Port Harcourt. University of Port Harcourt Printing Press

Akpuru-Aja, A. and Emeribe, A.C. (eds.) (2000). Policy and Contending Issues in Nigeria's National Development. Enugu: John Jacobs Classic Publishers.

Akpuru-Aja,A. and Ibe, A.N. eds.(2012). Repositioning the State for Development in Africa: Issues, Challenges & Prospects. Enugu: Rhyce Kerex Publishers.

Akpuru-Aja,A.(2002). Selected Themes in International Economic Relations. Enugu: Rhyce Kerex Publishers.

Alapiki, H.E.(ed.) (2005). Political Economy of Globalization. Port Harcourt: Amethyst Colleagues Publishers.

Frieden, J. (2018). The Backlash Against Globalization and The Future of The International Economic Order. Accessed from:https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jfrieden/files/frieden_future_feb2018.pdf

Han, Z. (2018). The Antagonistic Sino-US Trade Relations under The Trump Administration: US's Inclination Towards Anti-Globalization and the Ongoing Power Transition in International Order. An unpublished Thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Science (MSc) in Social Sciences, Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark.

Izu, I.S. (2021). Matrix and Praxis of Nigerian Political Economy. Kaduna: Joyce Publishers

Izu, I.S. (2021). Patriots and Traitors: Politics of Citizen/State Relations in Nigeria. Kaduna: Joyce Publishers

Izu, I.S. (2023). The World Economy: From Collective Survival to Trans-continentalism. Kaduna: Joyce Publishers

Khor, M. (2001). Globalization and the South: Some Critical Issues. Malaysia: Third World Network

Nwozor, A. (2012). Market Failure: A Revisit of the Role of the State in Economic Development. In Akpuru-Aja,A. and Ibe, A.N. eds.(2012), Repositioning the State For Development in Africa: Issues, Challenges & Prospects. Enugu: Rhyce Kerex Publishers.

Smith, S. and Baylis, J. (1997). "Introduction", in Smith, S. and Baylis(eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

United States Census Bureau (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). Trade in Goods with China. Accessed from: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html

Williamson, J. (1990). What Washington Consensus Means By Policy Reform, in Williamson, J. ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

BORDER PROTECTION AND TRANSBORDER CRIMINALITY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE KUJE JAIL BREAK, ABUJA, NIGERIA

Emmanuel Ugbedeojo AMEH, PhD
Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
National Open University of Nigeria
eameh@noun.edu.ng

ABSTRACT
This study examines the connection between border security measures and cross-border criminal activity, with a specific focus on the Kuje Jail Break episode in Abuja. A total of 250 copies of the questionnaire were issued to community members and government officials in Kuje using purposive sampling. The collected data were analyzed using structural equation modelling with the help of SmartPLS4. The study aimed to assess the efficacy of physical border security infrastructure, analyze the influence of technical border surveillance, and evaluate the function of people deployment in managing transborder criminal activities. The empirical findings demonstrate a substantial and adverse impact of each component on transborder criminality, underscoring the necessity for a holistic approach to border protection. The study's recommendations advise policymakers to allocate resources towards strong physical barriers, utilize modern technical surveillance capabilities, and strategically deploy highly trained staff. These policies jointly aim to strengthen border security frameworks, providing evidence-based solutions to successfully reduce transborder crime threats. This study not only provides important evidence for academic discussions but also offers practical insights for policymakers and security practitioners responsible for improving national border security in response to changing transborder criminal threats.

Keywords: *Border Protection, Trans-border Criminality, Jail* Break

Introduction

Over the past few years, there has been increasing attention on border protection and transborder criminality due to specific occurrences that have highlighted the weaknesses in security procedures (Castañeda , 2020).The Kuje Jail Break in Abuja serves as a significant illustration of the difficult obstacles involved in maintaining efficient border protection and controlling transborder criminal activity (Lenshie, Miapyen, Ogbonna, Okengwu, Idris &Ganiyu2023).This notable incident, marked by the successful escape of prisoners, highlights

the crucial need to establish and strengthen effective border protection plans at the national level (Ike,Jidong, Ike, Francis &Ayobi,2022).

The episode of the Kuje jail breach highlights the intricate nature of border security and the urgent requirement for comprehensive methods to tackle the intricacies of cross-border criminal operations (Lenshie et al., 2023). It functions as a practical example, encouraging a reassessment of current security measures in terms of their effectiveness and flexibility to react to changing threats. According to Ike et al. (2022), events such as the Kuje Jail Break require a detailed comprehension of the weaknesses that can be taken advantage of by criminals crossing borders. This understanding will help direct efforts to strengthen border protection systems. Thus, the literature on border protection highlights the necessity of implementing comprehensive tactics to tackle the intricacies of transborder criminal activity. Academics like Oliievska, Troitiño and Kerikmäe(2020), and Slack and Martínez (2020) have emphasized the complex and diverse aspects of border security, emphasizing the significance of combining physical infrastructure, technological surveillance, and personnel deployment to efficiently manage the movement of individuals and illegal activities across borders.

The Kuje jail break incident exposes significant deficiencies in comprehending the precise dynamics and vulnerabilities that lead to cross-border criminal activities, despite the presence of previous research on border protection. The occurrence highlights the need for a thorough evaluation to guide policies and tactics based on evidence, with the aim of improving border protection. This is especially important in relation to the Kuje facility and its potential impact on national security. Therefore, this study aims to fill these knowledge gaps by thoroughly investigating the aforementioned objectives following the occurrence of the Kuje Jail Break. This research will provide significant insights that can guide the development of more robust and focused border defence strategies. This research is to provide guidance to politicians, law enforcement organizations, and scholars by conducting a detailed examination of the occurrence and its consequences. The goal is to develop proactive and successful strategies to reduce transborder criminal activity following similar key events.

Conceptual Review

Border Protection Measures

Border protection involves the use of a comprehensive approach that includes a range of measures to defend national boundaries and prevent cross-border criminal activity. An essential aspect involves the construction of physical infrastructure, such as walls and fences, intended to create a palpable obstruction to unauthorized entry. These physical structures serve as a primary means of defence, discouraging potential wrongdoers and limiting entry points. The efficacy of these physical barriers has been highlighted in a study conducted by Brown and Smith (2020), wherein they emphasize the significance of structural obstacles in decreasing the occurrence of unlawful border crossings and criminal behaviours.

Technological surveillance is a crucial part of modern border protection tactics. State-of-the-art technologies, like as drones and sensors, are utilized to improve understanding of the situation and enable immediate surveillance of border regions. This sophisticated surveillance capabilities not only assists in identifying and monitoring potential dangers but also enables prompt reactions to security breaches. The deployment of personnel, namely border patrol agents, is a strategy focused on actively patrolling and securing border regions with a strong emphasis on human involvement. Border patrol personnel play a crucial role in the protective framework by promptly and effectively responding to and adapting to developing threats as they occur.

Transborder Criminality

Transborder criminality is a complex and widespread problem that involves many illegal actions that go beyond the boundaries of individual countries. Transborder criminality refers to the act of committing crimes that cross geopolitical boundaries, disregarding the limitations of certain authorities (Juntunen, 2018). Activities such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, and illegal immigration exemplify the extensive and intricate nature of cross-border criminal behaviour. These illicit organizations take advantage of weak borders, exploiting the deficiencies in law enforcement and regulatory systems across countries.

Human trafficking is a widespread type of cross-border criminal activity that encompasses the unlawful recruitment, transportation, and exploitation of people across international boundaries. This malevolent behaviour not only constitutes a breach of human rights but also creates significant risks to the stability and security of nations (Saunders, 2020). Drugs smuggling is a form of transborder criminal activity that involves the illegal transit and distribution of narcotics across borders. This activity frequently supports organized crime networks. The consequences of drug-related cross-border criminal activity go beyond public health issues and have substantial implications for national security (Toft Hansen & Re, 2023). Furthermore, cross-border criminal activity damages public safety by creating a favourable environment for illegal businesses (Magaña, 2022).

Kuje Jail Break

The Islamic State executed a synchronized assault on Kuje jail, situated in close proximity to the Nigerian capital of Abuja, on July 5, 2022 (Onyekaneze et al. 2019). The attack led to the demise of five individuals and the successful evasion of 879 prisoners, although nearly half of them were apprehended in the subsequent days. Kuje jail, a prominent correctional facility in Abuja, experienced multiple instances of prison escapes carried out by diverse militant organizations in the period preceding the assault, resulting in the liberation of more than 5,000 inmates. Before the attack, there were a total of 65 personnel comprising military, police, and prison guards assigned to duty at the prison facility. Additionally, the prison housed a total of 994 registered inmates serving their sentences in Kuje (Onyekaneze et al. 2019). The incarcerated prisoners included prominent figures such as Abba Kyari, a former senior Nigerian police officer implicated in a money laundering scheme, as well as 68 men who were found guilty of being members of Islamic State and Boko Haram. Significantly, there was an absence of CCTV footage in the prison before to the incident (Lenshie et al. 2023).

An ex-Boko Haram prisoner disclosed that he maintained touch with ISWAP members outside the prison via mobile devices, enabling convenient and seamless interaction. During the evening of July 5th, Islamic State militants, with the assistance of Ansaru, initiated

three coordinated assaults on multiple sections of the prison (Aluko. 2019). Prior to the escape, incarcerated ISIS commanders delivered a 15-minute sermon to other members of the gang. Around 100 assailants, equipped with firearms and explosive devices, forcefully entered, resulting in extensive damage and the incineration of eight vehicles.

International Cooperation

International cooperation is crucial in the joint endeavours to combat transborder criminality by promoting collaboration among governments in the field of border protection. The collaborative method relies on the inclusion of bilateral agreements, cooperative task groups, and information-sharing channels as essential components (Brunet-Jailly, 2022). Bilateral agreements between governments establish structured mechanisms for coordinated efforts in border protection. These agreements create reciprocal obligations and principles for the sharing of intelligence, undertaking collaborative operations, and enabling the smooth exchange of information. An example of a long-time bilateral agreement exists between the United States and Mexico, aimed to improving border security by tackling challenges such as drug trafficking and illegal immigration (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

Joint task forces are cooperative endeavours in which numerous countries combine their resources and skills to address cross-border criminal activities. These task groups frequently entail collaborative patrols, exchange of intelligence, and synchronized reactions to security concerns. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Matos, 2019) serves as a prime example of a collaborative effort inside the European Union, where member states work together to enhance border control and combat cross-border criminal activities (Frontex, n.d.). Information-sharing mechanisms are crucial for international collaboration in border protection. Facilitating the prompt transmission of information allows countries to maintain an advantage over new dangers and dismantle cross-border criminal organizations. INTERPOL, as an international law enforcement organization, promotes the exchange of information and cooperation between its member nations, strengthening their combined ability to fight cross-border crime (INTERPOL, n.d.).

Socioeconomic Factors

Socioeconomic elements in border regions have a substantial impact on the development of transborder criminal activity. Factors such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality lead to and worsen criminal activity across borders, creating a favourable climate for illegal companies (Lee, 2021). Poverty is a key socioeconomic issue that significantly impacts transborder criminal activity. Impoverished populations located in border regions may have a higher vulnerability to participating in or endorsing illegal behaviours as a means of ensuring economic sustenance. Studies conducted in different border regions throughout the world have shown that individuals may engage in smuggling and trafficking due to desperation and a lack of other viable options (Naim, 2021).

Significant socioeconomic differences can lead to increased tensions, as criminal groups take use of these inequalities to attract individuals who feel disadvantaged or excluded from wider economic prospects. Addressing economic inequality is essential for diminishing the allure of illegal activities as a substitute method of economic progress (Savona & Berlusconi, 2018). Ultimately, socioeconomic variables exert a substantial impact on transborder criminality by moulding the circumstances in which criminal activities flourish. It is crucial to tackle poverty, unemployment, and inequality in border regions in order to develop comprehensive strategies to fight transborder criminal organizations, promote economic growth, and establish lawful alternatives that decrease the attractiveness of illegal operations. Identifying and addressing these socioeconomic variables are essential measures for developing stronger and safer border regions worldwide.

Theoretical Framework

Routine Activity Theory

Routine activity theory, created by Cohen and Felson in 1979, is a criminological theory that redirects attention from individual traits to the influence of regular activities and the immediate surroundings on criminal conduct (Williams,Levi, Burnap &Gundur,2018).This theory is based on numerous fundamental assumptions. Firstly, it asserts that criminal events are

influenced by habitual actions and everyday routines. People participate in behaviours that expose them to possible wrongdoers, victims, and protectors (Silva & Greene-Colozzi, 2020). Furthermore, in order for a crime to take place, three factors must come together simultaneously: a perpetrator with a strong incentive, a target that is appropriate for the crime, and the lack of a person or entity capable of preventing the crime (Griffith, Tetzlaff-Bemiller & Hunter,2023).

Furthermore, the theory acknowledges the importance of time and space in the occurrence of crimes, proposing that alterations in daily activities and spatial arrangement influence the probability of criminal incidents (Wachs,Mazzone, Milosevic, Wright, Blaya, Gámez-Guadix & O'Higgins2021). Within the framework of the research on border protection and transborder criminality, routine activity theory offers a perspective to comprehend the mechanisms of criminal incidents in border regions. This theory encourages an analysis of individuals who are motivated to commit crimes across borders, including both organized criminal networks and individuals who take advantage of opportunities at the border. These individuals may also include external actors who aim to exploit vulnerabilities at the border (Maimon et al., 2021).

It promotes an examination of the appropriateness of targets for illegal actions that occur in different countries, which includes assessing the characteristics of sites or institutions that are susceptible to security breaches. This analysis draws comparisons to instances such as the Kuje jail break. In addition, routine activity theory emphasizes the significance of effective guardianship. Within the context of border protection, this entails evaluating the efficiency of security measures, deployment of personnel, and technological surveillance as safeguards against cross-border criminal activity (Pettersson, 2020).

Effectiveness of Border Protection Strategies

Evaluating the effects of specific measures, including as physical infrastructure, technical surveillance, and manpower deployment, is crucial in fighting transborder criminality and ensuring the effectiveness of border protection tactics. Tangible deterrents, such as walls and

fences, in the form of physical infrastructure, effectively discourage unauthorized border crossings. According to a study conducted by Brown and Smith (2020), the implementation of effective and well-maintained physical barriers can decrease the occurrence of unauthorized border crossings. Nevertheless, the efficacy of such constructions is contingent upon the specific circumstances, taking into account variables such as the topography and the flexibility of individuals attempting to penetrate the boundary (Biermann & Boas, 2021).

The utilization of technological surveillance, such as drones, sensors, and other monitoring technologies, improves the understanding of the current situation and assists in the immediate monitoring of borders. Johnson et al. (2021) highlights the crucial importance of technology progress in strengthening border security. Efficient utilization of surveillance technologies can enhance the speed of response to security breaches and offer significant insights for pre-emptive actions.

To summarize, evaluating the efficacy of border protection measures necessitates a thorough analysis of physical infrastructure, technological surveillance, and manpower deployment. Efficient border security requires not only the implementation of these measures, but also assuring their integration and adaptability to effectively tackle the ever-changing difficulties posed by cross-border criminal activities. Regular assessments and modifications informed by acquired knowledge are essential for improving tactics and maximizing the overall efficiency of border security endeavours.

Policy Implications

The study's results regarding border protection and transborder criminality have important policy implications, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive strategy to strengthen border security and tackle the complex nature of transnational crime (Brown & Smith, 2020).In order to strengthen border protection policies; policymakers should prioritize adaptive measures that take into account the unique problems of each border location. This encompasses constant investments in technology to guarantee the progressive development of surveillance and detection systems, together with periodic risk assessments to pinpoint weaknesses in physical

infrastructure and people deployment (Biermann & Boas, 2020). Within the domain of global cooperation, the promotion of collaboration among nations is of utmost importance (INTERPOL, n.d.).

Policymakers should give priority to bilateral and multilateral agreements that enable the exchange of information and collaborative efforts. Establishing standardized rules for cross-border operations and intelligence sharing can facilitate prompt and synchronized responses to transborder criminal activity. It is essential to enhance collaborations with international organizations, such as INTERPOL, in order to efficiently utilize global resources and knowledge in combating transnational crime.

Legal and Ethical Considerations

An essential aspect is to analyse the legal and ethical aspects of border protection measures, especially in relation to the preservation of human rights and compliance with international law. Achieving a harmonious equilibrium between the need of security and the safeguarding of individual liberty poses intricate difficulties that demand meticulous deliberation. Border protection measures must adhere to both domestic and international legal frameworks to assure conformity and prevent potential infringements on human rights. Legal frameworks should establish unambiguous directives about the allowable extent of surveillance, detention, and utilization of force by border security authorities.

The evaluation of the effect of border protection measures on individual liberty raises significant ethical concerns. The implementation of surveillance technology, such as facial recognition or biometric data collecting, in policies gives rise to apprehensions over privacy and individual liberties. It is imperative to establish ethical measures to guarantee responsible and conscientious utilization of new technologies, while also respecting individuals' right to privacy (Hildebrandt, 2019). Moreover, the ethical examination of how individuals are treated at border crossings is necessary. It is ethically necessary to guarantee humane circumstances for those in detention, uphold their dignity, and ensure them access to legal representation. To fulfil this, one must demonstrate a dedication to the ideals established in global treaties, such

as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) (United Nations, 1984).

It is therefore crucial to carefully consider the legal and ethical aspects of border protection measures to guarantee that security requirements are fulfilled while safeguarding individual freedoms. To establish a border protection framework that is both effective and ethically sound, it is crucial to ensure that policies are in line with international laws, human rights values, and ethical considerations are taken into account during decision-making processes. This strategy demonstrates a dedication to protecting the dignity and rights of persons while dealing with the difficulties presented by cross-border criminal activity.

Crisis Response and Preparedness

An essential aspect of comprehending how authorities can efficiently handle security breaches and incidents, such as the Kuje Jail Break, is to examine the concept of crisis response and readiness within the context of border protection (Brown & Johnson, 2021).Crisis response pertains to the prompt and synchronized steps undertaken by authorities following an unforeseen occurrence, whereas readiness encompasses the proactive efforts implemented in advance to foresee, avert, and alleviate the consequences of such incidents. Within the realm of border protection, crisis response refers to the capacity of authorities to promptly and efficiently handle security breaches, which may entail unlawful border crossings, organized criminal operations, or events such as the Kuje Jail Break. The Kuje tragedy exemplifies the importance of a meticulously organized reaction to unforeseen occurrences that jeopardize security. Efficient crisis response entails initiating emergency protocols, mobilizing resources, and fostering collaboration across various agencies to swiftly contain and handle the issue.

Preparedness, in contrast, entails proactive actions implemented prior to the occurrence of a crisis. This includes the formulation of long-term plans, the instruction of staff, and the creation of procedures and channels of communication to guarantee a prompt and synchronized reaction in the event of a crisis. To enhance border protection, readiness measures may involve conducting routine exercises to replicate diverse scenarios, so ensuring

that border patrol officers and other pertinent personnel receive comprehensive training and are well-acquainted with emergency protocols (Brown & Smith, 2020).Evaluating the capacity of authorities to efficiently address occurrences such as the Kuje Jail Break necessitates an analysis of the current crisis response strategies and the degree of readiness implemented (Brown & Johnson, 2021).

Furthermore, a successful crisis response and preparedness strategy should incorporate ongoing education and enhancement. Following an occurrence, it is imperative for authorities to carry out comprehensive post-event evaluations in order to ascertain the merits and shortcomings of their response (Brown & Johnson, 2021). This knowledge is vital for improving crisis response strategies, strengthening preparedness measures, and establishing a more resilient and adaptable system for future disasters. Hence, crisis reaction and preparedness are essential elements of efficient border protection (Brown & Smith, 2020). The prompt and effective response of authorities to security breaches, such as the Kuje Jail Break, relies on the presence of comprehensive crisis response plans, continuous readiness efforts, and a dedication to constant enhancement. To boost their ability to respond unexpected occurrences and safeguard border security, authorities can strengthen their capability by investing in comprehensive crisis management methods and continuously evaluating and revising protocols.

Empirical Review

Prior empirical studies on border protection have mostly examined several facets, such as the efficacy of physical infrastructure, technological surveillance, and manpower deployment in deterring transborder criminal activities (Jones et al., 2022; Brown & Smith, 2020). Research has utilized several approaches, such as quantitative analysis of border security data, examination of individual border occurrences, and assessment of the effectiveness of certain border protection systems.

Empirical research has examined the socioeconomic elements that contribute to transborder criminality, such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality in border regions (Naim, 2019; Rosenfeld &Messner, 2019).Moreover, the literature underscores the significance of global collaboration in tackling cross-border criminal activities, emphasizing the involvement of mutual agreements, collaborative task forces, and information exchange systems (INTERPOL, n.d.; ASEAN, 2021).Regarding occurrences akin to the Kuje Jail Break, empirical research has examined the intricacies of jail escapes, weaknesses in security measures, and the reactions of law enforcement bodies (Brown & Johnson, 2021).These investigations frequently utilize case study approaches, which involve evaluating particular events to uncover trends, problems, and lessons acquired.

Empirical evaluation places the study within the wider body of literature concerning border protection, transborder criminality, and crisis response. This highlights the necessity for a thorough investigation of the Kuje Jail Break episode, providing a distinctive empirical contribution to the comprehension of border security difficulties and the intricacies of transborder criminal activity. The study formulated hypotheses based on the review of literature:

H_{01}: Physical border security infrastructure has no significant influence on transborder criminality.

H_{02}: Technological border surveillance has no significant influence on transborder criminality.

H_{03}: Border patrol and personnel deployment has no significant influence in controlling transborder criminality.

Methodology

The investigation was carried out utilizing a cross-sectional methodology. Due to the limitations on the researcher's time, a longitudinal study was excluded as an option for this investigation. The reason for this is that longitudinal surveys require a longer duration for completion compared to cross-sectional surveys, which may be conducted in a shorter period of time (Kothari & Garg, 2014). Furthermore, the study specifically concentrates on the

Federal Capital Territory (FCT), with a particular emphasis on the Kuje region of the FCT. The study population consisted of government officials and community members. The study's population exceeds tens of thousands. According to research academics, when a population reaches hundreds of thousands, it might be seen as an infinite population. This is because although such populations are finite, they are nevertheless very large and difficult to comprehend (Sa'id&Madugu, 2015). According to Rose, Spinks, and Canhoto (2015), when dealing with an infinite population, the formula for calculating the sample size is:

$$n_r = \frac{4pq}{d^2}$$

Where:

n_r = required sample size, p= proportion of the population having the characteristic, q = 1- p and d = degree of precision (i.e. margin of error acceptable).

p was set at 0.5 as advised by Rose *et al.,* (2015), $q = 1 - q = 1 - 0.5 = 0.5$, $d = 0.05$, (d was set at5%, as the acceptable margin of error for this study). Substituting these figures into the formula we have:

$$\boldsymbol{n_r = \frac{4 \times .5 \times .5}{.05^2} = \frac{1}{.0025} = 250}$$

Thus, a total of 250 served as the respondents of the study.

Copies of the questionnaire were distributed to respondents using the purposive sampling method. Purposeful sampling is a commonly employed method in quantitative research to identify and choose cases that contain a wealth of information, allowing for the optimal utilization of limited resources (Patton, 2002). Copies of the questionnaire were distributed exclusively to persons who possess knowledge about the Kuje jail break. In order to obtain the requisite data from participants, researchers utilized duplicates of the questionnaire. The study utilized questionnaire that were modified from items employed by previous researchers to assess the factors. The questionnaire's reliability was assessed using composite reliability. The preliminary investigation demonstrated that the questionnaire

employed in the study successfully passed assessments of reliability and validity. Ultimately, the study employed SmartPls2 software to do partial least square structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) on the entirety of the collected data.

Data Presentation and Analysis Measurement Model

To ascertain the measurement model, the reliability and validity of the model were assessed by the measurement model of PLS-SEM path modelling. As can be seen, Table 1 represents the reliability and convergent validity of constructs of the study.

Table 1: ***Construct Reliability and Convergent Validity***

Construct	**Items**	**Loadings**	**AVE**	**CR**
Physical Border Security Infrastructure	PBSI1	0.77	0.55	0.83
	PBSI2	0.76		
	PBSI3	0.79		
	PBSI4	0.81		
	PBSI5	0.77		
Technological Border Surveillance	TBS1	0.81	0.61	0.91
	TBS2	0.82		
	TBS3	0.82		
	TBS4	0.72		
	TBS5	0.76		
Border Patrol and Personnel Deployment	BPPD1	0.72	0.53	0.79
	BPPD2	0.79		
	BPPD3	0.75		
	BPPD4	0.73		
Transborder Criminality	TC1	0.79	0.54	0.92
	TC2	0.76		
	TC3	0.75		
	TC4	0.76		

Note: AVE represents Average Variance Extracted; CR represents Composite Reliability.

As per the findings of Hair et al. (2014), loadings should not fall below 0.4. Table 1 shows that all items have a loading value greater than 0.5. This indicates that all the objects were loaded uniformly in their respective structure. On Table 1, all constructs have a

composite reliability coefficient exceeding 0.7, and all constructs meet the minimum AVE criterion of 0.5, as specified by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013). Consequently, this implies that the evidence demonstrates convergent validity. The data on Table 2 were further examined for discriminant validity.

Table 2: ***Discriminant Validity using Fornell-larcker criterion***

	1	2	3	4
1. Physical Border Security Infrastructure	**0.74**			
2. Technological Border Surveillance	0.35	**0.78**		
3. Border Patrol and Personnel Deployment	0.44	0.17	**0.73**	
4. Transborder Criminality	0.31	0.02	0.13	**0.73**

Note: The bolded diagonal numbers represent the square root of the AVE of each latent construct.

The results of discriminant validity are presented in Table 2. Discriminant validity refers to the degree to which a specific construct is different from other constructs within the same model, as determined by empirical criteria (Hair et al., 2014). The square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) was utilized to prove discriminant validity in each latent variable. The discriminant validity result is displayed in Table 4.5. According to Hair et al. (2019), discriminant validity refers to the extent to which a construct is distinct from other constructs in a research study. The discriminant validity of each latent variable was established by calculating the square root of AVE. If this value is greater than the other correlation values among the latent variables, then discriminant validity is considered to be well established (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The square root of AVE is computed manually and shown prominently in bold font along the diagonal of the table. The magnitude of this number surpasses the correlation values in both the column and row, so indicating that discriminant validity is firmly established.

Test of Hypotheses

Table 3: ***Direct Path Coefficient***

Hypotheses	Beta Value	Standard Error	T Stat	P Value	Decision
H_{01}: PBSI-TC	-0.34	0.04	8.47***	0.00	Rejected
H_{02}: TBS-TC	-0.41	0.06	6.81***	0.00	Rejected
H_{03}: BPPD-TC	-0.38	0.07	5.41***	0.00	Rejected
R Square	51%				

*** p< 0.01; **p< 0.05; *p <0.1

There is a strong and adverse correlation between the presence of Physical Border Security Infrastructure (PBSI) and the occurrence of Transborder Criminality (TC).Table 3 demonstrates a strong correlation between physical border security infrastructure and transborder criminality, with a significance level of less than 1 percent (β=-0.34, $p<0.01$).Thus, the hypothesis H_01, which claims that physical border security infrastructure does not have a major impact on transborder criminality, is statistically disproven. Technological Border Surveillance (TBS) is negatively and significantly correlated with Transborder Criminality (TC) (β=-0.41, $p<0.01$).

Therefore, H_02, which claims that technology border surveillance has no major impact on transborder criminality, is invalidated. Border Patrol and Personnel Deployment (BPPD) has a strong and negative correlation with Transborder Criminality (TC) (β=-0.38, $p<0.01$). Therefore, the claim made in H_03, which suggests that border patrol and manpower deployment have no substantial impact on suppressing transborder criminality, is refuted. Furthermore, the modified R square value of 51% indicates that 51% of the variation in transborder criminality can be explained by the presence of physical border security infrastructure, technology border monitoring, and the deployment of border patrol and personnel.

Discussion of Findings

The study demonstrates that physical border security infrastructure has a detrimental and statistically significant impact on transborder criminal activity. These findings indicate that the existence of sturdy physical obstacles, such as fences or walls, is linked to a decrease in cross-border criminal endeavours. This is consistent with previous research that emphasizes the discouraging impact of physical infrastructure on unlawful border crossings (Biermann & Boas, 2010). The findings suggest that allocating resources to establish and uphold efficient physical barriers can be a crucial element of comprehensive border protection strategy.

Furthermore, the study demonstrates a substantial and adverse impact of technology border surveillance on transborder criminal activity. Advanced technologies, such as drones and sensors, effectively decrease cross-border criminal operations. Technological surveillance improves the understanding of a situation and enables faster reactions to security breaches. The results emphasize the significance of incorporating advanced technologies into border security systems to enhance the control of cross-border criminal activities (Johnson et al., 2021).

Conclusion

Ultimately, the research highlights important aspects of border protection and cross-border criminality, demonstrating that strong physical border security infrastructure, sophisticated technological surveillance, and strategic personnel deployment are crucial in reducing criminal activities across borders. The detrimental and substantial impacts of these elements emphasize the significance of adopting a comprehensive and cohesive strategy towards border security.

The study's findings suggest many solutions to enhance border security measures and successfully combat transborder criminal activity. To begin with, officials should give utmost importance to the ongoing improvement of physical border security infrastructure. This involves focusing on the building and upkeep of strong barriers that serve as effective deterrents against unlawful border crossings. Simultaneously, it is imperative to allocate

resources towards state-of-the-art technology advancements for border monitoring, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and sensors, in order to enhance understanding of the current situation and improve the ability to respond effectively. Furthermore, it is crucial to strategically employ highly skilled professionals, such as border patrol agents, in order to effectively address the current challenges.

Recommendations

This requires continuous training programs to ensure their capacity to respond to new and evolving threats. Moreover, promoting global collaboration through bilateral agreements, joint task forces, and information-sharing systems can enable a more cooperative and all-encompassing strategy to address cross-border criminal activities. Ultimately, governments must tackle the socioeconomic elements that contribute to criminal behaviour in border regions. This can be achieved by establishing specific development programs that target poverty and unemployment, hence diminishing the motivations for participating in illegal cross-border operations. These ideas aim to strengthen border protection methods, creating a comprehensive and flexible framework that tackles the complex difficulties faced by cross-border criminal activities.

References

Bossler, A. M., &Berenblum, T. (2019). Introduction: new directions in cybercrime research. Journal of Crime and Justice, 42(5), 495–499. https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648x.2019.1692426.

Brunet-Jailly, E. (2022). Cross-border cooperation: a global overview. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 47(1), 3–17. https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754211073463.

Castañeda Pérez, E. (2020). Transborder (in)securities: transborder commuters' perceptions of U.S. Customs and Border Protection policing at the Mexico–U.S. border. Politics, Groups, and Identities, 10(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2020.1748066.

Griffith, C. E., Tetzlaff-Bemiller, M., & Hunter, L. Y. (2023). Understanding the cyber-victimization of young people: A test of routine activities theory. Telematics and Informatics Reports, 9, 100042. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.teler.2023.100042.

Ike, T. J., Jidong, D. E., Ike, M. L., Francis, C., & Ayobi, E. E. (2022). Reintegration of former Boko Haram members and combatants in Nigeria: an interpretative phenomenological analysis of community members' experiences of trauma. Third World Quarterly, 43(12), 2811–2829. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2109459.

Juntunen, A. (2018). Criminality, Smuggling, Counterfeit and Trafficking: A Review of Different Types of Criminal Activities in Diaspora Networks. Contributions to Management Science, 183–201. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91095-6_10.

Lenshie, N. E., Miapyen, B. S., Ogbonna, C. N., Okengwu, K., Idris, A., &Ganiyu, A. D. (2023). Between Rhetoric and Performance: The State and Counterterrorism in Nigeria's Post-2015 Presidential Election. Journal of Asian and African Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096231207884.

Magaña, M. R. (2022). Multimodal archives of transborder belonging: Murals, social media, and racialized geographies in Los Angeles. American Anthropologist, 124(4), 703–720. https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.13772.

Maimon, D., Howell, C. J., Perkins, R. C., Muniz, C. N., & Berenblum, T. (2021). A Routine Activities Approach to Evidence-Based Risk Assessment: Findings From Two Simulated Phishing Attacks. Social Science Computer Review, 41(1), 286–304. https://doi.org/10.1177/08944393211046339.

Matos, S. (2019). Privacy and data protection in the surveillance society: The case of the Prüm system. Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine, 66, 155–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jflm.2019.07.001

Okafor, J. C., Ononogbu, O. A., Ojimba, A. C., & Ani, C. C. (2023). Trans-border Mobility and Security in the Sahel: Exploring the Dynamics of Forced Migration and Population Displacements in Burkina Faso and Mali. Society, 60(3), 345–358. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-023-00859-4.

Oliievska, N., Troitiño, D. R., &Kerikmäe, T. (2020). Internal Security: Terrorism and Criminality Fostering Integration in the EU. The EU in the 21st Century, 85–100. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38399-2_6.

Onyekaneze, O. O., Theophilus, A. O., &Ikenna, E. M. (2019). Increasing Cases of Prison Break in Nigeria: A Theoretical Explanation. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications (IJSRP), 9(10), p9413. https://doi.org/10.29322/ijsrp.9.10.2019.p9413.

Pettersson, F. (2020). Understanding digitalization and educational change in school by means of activity theory and the levels of learning concept. Education and Information Technologies, 26(1), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10639-020-10239-8

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC SPACE: DISCOUNT HOUSE OR PRAETORIAN GUARD?

Ebele Angela UDEOJI, PhD
Department of Political Science
National Open University of Nigeria
uebele@noun.edu.ng

and

Ikenna Arthur AMANCHUKWU, PhD
Department of Political Science
National Open University of Nigeria
ikama7729@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT
The article investigated the nexus between the legislature and the furtherance of the democratic experience in Africa since the democratic wave of the late and early eighties and nineties respectively. In this regard the article examined the contributions made by the legislature toward the strengthening and deepening of democracy within the aforementioned period. The article concluded that the legislature in Africa has had a retrogressive impact on the continent's journey to democratic consolidation.

Keywords: *Democracy, Legislature, Discount house, Praetorian Guard, African Politics.*

Introduction

In the 1960s Africa's sudden liberation from the yoke of over half a century of Western imperialism was aptly described as a 'wind of change' (by Harold Macmillan) in a landmark speech in Cape Town (Wilson, 2003, p.294). Almost three decades later the continent's abrupt unshackling, this time from the bondage of her own outlandish ruling elite (the Big Men rulers) was also aptly described by an ardent student of African politics as the 'new wind of change' (Meredith, 2006, p.386). Samuel Huntington (1991) situated these dramatic democratic transitions within his 'Third Wave' paradigmatic democratic spectrum. However, even though Africa's political colouration still remains arguably democratic (Van de Walle, 2003, p.315),

bold and even 'legalized', attempts by autocratic forces to overwrite democratic institutions are on the raise across the continent. It is in this regard that this paper investigates the extent to which the legislature in Africa has become either a defender of nascent democratic values, forces and institutions or a key ally of these rising autocratic forces.

Indeed, a key challenge to Africa's democratisation process was and still remains the inability of the major democratic institutions i.e. the executive, legislature and the judiciary to emerge as veritable outposts for the defence and propagation of democratic values and ideals. In fact, for example, as Billy Dudley observed that in the immediate post-colonial period in Africa, the legislature became increasingly emasculated as, under the single party, it was systematically subordinated to the executive while the executive itself was converted into an instrument for effecting the will of the president. Other changes followed as the judiciary was made to serve the interests of the executive and the security forces were converted into para-political extensions of the ruling party (Dudley, 2003, p.65).

These developments were in stark opposition to the oft repeated admonition that 'the first principle of a good government is certainly a distribution of its powers into executive, judiciary and legislative' (Dumbauld, 1956, p. 134). Furthermore, institutions such as the judiciary and the legislative are important in a democratising polity because they not only 'discipline governments' but are also 'the requisites for democratic governance' (van de Walle, 1996, p. 248). However, the inability of these institutions to shepherd democratic ethos and ideals within Africa's democratic space has come under scrutiny in recent times. For example, the judiciary has been repeatedly censured for rarely showing any 'sign of real independence' (Drame, 1996, p. 207) while the legislature itself has been dismissed as a mere "sideshow" in Africa's enigmatic political gymnastics (Van de Walle, 2003, p.310). To be sure, the legislative assemblies in Nigeria, South Africa and Madagascar have all been indicted as mere accoutrements of the executive branch.

However, on the contrary, there are scholars who have equally argued that the legislature in African states is not simply a mere "side-show" and thus can 'no longer be

dismissed as an inconsequential rubber stamp if indeed it ever could be' (Collord, 2018, p.298). In fact Joseph Fashagba and Abdullahi Mu'awiyya (2019, p.73) went so far as to assert that the 'Nigerian central legislature has grown from an inchoate institution in 1999 to a matured body over the past 19 years of the current democratic dispensation'. Michaela Collord (2018, p.281) on her part asserted that positive institutional evolution has also equally been witnessed within the legislature in some parts of Africa such as Ugandan, Tanzania, and South African.

Thus, given these discordant assessments of the performance of the legislature three decades after those iconic democratic transitions this paper seeks to assess the role(s) presently played by the legislature in Africa either in the discounting or defence of the democratic process.

Democracy

Democracy, like most concepts in the social sciences, is an essentially contested concept. In recent times, the relative terminological pliancy of the concept has made it particularly attractive, and thus vulnerable to megalomaniacal manipulations by despots. It is perhaps for this reason that Bernard Crick (1962, p.51) has asserted that democracy is "the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs". She is everybody's mistress and yet somehow retains her magic even when a lover sees that her favours are being, in his light, illicitly shared by many another. Indeed, even amid our pain at being denied her exclusive fidelity, we are proud of her adaptability to all sorts of circumstances, to all sorts of company. However, in its generic sense, democracy is often taken to mean a theoretical, analytical and paradigmatic construct which lays strong emphasis on consent and debate, openness and mass participation in public policy otherwise referred to as participatory democracy. The now dominant theme that democracy is a political ideology with faith in the 'common man' originated from its early praxis in ancient Greece in which each member of the political community (Greek city-states) represented his own political and social interests. It is however, important to point out that while the Greek model of 'demokratos' suggested, in theory, a

system of participatory democracy or popular engagement in public policy, in actuality it fell rather short of that ideal. In its stead, what obtained in reality was a polity in which a considerable totality of the political community was effectively excluded from policy formulation because of their class, gender or ascribed status.

In the wake of democracy's failure in the immediate post-colonial era, Africa witnessed the rise and proliferation of the so called 'Big Men' in its political space. These leaders would tightly wind the political system around their thumbs for the next three decades or so. The 'Big Men' leaders represented by leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah (Osagyefo), Julius Nyerere (the Teacher), Jomo Kenyatta (Mzee) and several others exemplified the apogee of personalistic rule. These political figures were extremely contemptuous of constitutional restraints, and brushed them aside if need be with violence. According to Frantz Fanon in the aftermath of independence 'the leader will reveal his inner purpose: to become the general president of that company of profiteers impatient for their returns which constitutes the national bourgeoisie' (Dudley, 2003, p.65). The inglorious reign of the 'Big Men' rulers was brought to an end by the abrupt cessation of the Cold War at the turn of the twentieth century (Schmidt 2013). Furthermore, the heightened democratic consciousness which followed the remission of Cold War antagonisms occasioned dramatic transitions to democratic administrations in Eastern Europe and Africa.

However, in recent times, democratic praxis in Africa is becoming increasingly symptomatic of actions inimical to the spirit and letter of extant democratic creed – and more forebodingly reminiscent of the rise of another set of big men rulers. This development underscores the fact that not all of Africa's democratic 'transitions have resulted in the installation of real democracy' (Randrianja, 1996, p.36). In fact, Van de Walle (2003, p.298) has characterised a number of African states as 'semi-authoritarian regimes despite their regular multiparty elections'. To be sure, more often than not, the executive branch of government has been fingered as the key agent behind the rise of the autocratic ethos in Africa. For example, witness the growing manner in which African presidents crassly overturn

constitutions precepts in order to extend their tenure in office and considerably broaden their powers. However, this steady but perceptible rise of legalised autocratic governments and authoritarian ethics in African politics naturally elicits questions about the efficacy of the legislature as the watch-dog of not only the executive but the entire democratic infrastructure. In order to situate the operationalisation of the legislature within the democratic space in Africa this paper adopted two concepts – discount house and praetorian guard. It is to the elaboration of these conceptualities that we now turn.

Conceptual Clarifications

Discount house

A discount store is a class of department store which sells products at prices lower than those asked by traditional retail outlets. A discount house specializes on discounting short-dated financial securities and acts as an intermediary between a lender and a borrower. Through short term securities they borrow funds from commercial banks at a rate below the market rate and lend these funds to the borrower, at a slightly higher rate. The interest rate differential constitutes a profit for the discount house. The important point to note from the foregoing is that whatever the discount house retails – merchandise or securities – some discounting, from which it derives its name, is done. This discounting enables the discount agency to realize some profit from the transactions. In this paper the legislative house is taken to be a 'discount house' if it is primarily engaged in the retailing off of the ideals of democracy in exchange for a profit, material or otherwise. The other perspective is that the legislature operates like a praetorian guard of democratic values and institutions in the body politic.

Praetorian guard

The cohors praetoria (praetorian guards) which had existed by the Second Century BC acted as bodyguards for Roman generals. For most of their history they were the loyal protectors of the leaders of the Roman world. The praetorian guards were an integral factor behind the success of the Roman Empire. Praetorian guardianship is taken to mean when ascribed to the legislature, in this paper, the tendency to steadfastly and selflessly defend the values,

institutions and processes of democracy with loyalty and dedication. In other words, the 'praetorian guard' conceptuality in this paper denotes the quest of the typical African legislature to function as a veritable protective membrane around African's emerging democratic framework.

The Legislature in historical perspective

The legislature, one out of the tripartite democratic institutions within the political system, has an eminent stature in the chronicles of democracy; in a letter to John Taylor on May 28, 1816 Jefferson had opined that the 'purest republican feature in the government of our own state is the House of Representatives' (Dumbauld, 1956, p.51). Indeed, it is because of the premium placed on the legislature that the early Americans initially conceived the legislature to be the governing institution rather than the executive which was widely feared and distrusted given their early experience with the English monarch. In England itself the triumph of the English parliament over the absolutist and centrist monarch Charles I in the English civil war and the forced abdication of James II in the Glorious Revolution changed the texture of that country's democratic experience forever. To be sure, the overall impact of the legislature or parliament (parliament' comes from the French word parler meaning 'to speak') on governance, representation and democratic institutionalization worldwide cannot be overemphasized. Usually, legislatures are categorized either as unicameral (one chamber) common in unitary states or bicameral (two chamber) common in federal states. In extreme cases there have been instances of three even five chamber legislatures. This scenario obtained in South Africa and Yugoslavia respectively.

However, despite the centrality of the legislature to the overall functionality of contemporary body politic it has progressively shed key powers of government to the executive branch over the centuries. Indeed, as early as 1930 the British social philosopher Bertrand Russell (1968, p.292) could observe that in comparison to the nineteenth century, 'parliament has become a somewhat unimportant body'. On his part, Andrew Heywood (353, p.2007) has attributed the decline of legislators to a number of important factors, to wit; one,

the rise of disciplined political parties which 'undermined the ability of individual members to represent constituents as trustees by exercising their own judgement and conscience'; two, the advent of Big government especially in the 'areas of social welfare and economic management has usually been associated with a redistribution of power from assemblies to executives'; three, lack of leadership i.e. 'the egalitarian and fragmented character of assemblies weakens their capacity to provide leadership and take concerted action' and finally interest group and media power have eviscerated legislatures in the sense that the one 'tend to be more effective than assemblies in taking up popular grievances and giving expression to the concerns and aspirations of particular groups' while the other on its part 'have displaced assemblies as the major forms for political debate'.

However, despite the decline of the legislature vis-à-vis other democratic institutions and arms of government especially the executive branch it is impossible not to agree with Jean Blondel's (in Heywood 2007) assertion that legislatures still retain their importance as 'communicating mechanisms'. Indeed it is quite self-evident, and experience have repeatedly shown, that in the absence of a chamber with specificity for the receipt of contrary views and opinions there is every likelihood of a recourse by citizens to the 'weapons of the weak' such as civil unrest and disobedience, violence and the like 'to make their opinions known' inevitably 'such actions by the disenfranchised and disenchanted threaten not only peace and security but democracy, development and the environment' (Veit, 2008, p.10). In the light of this, the 'legislature has now become a standard institution in virtually all countries; in democracies legislative houses occupy a pre-eminent position' (Ayeni-Akeke, 2008, p.288). Elsewhere in Africa, Solofo Randrianja (1996, p.37) likened the members of parliament in Madagascar to 'political entrepreneurs' who are more intent on their re-election 'by making use of new patronage networks'. In South Africa too 'patronage politics is responsible for crippling the capability of the legislature to enforce accountability' (Makiwa and Ile, 2019, p. 97), despite its enormous powers (Fagbadebo, 2019, p.30).

In the management of state finance, in theory that is, the legislature controls the 'money purse' yet in praxis in the African political landscape 'only the executive may initiate, introduce or amend a bill that has the purpose or effect of raising taxes or imposing a charge on the national treasury'. This procedure inadvertently grants the presidency extensive 'monopoly control over "pork"' (Prempeh, 2008, p.102). In this wise Private Member Bill (PMB) in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 'need to be pre-approved by the executive branch' (Veit, 2008, p.32). On the basis of this routine display of executive omniscience, legislative members in Africa have quietly yielded the policy field and prefer to wait 'for the government to draft and submit bills to the legislature for review and do not proactively draft PMBs. Parliamentary reviews of government bills are often cursory; their mark-ups rarely call for a significant departure from government positions especially on budget and other critical issues' (Veit, 2008, p.31).

Thus, in the final analysis, arising from the foregoing, we can only assert that, to the extent the legislature in Africa is willing to trade away its prerogative, functions and duties in exchange for exclusive material benefits it is, properly speaking, not a legislative assembly but a discount house. And by this we mean that the legislative assembly in Africa engages in daily trade-offs in which valuable democratic dividends are crassly traded away by legislators at extreme cut rates to the 'executive branch, their political party, powerful interest groups, and their own personal needs over the concerns of their electors' (Veit, 2008, p.15). Thus, despite the immerse powers of the African legislature few of its members are ever willing to 'use these powers, especially in support of their constituents' specific concerns' (Veit, 2008, p.30). This gross mercantilist nature of the legislature is not lost on the typical African elector. According to an Afro-barometer citizen survey, a fully 73% of Nigerians do not trust their legislators (Odeyemi & Abioro, 1996, p.223). Thus, with this deficit in mind, one may then solemnly say with Jefferson that when the representative body have lost the confidence of their constituents, when they have notoriously made sale of their most valuable rights, when

they have assumed to themselves powers which the people never put into their hands, then indeed their continuing in office becomes dangerous to the state (Dumbauld, 1956, p.29).

Indeed, the current material proclivities of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive has thrown up a dangerous dilemma for the democratic state in Africa. In the section below we shall examine the impact of the trade-offs between the lawmakers and the executive on the praetorian guardianship of the legislature over democratic institutions and procedures.

The legislature and the praetorian guardianship of democracy in Africa

Properly speaking the legislature's chief function together with political representation is to act as an institutional check on the powers of the executive branch and thus be the guardian of the democratic state. However, one finds that in Africa's legislative space the legislature has withdrawn from key legislative 'defensive' duties such as policy development, implementation, monitoring and scrutiny. In actual fact, whatever legislative scrutiny that ensures 'is often driven by opposition parties' (Mattes, 2010, p.18). For example, Fagbadebo (2019, p.40) reports that save for the 'persistence of the opposition parties' in seeking 'judicial interventions each time there were infractions, the ANC led government in South Africa would have continually rubbished the integrity of the parliament'. Thus, it is been suggested that only opposition parties, within parliament, are 'capable of galvanising a "coalition for change"' in Africa (Collord, 2018, p.293). This enthusiasm is at best a moot point as empirical evidence have shown that as soon as the opposition comes to power in Africa it immediately reverts to the antics of the erstwhile ruling party. Furthermore, opposition scrutiny must be balanced against the likely consequence, either directly from the executive as noted above – or through its supporters in the legislature. For instance the attempt in Nigeria by a senator of an opposition party to call the attention of the Senate to the several constitutional travesties of president Obasanjo was drowned in a barrage of angry shouts by members of the president's ruling party (Isumonah, 2012, p.65). There is thus a fruitful patron-client relationship between the president and the legislative house which the house members are more often than not reluctant to breach (Prempeh, 2008, p.101).

The consequence is far worse for any member of the ruling party who mounts a challenge against executive infractions in the legislature. In instances where the president's party commands a majority in parliament, 'conscience voting' is firmly disallowed and it then literally amounts to treason and thus a political hara-kiri for a legislator to attempt to oppose the party line on the floor of the legislative chambers. In this regard, in Nigeria the probability (out of ten) of not getting re-elected on a party's platform for an MP who fails to toe the party line is almost ten (Gidado, 2019, p.184). Similarly in Malawi, 'one influential view of section 65 of the country's constitution would even make cross-party voting against the wishes of one's party grounds for forfeiture of one's seat in parliament'(Prempeh, 2008, p.100). While in South Africa after the ANC warned its members not to vote in favour of a motion of no confidence against Jacob Zuma, Makhosi Khoza who contravened this order was made the 'target for disciplinary action by her own Kwazulu Natal ANC branch' (Makiwa & Ile, 2019, p.99). She later resigned 'from the party and ceased to be a member of the parliament' (Fashagba and Mu'awiyya, 2019, p.74).

However, as we noted at the beginning of this section, the neglect by the legislature in Africa of its traditional watchdog role over the executive branch has considerably reduced if not totally annihilated its ability to act as the guardian of democratic institutions against threats from that branch of government. This self-inflicted incapacitation, as we shall soon show, is behind the rise of 'legalised democratic dictatorships' in Africa – a development which closely mimics the infamous era of Big Man rule in African politics.

The 'Big men' rulers' stock had been populated mainly by nationalist leaders who became the respective leaders of their countries at independence by astutely converting the goodwill and prestige generated during the nationalist struggles into political capital. However, in the aftermath of independence, according to Solofo Ranrianja (1996, p.20), the post-colonial state in Africa transformed nationalism 'in many cases into an ideology in the service of the state'. Houphoueut-Boigny for one famously viewed 'public debate and political criticism' as 'impediments to the business of economic development' (Meredith, 2006, p.286).

Toward the end of the reign of the 'Big Men' the mechanics of state and society in Africa had become so macabre that the state was commonly associated in the literature with such obnoxious epithets as 'inverted' 'predatory' 'vacuous' 'vampire' 'kleptocratic' 'pirate'. In fact given the collective shenanigans of those tinpot leaders Africa's 'annual growth of the Gross National product fell below zero during the 1980s' (lost decade) (Falola, 1996, p.17, 13) thus forever associating the 1980s in development circles with the infamy of economic retrogression.

In practice democracy has endured and appears to have gained firm traction in African states such as Botswana (Meredith, 2006, p.386). In some states in Africa there are clear signs of an incipience of Big Man rule once again. Thus, it has been rightly suggested that presently 'many of the woes of Africa's developing democracies are not new but old authoritarians are learning new tricks' (Cheeseman and Smith 2019 www.foreignaffairs.com). Following the accent in the international system of democratic ideals such as 'good governance' 'consent' and the like the erstwhile notion by 'life presidents' that a 'leader should possess a state and government' by fiat or proclamation (Falola, 1996, p.13) is presently on the backfoot in Africa. Consequent upon this, would-be autocrats have sought to impose their iron will on the state through law – that is by using the legislature as a veritable handmaiden.

To attain this undemocratic end aspiring autocrats in Africa have first of all sought to make a puppet of principal heads of the legislature; and available evidence suggests they are being increasingly successful. For example, under the sustained barrage of the twin instruments of coercion and patronage Africa's legislative assemblies usually 'have tended to yield to the president's known preference for the job of speaker' (Prempeh, 2008, p.101). In Nigeria, we can note that despite the overwhelming support garnered by Dr. Chugba Okadigbo for the post of president of the Senate, President Obasanjo would not have it. Party insiders and senators later revealed that he wanted a malleable candidate. Dr. Okadigbo did not satisfy that criterion. He could not be easily cowed. To secure the post for Evans Enwerem, his preferred candidate, ex-president Obasanjo and the clique around him engaged in the same

corrupt practices he had condemned in his inaugural speech in 1999 (Mohammed, 2010, p.183).

Indeed, it is therefore no longer totally out of place in Africa to find an increasing number of Speakers becoming totally 'beholden to the executive branch' and in turn using 'their powers to do the government's bidding' rather than the people's business. Thus, across Africa legislative leaders act more like supervisors than presiding officers. They can ignore questions from opposition party legislators, deny their motions, distribute legislative funds to allies and refuse to table Private Members' Bills (PMB) – bills which emanate from an individual member or group of legislators (Veit, 2008, p.30). Thus, held in check by their own Speakers legislatures are grossly handicapped from carrying out inquiries that may 'embarrass or compromise' the executive branch (Veit, 2008, p.33).

A typical example would suffice. During the Buhari administration, the Senate president in Nigeria, Ahmad Lawan, unabashedly declared that the senate under his presidency will pass any law brought to it by the executive branch. For Lawan any request from President Muhammadu Buhari, in terms of 'appointments or legislation' would make Nigeria a better place and therefore should be acted on 'expeditiously' (punchng.com November 22 2019 saharareporters.com reported that the senate president had said that 'there's nothing Buhari asks that I will not approve'). The earnest senate president soon had cause to show his 'fealty' to the executive when it sought legislative assert for a gargantuan 22.7-billion-dollar loan (the legislature has since approved several loan requests of the government thus greatly raising the country's debt profile and also greatly increasing the frightening spectre of another debt crisis). Staying true to his declaration the executive request was literally rammed, in an unprecedented manner, through the legislative process. This was against the background of massive outcry against the loan given the alarming state of the country's debt profile under the administration of Muhammadu Buhari. The senate president's antics and display were so blatant and servile that there was even a cacophony of angry protests from within an otherwise compulsively subservient and docile Senate (punchng.com March 6 2020). This complete bastardisation of

legislative oversight under the Muhammadu Buhari administration accounts for the principal reason why so many Nigerians even from within president Buhari's own party stoutly refuse to accept the president's repeated denials that he would not amend the constitution to enable him run for a third term in office or even continue in perpetuity.

Thus by actively neglecting their oversight functions as a result of material aggrandisement and institutional vacillation, legislators in Africa to all intents and purposes play a preponderant role in the daily rape of democracy in the body politic. In this regard Victor Isumonah (2012, p.64) is correct when he argued in his work 'Imperial Presidency and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria' that it was the repeated unabashed penchant of members of the National Assembly to 'dance cheek to cheek' with President Obasanjo that encouraged that president to commit obnoxious but gradational constitutional illegalities which finally emboldened him enough to seek to break the constitutional barrier of the fixed term. This unholy expedition by the president was carried out, of course, 'with full knowledge of the effectiveness of bribery and corruption for compromising the National Assembly'. We must hasten to add here that the ultimate defeat of Obasanjo's 'Third-Term Agenda' in Nigeria was due less to any effective resistance by the national legislature, which in any case had already been largely eviscerated through financial cooptation by the presidency (according to Femi Gbajabiamila, minority leader of the House of Representatives Obasanjo gave over N10 billion to legislators (Isumonah, 2012, p.57), and more to the media and the common people who even physically assaulted their 'pro-third-term senators' thereby putting 'considerable pressure on the legislators' (Muhammed, 2010, p.191, 200). In a like manner in 2005, 'Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni openly bribed members of parliament, blackmailed and intimidated others to amend the constitution and remove term limits on the presidency so that he can run again, and again, and again' (Diamond, 2008, p.3). Thus, ruling parties in Africa have through their majorities in national legislatures repeatedly 'manipulated presidential term limits to favour themselves' through the irregular amendment of the constitution (Thomson, 2010, p.256).

President Nujoma of Namibia was the first to successful compete for a third term of office in 1999. Following his lead, Conte of Guinea (2001), Eyadema of Togo (2002), Bongo of Gabon (2003), Campore of Burkina Faso (2005), Derby of Chad (2005), Museveni of Uganda (2005) and Biya of Cameroon (2008) all mounted successful bids to scrap or otherwise circumvent a two-term limit. Although these constitutional amendments were lawful, this manipulation of electoral rules to suit incumbents clearly disadvantaged opposition parties. It sent the message that those in power have the right to dictate the rules of the political game (Thomson, 2010, p.256).

And so with legislative assemblies across Africa eschewing their statute guardianship of democratic institutions the Big Men are slowly but steadily making their way back to power; in Burundi Pierre Nkurunziza invokes evil memories of a dark age in Africa's political history when he ascribed the title of 'Supreme Leader' to himself. He adopted this somewhat nebulous lingo in conjunction with the legislature only after the people fiercely resisted his third term agenda.

The legislature and democratic failure: the search for an answer

A principal reason often advanced for the institutional fragility of legislative assemblies in Africa is the view that the legislature has had little experience of institutional autonomy or the so-called lack of 'institutional memory' as a result of repeated political incursions by the military into the political space. Thus, it is argued that in contrast to the executive which has had a rich reservoir of historical antecedence to draw from 'Africa's parliaments have suffered substantial gaps in their institutional lives since independence; those that have a record of continuous existence operated largely in single party regimes' (Prempeh, 2008, p.101).

This argument if juxtaposed with existing empirical evidence is at best spurious. The major problems afflicting legislatures in Africa are not connected with policy framing or inadaptability with legislative procedure and process but with the severe ethical shortcomings of its membership. Since the transition to civil rule in 1999 Nigerian legislators, both at the national and sub-national levels, have made a fetish of attending periodic training at some of

the most prestigious institutions in the world. From the foregoing it is apparent that the challenge of the legislature in Africa centres on severe ethical shortcomings rather than on the intricacies of legislative procedure. One must therefore cast about for more cogent reasons to explain the collapse of the legislature in Africa. In this regard Taofeek Gidado's (2018, p.178) attribution of the 'inaction of the parliament' to the complete disregard of the principle of internal democracy within political parties appears more germane. For Gidado the 'truncation of the will of the people at the party level provides the context for the selection of legislators who violate their oaths and pay homage to their godfathers'.

Once in the legislature these afore tainted offspring of rigged political processes are instinctively driven toward plunder, primitive accumulation and political brigandage. Another reason advanced for the significant failure of the legislature in Africa is a longstanding generalised disdain by the post-colonial state toward alternate power centres. This disdain is often usually channelled against 'courts or legislature or even non-governmental organisations' (Chibwana, 2010, p.89). On his part Fagbadebo (2019, p.40) has attributed the executive-centric nature of the state in Nigeria and South Africa to the crisis of authoritarianism experienced by both countries in the past.

In these despairing circumstances if there is any panacea at all for executive waywardness it must lie with the people. The people defeated the third term agenda of Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Blaise Campore of Burkina Faso, Abdulazzi Boueflika of Algeria, Omar Bashir of Sudan; the people fought late Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi to a stalemate.

Conclusion

In conclusion the paper notes that a significant proportion of the legislature within Africa's emerging democratic space acts more like a discount house than a praetorian guard over the instrumentalities of democracy. This view was arrived at through a historical analytic model which traced the antics of the legislature since the post-colonial era.In this regard the article investigated the nexus between the legislature and the furtherance of the democratic

experience in Africa since the democratic wave of the late and early eighties and nineties respectively. The paper examined the extent to which the legislature in Africa has defended the ethos of democratic rule since the advent of democratic rule.

Recommendations

In this regard the article suggested that contrary to its institutional underpinning the legislature has become a major contributor to the current reversal of democratic systems in Africa. To this end the paper averred that the legislature in Africa largely neither uplifts nor defends democratic values rather it emasculates and discounts democracy and democratic processes, but should change the narrative. This disposition by the legislature has led in the final analysis to the considerable loss of democratic purchase on the continent.

References

Aborisade, Sunday. (2020) "Senate Okays Buhari's 22.7 Billion Dollar Loan Request Amidst Protests". 6 March. Retrieved from https://punchng.com/senate-okays-buharis -22-7bn-loan-request-amidst-protest/

Aron, Janine. 1996. "The institutional foundations of growth". In Stephen Elis ed. Africa Now: Peoples, Policies and Institutions. (Portsmouth: Heinemann): 93 – 118.

Awoyinfa, Samuel. (2020) "LCCI knocks Buhari, Senate on Fresh 22.7 billion Dollar Loan." March 7. Retrieved from https://punchng.com/lcci-knocks-buhari-senate-fresh-22-7bn-loan/

Ayeni-Akeke, Afolabi. 2008. Foundations of Political Science. Ibadan: Ababa press.

Burke, E. 1975. On Government, Politics and Society. London: Fontana. (ed. B. W. hill).

Collord, Michaela. 2018. "The Legislature Institutional Strengthening in Dominant-Party States". In Nic Cheeseman (ed.), Institutions and Democracy in Africa: How the Rules of the Game Shape Political Developments. (London: University of Cambridge Press): 281 – 303. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316562888.012

Crick, Bernard. 1962. In Defence of Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago press.

Day, James. & Fisher, David. 1973. British Life and Institutions. London: Dennis Dobson.

Diamond, Larry. 2008. "The state of democracy in Africa". Presented at the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development "Democratization in Africa: What Progress toward Institutionalization?"

Drame, Tiebile. 1996. "The Crisis of the State". In Stephen Elis (ed.) Africa Now: Peoples, Policies and Institutions. (Portsmouth: Heinemann): 201 – 210.

Dudley, Billy. 2003. "Decolonisation and the problems of independence ". In J. D. Fage and Roland Oliver (eds.) The Cambridge History of Africa. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 52-93

Dumbauld, Edward. 1956. The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Representative Selections. New York: Liberal Arts Press Inc.

Elis, Stephen. 1996. "Africa's Future and the World". In Stephen Elis (ed.) Africa Now: Peoples, Policies and Institutions. (Portsmouth: Heinemann): 261 – 286.

Fagbadebo, Omololu. 2019. "An Overview of Legislative Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms in Nigeria and South Africa." In Omololu Fagbadebo and Fayth Ruffin (eds.), Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing):19 – 44. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93509-6

Falola, Toying. 1996. "Africa in Perspective". In Stephen Elis (ed.), Africa Now: Peoples, Policies and Institutions. (Portsmouth: Heinemann): 3 – 19.

Fashagba, Joseph. & Mu'awiyya, Abdullahi. 2019. A Comparative Analysis of the Roles of the Legislature in Nigeria and South Africa: The Central Legislature in focus." In Omololu Fagbadebo and Fayth Ruffin (eds.), Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing): 63 – 84. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93509-6

Gertzel, Cherry. 2003. "East and Central Africa". In J. D. Fage and Roland Oliver (eds.) The Cambridge History of Africa. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 383-451

Gidado, Taofeek. 2018. "Internal Democracy and Leadership Crisis in the Nigerian Legislature." In A. Adeniran and Lanre. Ikuteyijo (eds.), Africa Now! Emerging Issues and Alternative Perspectives. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan):167–187. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62443-3_8

Heywood, Andrew. 2007. Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Huntington, Samuel. 1991. Third Wave: Democratisation in the late Twentieth Century. Norman, Okla. And London: University of Oklahoma Press.

Isumonah, Vincent. 2012. "Imperial Presidency and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria". Africa Today 59.1: 43-68. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.59.1.43.

Mackintosh, John. 1966. Nigerian Government and Politics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Makiva, Msuthukazi & Ile, Isioma. 2019. "Executive-Legislature Relationships and the Promotion of Accountability and Transparency in South Africa." In Omololu Fagbadebo and Fayth Ruffin (eds.), Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing):85 – 104. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93509-6

Martin Meredith. 2005. The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence London: Free Press.

Mattes, Robert. 2010. “Controlling Power – Africans’ Views on Governance, Citizenship and Accountability”. In Mario Claasen and Carmen Alpín-Lardiés (eds.), Social Accountability in Africa; Practitioners’ Experiences and Lessons. (Cape Town: ABC Press): 8 – 22.

Meneses, Isaú. 2010. “Parliamentary Oversight of the HIV and AIDS Pandemic”. In Mario Claasen and Carmen Alpín-Lardiés (eds.), Social Accountability in Africa; Practitioners’ Experiences and Lessons. (Cape Town: ABC Press): 98 – 107.

Mohammed, Abubakar. 2010. “The Masquerade Unmasked: Obasanjo and the Third-term Debacle”. In Said Adejumobi (ed.) Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria: Changes and Challenges. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan): 173 – 205.

Notshulwana, Koliswa & Lebakeng, Teboho. 2019. “Constraints and Prospects for Legislative Oversight in Emerging African Democracies: The Case of South Africa.” In Omololu Fagbadebo and Fayth Ruffin (eds.), Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing):179 – 196. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93509-6

Odeyemi, Temitayo & Abioro, Tunde. 2019. “Digital Technologies, Online Engagement and Parliament-Citizen Relations in Nigeria and South Africa.” In Omololu Fagbadebo and Fayth Ruffin (eds.), Perspectives on the Legislature and the Prospects of Accountability in Nigeria and South Africa (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing):217 – 232. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93509-6

Olewe, Dickens (2020) “Corona Virus in Africa: Emergency Laws vs. Individual Rights”. 9 April. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa.

Randrianja, Solofo. 1996. “Nationalism, ethnicity and democracy”. In Stephen Elis (ed.), Africa Now: Peoples, Policies and Institutions. (Portsmouth: Heinemann): 20 – 41.

Russell, Bertrand.1968. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.

Schapiro, Leonard. 1972. Totalitarianism. London: Pall Mall Press.

Schmidt, Elizabeth. (2013). Foreign intervention in Africa: from the cold war to the war on terror. Cambridge.

Thomson, Alex. 2010. An Introduction to African Politics. London: Routledge.

van de Walle, Nicholas. 1996. “The politics of aid effectiveness”. In Stephen Elis (ed.) Africa Now: Peoples, Policies and Institutions. (Portsmouth: Heinemann): 232 – 250.

van de Walle, Nicholas. 2003. ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems’. The Journal of Modern African Studies 41. 2: 297–321.

Veit, Peter. 2008. On Whose Behalf? Legislative Representation and the Environment in Africa. United States of America: World Resources Institute.

Wilson, Francis. 2003. “Southern Africa”. In J. D. Fage and Roland Oliver (eds.) The Cambridge History of Africa. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 251-328.

ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING IN THE NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION, 1999-2023

Adedoyin ADEDAYO, Ph.D.
School of General Studies,
Michael Okpara University of Agriculture,
Umudike, Abia State, Nigeria.
dayodoyin@gmail.com

and

Okengwu Kelechi OKENGWU, Ph.D
Michael Okpara University of Agriculture,
Umudike, Abia State, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

Ethnicity as a social construct of 'we and they' in the last 23 years of Nigerian democratic practices has manifested itself as an element of division and disunity across the geopolitical zones. The Nigerian socio-political system witnessed a series of struggles for true democratic governance because of ethnic sentiments. Virtually all the socio-political issues are tilted toward ethnic lines without competencies. For instance, the political affairs/appointments of Nigeria under the leadership of Muhammadu Buhari were mostly influenced by ethnicity and religion which created different elements of divisions, disunity, corrupt practices, kidnapping, insecurity, and poverty across the land. Instead of allowing the terrorists to face the wrath of law through prosecutions, his administration was grossly accused of 'shielding' and 'pampering' killer herdsmen, Boko-haram, and bandits through rehabilitation. Drawing on the peculiarity of Buhari's administration, the study, therefore, examined the issues of ethnic manipulations in Nigerian political affairs/appointments and its social implications for nation-building between 2015 and 2023. Its specific objective highlights and shows how ethnicity is undermining Nigeria's quest to be a developed nation. Internet explorations, magazines, newspaper cut-outs, books, and journals were the instruments of data collection. Ethnic sentiment was identified as a long-time social 'decimal' that makes Nigeria ungovernable and undermines its true democratic practices that could ensure nation-building. Suggestions for proper management of ethnic agitations and prevention of social crises emanating from ethnic sentiments were proffered.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Nation-building, Socio-political system, Democratic dispensation

Introduction

The reoccurrence of socio-political crises in Nigeria since her independence in 1960 was a result of a defective governing system that enshrines poor constitutional development and encourages ethnic agitations among the citizens. The misgoverns on several occasions metamorphosed into ethnic divisions, animosity, disunity, corrupt practices, and ethnoreligious clashes that culminated into life-threatening, huge human sufferings, armed struggles, socio-political instabilities and insecurity. Its inadequacies of constitutional designs and political structures coupled with poor orientation of nationhood paved the way for sentiments or agitations along the ethnic lines that posed challenges to the peace and security of the country. Human dignity and honour are flagrantly debased at the altar of injustice and greed of the elites. The rates of insecurity perpetrated by the herdsmen, Boko-haram, bandits, and cultists are unquantified. Peace, security, progress, and development are gradually eluding the country because of the selfish interest of the political leaders that made Nigeria fragile.

In two decades of democratic governance, the Nigerian socio-political system has become a struggle for responsible/responsive governance that deterred ethnoreligious sentiments. Virtually everything in Nigerian politics is tilted toward ethnic lines with less emphasis on competencies. Political gangsterism becomes a bane without a serious measure to curtail it. The political affairs/appointments, most especially, under the leadership of Muhammadu Buhari were ethno-religiously accredited, and directly or indirectly created social divisions, disunity, corrupt practices, kidnapping, insecurity, etc. across the country. Instead of allowing the terrorists to face the wrath of law through prosecutions, his administration was adjudged to be shielding and pampering the terrorists such as herdsmen, Boko-haram and bandits by rehabilitating them.

Everything was all about the North for the Northerners and the South vice versa. Each ethnic group supports its ethnic members even in committing grievous crimes or offenses against the system. The Boko-haram attacks exist in the northeast; armed banditry, kidnapping, and cattle rustling in the northwest/central; and farmer-herdsmen crises in the

south. The terrorist groups were unfortunately believed to be shielded by the Buhari administration. According to Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association in 2020, "Our brothers (Fulani) from the neighboring countries don't need a visa to come to Nigeria", and the Buhari administration remained quiet on this throughout his tenure. Many Fulani or herdsmen illegally possessed Ak-47 riffles without prosecutions.

In other words, in the quest for Nigeria's national integration and nation-building, the nepotism of Nigerian socio-political leaders is disorientating the national order of the citizen's obligations and loyalties to their fatherland. The resultant effects of this are defective federal system, poor constitutional framework, and social services due to unprecedented ethnic hatred, corrupt practices, and widespread insecurity. The study, therefore, examined the issues of ethnic manipulations in Nigerian socio-political affairs/appointments and its social implications for nation-building in Muhammadu Buhari's administration. Its specific objective highlights and shows how multi-ethnic societies can build a strong formidable developed nation using multi-ethnic features. The instruments of data collection were research interviews, internet explorations, magazines, newspapers, books, and journals. The study is broken down into introduction, conceptual and theoretical analysis, findings and content analysis, recommendations, conclusion, and references.

Conceptual Analysis

Ethnicity

Globally, the issue of ethnic jingoism has been a rising factor of de-nationalization of some states or sub-states for decades in societies. Ethnicity as a concept to Shibutam and Kwan (1965:23) has no agreeable definition. According to Shibutam and Kwan, "ethnic groups are those who conceived themselves as alike by the virtue of common ancestry, real or fictitious regarded by others as one". Ethnicity is described as a sense of commonality transmitted over generations by people and reinforced by surrounding communities. It is rooted in the idea of a social group marked with a specific share of nationality, tribal affiliation, religion, cultural

language, and traditional origins. It refers to the relationship between the groups who consider themselves a distinctive group.

Nnoli (1980:5) ethnicity is a social phenomenon associated with interactions among the members of different ethnic groups. It is a social formation distinguished by communal character (language and culture) of boundaries (Imobigbe, 2003: 16). Otite (1990: 17) ethnic groups are the categories of people characterized by cultural criteria of symbols including language, value system, and normative behavior whose members are anchored on a particular part of a state or territory. Smith (1991: 21) ethnicity is a collective proper name of a myth of common ancestry that shares the same historical memories differentiating the elements of common culture associated with a specific homeland. Richmond (1987: 3) distinguishes between the ascriptive and primordial nature of ethnic memberships and importance of early socialization and primary memberships. It is a complex whole of people or groups of people, and societal ways of life. Ethnicity comprises features and characteristics of society. It is an identity re-visitation that has a common interest of "We and They".

In other words, the solution to the Nigerian ethnic problem lies in addressing the problem of national question that has a basis for the rising factor of agitations. The rise in ethnic violence in Nigeria is directly or indirectly related to the political militarism that characterizes Nigerian post-independence political culture. Gurr and Harff (1994:13) sees the 'explosion' of ethnopolitical conflicts since the end of the Cold War as the continuation of trends that began as early as 'the 60s. It is a manifestation of enduring tension between the states that want to consolidate and expand their power, and the ethnic groups that want to defend and promote their collective identity interests.

It is imperative to canvass that the issue of ethnicity should not be used to jeopardize the existence of Nigeria. This is because it was European colonialism that altered the necessary African social fabric (principle-laden) of peaceful co-existence and undermined the socio-structural formations that kept them together in the past. It sown the seeds of discontent, hatred and prejudice to Africa. At the Berlin Conference of 1884, Europe partitioned the African

Continent into incoherent colonies of maximum exploitation. Various methods such as direct, indirect, assimilation and association were used to govern the colonies. After independence, European legacies became impediments to African nation-building. Their direct rule was mostly practiced by France, Germany, Portugal, and Belgium. The philosophy of their direct rule was that colonies should be ruled directly by the colonizers. They brought their respective administrators including police, clerks, governors, and other personnel from their countries, and transplanted them into the colonies. The Africans were excluded from the governing affairs. Their method introduces a one-state government to the African Continent and destroys African traditional autonomy.

Socio-political system

The second colonial system of rule was indirect, and practiced by the British. The policy allowed the British to rule their colonies through the local ethnic leaders, who in return, reported to the British officials. Examining the two systems critically; one would think that the latter is perhaps better than the earlier one, because, it involves African leaders in governing the colonies but that was not the case, the latter used the African rulers against their people. They collected taxes for the colonizers and implemented policies that were grievously extorting and exploiting their people. They forcefully collected taxes for the colonizers; such tax as ridiculous as hut tax. Those who could not pay were prosecuted which created animosity and divisions among the Africans. The Africans saw their rulers as collaborators of the colonizers for exploitation. The Africans who had been governing themselves, living their life, and working in their communities before the colonization became slaves to the foreigners. They have been ruling their respective ethnic societies without discrimination before colonization. The European one-state government forced them to abandon their indigenous political system and adopt the European political system.

Ethnicity was politicized by the Europeans and became a fundamental cause of many African post-independence civil wars. Horowitz (1981:160) argued that colonial evolution imputed group characters favorable to some ethnic groups at the expense of others, and sowed

the seeds of post-colonial conflicts or "internal war" across Africa. Their policy of "divide et imperia" built sense of nationhood on a weak foundation".

According to (Jinadu, 2003:5), the departure of colonial powers was hastily concluded in many African places, and accompanied by internecine struggles to maintain control or capture the states. On the other hand, nation-building involves a reduction of disparities between the groups and the promotion of ideas that share common nationhood (Horowitz, 1985:599). It is a collective sense of belonging from different numbers of actors (Hazleton, 1998: 104-105). It promotes identity based on common territory or history, rather than ethnicity. The Nation-building and its strategies in Nigeria are naively carried out and failed along the line. While ethnic identity is the focus of frequencies and waives of Nigerian political practices, nation-building enhances national social order that is based on ideal freedom, equality, and justice. Albert (2005:130) nation-building is the ability to create relationships and instructive social facilities by putting in place schemes that help the state's members to unite as one. Its features are public accountability, rule of law, civic education, advocacy of peace, security, trust and social order, good governance, and responsive leadership. Once the gambling process recurs in a political system, the focus of nation-building would be disrupted or distorted.

All these made developing nation like Nigeria occupy subordinate position to their developed counterparts in the 21st century. The leaderships of developing nations allow developed counterparts to dictate the pace of their development. The problem of nation-building in Nigeria is all about deficiencies in quality leadership that play ethnic prejudice, which is the diagnostic assertion of research findings. The current protracted Nigerian political crises raise the question of nation-building as a major concern.

Theoretical Analysis

Universally, ethnicity or ethnic identity is based on deep primordial attachments across cultural backgrounds. It is a fixed identity at birth or endowed by birth passing through genealogical compositions from generation to generation. Ethnicity is a function and myth

belief of common blood shared by a group anticipating cooperation among the members (Horowitz 1985, 7; Smith 1996, 445; Hammond and Axelrod 2006, 927). It is an ancestral impulse that is irreconcilable. The primordial theory was of the view that the maintenance of ethnic boundaries occurs through interactions among the cultural groups and dynamic in nature. The theory amplifies the relational, interactional, and situational nature of ethnicity as determinants, but when it is misused, it would degenerate into hatred, fear of domination, expulsion, or extinction of one another (Geertz 1963).

The contemporary primordial thoughts are subdivided into two groups:
(i) those who are tied to the ethnic issue by biological and socio-biological phenomena. That is, some see ethnicity as a product of culture, history, or foundational myths, symbols and memories (ethno-symbolism). Their primordial ties to ethnic groups are fixed and unchangeable, and Smith (1991) sees elements of ethnic identity as psychological and emotional phenomena emerging from the historical and cultural background of people. Their 'core' ethnicity resides in myths, memories, values, symbols, and characteristic styles of particular historic configurations. It is a myth-symbol complex that constitutes a myth of ethnic commonality.

Barth (1998) noted that the social world is made up of distinct named groups, and the identity of such group, may not be the "quality of its container. That is, the essence or fixed objective of reality belongs to such a cultural or ethnic group. Whenever a given social group interacts with other social groups, the group changes. Their interactions would highlight the existing differences, but since it can undergo changes, means, ethnicity cannot be fixed with time, it is situational and subjective. The question is- at what point could ethnic identity be diversified or maintained "boundaries" within or between the group's needs?

The second group are the constructionists, to them ethnicity is socially constructed. It has been 'constructed' and continues to be constructed by both the elites and proletariat through interactions. Ethnic identity is not something "possessed" but "constructed" due to the socio-historical contexts of people. It is a fluid subject to nature. The views of the theory are divided

into three subsets based on the characteristics of people. The theory differentiates ethnic constructs based on individual views, discursive formations, and broad structural forces of other theories. On individuals as agents of social construction, its construction was mainly on the expansion of earlier theories regarding the instrumentalism approach of ethnicity. The strand of this theory recognizes both the poor and elites as people. It sees ethnicity as the creation and recreation of people through day-to-day activities, which are all about group identity claiming and gaining. Discursive formations or cultural systems are intrinsically resulting in the construction of ethnic differences.

To instrumentalism, ethnicity is based on people's "historical" and "symbolic" memory, and something created, used, or explored by leaders, or some groups as a pragmatic means of pursuing their interests. It is something that changes, constructs or manipulates specific political or economic gains or ends. For example, the leaders in the modern state (the elite) use and manipulate ethnic identity to further their ends and stay in power as long as they wish. Ethnicity is created within the framework of elite competitive needs or ends. It is a product of political myths manipulated by cultural elites in their pursuit of advantages over others. It is something negotiated and constructed day by day. For example, the ethnic conflict hardly emerges directly from an ethnic group, but once the identities are politicized or manipulated for political or socio-economic advantages of one ethnic group, or depriving or neglecting of the other (Posen 1993; Gurr 1994; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Chandra 2004). In other words, the sentiments of discontent underline the factors of ethnic conflicts, which are commonly motivated by grievances and frustrations (Ellingsen 2000).

Relative to primordialism and instrumentalism is a nuanced theory. The nuanced theory recognizes the relevance of political and socio-economic dynamic structures as factors accounting for temporal and geo-political differences degenerating into ethnic conflicts. It is however clarified the power of ethnic identity as expressed by a sense of common blood, a share of values, interests, threats, and most fundamentally, a sense of solidarity as indispensable factors for collective action. The analysis lays the foundation for instrumentalist

contributions on ethnicity and posits elites as promoters of ethnic tensions, and in some cases, intentionally provoke ethnic violence as a method of securing power and protecting their existing authority, or defending against threats.

Similarly, functionalism sees racial and ethnic inequalities as important functions of ethnic identity differences. It sees racism and discrimination sometimes contributed positively to some extent. The theory looks at "functions" and "dysfunctions" caused by racial inequality and clarifies how racism is a function of the dominant group. Racism according to Functionalism can contribute positively to the functions of society by strengthening the bonds within its group members. It can help to increase solidarity and prevent intruders from having access to a territory. The dysfunctions associated with this are failures to take advantage of talent and other purposes for relative peace and development. Another way of applying functionalism to racism is to how it can contribute positively to the functions of society by strengthening the bonds among its group members and ostracizing those who are deviant in character. It can also increase solidarity within a social system by refusing or preventing outsiders from having access to society.

In other words, only social collectivity can manage the problem of ethnicity and build nations in the 21st Century. Crenshaw (1989) sees inter-sectionalism emerging from a race theory as the way forward. The theory stresses systems of power that are not in isolation but involve: race, gender, class, sexuality, ability, age, country of origin, and status. It calls for a profound shift from the scope of analysis of ethnicity to the interrelationship which is globalization.

Ethnicity in Nigerian Nation-building

The findings of this study asseverated Nigeria as an artificial 'handwork' of European colonialism oscillating around the legacies of ethnicity manipulations and sentiments. Its colonialists created divide-and-rule system of government that remains her classical post-independence structural problem. In other words, before the intrusion of colonialists, all Nigerian ethnic groups were living in different socio-political groups and managing their

affairs/differences based on their African socio-political practices of communalism. They referred to themselves as brothers and sisters. However, the advent of European colonialism ironically destroyed their communal orientations and played on their ethnic differences that accentuated identity sentiments through a divisive system of governance. Despite the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates of Nigeria in 1914, European colonialism encouraged divisive social practices between the two protectorates in terms of socio-political motivations and agitations (Adedoyin, 2015). Their legacies are the problems of today.

For example, in 1999, one of the country's northern states declared its slogan "born to rule", because, the antecedent of post-colonial political power of Nigeria was handed over to a northerner in 1960 by the colonial masters, consequently generating tensions in politics since then between the north and south. That is, the Nigerian socio-political practices since independence encourage ethnic cleavage and sentiment. Every one of Nigeria's geo-political zones contain a nucleus of a majority ethnic group that dominated respective zone, and their political parties, controlled by their ethno-religious prejudices. They agitated ethnically and not nationally.

They think ethnically and religiously and bring sentiments to all their world of views, and until the crushing burden of ethnic and religious sentiments is lifted, Nigerians cannot enjoy the maximum social well-being that is possible. They cannot build a city of their own under the constant menace of ethno-religious sentiment and discrimination. Freedom from fear and freedom from want must be sought together. Their country's progress and development can only be achieved when they are united (Adedoyin, 2015).

Their ethnic issue is a disturbing rising factor in the de-nationalization of Nigeria. Nigerians see ethnic identity as a sense of commonality routed in nationality, language, cultural, traditional origins, and tribal and religious affiliation. Their ethnic intolerance dis-accentuates unity, progress, and development. Instead of sharing formulas to be based on merits, fairness, and equity; they agitate based on ethnic identity. Their minority groups feel

oppressed and dominated by the majority (Jinadu, 2003). They agitated for separate state or local government establishments based on their ethnic sentiments. Uneven rates of development concise their agitations. The creed of their political life is 'the north for the northerners, the west for the westerners, and the east for the easterners', which has continued to affect their national integration. The outputs of all these are ceaseless disagreements and rancor over allocations of revenue.

Another consequence of Nigerian ethnic sentiments is the fragmentation of their socio-political institutions and stakeholders. Unlike other African countries, Nigeria had no specific national leader since its independence in 1960. It has been politics of ethnic identity prejudice in power. Even in the current democratic dispensation. The fractionalization of the Nigerian political system and stakeholders reinforces their ethnic conflicts that brewed militant groups like Oodua People's Congress, MASSOB, Arewa People's Congress, Ijaw, Egbesu, IPOB, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders, Eastern Security Network, Ebube-Agu, and recently Amotekun, which always give rise to do-or-die affair in socio-political agitations and competitions like sharing formula of resources or material privileges. The emergence of cattle rustling, kidnapping, Niger Delta crisis, Sharia law, and boko-haram guerrilla warfare etc are clear factors clarifying Nigeria's fragile state.

Meanwhile, governance is a coping mechanism that guarantees congenial environments where aspirations and lawful activities can be carried out freely. It ensures sustainable peace and security that guarantee means of better living, good service delivery, simplicity and accessibility systems, proper fiscal responsibility and expenditure efficiency, high levels of accountability and transparency, and democratic principles that ensure the rule of law, stringent anti-corrupt practices measure, etc. The absence of all these produced a country that is weakly united, fragile in nature, and threatened to break up at any time (Adedoyin, 2015).

The mobilization of primordial identities in the pursuit of state power ultimately culminated in the tragic Civil War of 1967 to 1970. The issue of ethnic sentiment becomes

problematic to nation-building and development in Nigeria. It raises the vexing issues of justice or injustice, equality or inequality, minority or majority, rights, loyalty, citizenship, tolerance or intolerance, freedom, restructuring, self-determination, or autonomy, which may remain unresolved if the proper measures are not put in place by the state organs which can generate socio-political conflicts, in terms of cross-cutting clashes, or, gender, religious, and any other solidarity that tries to define or shape forces to control and influence the state's affairs. Danjuma (2019) all indigenous Nigerians from the north, south, east, and west must rise and defend themselves.

The administration of Muhammandu Buhari jettisoned the provisions of the Nigerian constitution (federal character) in appointments, allocations of resources, and developmental projects. It has been directly or indirectly pushing Nigerians to a "brink" hit of war through nepotisms in governance. Given this, Col. Abubakar Dangiwa Umar wrote a letter to him in 2020 attesting to the constancy of nepotism in his governance. According to Umar, the biggest trouble with Buhari's Administration. He noted that Buhari's arbitrary order of retiring nine ddirectors in the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) without recourse to Federal Character and replacement of those who were retired with northerners in 2019 reveals the kinds of nepotism going on in his administration. The development is reminiscent of Buhari's penchant for violation of the Federal Character principle enshrined by the constitution. The 1979 Nigerian Constitution adopted the federal character principle to orchestrate elusive peace, equity, and stability, and prevent inter-ethnic distrust, dominance, rivalry, conflicts, and wars. Section 14 (3) (4) and part 1 (C) of the 1979 constitution spelled out the principle of federal character in clear terms. Section 14 (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended was as well stated that "the composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner that reflects the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, common national interests, loyalty, and thereby, ensure that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states, ethnic groups or other sectional groups in the government or any of its agencies". The inherent

goal was to broaden participation in all areas of power, enhance inclusiveness, and douse alienation of segments in a truly federal system. The Pan Niger Delta Forum also claimed that twenty major managerial positions in the NNPC were headed by the northerners. That is, from the Group Managing Director (GMD) to the Director of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), they superintended crude oil exploration in Akwa-Ibom, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Edo, Ondo, Imo and Abia State. The entire Southern Nigeria had just three allocated top management positions in NNPC. The oil-producing regions, South-South, South-East, and South West have one Chief Operation Officer position each, with a few seniors and middle-level management positions in the peripheral, subsidiaries, departments, and divisions of corporation.

Hence, the major task of the Nigerian democratic dispensation is to discover the stage at which state building could lead to the development of the country through cultural pluralism. Positive collective contribution of resources should unite the country, promote the rule of law, and ensure justice, peace, harmony, and integration. The current Nigerian political system is corrupted and politically greedy, self-interested/centered; and not of the national interest, progress, and development. Virtually everything is all about politics of ethnic manipulations, sentiments, hatred, and ad-hoc alliances such that the northern and southern politicians cannot achieve without crises.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is evident that the country's socio-political elites are not cautious of their actions and dealings in politics. They are found of seeking selfish interests or political gains at the expense of fellow citizens. Their 'aprons' of greed and unimaginable personifications of wealth are not in doubt undermining Nigeria's existence as a country. They are fond of subverting true federalism and democratic processes for their ethnic cleavages and jingoism. Every Nigerian national debate has always raised the question of Nigeria's secular status enshrined by the constitution. The traditional leaders are as well failed in their royal roles of maintaining justice, peace, and security. Many of them conferred titles on citizens

who were questionable in character and acquired their wealth through dubious means. People of no value, integrity, and dignity are given state recognition.

That is, the strength of democratic governance in any society lies in the ideologies of its political parties and not in accumulations of wealth or ethnoreligious manipulations. The security of citizens and their country is paramount to their democratic setting. Instead of this, the Nigerian elites are fond of playing ethno-religious politics and manipulations. The cultural diversity of Nigerians has not been used for their national development. Just as it is in one of the African popular dictum of unity, which states that "I am what I am because we are, and since we are, I am what I am". The leaders in Nigeria need to employ this popular African philosophy to stem the tide of every crisis. The interests, security, and protection of citizens must be guaranteed at all times for the country's survival.

Recommendations

From the above contents analysis, it is obvious that ethnicity as a term is being misunderstood and misused by Nigerians. "Cap 11, section 15, Act 2 of the same country's 1999 Constitution states that "the national integration is predicated on the absence of discrimination against persons based on origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistics association". The failure of its implementations to a large extent promotes poor federalism and disunity. Instead of using ethnic differences as agents of unity and security, it is used for political manipulations, oppression, injustice, cheating, etc. Nigerians have failed to abide by the norms and rules of the constitution. Justice, fairness, and equity are found wanting in virtually all their activities, and until they see their country as a melting point, where everybody can live and survive, there may be no progress and development. The political elites need to see political offices as a service to humanity and know that the attainment of offices is not an avenue of selfish ends or gains. The use of state of origins in political allocations needs to be abolished for national integration, where the citizens can have equal rights across their land without discrimination on the accounts of sex, religion, or, ethnic identity.

However, the following specific recommendations are additionally proffered:

Governing system that ensures true democratization process, implementation of rule of law, power sharing, equal opportunities, etc. should always be implemented; ethno-religious enlightenment that guaranteed the unity of purpose should be the focus of orientations in Nigerian public and private affairs. There is a need for improvement in the socio-economic system and relations that ensured job opportunities for Nigeria's teeming population. There is a need for a national sovereign conference that addresses and ensures how Nigeria should be governed without sentiment. There is a need for massive publicity on ethnoreligious tolerance. Fairness and equitable distribution of resources in governance. Opportunities based on regionalism, state, and ethnic origin should be de-emphasized in Nigeria. Proper information management and effective communication on social activities such as ethnicity, religion, and politics are crucial to the country's survival; and there is a need for media cautiousness and investigative journalism on cases of ethnic and religious discrimination.

References

Adedoyin, A. (2015). Religion, Ethnicity and Political Crises in Nigeria. AMonograph in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, College of General nd Communication Studies, Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, Umudike. Series No 1, John Archers (Publishers) Limited Ibadan, Nigeria. Pp 1-32.

Albert, I.O (2005). Introduction to Third-Party Intervention in Community Building: Ibadan PEFRAF/John Archers.

Barth, M. (1996) Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions, London: Routledge in Barth, F. (1998) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference, 2nd ed., Long Grove IL: Waveland Press.

Chandra, M. (2004) A Review of the Literature on Ethnicity, National Identity, and Related Missiological Studies. www.globalmissiology.org (accessed 2 June 2013).

Collier, P., and Hoefter (1998) 'Inter-sectionality', in K. Celis, J. Kantola, G. Waylen and L. Weldon, The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. (1992) Ethnography and Historical Imagination. Boulder CO.

Crenshaw, K. (1989) 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics'. University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989.1: 139–67.

Danjuma, T.Y. (2019). Fulanis Have Declared War Against Indigenous Nigerians, We Must Act now, 2023 Will Be Late. Guardian Newspaper.

Ellingsen, F. (2000) 'The Impacts of Politics and Ethnicity on Volunteering', IDS Bulletin 46.5: 54–68, http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/ idsbo/article/view/65 (accessed 23 March 2016).

Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York; Basic Books.

Giordano and Giordano, (1977). Ending Violent Conflict. Washington, USA: World Watch Institute.

Gurr, T. and Harff, B. (1998). Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Boulder, Colorado: West-view Press.

Hammond and Axelrod (2006) Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations. 2nd ed., London: Sage Publications.

Horowitz, D. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hutchinson, J and Smith, D.A, (1994). Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Imobighe, T.A. (2003). Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria. Ibadan: AFSTRAG.

Jinadu, L.A. (2000) Ethnic Conflict and Federalism in Nigeria; Discussion Paper. Centre for Development Research, University of Bonn.

Jinadu, L.A. (2003). Confronting the Gods of Ethnicity. Ibadan, CEPACS University of Ibadan.

Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (eds). (2000). Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Nigerian Constitution, (1999). National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Nnoli, O. (1980). Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension.

Okoli, J.E. (1983). "The NPN's Zoning Dilemma". West Africa. Vol. 22.11.82. Pp. 3003.

Okwudiba, N. (1998). Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Dakar, CODESRIA

Osaghae, E. (1994). Ethnicity and its Management in Africa: the Democratisation Link. Lagos, Nigeria, Malthouse Press.

Otite, O. (1990). Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria. Ibadan, Shaneson Ltd.

Richmond, A.H. (1987). "Ethnic Nationalism and Social Sciences". International Social Science Journal, Vol.39.

Sobowale, D. (2020). The North Has Already Destroyed Itself.

The Guardian Editorial, (2020). "Buhari and His Federal Character Virus". June 2nd

Udoji, A. (1977). A National Conference Reports on Nigeria 1978 Constitution in Lagos.

Umar, A. D. (2020). Letter of "Love" to the President -Mr. President, Please Belong To All of Us: An Open Letter to President Muhammadu Buhari. May 2nd.

PROBLEM-SOLVING MODEL OF COMMUNITY POLICING AS A TOOL FOR CRIME PREVENTION IN RIGASA WARD IN IGABI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF KADUNA STATE: 2015 - 2023

Mohammed Kabeer GARBA, PhD
ECOWAS Parliament, Abuja, Nigeria
kabirmashi@gmail.com

and

Prof. Usman Muhammed, PhD
Department of Political Science,
Kaduna State University, Kaduna, Nigeria
usman.mohammed@kasu.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

Crime and criminality differ from one society to another. This is dependent on culture, perception and exposure to external environments. The inevitability of crime necessitates crime fighting as in this case the Nigerian Police Force. Communities have witnessed constant criminal activities with consistent effort by the Nigerian police to prevent, fight, control and manage but this has come with lots of challenges ranging from poor funding, poorly trained security personnel, inadequate equipment, poor intelligent report, unfamiliarity of the community to mention but few. These inadequacies and challenges have led to direct and formal participation by communities to assist the Nigerian Police in enhancing community policing and improved security within specific communities. It is on this premise the work seeks to investigate if problem solving strategy of community policing as a tool of crime prevention is effective in Rigasa ward in Igabi Local Government Area of Kaduna State between 2015 and 2023. The structural-functionalism was adopted as a framework to guide the research process. Both qualitative and quantitative data were adopted to enrich this work where 40 questionnaires were designed, 33 distributed and 31 retrieved and analysed. From amongst the findings, the synergy has improved in intelligent report gathering as well as eased in arresting criminal suspects in Rigasa ward in Igabi Local Government Area of Kaduna State between 2015 and 2023. The work recommends among others, recruitment and training of police personnel should be improved to meet the United Nations Organization standard of ratio1:400 as well as an enlightenment media should be in placed to keep the members of communities well informed about the significance of their support and contribution to the relative peace and security in their areas.

Keywords: *Community Policing, Crime Prevention, Problem Solving Strategy*

Introduction

Crime is a human nature that exists as a household name in every society of the world. It is part of social structure which determines the policies that governs the existence of the society. It is the level and impact of crime that differs among societies that determines their friendlies or otherwise. There are globally accepted crimes which exist in almost every country of the world while others are defined and considered by individual societies. Therefore, a crime in one society may not necessarily be a crime in another society. Criminal behaviour cannot be explained by a single factor, because human behaviour is a complex interaction between genetic, environmental, social, psychological and cultural factors. In the first instance, there are many different types of crimes, committed by different types of people, at different times, in different places, and under different circumstance.

The Nigeria Police Force, which is saddled with the responsibility of crime prevention in Nigeria, is very active on its primary job but there exist a quite number of challenges which hinder their output nationwide. The former inspector General of Police, Ibrahim Idris said in January, 2019 that the Nigeria Police Force is operating at a ratio of 1:600, which is far below the approved United Nations ratio. Therefore, Nigeria needs at least 31,000 additional police officers in the next five years in order to meet the United Nations Organization (UNO) standard policing ratio of 1:400 persons (Premium Times, 2019). Besides that, the police are poorly paid & funded. Kaduna state government, in 2016, established the Kaduna State Vigilance Services to supplement the police personnel in its primary task. The Vigilance Service Law structured the vigilant personnel from state down to the 255 political wards of the state. They are to work hand-in-hand with Nigeria Police Force in policing the communities.

The establishment of the Community Policing was a response to the challenges of the Nigeria Police Force where the community will be formally involved in taking proactive measure to fighting crime. Rigasa, a suburb of Kaduna metropolis, is largely known to be one of the biggest political wards in Kaduna metropolis in terms of land mass as well as population.

However, with only one police station (until 2021) and minimum number of personnel, Police and the community responded to the idea of community policing by the formation of local voluntary security organization known as the Central Security and Safety Patrol Unit Rigasa (CESSPUR) in 2015 purposely to assist the police in fighting crime. Community policing has several strategies among which is problem solving strategy. This work seeks to investigate if the problem-solving strategy of the community policing employed by the Nigeria Police in Rigasa was effective in crime prevention from 2015 to 2023.

Literature Review

The Nigeria Police Force

The Nigeria Police force (NPF) is the most powerful constitutional organ among law enforcement agencies in Nigeria. The overall operational control of the Nigeria Police Force is vested in the President in accordance with the 1999 Constitution and the Police Act (Rauch & Spuy, 2006). As stated in the Section 214 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, "there shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section, no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof". The Police Act (2009) also states that, the Nigeria Police Force is vested with such responsibilities as: the protection of life and property; detection and prevention of crime; apprehension of offenders; preservation of law and order; the due enforcement of law regulations with which they are directly charged; and performance of such other military duties within and without Nigeria as may be required of them by or under the authority of any other Act.

In every modern society, police is the only strongest institution close to the people purposely for fighting crime but it is the effectiveness of their operations that differs. As of Nigeria, there are so many challenges within and outside the institution. These challenges remain unchecked even the constitution itself.

Community Policing

The literature on community policing illustrates a wide range of definitions for community policing. Mainly, it is viewed as a philosophy rather than a program by many scholars. Goldstein (1987) described it as decreased tensions between the police and the community, more effective use of police resources, increased quality in police services, effectiveness in dealing with community problems, higher job satisfaction of police participating in community policing programs, and greater accountability to the community. Carter and Sapp (1998) argue that "community policing is a proactive, decentralized approach, designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime, while also responding to the community's explicit needs and demands". Stevens (2003) contends that "Community policing is a preventive approach through an empowered problem-solving partnership of police and the community to control crime, reduce the fear of crime and enhance the life style experiences of all community constituents".

The Community Policing Consortium defines community policing as "a collaborative effort between the police and the community that identifies problems of crime and disorder and involves all elements of the community in the search for solutions to these problems." Community policing is based on the premise that police alone cannot control crime and disorder and promote residents' quality of life (Community Policing Consortium 1994). In community policing—in contrast to traditional policing—the public's involvement is viewed as a "co-producer" of community safety and wellness. Community policing also expands the role of police beyond crime fighting to maintaining order and promoting improved living conditions for residents. While traditional policing has been characterized by reactive responses to crime, community policing emphasizes proactive problem solving to prevent and otherwise control crime (Fridell and Wycolf, 2004).

With the many challenges and constraints facing the Nigerian Police Force which have adversely affected police image and police-community relations, the need to reconnect the police with the people they serve necessitated the introduction of community policing strategy

as a cardinal initiative in the evolving agenda of police reform since the transition to democracy (Abiri, 2011). Community policing involves collaboration between police and community members characterized by problem-solving partnerships to enhance public safety. Community policing was adopted widely among law enforcement agencies in the 1990s, with a view toward improving trust between community members and police and leveraging police resources through voluntary assistance by community members in public safety measures (Schanzer, Kurzman, Toliver, & Miller, 2016).

According to Nebo & Ndukwe (2022), no government can effectively combat crime alone through conventional enforcement without the assistance of sub-state actors due to a variety of circumstances. As a result, most countries around the world are seeking for new ways to combat the rising tide and increasing sophistication of insecurity. Community policing is now a global-phenomena in this shift from traditional reactive and incident-based policing to proactive problem-solving policing with the community as a cornerstone of policing. Since the late 1970s, community policing has grown in popularity in the Western world, particularly in the United States. In the early 2000s, community policing began to gain traction in Nigeria. The Nigeria Police Force followed the conventional British semi-military policing organization that emphasizes authority centralization. This principle of power centralization runs counter to the philosophy of community policing, which emphasizes power decentralization. In community policing, the police must share power with people of a neighbourhood, and crucial decisions must be taken at the community level rather than at police stations. Community policing seeks to decentralize police decision-making authority.

Kaduna State has witnessed recurring incidents of armed banditry. In more recent times, cases of armed robberies and abductions for ransom have become a major security challenge. Armed attacks on highways, villages and towns have been intensified with considerable loss of lives, destruction of properties and kidnapping of people in communities in Birnin-Gwari LGA. The preference for the formation of a local vigilante group in Birnin Gwari LGA was part of community policing to tackle the threat and jointly boost internal

security. This arrangement was supported by the Traditional Ruler of the LGA. Despite the individual sacrifices, the group's collective actions have overtime generated public discourse on the relevance, effectiveness, and excesses in terms of human rights abuses/violations of the unsuspecting public (WANEP, 2018).

Nevertheless, there has been an increasing security effort adopted by the Kaduna State Government in partnership with Security Services to curb the recurring armed bandits in the State. These efforts include joint security raids/patrol, aerial surveillance of Kamuku forest (Kaduna State) and adjoining forests in neighbouring States of Zamfara, Katsina and Niger which serve as hideouts for bandits, and also the disarmament programme initiated by the Nigeria Police Force for bandits to renounce crime and lay down their weapons. Therefore, in recent joint press statement on the escalation of security concerns in the area, the communities called on the Kaduna State Government to establish a formidable community policing in Birnin Gwari and also recognize and strengthen the self-defense group ("Yan Sa Kai") to augment the security of the LGA (WANEP, 2018).

While the states in the East and West and North Central of Nigeria are enacting state laws to domicile the regional outfits in their states, the need for local government involvement in the security architecture of Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. The local government, being the closest government to the people, is the first responder to emergencies including security challenges. Emulating the China, Hong Kong and Taiwan examples in this regard will strengthen the security architecture of Nigeria. Lin (2021), posited that local governments in China developed various forms of auxiliary police systems that were supervised and monitored by the public security outfits. These security outfits according to the study are driven by citizens' participation. Hong Kong and Taiwan according to the study also have a robust, well developed modern auxiliary police system that are community based. Nigeria should take a cue from the China example to strengthen her security architecture (Oke et al, 2021).

In Jigawa State, the community brought the achievements of Gwaram Division in relation to the training of police personnel, partnership forums, neighbourhood policing,

intelligence gathering, reduced crime and less fear of crime to the attention of the Police Commissioner and State Governor. These community members consisted of principles of institutions, hospital staff, market union representative, vigilantes, civil defence, immigration and prison personnel and many more who now consider themselves to be part of the police. Birnin Gwari is one of the Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Kaduna State, North-West Region of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The security situation in the Region remains challenging particularly in Kaduna and Zamfara1 States, due to re-emerging threats of armed banditry that has weakened economic activities and also impacted negatively on the delivery of democratic dividends. Recently, there are reports of persistent abductions by armed bandits mainly along the Birnin Gwari Highway in Kaduna State.

Prior to the escalation of armed banditry in the State, the villagers formed self-defense forces 'local vigilante' but were often accused of killing suspected armed bandits, which triggered retaliatory attacks from armed bandits in the State. The preference for the formation of a local vigilante group in Birnin Gwari LGA was part of community policing to tackle the threat and jointly boost internal security. This arrangement, was supported by the Traditional Ruler of the LGA. Despite the individual sacrifices, the group's collective actions have overtime generated public discourse on the relevance, effectiveness and excesses in terms of human rights abuses/violations of the unsuspecting public (WANEP, 2018).

Problem-Solving Model of Community Policing

According to Austin Iwar (2017) Problem-solving is defined as the process of engaging in proactive and systematic examination of identified problems to develop and rigorously evaluate effective responses. Problem solving is new way of policing to address not only the causes of crime and the fear of crime but all quality-of-life issues in the community. Community policing uses a model for problem solving that offers you a framework for approaching crime and disorder problems. The model used is an easy four-step model (known by many as SARA model). The steps involved in this approach are Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment.

Proactive measures are the main ingredients in crime prevention. For a society to prevent crime should adopt the problem-solving approach in community policing where the community participation will improve in intelligence gathering as well as identifying the bad eggs in the community. According to Raymond W. Kelly (n.d), under Community Policing: everyone is a problem solver. Officers are encouraged to enrol non-traditional participants in the problem-solving process. People who have a vested interest in solving the problem are more likely to become dedicated problem solvers. Problem solvers include police personnel, other Law Enforcement Agencies, Community Residents, and their Leaders as well as other relevant community stakeholders. The police officers will be the primary problem-solving coordinators in their assigned areas. Identifying a problem is the first step in the problem-solving process. Officer determines what incidents, situations, or conditions cause problems or discomfort for people who live and work in the community.

Problem solving model is one of the models' officials adopted by the Nigerian Police Force. The personnel who have been trained in Community Policing proactively act beyond simple crime fighting and law enforcement. They rely on the community, decentralize to the neighbourhood level to be more accessible, maintain contact and cooperation with their communities, engage in tactics to target specific problems identified by the whole community, work in partnership with other public and private organizations and continually evaluate and adapt their strategies. It follows that Community Policing also enables intelligence-led policing because of the increased level of trust between partners (British Council,2010).

Crime Prevention

According to United Nations Office on Drug and Crime Doha Declarations (UNODC, 2016), Crime prevention involves any activity by an individual or group, public or private, which attempts to eliminate crime prior to it occurring or before any additional activity results. By drawing on the public health model, some theorists have distinguished between primary crime prevention (universal), secondary crime prevention (at-risk) and tertiary crime prevention (known offenders).

The Government of the country as well as the states are required to contribute towards the prevention of crime by formulating proper rules and policies. The crime prevention strategies should be integrated in a cross-cutting manner, into a social, economic, educational, employment, health, housing, urban planning and justice. In all these areas, there is prevalence of crime, hence, prevention strategies are required to get incorporated in a cross-cutting manner. Strategies are required to be built upon cooperative partnerships between government institutions and ministries, community and non-governmental organizations and the business sector and civil society (Kapur,2018). Clancey, (n.d.) there are four key models of crime prevention and each model illustrates different approaches to prevent the occurrence of criminal acts.

Developmental Model

This model is often known as early intervention. developmental crime prevention aims to address the early causes of criminal behaviour. Causing a decline in community and individual risk factors and increasing protective factors, assisting to prevent crime later within the lives of the individuals. The most distinguished examples of developmental crime prevention include parenting programs, school upgrading initiatives, pre-school administrations and improvements in changes to the school procedures.

Social Model – This model contributes to the reinforcement of the neighbourhoods, so that people incorporate and help each other in the prevention of crime. Local communities that have resilient bonds and where people know each other are less prone to experience crime. When an individual has a strong social circle, he may experience less of criminal and violent acts. Augmenting social capital or the relationships between people can be advantageous in protecting people from crime. Operative social crime prevention is difficult to achieve because it can comprise of many different aspects. Community building activities, provision of welfare services and increasing community support groups all assist to improve the sense of community and prevent crime.

Situational Model – Putting a restraint upon the instances for crime is an active way of preventing crime. Increasing the risks of discovery, reducing the rewards for insulting and offending individuals and increasing the efforts of supporting and helping individuals are all ways to prevent crime. Situational crime prevention can be as modest as installation locks and alarms, increasing investigation through lighting and making buildings harder to enter, damage or hide near. The houses and buildings should be constructed in such a manner, that they cannot be destroyed and during the nighttime, one should keep the windows and the doors of the house locked.

Criminal Justice - This model of crime prevention is most universally understood and is associated with the criminal justice system. Research tends to provide ideas and suggestions, that these measures are only partly efficacious. These measures work to the best of abilities when accompanied by the other models. The criminal justice system is associated with imposition of severe penalties upon the individuals for the serious criminal acts that they have committed. Progressively, there is acknowledgment that there are sharper ways to curb crime, this model and the other models of crime prevention work together to implement the crime prevention strategies in an operative manner.

Theoretical Framework: Structural Functionalism

Talcott Parsons (1951) marks the beginning of functionalism as a formal theory and method in sociology. His theory 'structural-functionalism' is based on the ideas of cause and effect, part–whole and necessary condition. In structural-functionalism, the whole in the part–whole idea is a 'system' consisting of a large number of actions (or actors) as elements, each in an interdependent relationship with all the other elements.

In the 1970s, political scientists Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell introduced a structural-functionalist approach to comparing political systems. They argued that, in order to understand a political system, it is necessary to understand not only its institutions (or structures) but also their respective functions. They also insisted that these institutions, to be properly understood, must be placed in a meaningful and dynamic historical context.

In addition to structures, Almond and Powell showed that a political system consists of various functions, chief among them political socialisation, recruitment and communication: socialisation refers to the way in which societies pass along their values and beliefs to succeeding generations, and in political terms describes the process by which a society inculcates civic virtues, or the habits of effective citizenship; recruitment denotes the process by which a political system generates interest, engagement and participation from citizens; and communication refers to the way that a system promulgates its values and information.

To sum up, structural-functionalism is an approximate model based on the assumption that, on the grounds of the functional requirement of constant social relations, the behaviour of the whole system can be sufficiently known from partial information. If this requirement ('function') is fulfilled, the constant relation ('structure') and the whole system ('society') are maintained. If it is not fulfilled, structure and society must change (Sato, 2011).

It is relevant to work also as it explains the society as a system with each part playing its function to make the whole. If a part fails to perform as expected due to one reason or the other, then the system will be faulty. In this situation, the police and the community, as structures, make up the system (society). Each must play its part for the system to work properly and address the security situation in the community. Therefore, the police alone cannot solve the security situation likewise the community.

Methodology

Primary source of data was adopted in the course of this work. A survey design was employed as a method using structure questionnaire for data. The choice of this design is informed by the effectiveness of the method in obtaining information in research of this situation. Purposive sample technique was used as sampling method because only those in the security cycle and experience will have the relevant information needed for this work. 40 people were targeted but only thirty-three (33) were sampled because of the nature of the sampling technique. Therefore, thirty-three (33) questionnaires were administered; thirteen (13) to the police

personnel in the department of Community Policing in Rigasa and Nariya Divisional Police Headquarters, Nine (9) to the executive officers of the joint local voluntary security organization (CESSPUR) and eleven (11) village heads within Rigasa. Explanatory method was employed for analysis of the findings and discussion of the primary data using textual analysis.

Findings and Discussion

This section presents and discusses the results obtained from the data collected for the study. It describes the data collected for the study using statistical inference. Thirty-three (33) questionnaires were administered and thirty-one (31) were retrieved. Therefore, the findings and analysis are on the retrieved data.

31 respondents representing 100% of the respondents claimed to know the existence of the Community policing in Rigasa. This indicated that the relevant stakeholders are well and fully informed and engaged in the security situation in the community. 13 of the respondents representing 41.9% of the respondent rated the effectiveness of the Community Policing in Rigasa as Good and 18 representing 58.1% rated it very good, while none of the respondents rated it fairly good. Looking at the percentage margin, the difference between the good and very good is minimal. With this, it can be admitted that Community Policing is positively effective in Rigasa. 19 respondents, representing 61.2% of the respondents, rated the cordial relationship between the police personnel and the joint local voluntary security organisation as good and 12 respondents, representing 38.8% of the respondents, rated it very good. No respondent rated it fairly good. This shows averagely a good cordial relationship between the two parties. This will eventually result into a positive outcome in their primary task.

27 respondents, representing 87% of the respondents, rated the response of the community to the establishment of Community Policing in Rigasa as very high and 4 respondents, representing 13% of the respondents, rated it as high. No respondent on low option. It is an indicator that the community was ready to accept anything positive that will

aid in tackling the security challenges in the Rigasa. 100% of the respondents strongly agreed that the intelligent gathering and proactive response on the security measures have relatively improved with the implementation of the community policing in the Rigasa ward. 31 respondents, representing 100% of the respondents, agreed that there are achievements from the implementation of the community policing in Rigasa. While they listed just three (3) of the achievements, their responses were collectively grouped and summarised into the following.

i. There was record of lowest crime rate in the first thirty-six (36) months.

ii. There was always a prompt response to security threatening situations.

iii. It has leads to the access of highly intelligent security reports within the community.

iv. Criminal activities were easily checked.

v. There is a mass relocation of the criminal minds out of Rigasa to the neighbouring communities.

vi. The sale of stimulant related drugs has relatively reduced to a low level as well as drug abuse.

vii. Relevant stakeholders of the community have supported the policy.

viii. The community became more informed about the significance of their role and support to security issues affecting them.

ix. Many of the criminal minds repented and supported the community against crime.

x. It has restored the confidence of business and residency to the people in the community.

xi. Minor civil cases were solved at the level of local security operations.

xii. Public perception on police has improved positively.

xiii. The local securities assist in traffic control.

31 respondents, representing 100% of the respondents, responded to the likely challenges in the operation of the Community Policing in Rigasa within the stated period. Below is the collective summary of their responses.

i. Lack of motivation to the local voluntary security personnel from the relevant stakeholders

ii. The local security personnel lack professionalism in their operations.

iii. The local security operation is voluntary.

iv. There was inadequate mobility and logistics from both the police and the local security personnel.

v. There were only two police stations and a total number of 230 police officers (Officers and Rank &files) in the whole of Rigasa political ward.

vi. There is the problem of communication system.

vii. The local security personnel were in disharmony with constable officers of the police in their operations.

viii. Some bad eggs disguised into the local security formation.

ix. Arrested criminals, who were charged to court, were easily having access to bail.

x. With the advent of Kaduna State Vigilance Service (KADVS), the operation and effectiveness of the Community Policing in Rigasa has soft-pedalled because of some legal issues.

Looking at the above responses, one can admit that there were positive effects toward the implementation of the community policing in Rigasa despite the challenges. This indicates that community policing could be one of the effective security policies that should be in place in security threatening areas. It shows that the community participation has a major role to play in ensuring peace. As primary stake holders, therefore, they are the key players and should be more enlightened and fully engaged. Before now, people have no faith in the operation of the Nigeria Police Force, therefore, become reluctant in offering their support. The implementation of Community Policing in Rigasa has established a forum where the police have opened up and upgraded in their operation which gave hope to the community and improve their trust in the personnel. The community now can give vital information to and

work with the police in preventing crime. To prevent crime, one must know the root cause and societal factor should be considered in identifying criminal and non-criminal minds alike.

The findings further show that the operation of the police has improved and become more effective with a number of achievements ranging from prompt response to security matters to traffic control. These achievements are not unconnected with the community acceptance of the policy and the cordial relation between the community and the police personnel which was hitherto fairly good. It goes in line with tenet of the structural functionalists which stipulated that every part must play its role to make the whole i.e. the community and the police personnel.

However, the policy was not without challenges which, if not addressed, may affect the outcome of the operation in Rigasa. Some of these challenges are known and glaring. The United Nations ratio of standard policing is ratio 1:400 whereas the Nigeria Police Force admitted having a ratio of 1:600. This is applicable to the police personnel in Rigasa. As the biggest political wards in Kaduna Metropolis, it has only one police station and two outposts with almost 230 personnel in summation. In addition to this, there was inadequate logistics, equipment and mobility as communication system. Moreover, the local security personnel are not under any financial support. It is voluntary. This keeps local operation at risk in the run long. Also, the local operators were not trained; a lot of unprofessional approaches were likely to be recorded and may have corresponding effect on the expected outcome.

Conclusion

From the findings and discussion, the work concludes that, despite the challenges lamented, the implementation of problem-solving strategy of community policing was positively effective and promising in Rigasa ward of Igabi local government area of Kaduna state within the period of study. It has brought a relative peace in the community and glitters the name of the area which was hitherto fading due to high crime rate. It has also improved the synergy between the police and the members of the community as well as restored confidence in business and residency.

Recommendations

The federal Government of Nigeria should improve in the recruitment of the personnel of the Nigeria Police Force to meet the United Nations standard of ratio 1:400 as well as logistics, mobility and relevant equipment. The policy of community policing should be implemented in all areas exposed to security threat nationwide just like Rigasa Ward. The relevant authorities should support the local voluntary security organisation, not necessarily with pay but logistics and mobility to give them confidence and improved their input because peace and security is the primary task of the government. The challenges of the judicial system should be addressed to assist in prosecuting anyone found wanting on criminal and security disruptions. An enlightenment media should be in placed to keep the members of communities well informed about the significance of their support and contribution to the relative peace and security in their areas. Proper checks and balance should be provided in the recruitment, activities and performance of the local voluntary security operations for rewards and otherwise in the implementation of community policing.

References

Abiri, B. (2011). Models of community policing: What worked and what did not. CLEEN Foundation experience. A paper presented at the 3rd biennial national conference on community development in Nigeria, Nov. 22, 2011, Grand hotel, Asaba, Delta state

British Council (2010). Community policing frequently asked questions. Security Justice and Growth Programmes, Nigeria

Burke, Roger Hopkins (2009). An introduction to criminological theory. Willan Publishing, UK Third edition

Carter, D. L., & Sapp A. D. (1998). Community policing evaluation, In L. T. Hoover (Ed.), Police program evaluation (pp. 57-127). Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Clancey, G. (n.d.). Models of Crime Prevention. Retrieved May 9, 2017 from http://garnerclancey.com/pdfs/fs_Models-of-Crime-Prevention.pdf

Danbazau, A. B. (2007). Criminology and criminal justice, Spectrum Books Ltd, Ibadan 2nd Edition

Edet, Louis Ajom Ph. D and Nkeng, Philip Nsa (2019), Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) and Community Policing in Nigeria, 1984 – 2014, International Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol. 11, No. 2

Fridell, Lorie and Wycoff, Mary Ann (2004), Community policy: The past, the present & the future, Police Executive Research Forum Washington, D.C.

Goldstein, H. (1987). Toward community-oriented policing, crime & delinquency, 33(1), 6-30.

Iwar, CP Austin I. (2007). Five strategic elements of community policing. A paper presented at security workshop in Metro Area Command, Kaduna

Kapur, Dr. Radhika (2018), Crime Prevention Strategy, University of Delhi,

(PDF) Crime Prevention Strategies (researchgate.net)

Kelly, Raymond W. (n.d). Problem-solving strategies for community policing. U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (retrieved online July, 2019)

Mu'azu, Abubakat, Ibrahim Mohammed and Abdullahi, Musa (2016), Partnership between the Police and the Community in Borno State, Nigeria: Problems and Prospects, Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol.6, No.10, Pg. 103 - 106

Nebo, Ogochukwu and Ndukwe, Oko (2022), Insecurity in Nigeria and the Need for Community Policing in Nigeri – 2019, International Journal of Business Systems and Economics, Volume 13, Issue 7, Pg 217-232

Oke, Chris I. A, Braimah, Frederick and Masajuma Florence U. (2021), Policing through the Community in Nigeria: The Missing Link in Security Architecture, IKENGA Journal of African Studies, Vol. 22, No.2, Pg 146 - 162

Open Learn (2017). Introduction to critical criminology. The Open University, UK, http://www.open.edu/openlearn/society/introduction-critical-criminology (retrieved December, 2018)

Parsons T. (1951). The social system. Free Press, New York

Police Act and Regulations (CAP. P19.LFN 2004) (2009), 2nd Edition

Sato, Toshiki (2011). Functionalism. University of Tokyo www.sociopedia.isa (Retrieved June, 2019)

Schanzer, D., Kurzman, C., Toliver, J., & Miller, E. (2016). The challenge and promise of using community policing strategies to prevent violent extremism, National Institute of Justice, US, January, (2016)

Stevens, D. J. (2003), Applied community policing in the 21st century, Boston: A and B

UNODC (2016), Doha Declaration: Promoting Culture and Lawfulness

Microsoft PowerPoint - CPCJ Module 2_Crime Prevention - with notes (unodc.org)

WANEP NEWS Quick Updates (2018). www.wanepnigeria.org (Accessed 23rd October, 2019).

LOW-INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES FROM JUNIOR CIVIL SERVANTS IN KWARA STATE, NIGERIA

Precious Olubunmi GABRIEL, Ph.D.
Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies,
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria.
preciousgabriel7@gmail.com

and

Tawakalitu Bola YUSUF, Ph.D.
Department of Politics and Governance,
Kwara State University, Malete, Nigeria.
ladytawakalt@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Low-income in Nigeria has led to a growing food insecure population, particularly within the households of junior civil servants in Kwara State. However, there is limited understanding of the impact of this economic issue on their food security. The study aimed to assess the impact of low-income on household food security among junior civil servants in Kwara State, with specific objectives to investigate the average remuneration status of junior civil servants; and the effects of low-income on their household food security. The study utilized a mixed design, combining quantitative and qualitative methods. Structured questionnaire was used for the quantitative data, while in-depth interview and key informant interview plans were employed for the qualitative data collection. Data analysis was based on descriptive statistics for quantitative data interpretation, and content analysis for the qualitative data. The Cronbach alpha reliability test confirmed instrument reliability with a 0.544 reliability value. The study found that low-income junior civil servant households in Kwara State had a low monthly remuneration of $79.2 (₦36,280), falling below the international poverty line benchmark of $109.5 (₦50,100) for lower-middle income countries in 2022; the effects were seen in hunger, low food consumption, short-term food storage capacity, and malnourishment. The study concluded that low-income has undermined household food security of junior civil servants in Kwara State; and recommends multiple income streams, and improved pay package higher than international poverty line for junior civil servants in Kwara State.

Keywords: *Low-income; junior civil servants; food security; international poverty line*

Introduction

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported a rise in world hunger for the third consecutive year, with the number of undernourished people experiencing chronic food deprivation reaching nearly 821 million in 2017, from about 815 million in 2016; Nearly a decade ago, Africa had a higher percentage of hungry people (33%) than Asia (16%), and sixteen out of the twenty-two countries affected were in Africa (FAO, 2018). Global hunger has increased significantly in recent times, with an estimated 828 million people affected in 2021 (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2022).

In 2002, the Food and Agriculture Organization, African Development Bank, and New Partnership for Africa's Development held the International Conference on Food Security for Africa in Nigeria, aiming to address the pressing food crisis in Africa (FAO, 2015). Low-income earnings significantly impact food security, and all its dimensions such as availability, accessibility, affordability, and utilization of food. Nigeria had a high poverty rate, with up to 67% of the population living below the poverty line (Odeyemi, 2012), which is higher now when compared to the World Bank recent poverty line measurement of $3.65 per person per day for lower-middle income countries (The World Bank, 2022a). A report revealed that four out of ten Nigerians live below the poverty line, and only 17% of workers earn wages that could alleviate poverty (The World Bank, 2022a and 2022b). Therefore, low-income access leads to food insecurity because it triggers poor feeding and increased malnutrition which in turn-hold implications for national peace.

In Kwara State, food affordability has become more challenging due to rising food costs and limited income access; and junior civil servant households face food insecurity due to inadequate remuneration packages, and poor adaptation strategies; several negative impacts have evolved as a result. Previous studies showed that household food insecurity exists in Kwara State; this was at 64% in 2007 (Babatunde et al., 2007), 65.5% in 2010 (Omotesho and Mohammed-Lawal, 2010); 54% in 2017 (Ogunbiyi and Olajide, 2017); and 54.5% in 2021 (Mukaila et al., 2021). Even though, the 2017 figures showed an improvement of 10%

compared to the 2007 figures; there was no significant improvement between 2017 and 2021 food insecurity levels within the households in Kwara State because quite a number of households are headed by low-income workers. This study aims to fill an academic gap in the area of effects of low-income on food security, particularly among junior civil servant households in Kwara State, existing studies (Agada and Igbokwe, 2015; Jimoh et al., 2018; Alani et al., 2019; and Mukaila et al., 2021) only established the correlation between income and food security.

Conceptual Clarifications

Low-income: low-income within the context of this study refers to a monthly remuneration package that is lower than $3.65 if broken down into a daily pay.

Junior civil servant: a junior civil servant is defined as a worker in the State civil service who earns less than the international poverty line benchmark of $3.65 per day.

Food security: food security is a situation where there is constant availability, accessibility, affordability and utilization of sufficient, acceptable, nutritious, safe and well-prepared food in a household for productive living.

International poverty line: this refers to the 2022 World Bank benchmark for lower-middle income countries such as Nigeria, to identify individuals who are experiencing poverty by living below $3.65 per person per day.

Review of Literature

Civil Service and Remuneration

Civil service is a system consisting of civil servants who are assigned functions in public administration; the body of civil servants comprises of staffs in central and local public administration institutions (Awotunde and Ojo, 2022). Most employees are career civil servants in the Nigerian ministries, progressing based on qualification and seniority (Pindiga, 2009). The civil service is the main apparatus of modern government (Osawe et al., 2015). Awotunde and Ojo (2022) opined that remuneration is a means through which workers are able to meet basic needs; or the employees' compensation for service rendered based on terms

of contract of employment. Sardjana et al. (2019) opines that remuneration refers to monetary or financial benefits such as salaries, wages, bonuses, incentives, allowances and benefits that an employer gives to an employee for the services rendered. Income has been described as the flow of economic compensation received over a period of time (Schiller, 2007).

Williams and Alcocer (2022) defined income as a unit of value employed in measuring the production of goods and services in an economy. Ogunlari-Smith (2015) revealed that in Nigeria, the Labour Act of 2004 regulated the minimum wages of employees in 2004 to ₦5,500.00; in 2011, the National Minimum Wage Act of 2011 fixed it at ₦18,000.00; and the 2019 amendment reviewed it to 30,000 naira by month. Williams and Alcocer (2022) described four main types of income as taxable income; tax-exempt income; disposable income; and discretionary income.

Conceptualizing Food Security and Insecurity

A UNDP report noted that food security exists when all people have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food at all times, which meets their dietary needs for an active and healthy life (UNDP, 1994; FAO; 2002a). The emergence of the term 'food security' was traced to a discussion on international food problem during a global food crisis in mid-1970s. At the initial stage, focus was on issues pertaining to food supply, and at the World Food Conference of 1974, it was defined as "availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices" (UN, 1975). Afterwards, there was a shift from availability to access, thus, in 1983, FAO expressed food security as: "ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food that they need" (FAO, 1983).

In 1994, UNDP Human Development Report popularized the idea of human security which embodied food security as a core aspect of human security, making food security to be seen not just as a social security issue but a human right concern (UN, 1994). In 1996, the World Food Summit opined that "food security, at the individual, household, national, regional

and global levels (is achieved) when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (WFP, 1996). In 2001, the State of Food Insecurity in the World 2001, redefined food security as "a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO, 2002a).

In 2009, the World Summit on Food Security, added a fourth dimension (stability) to food security and noted that, "food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. The four pillars of food security are availability, access, utilization and stability" (FAO, 2009). In 2015, Berry and Peng suggested a fifth dimension known as sustainability (Peng and Berry, 2019).

Nexus between Income and Food Security

De Marco and Thorburn (2009) revealed that individuals earning less than $34,999 are more likely to experience food insecurity compared to those earning $75,000. Arene and Anyaeji (2010) found that a household's income positively impacts its food security status, suggesting that more gainfully employed household heads are more food secure. Astemir (2014) showed that off-farm income determined adequate calorie intake of rural households in Ethiopia. Rachman et al (2021) found that higher income of farmers in East Java, Indonesia, leads to increased food security. Drammeh et al. (2019) found that monthly household income significantly increases food security in sub-Saharan Africa. Akukwe (2020) found that monthly income of household heads significantly impacts food security in Southeast Nigeria. Cordero-Ahiman et al. (2020) discovered that a single income source for a farming household head increases food insecurity in Paute River Basin, Ecuador. Semazzi and Kakungulu (2020) disclosed that households who were food secure had greater annual average incomes and were more likely to have greater food storage (availability) than the food insecure households. Abegaz (2017) found that 61.79% of the study population were food insecure, with 49.71%

lacking access to off-farm income in rural Ethiopia. WFP (2013) identified 'poverty trap' as a major setback for attaining food security. Wight et al. (2014) found that low wages, housing costs, and low involvement in food and nutrition assistance programs increased food insecurity in households with children and indicate poverty status.

Zekeri (2007) revealed that psychological aspects of food insecurity were depression, sadness, loneliness, sleep disorders, and lack of concentration. Roberts (2015) found that low-income was the primary trigger for food insecurity, with a 70% association between income and food security. The FAO (2015) highlighted the impact of low-income on food security, such as hunger, low food consumption, inadequate storage], malnourishment, low food exchange, poor food quality, limited food allocation, unhealthy food choices, lack of food safety, and limited food exchange. Zalilah et al. (2015) revealed that higher income was linked with improved diet quality. French et al., (2019) found that lower income households tend to buy less healthy, fresh vegetables and spend more on less nutritious items. Jose (2016) showed that low-income inhibits adequate food processing mechanism due to limited infrastructure (José, 2016). Friesland-Campina Institute (2019) showed that poorer households consumed less of healthy foods.

Theoretical Framework

This study discussed the problem of food insecurity from the perspective of low economic ability to access food due to low remuneration package that makes some workers fall below the global poverty line. Bruenig argued that structural poverty describes an economic structure such as income distribution or market economic structures imposed by governments, which leads to regular patterns of impoverishment (Bruenig, 2014). Structural theory depicts poverty as resulting from negative functions of capitalism. The structural perspective queries capitalist dynamics and structural forces that keep the poor from escaping poverty. An extensive range of socioeconomic and political issues are associated such as poor labor conditions, income inequalities, and biased and defaming rhetoric about poverty and welfare. Welfare condition, living wage, and wealth redistribution are possible interventions around the structural

framework (Stoeffler and Joseph, 2020). Around 80%-90% of poverty is a direct result of low-wage work, that can result from low skill or education, others are caused by income inequality where same work is paid different wages in different settings. Wage levels are influenced by the power balance between worker and employer, and by factors like skill, social organization, and contacts (UMass, 2023).

Food insecurity has been expressed as a sub-category of poverty, tagged "food poverty", which is the lack of sufficient income needed for food purchase, under the right conditions. Through the means of a household survey on income, it is then a likelihood theoretically that for the amount of food consumed in poorer households a greater part of their income is consumed (Buchi and De Muro, 2012). Poverty and food insecurity are inherently linked because poor households frequently lack the resources that are essential to access adequate nutritious food in order to live an active and healthy life. Structural poverty theory is relevant to this study because it provides a theoretical base for economic food access as a major determinant of household food security.

Methodology

The study utilized a mixed research design which combines quantitative and qualitative methods. The study adopted 2022 World Bank International poverty line of $3.65 per person per day for lower-middle income countries, and as at March 2023 when the study was carried out, one dollar amounted to ₦458 at official rate in Nigeria; therefore, $3.65 was ₦1,671. The quantitative data was derived from a descriptive survey, while qualitative data was gathered from key informant interviews with senior cadre civil servants and in-depth interviews with junior civil servants in Ilorin, Kwara State. The population of study consists of 468,780 households in Kwara State. The study area was Kwara State, it is located within the North Central geopolitical region of Nigeria, and one of the thirty-six (36) States in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Kwara State Government, 2017). Purposive and random sampling techniques were adopted for this study. Yamane's sample size formula ($n = N / 1+N (e)^2$) was used to determine the sample size, 409 civil servant households were randomly selected from

nine local government areas, and analysis was based on 401 households' data that were returned for analysis. Questionnaire was used to draw the quantitative data; the interview schedule consists of key informant and in-depth interviews for respondents' bio-data and enquiries on the research questions. Descriptive statistics and content analysis were employed for data analysis.

Results

Investigation of the average remuneration status of junior civil servants in Kwara State

From the qualitative data, it was revealed that civil servants in Kwara State were graded into seventeen (17) levels with up to fifteen (15) steps attached to each level. One of the top officials who preferred to be referred to as an anonymous revealed this. In his words: *"The minimum wage is ₦30,000, that's the least, the salary scale is from level 1 to 17, and there is a document that stipulated this. For secondary schools, apart from the non-teaching staff you're not likely to see anyone less than level 7 because before you can be there, you must have HND or a degree"* (KII: Male, 60 years, Ministry of Finance, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023). Data were taken from selected civil servants who were in levels 4 (step 1) to 8 (step 1) and who earned less than ₦50,100 per month. The quantitative data revealed that the remuneration statuses were ₦30,800 (level 4, step 1) for 18% of the respondents; ₦31,800 (level 5, step 1) for 27.9% of them; ₦32,000 (level 6, step 1) for 31.9% of them; ₦41,900 (level 7, step 1) for 10.2% of them; and ₦44,900 (level 8, step 1) for 12% of them. The respondents' average remuneration status was $79.2 (₦36,280), which was less than the monthly World Bank poverty line benchmark of $109.5 (₦50,100) for Nigeria in 2022, therefore, the study found that all respondents earned below the poverty line standard.

Findings showed that 144 (35.9%) of them were administrative staff in different forms such as secretaries, and administrative officers; 137 (34.2%) of the respondents were teachers in secondary schools; 48 (12.0%) of them were health workers; and 32 (8.0%) of them were janitors. The data revealed that most of the people who earned lower than the poverty line did not hold any top position, and could be classified as the junior cadre of the civil service in the

State. All the respondents were within the levels 4 to 8 of the civil service consolidated minimum wage income structure, 184 (45.9%) of them were in level 4; 128 (31.9%) of them were in level 5; 41 (10.2%) of them were in level 6; while 48 (12.0%) of them were in level 7. This finding corroborates the response from a respondent, a senior officer, in his words: *"Junior cadre is from level 7 to level 11 or 12, level 13 upwards is a senior staff. But now, it begins from level 4. For those in that category, the ministry conducts an interview and when they pass, they are given letters of promotion which will be used to pay their salaries"* (KII: Male, 60 years, Ministry of Social Development, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023).

It was revealed that on each level, there are up to fifteen steps which make people of same level to earn differently at times; a key official explains this: *"From what I see here (income structure document), salary structure is graduated from level 1 to 17 and because of the need for incentive, it is also evaluated with steps. Level 8 step 3, at step 3, I may have a difference of about ₦2,500 added to my salary. That's the idea of step increment. We call it annual increment"* (KII: Male, 60 years, Ministry of Finance, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023).

Assessment of the Effects of Low-Income on Household Food Security among Junior Civil Servants in Kwara State

Findings showed that effects of low-income on food security among the junior civil servant households were: hunger (lack of food), 328 (81.8%), while 73 (18.2%) of them disagreed; lack of food quality, 296 (73.8%), while 105 (26.2%) of them declined; low food consumption, 296 (73.8%), whereas 105 (26.2%) of them disagreed; short-term food storage capacity, 295 (73.6%), but 106 (26.4%) of them refuted it; low food exchange, 292 (73.6%), while 106 (26.4%) of them disagreed; unhealthy food choices, 286 (71.3%), but 115 (28.7%) declined; lack of food safety 276 (68.8%), but 125 (31.2%) of them disagreed; limited food allocation, 244 (60.8%), while 157 (39.2%) of them refused; constrained food processing, 212 (52.9%), while 189 (47.1%) of them refused; and malnourishment, 210 (52.4%), but 191 (47.6%) of them disagreed. For the qualitative data on the effects of low-income on food security, a respondent described his household experience, in his words: "Yes, I do often experience

hunger without being able to buy food, it happens very well. Food processing is stressful, we use charcoal pot because it's cheaper. Gas? No go area" (IDI: Male, 45 years, Ministry of Justice, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023).

The second respondent added that: *"Hunger happens to my household very well, and it leads to stomach pain, we drink water to feel the stomach; and also, there is no "I'm filled", just "I've eaten"* (IDI: Male, 55 years, Ministry of Finance, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023). The third respondent note that: *"When you know your low financial ability and the quantity of food you have, you won't do pass yourself. Food allocation is not adequate due to low cash"* (IDI: Male, 60 years, Ministry of Education and Human Capital Development, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023). The fourth respondent affirmed experience with hunger, she says: *"Lack of food happens to me more often. Continuously. On food storage, it's not all the time we buy and store food at home. We buy food every month, and it doesn't last"* (IDI: Female, 24 years, Ministry of Justice, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023). The fifth respondent says that: *"We go through much stress to access food due to increase in food price. Our food allocation is often impacted because we manage the available food since money is not sufficient"* (IDI: Male, 35 years, Ministry of Education and Human Capital Development, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023).

The sixth respondent opines that: *"Insufficient food leads to financial strain, affecting various aspects of life, including mental health, family dynamics, and productivity. It also affects one's ability to think well, as one may not be able to consider other aspects of life."* (KII: Male, 45 years, Civil Service Commission, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023). The seventh respondent says that: *"Lack of food for a civil servant can lead to malnutrition, maternal health issues, ulcers, and weakened immune systems, affecting children's health, maternal health, and immune system function"* (KII: Male, 40 years, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ilorin, Kwara State, March 2023).

Conclusion

The study concluded that junior civil servants earn below the 2022 international poverty line of $109.5 (₦50,100) per month, which was insufficient for their household food security; leading to hunger and low food consumption that were prevalent in most of the households. Thus, sustainable development goal two on ending hunger by 2030 in Kwara State may be unachievable, unless the current income structure of junior civil servants is advanced.

Recommendations

The study recommends that Kwara State civil service commission should prioritize a consolidated salary structure that is not below the International poverty line benchmark for lower-middle income countries to increase economic access to food; Kwara State government should pursue the sustainable development goal two agenda on food security through a bottom-top approach that will have domestic impact on household food security for junior civil servants; and junior civil servants should actively engage in multiple income streams for improved economic food access to improve their household food security.

References

Abegaz, K. H. (2017) Determinants of Food Security: Evidence from Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) Using Pooled Cross-Sectional Study. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40066- 017-0153-1

Agada, M., and Igbokwe, E. (2015). Constraints to Achieving Household Food Security in North Central Nigeria. Pdf. Doi:10.9734/JAERI/2015/13758

Akukwe, T. I. (2020). Household Food Security and its Determinants in Agrarian Communities of Southeastern Nigeria. Agro-Science Journal of Tropical Agriculture, Food, Environment and Extension. Volume 19 (1), pp. 54 – 60. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/as.v19i1.9

Alani, E.A., Babatunde, R.O., Adekunle, A.O., and Oni, A.M. (2019) Effect of Social Capital Endowment on the Welfare of Farming Households in Kwara State, Nigeria. Acta Universitatis Danubius. Œconomica, Vol. 15, No. 7 (2019)

Anderson, E., Wei, R., Liu, B., Plummer, R., Kelahan, H., Tamez, M., Marrero, A., Bhupathiraju, S., and Mattei, J. (2021). Improving Healthy Food Choices in Low Income Settings in the United States Using Behavioral Economic-Based

Adaptations to Choose Architecture. Front. Nutr. 8:734991. doi: 10.3389/fnut.2021.734991

Astemir, H.Y. (2014). Determinants of Food Security in Rural Farm Households in Ethiopia. International Institute of Social Studies Economics of Development (ECD). Research Paper. https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/17359

Awotunde, T. A., and Ojo, O. (2022). Remuneration and Service Delivery in the Civil Services of Benue and Kwara States, Nigeria. KIU Journal of Humanities. Kampala International University ISSN: 2415-0843; 7(2): 63-70

Babatunde, R.O., Omotesho, O.A. and Sholotan, O.S. (2007). Factors Influencing Food Security Status of Rural Farming Households in North Central Nigeria. Agricultural Journal, 2: 351-357.

Cordero-Ahiman, O.V., Vanegas, J.A., Beltrán-Romero, P., and Quinde-Lituma, M.E. (2020). Determinants of Food Insecurity in Rural Households: The Case of the Paute River Basin of Azuay Province, Ecuador. Sustainability 2020, 12, 946; doi:10.3390/su12030946. www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability

Drammeh, W., Hamid, N. A., and Rohana, A. J. (2019). Determinants of Household Food Insecurity and Its Association with Child Malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of the Literature. Current Research in Nutrition

FAO (1983). World Food Security: A Reappraisal of the Concepts and Approaches. Director General's Report. Rome. Pdf

FAO (1996). Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action. World Food Summit 13-17 November 1996. Rome. www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3548e'w3548e00.htm

FAO (2002a). The State of Food Insecurity in the World. 2001 Rome. www.fao.org/docrep/005y7352e/y7352e12.htm –

FAO (2008). Climate Change and Food Security: A Framework Document. Rome/ www.fao.org/.../15538

FAO (2009). Draft Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security. World Summit on Food Security, 16-18 November 2009, Rome. pdf

FAO (2015). The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015. www.fao.org/hunger/en/

FAO (2018). Food Security and Nutrition around the World. www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/

FAO (2020). Role of Income Inequality in Shaping Outcomes on Individual Food Insecurity. Background Paper for the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019 by Cindy Holleman and Valentina Conti.

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO (2022). The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing Food and Agricultural Policies to Make Healthy Diets More Affordable. Rome, FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0639en

French, S.A., Tangney, C.C., Crane, M.M., Wang, Y., and Appelhans, B.M. (2019). Nutrition Quality of Food Purchases Varies by Household Income: the Shopper Study. BMC Public Health 19, 231 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-019-6546-2

Friesland-Campina Institute (2019). The Correlation between Socioeconomic Status and Healthy Diets: An Overview. https://www.frieslandcampinainstitute.com/ng/health/maternal nutrition/correlation-socioeconomic-status-healthy-diets-overview/

Jimoh, O., Adebisi, L.O., Osasona, K.K., Alalade, O.A., Olaoye, I.J., and Aloga-Omale, R. (2018). Effect of Small-Scale Irrigation Scheme on Food Security of Farming Households in Kwara State, Nigeria. Fudma Journal of Agriculture and Agricultural Technology. Fudma- Jaat Vol 4, No 2 (2018)>Jimoh

José, G. (2016) Food Losses and Waste: A Challenge to Sustainable Development. FAO of the UN. 10 Aug 2016. http://www.fao.org/save-food/news-and-multimedia/news/news/details/en/c/429182/

Kwara State Government (2017). About Kwara State. https://kwarastate.gov.ng/about-kwara-state/

Li, L., Zhai, S. and Bai, J. (2021). The Dynamic Impact of Income and Income Distribution on Food Consumption among Adults in Rural China. Journal of Integrative Agriculture, Vol. 20, Issue 1, January 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2095-3119(20)63239-7

Mukaila, R., Falola, A., and Omotesho, O.A. (2021). Food security Status: Its Drivers and Coping Strategies among Vegetable Farming Households. Journal of Applied Life Sciences and Environment. https://repository.uaiasi.ro/xmlui/handle/20.500.12811/349

Ogunbiyi, K.K. and Olajide, O.A. (2017). Assessment of Food Security Status and Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change among Farm Households in Kwara State. Conference Proceedings of the I8th Annual National Conference of the Nigerian Association of Agricultural Economists, Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria. 19th October, 2017.

Ogunlari-Smith, A. (2015). Minimum Obligations of an Employer under Nigerian Labour Law and Employment Regulations. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/minimum-obligations-employer-under-nigerian-labour-adesegun

Omotesho, O.A. and Mohammed-Lawal, A. (2010). Journal of Agricultural Biotechnology and Sustainable Development Vol. 2 (1) pp. 007-014, January, 2010. http: www.academicjournals.org/JABSD

Osawe, C., Agbodike, F., and Igbokwe-Ibeto, C. (2015). The Civil Service and Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Issues, Prospects and New Hopes. Academic Journal of Research in Economics and Management. 2. 1-13. 10.12816/0017359.

Pape, U. (2020). Rapid Emergency Response Survey. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336614945_Rapid_Emergency_Response_S

Peng, W., and Berry, E.M. (2019). "The Concept of Food Security" In Ferranti, P., Berry, E.M., Anderson, J.R. Encyclopedia of Food Security and Sustainability, Vol. 2, pp. 1-7 Elsevier. pdf

Pindiga, H.I. (2009). New Service Tenure - Oronsaye, FCSC Boss Clash over Exams. Daily Trust. 2009-12-21.

Rachman, H., Tri, H., and Dyah, W.S. (2021). Technical Efficiency among Agricultural Households and Determinants of Food Security in East Java, Indonesia. Scientific reports (2021) 11:4141. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-83670-7

Sardjana, E., Sudarmo, S., and Suharto, D. (2019). The Effect of Remuneration, Work Discipline, Motivation on Performance. International Journal of Multicultural and Multi religious Understanding. 5(6):136. DOI: 10.18415/ijmmu.v5i6.529

Schiller, B.R. (2007). The Economics of Poverty and Discrimination. 10th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.

Schiller, J.S., Lucas, J.W., and Perego, J.A. (2012). Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: National Health Interview Survey, 2011. Vital and Health Statistics 10, no. 256: 1– 207. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_256.pdf.

Semazzi, J. and Kakungulu, M. (2020). Household Determinants of Food Security in Rural Central Uganda. African Journal of Agricultural Research. Vol. 16(9), pp. 1245-1252, September, 2020. DOI: 10.5897/AJAR2020.14992

Stoeffler, Stephen W. and Joseph, Rigaud (2020). "Etiology of Poverty: A Critical Evaluation of Two Major Theories," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 47: Iss. 1, Article 5. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15453/0191-5096.4269

The World Bank (1986). A World Bank Policy Study: Poverty and Hunger. Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries. www.wds.world bank.org/external/default/…/multi_page.pdf

The World Bank (2022a). Understanding poverty. https://www.worldbank.org/en/understanding-poverty#:~:text=The%20new%20global%20poverty%20lines,be%20available%20in%20October%202022.

The World Bank (2022b). Deep Structural Reforms Guided by Evidence are urgently Needed to lift Millions of Nigerians out of Poverty, says New World Bank Report. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/03/21/afw-deep-structural-reforms- guided-by-evidence-are-urgently-needed-to-lift-millions-of-nigerians-out of-poverty

UN (1975). Report of the World Food Conference, Rome, 5-16 November1974. New York. Pdf

UN (1994). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. United Nations Department of Public Information. New York: reprinted in April, 1994. Chapters VI and VII.pdf

UNDP (1994). Human Development Report 1994. Oxford University Press

UMass Amherst (2023). Structural theory of poverty https://people.umass.edu/~rgstokes/soc103/STRUCTURE.htm

WFP (1996). "Food Security and Food Assistance" World Food Summit Technical Background Documents, #13 (1996)

WFP (2009). Distinguishing Between Chronic and Transitory Food Insecurity in Emergency Food Security Assessments (EFSA) (2009). www.wfp.org/food-security

WFP (2013). What Causes Hunger? m.wfp.org/stories/what-causes-hunger

WFP (2017). Hunger Glossary. World Food Programmes m.wfp.org/hunger/glossary

Wheeler, E.F. (1991). Intra-Household Food and Nutrient Allocation. Centre for Human Nutrition, Department of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aopcambridgecore/content/view/82CA283B 1E1D8C5337B1B6FF885EE233/S0954422491000094a.pdf/intrahousehold_food_and nutrient_allocation.pdf

Wight, V., Kaushal, N., Waldfogel, J. and Garfinkel, I. (2014). Understanding the Link between Poverty and Food Insecurity among Children: Does the Definition of Poverty Matter? pp. 1–20. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4096937/

Williams, K. and Alcocer, Y.Y. (2022). Income Concept, Types and Examples. What is Income? https://study.com/learn/lesson/income-concept-types-examples.html

Zalilah, M.S., Khor, G.L., Sarina, S., Huang, S.L., Chin, Y.S., Barakatun, N.M. Yusof, C.Y.M., and Maznorila, M. (2015). The Relationship between Household Income and Dietary Intakes of 1-10 year old Urban Malaysian. Nutr Res Pract. 2015 Jun; 9(3): 278–287. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4460060/

Zekeri, A.A. (2007). Livelihood Strategies of Food-insecure Poor, Female-headed Families in Rural Alabama. Psychol Rep. 2007 Dec: 101(3 Pt 2):1031-6. doi: 10.2466/pr0.101.4.1031-10 36. PMID: 1836111

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ARMED CONFLICTS: A STUDY OF KONDUGA LGA, BORNO STATE, NIGERIA, 2010–2015

Jibrin Ubale YAHAYA, Ph. D
Department of Political Science,
National Open University of Nigeria
jyahaya@noun.edu.ng

and

Abdullahi ADAMU, Ph. D
Department of Political Science,
National Open University of Nigeria
aadamu@noun.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

The military has made several attempts over the years to counter and neutralize insurgency threats in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. Militarism has been used to accomplish this task of restoring peace in the North East. However, since the militants from Boko Haram emerge, the threats have increased, greatly taxing the Nigerian military. The operations overview specifically mentioned operation BOYONA, operation Zaman Lafiya, and operation Restore Order I, II, and III. The perception of the operation thus far has been shaped by the Civilian Joint Task Force's role in countering insurgent forces in the northeast and the perception of civil-military relations. The strategies used by the Nigerian Army against Jama'atu Alis Sunna Wal Jihad have been discussed in this study. Boko Haram is the collective name for Suna lidda'awati Wal-jihad. The reasons behind the formation of Boko Haram and the group's escalating attacks against Nigeria and its neighbors is as result of the wrong perception developed by the Boko Haram followers who advocate that modern knowledge and the practice of democracy is against the teaching of Islam. The attacks by Boko Haram have resulted in a multitude of issues, such as internal displacement, violations of human rights, insecurity, and loss of livelihoods. The activities of Boko Haram have come to represent instability in Nigeria and throughout West Africa because of attacks lunched that resulted to human right violation, displacement and higher level of poverty. This study uses both primary and secondary source of data and offered a number of recommendations based on research findings. These included that all governmental at levels need to continue fighting insurgencies, ensure that security agencies receive adequate funding and training, equip the armed forces with state-of-the-art weapons that can effectively outmatch terrorists' firepower, and secure borders to stop terrorist attacks.

Keywords: *Insurgent, Military Operations, Joint Task Force, Insecurity*

Introduction

Nigeria is a country in West Africa with over 250 ethnic groups. According to the 2006 Census, there were about 170,123,740 people living there (Adeluke, 2013). As a result, Nigeria has the biggest population of any country in Africa. It's crucial to remember that, despite Nigeria's abundance of material and human resources, the majority of its population still lives in abject poverty. The country's GDP per capita has recently increased. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has mainly relied on a political structural arrangement that has been the focus of the central government. This aligned with upholding a certain degree of mutual reliance and autonomy to establish dominant power and control over one or more member states.

In the northeastern part of the Nigerian state, conventional military units have engaged in combat with non-conventional armed groups. Guerrilla warfare, hybrid warfare, stability operations, fourth generation warfare, and counterterrorism are other terms for the participation or involvement of military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism effort against Boko Haram or armed groups. This kind of military engagement in armed conflicts is exemplified by operations such as the US military's war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the governments of Kenya and Somalia taking on Al-Shabaab, the US military in Iraq and Syria taking on ISIS, the Nigerian government taking on Boko Haram, and so forth. Every one of these wars is a non-symmetrical military operation. Conflicts that were once common and symmetrical between states—such as the wars between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland and Malvinas Islands, the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, and the conflict between Ethiopia and Exteria just before the turn of the twenty-first century—have since become uncommon and given way to wars of ambiguity.

Islamic reform groups have proliferated in the North; many of them have as their declared goals the creation of an Islamic state there, the advancement of a strict, sharia-based interpretation of Islam, and the eradication of heretical innovations. Their influence on the

politics and religion debate there has been noteworthy, as they typically support legalistic interpretations of sacred texts. Though traditional sufi orders still maintain a dominant position, the Izala movement, also known as the Jama'at Izalatal-Izalat al-Bida wa Iqamat al-sunnah (society for the eradication of evil innovations and the reestablishment of the sunna), has made a significant contribution to a general religious revival and a much greater public and political role for Islam (Jacob, 2013). It was joined by numerous other reform movements, such as the Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN), which is typically seen as a platform for young radical preachers, and the Muslim the Islamic movement of Nigeria, a radical branch of the MSSN better known as the Muslim brotherhood or Zakkaky after its leader (Jacab, 2013).

Around the same time, a younger preacher from Northern Cameroon by the name of Izala Muhammed Marwa—also called "Maitatsine" in Hausa, which means "the one who curses"—became involved in a smaller, much more radical movement when he took an aggressive stance against western influence and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of secular authorities. As his fan base among unemployed urban youth grew during the 1970s, his relationship with the police deteriorated. In December 1980, a confrontation at an open-air rally in Kano sparked weeks of widespread rioting that eventually spread to other states and claimed hundreds of lives. Marwa died in the first riots, though there were sporadic violent incidents for a number of years (Toyin and Matthew, 2008).

Early in the new millennium, a group akin to this one appeared in the Northeast. Before becoming known as Boko Haram, it was also known as the Nigerian Taliban, or Yusuffiyya, and it rejected all secular authority. Over time, its position became more rigid, resulting in disputes with law enforcement (Charas, 2015). While Boko Haram and the Maitatsine group are similar, Boko Haram draws ideas and inspiration from more modern radical Muslim groups. Most importantly, it is directly affiliated not only with Al-Qaeda but also with a number of radical African Muslim Jihadi groups. Now that they have the ability to spread, Boko Haram is a far bigger threat than MaitatsineMovement

Numerous factors that dynamically shape Nigerian politics enable the emergence of Islamist organizations and the violent outbursts of Boko Haram. First and foremost, there is still a North-South divide. Aghedo and Oarhe (2012) state that the North, which is primarily Muslim, is still on the margins of politics and the economy. Some are driven to resort to extreme means in order to achieve political power, including the sporadic, negligent exploitation of their ethnic and religious identities, since political power is necessary for both individual and collective enrichment. Nigerians are politically encouraged to employ all available means, including inciting conflict between ethnic and religious groups, using violence, and supporting extremist organizations like Boko Haram (Aghedo and Oarhe, 2012). The pervasive corruption in the Nigerian government, which only helps to enrich a select few elites through patronage networks, exacerbates the aforementioned factors.

Therefore, despite Nigeria's wealth of natural resources and noteworthy recent economic growth, a significant portion of the population remains excluded from economic opportunities.Since democratization in 1999, Nigeria has frequently seen ethnic and sectarian violence, primarily due to competition for financial and political resources. Over 30,000 Nigerians have died as a result of the conflicts (Nigerian Social Violence Project, 2014), eroding social cohesiveness and intensifying the zero-sum, competitive nature of both politics and the economy. Furthermore, in response to these conflicts, the state has mostly employed coercion and repression, occasionally acting arbitrarily (Aghedo and Oarhe, 2012), which has reduced people's trust in the Nigerian government. However, this work will explore the significances and challenges of military intervention in conflict related crisis in the North East in particular and Nigeria at large.

Conceptual Clarifications

Terrorism

A violent approach that targets civilians from one side only, as stated by Ekaterina (2008), is what is known as terrorism. It also participates in uneven, violent conflict with a more powerful opponent, which could be a state or a collection of states. To achieve political,

religious, or even other goals, people may employ coercive means against populations, which is what Chomsky (2001, p.19) Armed Conflicts: these are actions by the military and rebel organizations that result in the deaths of innocent bystanders and the destruction of property Nigeria's Northeast: is the region with the greatest amount of semi-arid savanna and desert. It serves as a buffer between sub-Equatorial Africa and the Sahel. The Islamic group Boko Haram originally originated in the northeast of Nigeria.

Counter-Terrorism

What should be done to combat terrorism depends on the various types of terrorism and the motivations behind them in various nations (Crelinsten, 2009). These consist of resources like money, people, places, and time (Crelinsten, 2009). These claims clarify why counterterrorism is viewed by Chailand (1987) as both a reaction to and one of the primary results of terrorism. In line with this, Richardson (2011) stated that policymakers might not be able to create and carry out measures to stop terrorism until they have control over the causes of the crime. Understanding the underlying causes of terrorism leads to the development of a comprehensive counterterrorism policy (Kundnani, 2015). But a reaction ought to include military action, police investigation, and preventative measures (Kundnani, 2015). These are methods for fighting terrorism that are both hard and soft. In order to combat terrorism, Hoeft (2015: 3-6) succinctly explains this by stating that, while military action (hard approach) may be required in cases where terrorists resist the soft approach, "war on idea" (soft approach) and "not war on terror" are crucial. According to Hoft (2015), he draws the conclusion that counterterrorism strategies that are effective in one nation might not be in another.

Radicalisation

Radicalization is a process where individuals and organizations adopt violent strategies to achieve political goals. It can result from factors like splits, resentments, peer pressure, group influence, charismatic leaders, and group influence. Some terrorists are enlisted for evil purposes like rape, plunder, or power, while others join for a common ideology that benefits the group. Some individuals only join if coerced into doing so.

De-radicalisation

Schmidt (2013) argues that the low number of terrorism-related crimes is evidence of successful deradicalization efforts. Deradicalization involves preventing and deprogramming those who have become radicalized and become terrorists, as well as those who are radicalized but haven't yet. The primary objective of any deradicalization program is to reintegrate suspected terrorists into society and help them avoid future violence.

Combating Terrorism: An International Perspective

The effectiveness of counterterrorism measures depends on the balance between hard and soft power. Hard power involves a state's monopoly on the fight against terrorism, while soft power involves economic reforms, public education, advocacy, and diplomatic initiatives. The Nigerian government's actions have been linked to the use of force against Boko Haram. Both armed and non-combative action can serve as role models. The military model involves peacekeeping operations, military aid, and deterrence. The non-military model emphasizes persuasive tactics and addressing deradicalization and terrorism as fuels. The United Nations' model, also known as the 5Ds, aims to prevent terrorism, dissuade states, increase state capacity, and safeguard human rights. However, creating a uniform response to terrorism is challenging due to varying national views on terrorist acts.

Nigeria's Counterterrorism Agenda

The Nigerian government has responded to the threat posed by Boko Haram by enacting policies and forming bilateral and multilateral relationships. These include the declaration of a state of emergency, curfews, stationing of the Nigerian Army's 7th Division in Maiduguri, opening Almajiri schools, relocation of the military command center to Maiduguri, suspension and reinstatement of Global System for Mobile Communication (GSMC) services, establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), and an administrative panel to negotiate with Boko Haram. The government has also provided assistance from USAID, placing a $7 million bounty on Boko Haram's leader and prohibiting the group's leaders. Nigeria has recently joined the Coalition of Muslim Countries against Terrorism led by Saudi Arabia.

The government's response has taken various forms, including diplomatic outreach, military expeditions, declarations of emergencies, requests for foreign assistance, and relocation of the military command center to Maiduguri. Intelligence is considered a solid cornerstone of the fight against terrorism, and the Nigerian State's human intelligence assets are crucial in addressing Boko Haram.

The Nigerian security system has been criticized for inadequate intelligence collection and the need to eliminate bias. Security personnel react to but do not prevent violence, including Boko Haram terrorism. Inaction in the face of information about potential violent incidents leads to violent conflict, as demonstrated by the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s and the current Boko Haram crises. The National Anti-Terrorist Act (NACTEST) and other acts must be evaluated equally due to the paucity of research on the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in combating the threat posed by Boko Haram to peace and security. These documents broaden the purview and authority of current policies and function as formal legislation for counterterrorism efforts.

Military Operations and Civilian Vigilantes

The government deployed 3,600 people to Maiduguri and other northeastern towns in 2011 as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF), a coalition of military, police, and SSS units. However, the troops had too much on their plates to maintain control over the vast area. In May 2011, 2,000 extra troops and heavy military hardware were dispatched to Maiduguri, and a state of emergency was proclaimed in the Northeast. The following day, troops sealed off portions of the borders with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, and fighter jets began attacking Boko Haram camps in northern Borno. A new army division, the 7th, code-named BOYONA, took over counterterrorism operations in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. Civilian vigilantes, young people from city neighborhoods, have supported operations in Maiduguri since June 2013. The security environment surrounding Maiduguri has considerably improved thanks to their help, and President Jonathan referred to them as "new national heroes" in July 2013. The federal

government must create a cogent strategy for dealing with vigilantes and prove the state's ability to reestablish law and order.

Operation Restore Order I, II and III

Operation Restore Order I, launched on June 12, 2011, was the first military offensive against the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. The task force, consisting of 3,872 personnel from various government departments, aimed to restore law and order in Borno State. Initially ill-prepared to handle modern security issues, the Nigerian Army made progress in strategy and tactics, including anti-terrorism, special reconnaissance, information operations, management, and close-quarters combat. The military also increased warfare, intelligence operations, amphibious operations, demolition and explore breaching, tactical communication, and civil-military relations. However, the Joint Task Force (JTF) realized that to root out Boko Haram terrorists, they needed to "mouse hole" through homes thought to harbor terrorists, leading to numerous weapon apprehendings, detentions, and the recovery of IEDs and weapons.

Operation BOYONA

BOYONA, an acronym for Borno, Yobe, Nasarawa, and Adamawa operation, is used. In response to the ongoing violence and wanton destruction of lives and property in the northeastern region of the nation by Boko Haram insurgents, BOYONA was first designed to address the deteriorating security conditions in these states. On May 14, 2013, the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa were placed under a state of emergency by Goodluck Jonathan, the then-president of Nigeria and the head of state of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Thus, it was ordered that Admiral Ola sa'ad Ibrahim, the chief of defense staff, restore law and order in the impacted states (Osakwe and Audu, 2017). Following orders, soldiers made up of men from the police, the armed forces, and other Operation Boyona saw the deployment of security forces to guard the country's borders and uphold its territorial integrity (Abdul, 2013).

Operation Zaman Lafiya

Following the formation of the 7 Division in August 2013, Operation BOYONA was subsequently renamed Operation Zaman Lafiya. The close support command was used to

organize and structure the JTF operation Zaman Lafiya. This does not guarantee unity of Command, but it does guarantee mutual cooperation and coordination amongst the services to control the mission area (Ogbazino, 2015). The logistical support circumstances encountered during Operation Zaman Lafiya were not optimal. Since arriving in the mission area in 2011, the Army component of the JTF had been deficient in nearly every logistical item (Ogbazino, 2015). As previously mentioned, there have been some achievements in these operations, including the capture and removal of weapons, the arrest of Boko Haram leaders, and the overall demolition of bases. These achievements Nevertheless, they fell short of the goals that ought to have been attained through coordinated or coordinated operations. Major General Tukur Buratai, who was appointed Chief of Army Staff in July 2015, declared that Lafiya Dole, which translates to "Peace by Force," was the new name for Operation Zaman Lafiya at the 103 Battalion Nigerian Army, which is stationed in Konduga, Borno State.

Theoretical Framework

Baron and Richardson's Frustration Aggression Theory

According to the frustration theory, aggressive behaviors are a result of frustration. Frustration was defined by Baron and Richardson (1994) as the impediment to continuous goal-directed behavior. On the other hand, aggression is defined as any behavior that aims to cause harm to another individual who would otherwise be motivated to protect themselves from harm (either by introducing aversive stimuli or by more passive means, such as withholding beneficial stimuli) (Benjamin, 2006). When frustration turns into aggression, it's not always directed at the source of the aggravation. Wood and Boyd (2007) concur that aggression may be diverted if the desired target is too dangerous or unavailable (Wood et al., 2007). According to Feierabends and Nesvold (1971), "Systematic frustration leads to aggression," meaning that the political system under which a society lives causes collective frustration among its members, which in turn causes a tendency toward political aggression (Feierabends and Nesvold, 1971).

Rummel (1976) criticizes the ideas that anger can result in non-aggression, that anger can happen in the absence of frustration, and that in certain cultures, anger is not always the normal reaction to frustration. As a result, the theory of frustration and aggression has found a perfect home in explaining the wide range of violent acts regularly committed by the Boko Haram sect (Agbiboa 2013). According to Maiangwa et al., Boko Haram members have been carrying out a mission of vengeance ever since their sect leader was attacked by government security forces in a violent incident that occurred in July 2009. Radical Islamist groups have contested state authority in the North, where unemployment and long-term poverty are common (Agbiboa, 2013). A democratic government that should be able to meet their basic needs has left the youth feeling disenchanted and even more so, which has led to Boko Haram's horrific activities in Northern Nigeria.

Boko Haram Activities in Kundiga

On 5 January 2015, "Troops of the 7 Division of the Nigerian Army ... clashed with suspected members of the Boko Haram sect at Mainari village in Konduga Local Government of Borno State." The community has been the target of recruiting raids by Boko Haram. BH's activities in Konduga include a mass shooting in 2013, massacres in January and February 2014, battles in 2014 and 2015, as well as suicide bombings in 2018 and 2019.

Problems Encountered by the Military in the Fight against Boko Haram

The purpose of the research was to ascertain from the respondents what issues (military efforts, funding, battle readiness, remuneration, and equipment availability) typically arise when they deal with insurgency. The majority of respondents—13 percent—thought that insufficient efforts had been made to combat insurgency, which could explain why efforts to destroy Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria had been delayed. Battle readiness came in second with 83%, behind funding, compensation, and equipment availability at 27%, 30%, and 40%, respectively.

This reaffirms Faluyi's (2017) findings, which indicate that the military frequently struggles to contain the threat posed by Boko Haram due to a lack of funding and inadequate

equipment. As a security agency, the military has received inadequate funding (Adesoji, 2011). Insufficient financial resources and outdated capacity-building initiatives have reduced the military's ability to monitor Boko Haram's operations (Dietrich, 2015). Dealing with the orgy of crimes and violence committed by Boko Haram has proven to be challenging due to inadequate and untrustworthy intelligence reports on the group's activities (Maingwa, 2012).

Effective Military Participation in Armed Conflicts in Kundiga Nigeria

Effective Military Intervention in Armed Conflicts in Northeastern Nigeria. It is currently advised that the military play a role in effectively quelling the insurgency in the northeast. Ninety-three percent of the respondents to the survey said that the military in the northeast had done enough to arrest the security situation. Despite the ongoing killings and recent conflicts between farmers and herders, which often provide the rebels with an excuse to unleash havoc on the populace, only 7% of people do not exhibit greed. The majority of soldiers think that the military's assistance in managing and ending the Boko Haram situation, made possible by the Civilian Joint Taskforce's cooperation, is adequate; 97 percent of participants concurred that the Civilian Joint

In the conflict-turned community, the relationship between the military and the youths who volunteered to join the CJTF has frequently resulted in friendship that fosters harmony and reduces hostility; 99% of the troops concur that the relationship has helped foster friendship by placing a barrier on the insurgents' ability to take advantage of any discord that may have arisen to sow fear among the local population. As a result of the CJTF's and the community leaders' acceptance of them, the participating troops believe that this has greatly enhanced their operations and assisted in managing the security situation. The CJTF and military have provided strategies that have been involved in handling security situations in an efficient manner. In addition, 93% of the volunteered troops agreed that the availability of weapons and CJTF cooperation had contributed significantly to their victory over the insurgents. Of these, 96% agreed that the management of the security situation in the northeast

was attributable to the timely provision of weapons and military technology along with an improved political will.

Methodology

Area of the Study

Konduga is a community in Borno State has a population of 372,368 as the projection of NPC 2019, its Local Government Area of the same name about 25 km to the southeast of Maiduguri, situated on the north bank of the Ngadda River. The population of the Konduga Local Government Area is about 13,400. It is one of the sixteen LGAs that constitute the Borno Emirate, a traditional state located in Borno State, Nigeria. The primary languages are Shuwa Arabic, Kanuri, Mafa and Wandala / Malgwa. By 6300 BP, pottery began to appear in Konduga. Occurring in the era of Mega Lake Chad, the pottery was decorated in the custom of Saharan ceramics. As of 2006, most inhabitants were illiterate and engaged in subsistence farming, with earnings below US$20 per annum. Most people did not have access to potable water or electricity, and the roads are not passable in the rainy season. Maternal mortality is high. A 2003 study identified the main obstacles to accessing the hospital for emergency obstetric care as lack of money and transportation difficulties. Soil fertility in the area is declining

Methods of Data Analysis

The study's goals and research questions guided the analysis of the created and gathered data. Random sampling was used to distribute sixty questionnaires to respondents; of these, thirty were completed and returned. So, information obtained from the eighty questionnaires forms the basis of the data analysis. In order to provide an accurate representational value, data were expressed as percentages when needed.

Problems Raised as a Result of Armed Conflict in Northeast

According to the participating troops' opinions, the issue resulting from the insurgents' infiltration is presented in the table below. The sample of voluntarily drafted soldiers expressed their personal opinions and beliefs regarding the insurgency issue.

Problems created by the Insurgency in the Northeast

Problems	Strongly Agreed	Agreed	Disagreed	Don't know
Effects on Nation development	10(33%)	9(30%)	11(37%)	0(0.00)
High insecurity	12(40%)	8(27%)	10(33%)	0(0.00)
Religious intolerance	5(17%)	5(17%)	9(30%)	1(3.0%)
Weak patriotism among the populace of the country	3(10%)	6(20%)	0(0.00)	0(0.00)
Total	30(100%)	28(94%)	30(100%)	1(3%)

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

Troops 63% strongly agreed that the northeast's security issue has an affected on the country's development in terms of investment, but 30% disagreed that the region's youth has engage in to the link of Boko Haram as result of poverty, illiteracy and lack of proper guidance, while 7% has link the faut on both government, religious leaders and parent on not given the right training to youth until the Boko Haram advocacy led by Mohammed Yusuf damage the moral of the youth in the zone.

Civilian Perception of the Military in the Hosting Communities

S/N	Problems	Yes	No
1.	Presence of military has stopped the spate of attacks	5(17%)	3(10%)
2.	There is gross abuse of human rights	7(23%)	2(7%)
3.	Cooperation offered has improved the duties of the military to manage the security problem	3(10%)	4(13%)
4.	Involvement of the military has brought about the management of social, security, religious, economic and political problems respectively	4(13%)	2(7%)

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

The Relationships Between Boko Haram's Emergence, Poor Governance, Education, and Poverty

Poverty, illiteracy, and, worst of all, incompetent and unaccountable governance severely afflict Nigerian society. The most severely affected regions of Nigeria in terms of poverty and illiteracy are the northern regions. In addition, the high rate of illiteracy in the region may have

resulted from Northerners' earlier decision to forgo receiving an English education in the Western system. However, the cost of education is prohibitive for the poor, and this may also be the case in other nations. This is especially true in the case of Nigeria.

Comparably, those who are impoverished are more likely to worry about finding food on a daily basis than about pursuing an education. People who are dissatisfied with their lives may find themselves drawn into an insurgency in a place like Nigeria where the government appears to have no concern for the welfare of its people. Boko Haram militants also rob banks and threaten affluent Nigerians with financial threats. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the group purportedly asked for a ceasefire agreement worth 26 billion naira, or $165 million. This emphasizes the reality religion is not the only topic, despite what many people believe and what the media portrays. It is also important to note that the Nigerian media heavily frames news about Boko Haram, and that the group frequently fails to report on its struggle against corrupt officials, which is a component of its demands for the establishment of an Islamic state.

The group, according to the Nigerian media, is opposed to westernization and wants an Islamic state, maybe in order to attract foreign military support. This isn't meant to support the group, though; corruption is a major problem in Nigeria, as evidenced by the frequent embezzlement of billions of naira into the hands of private citizens. utterly obliging the general public's welfare, leaving them destitute, irate, and unable to pay for education. Empirical data indicated that the Boko Haram sect's birthplace, the northeast and northwest regions of Nigeria, had higher rates of poverty.

Conclusion

In Northern Nigeria, religious extremism and youth radicalism must be addressed immediately in light of the atrocities committed by Boko Haram in recent years. Numerous people have been forced to flee their homes, thousands of people have lost their lives, and both private and public property have been destroyed as a result of the horrible acts.

Recommendations

The researchers have following suggestion to improve the issue of security in the North-East in particular and Nigeria in general through adopting the following things: Supporting military formations in terms of training, facilities and welfare to end the issues of insurgency in the North East in particular and Nigeria in general.

Create a platform that can enhance synergy between the military and civilian task force to fight the menace of insurgency in North East in particular and Nigeria in general. Encourage a positive working relationship between military units and the host communities to ensure that the insurgency in the Northeast is defeated. Government needs to developed strategies on fighting poverty and providing the needed services that would enhance human development in the North East.

References

Abdul, L (2013) An X-ray on operation Boyona. (Special edition), Nigerian Defence Magazine, Nigeria, pp. 21-22.

Adeleke, A. (2013). Insecurity: A threat to Human Existence and Economic Development in Nigeria.

Adesoji, A. (2011). Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State. Africa Today, 57 (2) p. 98-119.

Aghedo, I. & Oarhe, O. (2012). The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond? Third World Quarterly. 33(5): pg.861

Benjamin, A. J. (2006). Human Aggression and Violence: Understanding Torture from Psychological Perspective. National Science Journal. Vol. 20 (2): pg. 12-19.

Best, S. G. (2006). The Method of Conflict Resolution and Transformation (Ed). Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa. University of Peace.

Charas, M. T. (2015). Insecurity in Northern Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and Resolutions. International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies. Volume 2, Number 4, Pg: 23-36.

CNN library (2015). Boko Haram Fast Facts [online].Retrieved on 16 May 2015 http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/.

Campell, J. (2014). United States Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram. Council for Preventive Action Council Special Report No. 70, November, 2014.

Hoeft, G. (2015). 'Soft' Approaches to Counter-Terrorism: An Exploration of the Benefits of Deradicalisaton Programs. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Isyaku, A. (2013). Terrorism: A New Challenge to Nigeria Stability in the 21st Century. International Affairs and Global Strategy, 12 (1): 16-24.
Jacob, Z. (2013). The Islamic Movement and The Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria, CTC Sentinel 6(10): pg. 13-18.
Kayode B (2015) Inside Nigeria's Sambisa forest, the Boko Haram hideout where kidnapped school girls are believed to be held. Nigeria.
Maiangwa, B., Uzodike, U. O., Whetho, A. and Onapajo, H. (2013). "Baptism by Fire": Boko Haram and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria: Africa Today, Vol. 59(2): Pg.42-57.
NACTEST. (2014). National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). Office of the National Security Adviser.
Olabanyi, O. E. (2014). Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development Studies. Volume 5, Number 1, 40-63.
Osakwe CCC, Audu BJ (2015) Nigerian military professionalism in complex military operations. Leadership and complex military operations, NDA Publishers, Kaduna, Nigeria.
Osakwe, C. C. and Audu, B. J. (2017). Nigeria Military Operations in the Lake Chad Basin. Journal of Defense Management. Volume 7, number 1, Pages 1-8.
Ogbazino EM (2015) Joint operations in the nigerian armed forces: An appraisal of operation Zaman Lafiya. Department of Political Science and Defence Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria, p.37.
Owono J (2015) Military and religious extremism on the shores of Lake Chad. NigeriaUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009). Human Development Report Nigeria, 20008 – 2009. Abuja, UNDP.
Umar, M. (2001). Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s. Africa Today, 48 (2), 127-150.

PERSPECTIVE ON THE CEDING OF THE BAKASSI PENINSULA TO CAMEROON AND ITS EFFECT ON NIGERIA- CAMEROON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Matthew Enenche OGWUCHE, PhD
Department of Political Science
National Open University of Nigeria
mogwuche@noun.edu.ng

ABSTRACT
This paper examined the ceding of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and its effect on Nigeria- Cameroon diplomatic relations, as historically the border between Nigeria and Cameroon extending to Lake Chad, to the Gulf of Guinea has been a source of friction between the two countries dating back to 1913 during the colonial period. However, with the subsequent discovery that the Bakassi Peninsula is resource rich and has proven commercial deposits of oil/gas reserves, triggered mounting hostilities and military conflict in the early 1990's between Nigeria and Cameroon. The methodology was qualitative depending on library resources online and offline. The study in its findings concluded that the right and needs of all stakeholders in a conflict should be considered during the process of mediation, rather than routinely following the traditional path of international intervention through the UN. The paper recommended that it is not a UN International Court of Justice ruling on territorial disputes between neighbourly nation-states, rather it is a referendum which gives people the right of self-determination that should determine where people in disputed areas should belong to, so as to safeguard their citizenship and final fate in statehood.

Keywords: *Diplomatic Relations, Ceding, Bakassi Peninsula*

Introduction

The border between Cameroon and Nigeria extending from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea has been a bone of contention between the two territories dating back to 1913. However, the knowledge that the Bakassi Peninsula harbor's important deposits of oil/gas reserves triggered mounting hostilities and military confrontations in the early 1990s between Cameroon and Nigeria. According to Klare (2014), the close connection between oil and differences derives

from three essential features of petroleum: (1) its vital importance to the economic and military power of nations; (2) its irregular geographical distribution; and (3) its imminent changing centre of gravity. Territorial claims, ideology, colonialism, nationalism, religion and natural resources have typically been the main sources of differences throughout the world. While the influence of some of these is waning, struggles for the control of valuable natural resources have remained a persistent feature of national and international affairs for decades. In addition to helping some of the most corrupt and oppressive regimes to remain in power, natural resources have been fuelling differences within and between African countries. Such differences situations typically take the form of territorial disputes over the possession of oil-laden border areas, factional struggles among the leaders of oil-rich countries, and major inter-state wars over the control of vital oil and mineral zones (Klare 2004). Africa was largely controlled by indigenous people in the 1870s, but by 1914 it became almost exclusively subjugated and divided into protectorates/colonies by the European powers (Rourke 2013; Aghemelo & Ibhasebhor 2016). The colonial boundaries in these configurations were not established according to the various indigenous groupings. Grouping nations together in some cases and dividing them in others was a common feature as long as it was consistent with the security and economic interests of the colonial powers. After independence, most of Africa became and is still troubled by the legacy of trying to get originally different indigenous groupings to live peacefully in a single country or to get the same ethnic group to live peacefully in different neighboring countries. As in most of Africa, therefore, the origins of the differences between Cameroon and Nigeria over border issues can be traced to the colonial era and some post-independence political activities.

On August 15, 2013, the United Nations Security Council issued a statement welcoming the peaceful end two days earlier of the special transitional regime that had been established for the Bakassi Peninsula. (Press Release, Security Council Press Statement on Bakassi Peninsula Developments, (Aug. 15, 2013).) The peninsula, which is rich in natural resources, was a long-time bone of contention between Cameroon and Nigeria until, in June

2006, the U.N. backed the "Green tree Agreement," in which Nigeria recognized the authority of Cameroon over the disputed region. The pact set the terms and timeline for a transition of the peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon. (Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria Concerning the Modalities of Withdrawal and Transfer of Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula (June 12, 2006), African Union website.)

The Green tree Agreement was designed to implement a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 2002 under which the Bakassi Peninsula was transferred from Nigerian control to that of Cameroon. (Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, No. 94, ICJ (Oct. 10, 2002).) The formal ceding of the territory occurred in 2008, and since that year there has been a transitional plan in effect. The Security Council has now praised the work of the U.N. Office for West Africa, which headed the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, and of the Follow Up Committee, which monitored the way in which the Green Tree Agreement was implemented. The U.N. bodies were instrumental in assisting the two countries to demarcate land and maritime boundaries. (Security Council Praises Cameroon, Nigeria for Bakassi Peninsula Transition, UN NEWS CENTRE (Aug. 15, 2013).)

Prior to the initiation of this border resolution process, there had been disputes between the two countries since 1960, with armed skirmishes resulting in loss of life in the 1990s. One factor complicating the resolution was the oil that Nigeria has been extracting from Bakassi; under the Green tree Agreement, Nigeria can continue to take out oil provided it keeps paying taxes on it to Cameroon. (Cameroon-Nigeria: Settling Bakassi – Interview with UN Envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, IRIN (Nov. 14, 2007).)

As noted by Asobie (2003), a deeper examination may reveal that, in essence, international differences are struggles between primary social classes, clashing across national boundaries. In this regard, the real actors in international differences are social classes (for instance, the ruling elite) which, in their struggles, mobilize and use the various state institutions to push forward their goals. For the most part, contests are related to the control of

productive resources. Even when such resources are exploited, the proceeds are typically distributed disproportionately in favour of the ruling classes and their cronies/protégés. As the working-class citizens become aware of this unequal sharing, the more vulnerable ones may be attracted into social movements conceived and sponsored by disgruntled dropouts from the ruling class. Such social movements are fashioned to operate in opposition to the ruling elite using all sorts of means, while expecting better days ahead. Hence, this study aims at examining the ceding of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and its effect on Nigeria and Cameroon relations.

Despite the laudable truce and verdict of the International Court of Justice to eradicate militancy in the region as well as promote peaceful co-existence, it totally failed to provide palliative measures to the residents and original inhabitants of Bakassi. It had been widely acclaimed that the verdict of the international court of justice on the disputed territory will go a long way to settling boundary disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon but the truth remains that Bakassi residents are still in disarray. This shows that no proper plan was drawn up to relocate the original inhabitants of the Island; Abana and Atabong to a well-planned area where they will continue their lives, and no proper plans were made for new means of livelihood. Most of the populace made their living through fishing (Mbuh 2014) but this would have to change to perhaps crop and animal production against their will.

Although both countries do benefit from the positive consequences of peace, there are a number of downsides socially, politically, and economically. First, over 12,000 Bakassi residents chose to leave the area and move to Nigerian territory. The Nigerian government found a place to resettle the refugees in Cross Nigeria State, but in doing so they displaced other Nigerian citizens. The accommodations for the refugees were not sufficient, with 172 housing units for 12,000 people, leaving many homeless. The Bakassi people also suffered a loss of cultural way of life, as the fishermen and their families were moved to a landlocked area where their skills could not be used. Second, those who choose to stay behind in Bakassi had ill-feelings toward the Nigerian government and started political movements in an attempt

to secede the region from both countries, such as the Bakassi Movement for the Self-Sovereignty of the Peninsula, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. These have been the problems not yet solved by the two countries.

Aim of the Paper

The paper sought to examine whether the ceding of the Bakassi peninsula affected the right of self-determination or sovereignty of the Bakassi people, and the consequent effect of ceding the Bakassi peninsula on the diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Historical Background to the Diplomatic Crisis over the Bakassi

Disputes along the Cameroon-Nigeria border has been a matter of historic proportions especially along the Cross Nigeria to the Sea section where in lies the Bakassi peninsula. The dispute over the Bakassi peninsula is not only the product of redefinition of boundary by the colonial powers but more so a product of resource allocation and clash of tradition and modernity in which the pre-colonial history of the ancient kingdom of Calabar haunted the postcolonial reality of contemporary Nigeria and Cameroon. In pre-colonial times, the now disputed Bakassi peninsula was under the ancient kingdom of Calabar which became part of Nigeria in 1914 under British rule. However, through a series of bilateral treaties and other legal instruments, the British ceded the territory, first to Germany, and then paced it under the mandate of the League of Nations and trusteeship of the United Nations. Meanwhile the British protectorates in Nigeria, including the Kingdom of Calabar were merged with its colonies in the area, as one integrated British colony. Later, largely due to the political errors and indifference of Nigeria politicians, the Republic of Cameroon obtained the Bakassi Peninsula in the process of a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations in 1959 and 1961.

By the same process, Nigeria also obtained some territories which formerly belonged to Cameroon. The most important documents that concerns the demarcation of the border between the Cameroons and Nigeria are the following: The Anglo-German Treaty; The Anglo German Protocol signed in Obokun, on April 12, 1913; The exchange of letters between British and German governments on July 6th 1914; the endorsement, in 1961, by both the

United Nations General Assembly and the International Court of Justice of the results of the plebiscite conducted in Northern and Southern Cameroon. February 11th and 12th, 1961; and the diplomatic note, accompanied by a map, dispatched to the government of Cameroon by Nigeria, in 1962 accepting the results of the plebiscite (http:// www.postwatchmagazine.come) As can be testified from the above material, Germany played a very important role in defining boundaries in West Africa especially along the Gulf of Guinea. The early arrival Germany in the region and their success in signing treaties with Cameroonian Kings of Akwa and Bell of Douala on July 14th 1884 set the tone for most of what obtains as acceptable boundaries in the region. These treaties in effect, proclaimed the German Protectorate extending from Rio Del Rey area to Gabon. This angered the British console Hewett who could not participate due to late coming (Weladji, 2015).

Among the many factors that contributed to the above differences was the legacy of both the imperialist colonial rule and the neo-colonial regimes in African at the time. The imperialist capitalist and the colonial masters like Portugal, German, France and Britain and their shrewd and selfish economic, political and strategic calculations of the 19th century acted as nursery for future African differences. The ground work for such future differences in the region were laid through things like the divide-and-rule system of administration and the partitioning of African States and their people irrespective of the damage it caused to the people's language, socio-political life and cultural affiliations and ancestral lineage. This selfish behaviour divided ethnics groups into territories controlled by the colonial lords and then stifled the reign of peace in the region as divided families opposed the system and fought for the unity of their families and friends. This response became rampant across the board in Africa as people objected the cruel and selfish destruction of their culture caused by the colonial masters.

According to Mbiti, (2009), African traditional life is anthropocentric since man is at the center of existence. Man, here comprises of a sum total of the unborn, the living and the living dead. In the African worldview, man is not viewed as an individual but essentially as a

member of a community. In traditional African life then, there is not split compartment called culture for culture lies at the core of an Africans life. An attempt then to separate an African from his or her own culture leads to identity issues which in effect ignite differences.

The African family is extended and covers a sum total of brothers and sisters of parents, with their families as well as grandparents. Relationships between uncles and nephews can be just as close as and even closer than between actual parents and their children. Children tend to be closer to their grandparents than their own parents because grandparents care for the children throughout the day while the parents are away working. A person then has many people who could be considered their fathers and mothers as well as a gamut of brothers and sisters. This deep sense of community living does not end at the level of the extended family but continues to the larger community of the tribe and even the clan which is not only limited to those living but extends backward to the ancestral spirits who constitute a vital part of the community. To Mbiti, (2009), then existence in relationships sums up the pattern of the African way of life. From the above worldview, it is certain that redefining boundaries and separating people under the pretext of colonization was deeply offensive to Africans values, thus differences.

However, during the colonial rule of present-day Nigeria, Great Britain ceded the Bakassi Peninsula, which was within the territorial ambit of Old Calabar, to Germany with the Anglo-German Treaty in March 1913. In the post-colonial era, the resource-rich Bakassi Peninsula became a disputed territory between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its immediate neighbor, the Republic of Cameroon. As both States claimed sovereignty over the peninsula, intermittent skirmishes between their armed forces occurred between 1981 and 1996.

In 1960, the French Cameroon got its independence as the Republic of Cameroon, and in 1961 following the results of United Nations organized Plebiscites to determine the future of both British Cameroons, Northern Cameroons got independence by joining the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which had got independence earlier in 1960. The Southern Cameroons

reunified with the Republic of Cameroon. There was every indication, particularly in the period preceding reunification of the Southern and French Cameroons that Britain intended to integrate it fully into Nigeria despite its distinct status as a trust territory (Awesome, 2018). The British method of administration had important consequences for future political developments. It created the appearance that Nigeria, rather than Britain, was the colonial power ruling the Southern Cameroons. But even after the reunification of both Cameroons, the inhabitants of the former Southern Cameroon consistently felt as if they were being recolonized by their French counterparts. All the same, they had accepted to form a common nation; a nation that by divine design had Nigeria as a neighbour.

The existing theoretical structure of the Cameroon- Nigerian relations fall within the confines of distributive ethnic compositions, colonial influence on indigenous boundaries, permeability of the Cameroon–Nigeria border and the dispute between both states over the Bakassi Peninsula. In fact, however separated these nation-states seem to be they remain a common people, especially the inhabitants of the frontier-line (Omede, 2016:17; Ate and Akinterinwa, 2012). They are duly associated not by colonial effort but through ethnic affiliations. Rather, colonial state creation dishearteningly fragmented brethren. No wonder, Njoku (2012) claims that the permanent presence of a population with a common historical experience, and of the same ethno-cultural stock on both sides of the ostensible international divides one of the natural features which have stubbornly frustrated Cameroon and Nigeria attempts to physically demarcate their borders. He maintains that ethnic groups and sub-groups of Nigerian origin cut across the Nigerian international boundaries with Cameroon. The four major ethnic groups that originally occupied the boundary area between both nations are the Ibibio, Efik, Ekoi, some Bantu and semi-Bantu peoples, and that the semi-bantu (Ibibio/Efik, Ekoi and Boki). This is confirmed by Hansen (2011) when he indicates that these groups constitute part of the Bakassi border region which "falls under sub-national areas where the socio-economic lives and well-being of the people are directly and significantly affected by proximity to international boundaries."

These boundaries (artificial in nature) once created as Niger Thomas (2011) suggests, cut across native areas, split communities and distorted the functioning of some of these communities, like the Ejagham and Boki groups of Manyu Division divided between Nigeria and Cameroon into Ejagham-Nigeria and Ejagham- Cameroon. Kah & Nkwi (2011) attribute this ethnic division and disintegration to the German and British boundary demarcation exercises of 1912-1913. Fanso (2018:53) adds that the Ejagham, who straddle the Cameroon-Nigeria border, are also located in the area extending from west of Nchang near Mamfe town to Ikom in Nigeria. They also extend from Agbokem on the Cross River to the Oban Hills and Calabar at the month of the Cross River. Pemunta (2011) supports Fanso when he says that Ejaghams and the Bayangs maintain similar socio-economic and political institutions and have historic connections to the outside world by virtue of their trans- border location on the Cameroon-Nigeria frontiers. Besides the Banyang, their northern neighbors living on the "over side" of the Cross River generally referred to as Anyang and the Keyaka-Ekoi people (Obang, Ekwe and Keaka) also constitute an ethnic connection with those distributed in neighboring Nigeria.

This is also the case with the Mbembe people of Abong (Nigeria) and Abongshe (Cameroon). Shewa (2016) and Ntoi (2013:13) confirm this when they say that the Abongshe and Abong peoples, living on both sides of River Donga are all Mbembe. They are only divided by the river, which represents the international borderline between Cameroon and Nigeria, and they all depended on one another's political, economic and social contacts.

Conceptual Framework

Diplomatic Relations and Differences

Diplomatic differences as a concept is as old as the history of mankind and therefore normal, natural and unavoidable, yet it can generate negative and very destructive impacts, as well as awareness, economic growth and development (Ivorgba 2015). What matters is our response to differences and post-differences situations. Differences is an indication that somehow, there is misunderstanding that requires attention and proper action. International differences might

occur between governments striving to monopolies the exploitation of resources in disputed territories. It could arise when a nation-state intervenes in the domestic disputes of another state. Occasionally, a difference may ensue where the nationals of one state are attacked, dehumanized, killed or maimed by the agents of another state. Differences between countries are often presented as occurring between their governments and such situations are either conducted or perceived as inter-governmental struggles, while the bone of contention is usually territory or some other economic resource (Asobie 2013). It is seldom the welfare of the ordinary citizens of the states concerned that provokes differences situations in Africa. Even when such reasons are brandished, they often turn out to be attempts at concealing other agendas.

As noted by Asobie (2013), a deeper examination may reveal that, in essence, international differences are struggles between primary social classes, clashing across national boundaries. In this regard, the real actors in international differences are social classes (for instance, the ruling elite) which, in their struggles, mobilize and use the various state institutions to push forward their goals. For the most part, contests are related to the control of productive resources. Even when such resources are exploited, the proceeds are typically distributed disproportionately in favour of the ruling classes and their cronies/protégés. As the working-class citizens become aware of this unequal sharing, the more vulnerable ones may be attracted into social movements conceived and sponsored by disgruntled dropouts from the ruling class. Such social movements are fashioned to operate in opposition to the ruling elite using all sorts of means, while expecting better days ahead.

Hiding behind governments, in some international differences, are the monopolistic capitalists operating trans-nationally with multinational tentacles. Major oil and mineral exploiting companies belong to this category. These dominant expatriate capitalists are typically in simultaneous alliances with the respective ruling classes in the exploitation of resources in both countries. These unpleasant alliances often manifest in millions of hard currencies diverted and stacked away in foreign banks, and open avenues for interventions in

domestic affairs of host countries that serve the interest of multinationals even at the cost of inter-state differences. Yet victims of such differences remain the working people – especially the youth, women and child soldiers, as well as old people who find it difficult to escape differences zones, emigrate or seek refugee status elsewhere.

Ceding

The ceding of Bakassi has induced several socio-cultural challenges in the area. Some of these challenges include cultural clash, governance and political adjustment problems, perceptual and cognitive reorientation, difficulty of embracing a new country, perception of being a refugee in one's country, economic subjugation and even human right abuses (Adoke, 2012). Some of these social and personality problems could have been avoided if the inhabitants of Bakassi were allowed the choices of determining for themselves their statehood. Nigeria's use of the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a reason for handing over Bakassi to Cameroun is an attribute of locus of control. Locus of control as noted by Nweke, Nwankwo, and Ugokwe-Ossai (2012) is a strategy of managing anxiety by adopting a disposition of making attributions and explanations of the cause of events. It is evident that Nigeria used the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to shroud the mistakes of ceding Bakassi to Cameroun. The ceding of Bakassi is a manifestation of Nigeria's political culture that leader's idiosyncrasy has adverse consequences on the nation. In Nigeria, leadership is personalized, and individuals are promoted over and above institutions (Adesola, 2012). By ceding Bakassi, Nigeria is perceived as exhibiting insensitivity to the feelings of the people of the Bakassi Peninsula. Soyinka (2012) and Adesola (2012) are therefore of the view that the inhabitants of Bakassi have the right to agitate for their identities and the government must oblige.

The inhabitants of Bakassi are often referred to as the "Bakassi People". This is an attribute of political and socio-cultural entity, identity, and recognition. The social psychology of such identification has compelled the people of Bakassi to reject being annexed by Cameroun. Again, there is a feeling of being betrayed by Nigeria. Consequently, consensus is

systematically being built for an independent and sovereign Bakassi, with a population that is greater than many independent and sovereign islands of the world (Edet, 2012).

The nature of domestic politics in the nation-states that form the bases for the contending parties. This includes the nature of the regime in power. Authoritarian/dictatorial regimes have the tendency to provoke the emergence of violent inter-state politics, so as to divert attention from burning domestic issues and prolong their stay in power. Generally, when violent conflicts erupt between two contending ruling classes of two distinct countries, they are extensions of violent intra-state conflicts promoted by the various discontented social groups who may be having international connections. Hoffmann (2015) observed that one definitely cannot imagine a non-violent diplomacy as long as violence has not been eliminated from intra-state politics. In this connection, social movements within territorial boundaries frequently seek to establish links with similar bodies in neighboring countries and will spare no effort in taking advantage of a conflict situation to canvass for international recognition.

Implications of the Verdict of the International Court of Justice

The disagreement over the international boundary dispute has been in existence for ages. Just like the boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula. The dispute was so serious to the extent that it generated serious controversy in the region. And this could be as a result of the natural resources therein hence; both Countries strived to retain ownership. In this regard, Osakwe (2016) &Akonye, (2018) observed that the boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria was a colonial legacy and consequently review the nature of the boundary as defined by various agreements and treaties which most at time was discomforted with scandalous loopholes. Akonye (2018) in agreement with Osakwe (1988) stated that the constant border conflicts between Cameroon and Nigeria is blamed on the recklessly and poorly defined borders bequeathed by the Colonialist. In a related observation, ICJ report (2012) opined that Bakassi is the Peninsula extension of the African territory of Calabar but is currently control and rule by Cameroon following the transfer of Sovereignty from Nigeria going by the International Court of Justice verdict of October 10, 2002. BBC

News Report of June 21, 2005 put the population of Bakassi inhabitant between 150,000 and 300,000. In effect, Omeje (2014) revealed that the Bakassi people are mainly, the people of Cross Rivers State, the Akwa Ibom State, the Efut, the Efik, the Ibibio and, the Anang, among others. Similarly, the Guardian Newspaper of 23rd August 2002, reports that the kingdom of Bakassi was founded around 1450 by the Efik nationality and was incorporated into the political frame work of the kingdom of old Calabar. The above assertion was in line with the view of Isaac (2014), who noted that the Bakassi People (Efik nationality) are the Afaha people from Usak Edet in Cameroon who left their place around 8000 BC to a place in Arochukwu called Ibom, in the present-day Abia state, there they established the long juju shrine in Arochukwu called ibinui kpabia. According to Arochukwu people, these people were living and interacting with them and they use to call them Ibibio people.

According to Akonye (2019), it is a body instituted by the United Nations for peace making, peace building, and conflict management, conflict resolution and for the settlement of disputes between and among sovereign nations and states. ICJ acts as a mediator for peace and conflict resolution between nation states. It has both a consultative and advisory function.

Green Tree Agreement

According to Akonye, (2019), Green Tree Agreement is the agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula at the Green Tree New York in USA in June 12, 2006 in the presence of then and late Secretary General of UNs, Mr. Kofi Anan. The aim of this agreement was to give a backup to ICJ verdict of 2002. Though the agreement only addresses the issue of citizenship rights of the Bakassi inhabitants who remain within the Bakassi region, but did not address the rights of those persons who may be on the Nigeria side of the border.

Theoretical Framework

The Consequence Theory

The consequence theory postulated that Nigeria rescinded its decision to reject the verdict of ICJ and ceded Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon because of the anticipated negative

consequences in the international system. In line with this argument, first it is contended that non-compliance with the verdict could incur the wrath of the UN security council under article 94 (2) of the UN charter, if any party may have recourse to the Security Council (Dayo, 2012). If the Security Council deems it necessary, it may make recommendations or decide measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. The member of the UN agreed to accept and carryout the decision of the Security Council and still in chapter II of the charter, the Security Council can impose sanctions and where necessary authorize enforcement against a state whose actions or omission threaten or lead to breaches of international peace and security. However, in seeking the intervention of the Security Council, Cameroon could easily court on the support and influence of France which is a permanent member of the council. Secondly, if Nigeria had failed to comply it would have risked being shut out should it seek to involve the jurisdiction of the court in subsequent cases as no court would readily grant audience to a country that flouts the ICJs orders (Dayo, 2012). Third, non-compliance on the part of Nigeria could undermine her contributions and impact at other international law bodies such as the international criminal court (ICC), and the international criminal tribunal (ICT), where Justice Adolphus Karibi-Whyte of Nigeria had once served as a judge with respect to an issue that affected Yugoslavia. Fourthly, non-compliance to the verdict could jeopardize the chances of Nigerian candidate for the judgeship of the court where distinguished Nigerians like T.O. Elias, Daddy Onyeama, and Bola Ajibola had served meritoriously on the court's Bench (Dayo 2012).

It is therefore notable that even though the national assembly may decline to implement the Green Tree Agreement under section 12 of the constitution thereby depriving it of any force of law domestically, this does not in any way void the international obligation of Nigeria firstly under the ICJ ruling of October 2002 and secondly under the Green Tree agreement. It is noted that the ICJ judgment imposed an international obligation upon Nigeria to comply with them as a member of the United Nations, and a party to the United Nations charter as well as the statute of the ICJ (an integral part of the charter) Egede; 2008). Under

article 94(1) of the united nation charter and article 59 of the statute of the ICJ" each member of the UN undertakes to comply with the decision of the international court of justice in any case to which it is a party.

The Economic Aid Theory

The economic aid theory argues that Nigeria ceded Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon because of other economic interest perceived to be higher and consequential for the country in the international community. As enunciated in the works of Akinyemi (2012), Egbo (2013), Fawole (2013), Akinterinwa (2017), Alli (2017), Agbu (2018) Eke (2019), and Aja (2019). Nigeria's economic interests largely revolve around (a) national economic recovery and diversified development (b) improved economic well-being of the Nigerian citizens (c) ensuring conducive economic conditions in African and the world to foster Nigeria's national self-reliance(d) promoting sustainable trade and investment (e) maintaining stable financial system and debt crisis management (f) job creation and poverty alleviation. However, in pursing these national economic interests, the Nigerian government anchored their efforts on economic diplomacy defined as the management of international relations in such a manner as to give topmost priority to the economic objectives of a nation through the application of economic measures or instruments in negotiating and bargaining with other countries either to control distribute, or redistribute scarce resources (Asobie, 2012; Ogwua, 2012; Eke 2014).

In this light, security debt relief from the international monetary Fund was seen as part of major efforts to achieve the identified economic interests which would be difficult if Nigeria were to flout the judgment of the ICJ. This is because most of the external creditors especially the Paris club of France have significant roles and influence to wield in the debt relief debates and the world bodies. Thus, given the entire declaration of the then president Olusegun Obasanjo that Nigeria needs to take the center globe and canvass her economic interests in the international community attention was focused more on pleasing the structures mechanisms, and institutions that allocate world resources.

Conclusion

This study was undertaken to investigate the consequences and implication of ceding Bakassi Peninsular to Cameroon with special reference to Bakassi local government area, over time, there have been lots of unending court cases, international dispute between Nigeria and her sister nation the republic of Cameroon over the oil rich peninsular (Bakassi). The disputed area became an area of concern since findings proved that the region was well endowed with oil. Before now, this area was inhabited by Nigerians who had their diverse means of livelihood aside oil exploration. Similarly, the disputed territory called for international verdict of which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) placed its ruling in favor of Cameroon. Hence, the original inhabitants are left with nothing to write home about. This study finally revealed that the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had a negative effect on the output of Bakassi residents, health status of Bakassi residents, housing status, as well as their employment status, and hence a call for intervention from the Nigerian Government and international communities.

The Bakassi territorial dispute resolution and the Green Tree Agreement are examples of a peaceful way to settle a potentially intractable problem. The personal involvement of the UN Secretary General and the building of relationships were key elements to ensure successful implementation of the agreement. In the interest of continuous improvement, however, there is an opportunity to do more to address underlying identity-based needs in these types of territorial negotiations. Content analysis of Nigerian newspapers for the year 2010 showed a prevalent discussion of unfulfilled identity needs, providing support for the hypothesis that there is an unresolved identity-conflict potential. From the Cameroonian perspective, content analysis revealed the fulfilling of a new identity as the Bakassi region was actively populated with Cameroonian citizens, culture, and connectivity to the rest of the country.

Recommendations

That though the dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula has been resolved due to the cordial relationship, it therefore recommends that the Green Tree document should fully be

implemented. More so, the indigenous occupants of the Bakassi Peninsula should be well catered for to avoid any form of human rights violations. Furthermore, both states should collaborate in the securing of the border to avoid infiltrations of terrorist acts and other illegal border activities.

The rights and needs of all stakeholders in a conflict should be considered during the process of mediation, rather than following just the traditional path of international politics at the state level. In the case of the Bakassi dispute, that would have meant giving a seat at the table to representatives of the local people, possibly kings and chiefs. New interactive techniques in mediation should be incorporated that strive to recognize the identity-based conflict frame, engaging parties in reflexive dialogue. The continuous improvement of the process for settling territorial disputes will help to bring stronger and longer lasting peace to the affected regions of the world

References

Akinjide R. (2002, November,24). "Senate is Right to Void Bakassi Handover, says Akinjide". Vanguard, Nigeria:

Aghemelo, A.T. &. Ibhasebhor, S. (2016). Colonialism as a source of boundary dispute and differences among African states: The World Court judgement on the Bakassi peninsula and its implications for Nigeria. Journal of Social Science, 13 (3), pp. 177–181.

Ameh, J. (2012, September 13). "Reps Seek Review of ICJ Judgement on Bakassi". The Punch

Aghemelo, A.T & Ibhasebhor, S. (2006). Colonialism as a source of boundary dispute and conflict among African States: The World Court Judgement on the Bakassi Peninsula and its implication for Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences Kamla-Raj 13(3):177-1

Akwen, G. (2011). Theories of International Relations. Germany: Lambert Publishing

Akinyemi, O. (2014). Borders in Nigeria's Relations with Cameroun. Journal of Arts and Humanities (JAH), 3(9): 1-8.

Asobie, A. (2013). Nigeria, Cameroun and the unending differences over Bakassi. Journal of Social Science, 13 (3), 178-185

Babatola J, (2012). Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary Dispute: The Quest for Bakassi Peninsula; International Affairs and Global Strategy.www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol 4 (accessed on 03/05/24).

Donnelly, J. (2000). Realism and nternational Relations. Cambridge: University Press

Eke, A. O. (2014). Globalisation challenges and Nigerian foreign policy. Abakaliki: Willy Rose and Apple Seed Publishing Coy.

Eke, U., & Eke, A. (2007). The truth about Bakassi Peninsula and the dynamics of Nigeria's external relations. Abakaliki: Willy Rose and Apple Seed Publishing Company.

Ede, O.O.B. (1981). Nigeria-Cameroon Border Problems: Causes and suggestions. A Paper Presented at the NIIA Departmental Seminar

Fanso, V.G. (1986). Traditional and Colonial African Boundaries: Concepts and functions in inter-group relations. Presence Africaine: The University of Yaoundé

Johari, J.C. (2009). Principles of Modern Political Science. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd

Klare, M. T. (2014). Blood and oil: The dangers and consequences of America's growing petroleum dependency. New York, Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt.

Mbuh, J.M. (2004). International Law and Conflicts: Resolving border and sovereignty disputes in Africa. Bloomington, Indiana: Universe Inc.

Odoh S, & Nwogbaga, D. (2015). Theoretical perspective on Nigeria's enforcement of the International Court of Justice's verdict on Bakassi Peninsula: International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.29. (accessed on 02/04/24).

Omoigui, J. (2012). The Bakassi Story http://www.omoigui.com/file/the bakassi story.pdf (accessed on 04/05/24)

Rourke, J.J. (2013). International Politics on the World Stage. New York: Dushkin/McGraw Hill.

United Nations (2001). UN General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961.

United Nations (2006). Bakassi peninsula: Recourse to the law to prevent differences. Available on International Affairs and Global Strategy.www.iiste.org [Accessed 10/05/24].

AN EMPIRICAL DISCOURSE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

Musa Mohammed BELLO, PhD
General Studies Unit,
Federal University of Technology Babura, Jigawa State
musamohammedbello@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
There is a relationship between Nigeria's socioeconomic structure and the problem of insecurity in the country. The literature on the extent and nature of insecurity in Nigeria indicates that it has gotten worse over time as a result of grave threats to people's lives and property, which also makes it difficult for businesses to operate and discourages foreign and local investment, all of which impede and delay Nigeria's socioeconomic progress. The nation's continued existence as a single geographic entity is in jeopardy due to this growing tide of insecurity. In order to generate pertinent data for studying the problem of insecurity and its connection to political and economic development in Nigeria, the researcher examined secondary sources of data. In view of the aforementioned, the study suggests that government should deal with security concerns and risks through the use of cutting-edge technology, training, logistics, and motivating techniques, as well as contemporary techniques for obtaining and sharing intelligence among security professionals. The actual answer is for the government to quicken economic development by building an infrastructure—social, economic, and physical—that is appropriate for business and industrial expansion.

Keywords: *Appraisal, Managing Political Economy and Insecurity Insurgent,*

Introduction

In order to comprehend the predicament of the Nigerian political economy concerning the escalating insecurity, it is imperative to conduct an analysis of the nation's ethnic, religious, economic, and political issues. The current pressures on Nigeria have the potential to fragment the state if pervasive corruption and partisanship persist. Scholars in the fields of social science and humanities can play a role in supporting relevant stakeholders indirectly to address the

political economy challenges of the country, thereby contributing to the alleviation of insecurity in Nigeria, serving the interests of both the state and the public. According to Adamu (2016), the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria explicitly emphasizes that "The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government."

Achumba (2018) highlights that a substantial portion of the 2013 budget was allocated by the federal government to enhance security and combat the escalating crime rates as a threat to national security. Nevertheless, the government has not succeeded in establishing a secure environment conducive to safeguarding lives, properties, and facilitating business and economic activities. The heightened insecurity in Nigeria has contributed to an increase in criminal activities and terrorist assaults across various regions, resulting in severe repercussions for the nation's economy and overall progress. Despite the interventions made, the insecurity levels in Nigeria remain notably high, as evidenced by the country's low ranking in the Global Peace Index (GPI, 2012). Despite the multitude of security measures implemented to tackle the formidable insecurity challenges in Nigeria, the government's endeavors have not yielded the intended outcomes. Consequently, the Nigerian government has recently sought foreign aid from nations like the USA, Israel, and EU countries to address the escalating threats of terrorism and insecurity.

Nigeria is the economic powerhouse of Africa. As the largest economy of the continent at US$ 440,777 (in 2021, using the World Bank’s atlas method for calculations) and the most populous country at 211 million (in 2021), it has a significant potential and critical role to play in economic revival of the entire continent. Undoubtedly, Nigeria can provide an added momentum to the process, with its growing middle class, expanding labour force and market opportunities. In the last 20 years, Nigeria’s economic growth has mostly been positive, peaking at an impressive 15.3% in 2002, with periods of mild recession in 2016 (-1.6%) and 2020 (-1.8%). The country has witnessed a steady decrease in poverty since 1995, however, the poverty ratio remains high at 39.1% (2018) of the population living below the

poverty line of $1.90 a day. Performance varies markedly between the northern and southern regions.

While the poverty level stands at around 30% in the South, it hovers above 60% in the North, with states, such as Zamfara and Sokoto, with poverty rates above 80% (in 2020). Human capital underdevelopment is also prevalent in these high poverty regions, signaling a connection between poor education, poor health access and poverty. This is reflected in the disparities in Human Development Index, with Lagos at 0.686 (2019) – a medium human development and comparable to that of Morocco, and Yobe, Sokoto and Kebbi states at 0.368, 0.340 and 0.339, respectively – a low human development and comparable to that of Somalia. Against this background, the article examines the crisis of the Nigerian state and its implication for Nigeria socio-economic development and its nexus with pertinent issues of rising insecurity in the country.

Conceptual Clarifications

Security

Security is the protection of territorial integrity, stability, and vital interests of states through political, legal, or coercive instruments. In the 1990s, it expanded to include non-military threats that lead to violent conflict, affecting individuals, communities, and states. Insecurity, on the other hand, refers to the absence of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty, lack of protection, and lack of safety. It is defined as a breach of peace and security, contributing to recurring conflicts and causing the destruction of lives and property.

Political Economy

Political economy is the study of production, trade, and their relationship with law, custom, government, and national income distribution. Originating in moral philosophy in the 18th century, it has been criticized by scholars like Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo. The term "economics" replaced "political economy" in the late 19th century, with the rise of mathematical modeling and the publication of a textbook by Alfred Marshall. Today, "economics" refers to the narrow study of the economy without considering political and social

considerations, while "political economy" represents a distinct approach. The term can refer to Marxian economics, public choice approaches, and advice given by economists to the government or public on general economic policy.

An Overview of Origin and Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria since 1960s

According to Jega (2019) the fear of insecurity in Nigeria is on the increase and this has been compounded by the rising waves of terrorism since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Violent crime has a root and history in Nigeria, and it could be traced back to the period from especially 1960 to 1970. At independence in 1960 a federal structure was imposed on Nigeria by the British. Wheare (1963) conceptualizes federalism as a constitutional division of power between two levels of government which are independent and coordinating in their respective spheres of influence. Unfortunately, the federal structure bequeathed to Nigeria at independence did not conform to Professor K.C.

Since independence, the demand for true federalism, fiscal and political restructuring by different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria has not abated. These agitations have contributed to violent rebellious reactions by aggrieved ethnic groups in the country, endangering the security, unity, and corporate existence of Nigeria as one country. Federalism that undermines the independence and autonomy of its federating units will only bring about conflict, threat to national cohesion and peace, and ultimate disintegration (Ali, 2013; Adamu, 2016). Insecurity challenges can be traced to the early years of military rule when large quantities of arms were imported into the country for the use of the military during and after the Nigerian civil war, some of which got into the hand of the civilians. Soon after the civil war these arms were used by civilians and ex-military men for mischievous purposes such as armed robbery.

While some researchers attribute youth violence to peer group influence and other psychological factors associated with growing up, others emphasized the impact of political and economic factors such as ethnic agitation, political agitation, unemployment, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as triggers of violent reaction among the youth.Many scholars have identified several causes of conflict and insecurity in Nigeria that are inimical to socio-

economic and national development (Ali, 2013; Okorie, 2011; Jega, 20019; Salawu, 2010; Onyishi, 2011; Ezeoba, 2011; Lewis, 2002). These causes have been classified into external and internal causes. In Nigeria the internal causes of insecurity pose major challenge to socio-economic development than the external causes of insecurity. This internal causes of insecurity in Nigeria includes:

Ethno-religious conflicts

In Nigeria arise from suspicion and distrust among ethnic groups and major religions, leading to lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion, and violent confrontation. These conflicts are a major security challenge and have emerged due to new political consciousness and identity structures. They are also attributed to Nigerian leaders' inability to tackle development challenges and distribute state resources equitably. Ethno-religious conflicts have become disintegrative and destructive social elements, threatening peace, stability, and security in Nigeria. Nigeria has a long history of politically based violence since the collapse of the first republic in 1966. Elections have been marked by violent conflicts, political thuggery, assassinations, and arson. Politicians often lack dialogue and consensus, leading to over-zealousness and desperation for power. This has resulted in catastrophic events.

Systemic and Political Corruption

This is a twin evil and hydra-headed monster that has held the Nigerian state captive. It has contributed to government failure and breakdown of institutional infrastructures. The state of insecurity in Nigeria is greatly a function of government failure, traceable to systemic and political corruption. It has added another dimension of violent conflicts which has eroded national values. Corruption is bad not because money and benefits change hands, and not because of the motives of participants, but because it privatizes valuable aspects of public life, bypassing processes of representation, debate, and choice. It has been described as cancer militating against Nigeria‟s development, because corruption deeply threatens the fabric of the Nigeria society (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). Corruption hampers economic growth,

disproportionately burdens the poor and undermines the effectiveness of investment and aid (Iyare, 2008).

Economic-Based Violence

It is also referred to as "political economy of violence". Eme and Onyishi (2017) note that, in recent writings in the mass media, much emphasis is laid on the role of resources in generating conflict which is a major cause of economic-based violence across the globe and across political divide. Cries of resource control and revenue sharing regularly rent the air between proponents and opponents also leading to violent agitations among the contending actors and between the state and proponents. The Niger-Delta crisis in Nigeria presents a classic case of this violent struggle that has been on since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. These violent agitations have claimed many lives of Nigerians and foreigners, military and para-military personnel, and properties worth billions of naira. It has also resulted in economic misfortune in Nigeria through loss of oil revenue as a result of shortfall in crude oil exports by the oil companies occasioned by disruption of oil exploration activities by the Niger-Delta militants.

Pervasive Material Inequalities and Unfairness

A major factor that contributes to insecurity in Nigeria is the growing awareness of inequalities, and disparities in life chances which lead to violent reactions by a large number of people. There is a general perception of marginalization by a section of the people in areas of government development policies, political patronage, and these are triggers of disaffection, resentment, and revolt (Achumba, et al. 2016). The incessant strikes by labour, professional groups and demonstrations by civil society groups are mainly due to pervasive material inequalities and unfairness. Their agitations are aimed at drawing public sympathy for their struggle for just and fair treatment by the government.

Unemployment/Poverty

According to Adagba et al (2018) unemployment/poverty among Nigerians, especially the youths is a major cause of insecurity and violent crimes in Nigeria. In particular youth's

unemployment have contributed to the rising cases of violent conflict in Nigeria. Also, one of the major causes of insecurity in the country is the failure of successive administration to address challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequitable distribution of wealth among ethnic nationalities.

Organized violent groups

Organized violent groups such as ethnic militia, vigilantes, secret cults in tertiary institutions and political thugs contribute significantly to security challenges in Nigeria in different dimension and forms. Examples which include OPC, MEND, IPOB etc, their emergence has been linked to a number of factors which include the culture of militarism that has its antecedents in military rule, the failure of the state and its institutions, economic disempowerment, the structure of the state and Nigeria's federalism, non-separation of state and religion, politics of exclusion, culture of patriarchy, ignorance and poor political consciousness (Adeola,2017)

Terrorism

Terrorism in Nigeria is not a recent phenomenon, it started with the notorious Islamic sect in the Northern part of Nigeria called Mataisine during Alhaji Shehu Shagari civilian regime of the Second Republic which was aborted by a military coup in December 1983 led by General Muhammadu Buhari. Terrorism rears its ugly head again at different periods including the Obasanjo led civilian government of the fourth republic which witnessed religious riots and others in Plateau state in Northern Nigeria. In recent times terrorism has assumed a political undertone be spearheaded by a faceless Islamic insurgent based in the Northern Nigeria, called Boko Haram, it has claimed thousands of lives since 2009.

Terrorism in Nigeria has been linked to religious, socio-political, economic and cultural factors. Even though terrorism originated from Islamic fanaticism, it is now driven by factors such as inequalities within the country and poverty among Nigerians, in terms mean of livelihood, resources, education or access to education and good values. The current challenge of terrorism is threatening the Nigeria society on all fronts. Some foreign observers have linked

terrorism in Nigeria to a number of factors which include, political conflicts, unbalanced development that involves horizontal inequalities, religious/ethnic distrust, poor governance linked to leadership failure, and high-level of corruption (Kufour, 2012; Oluwarotimi, 2012).

Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria and Challenges of Insecurity

Nigeria, despite its abundant resources, still ranks among the poorest countries in the world. This has led to security challenges and grave consequences for socio-economic development. The ruling elites in Nigeria are dependent, corrupt, and mal-administration. The constitutions provide citizens with rights such as life, social security, work, livelihood, and a standard of living. However, previous and present governments have failed to guarantee these rights, leaving individuals to seek means to provide basic necessities. The inability of the government to provide a secure environment has led to resentment among ethnic groups, resulting in ethnic violence, communal clashes, and religious violence. This has disrupted economic growth and development, as investors seek high returns and safe havens for their investments. Thus, from the above analysis insecurity, and corruption have contributed to low level of socio-economic development in Nigeria between 2007 and 2012. The year

Insecurity in Nigeria has retarded socio economic development in Nigeria in various ways. These include: social dislocation and population displacement, social tensions and new pattern of settlements which encourages Muslins/Christians or members of an ethnic group moving to Muslim/Christian dominated enclaves. Heightens citizenship question which encourages hostility between "indigenes" and "settlers". Dislocation and disruption of family and communal life. General atmosphere of mistrust, fear, anxiety and frenzy, dehumanization of women, children, and men especially in areas where rape, child abuse and neglect are used as instruments of war, deepening of hunger and poverty in the polity, discourages local and foreign investment as it makes investment unattractive to business people. It also halts business operations during period of violence and outright closure of many enterprises in the areas or zones where incidence of insecurity is rife and are on daily occurrence.

Insecurity and Industrialization in Nigeria

Rapid industrialization is very vital to modern economic growth and development. The level of industrial performance reflects the ability of any economy to utilize its resources, its level of technological and managerial development to enhance the standard of living of its citizens. The term "industrialization" originated from the industrial revolution of 18th and 19th century in Europe. Industrialization describes an increase in the share of manufacturing in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and in the occupations of the economically active population. It could also be used to explain the development of economic activity in relatively large industry, Nnabuife, Okeke, and Ndubuisi-Okolo (2018). Industrial development is one of the best training grounds for skill acquisition/development, and it can increase the flexibility of the economy and reduce dependence on external forces. Industrial development provides employment, foreign exchange, and domestic earnings. Insecurity in Nigeria: The Implications for Industrialization and Sustainable Development 10 International Journal of **Research in Business Studies and Management**

Industrialization in Nigeria is bedeviled by paucity of data, threats of insecurity, transportation facilities, power outages, finance etc. But the major cankerworm besetting industrialization and its efficient performance is enormous rate of insecurity in the country which has vitiated the morale of inventors. Relentless effort to industrialize the country began after independence in 1960 with the implementation of four national development plans, a perspective fifth development and several other economic policies like the indigenization and structural adjustment policies, the vision 20:2020 among others which aimed at strengthening the Nigerian manufacturing sector. These economic policies are designed to address problems relating to industrialization as they come up such that different policies are passed at different times to address issues of the time (Muo, Okeke & Okpala, 2018).

Despite these challenges, it is very conspicuous that the major challenge confronting industrialization at present is still high rate of insecurity. It is crystal clear that insecurity is detrimental to general wellbeing of the people with its resultant effects in the areas of illnesses;

low life expectancy; low quality of life and even death. Therefore, with the incessant security challenges and the inability of the security agents to guarantee safety and security in the country, many factories have been burnt down, lives and properties lost, investors on the run, relocation and closing down of businesses. All these bottlenecks hamper smooth industrial growth and development. Africa as a continent has continued to lag behind in industrialization mainly because most of the countries that make it up are still not measuring up in the indices of global competitiveness, as confirmed by Ease of Doing Business Index Published by the World Bank (2005) as cited in Nnabuife Okeke, and Ndubuisi-Okolo (2018).

In Nigeria, government at all levels from the federal, states, and local governments have not fared well in the provision of public goods such as infrastructure, health, education, employment and security despite the enormous oil revenues accruing into their coffers. Many people provide all the services that otherwise would have been provided by the government including security. Monies are allocated to the various tiers of government for the development of their areas but it is diverted by those in position of authority into their private purse. Gwom (2011) opines that kidnapping and terrorism are signs and consequences that formal authority is ineffectual and checks and balances in governance are not working. Despite stupendous wealth in the country, majority of the youths are not gainfully employed while some lack the requisite skills to acquire a befitting job. This is made worst by the inexplicable wealth displayed by those whose rise to fame could only be traceable to few moments of lawlessness or defiance of order rather than to hard work. Most of the youth learn from those they see as models even if they are not doing the right thing. Some of the super-rich men were former coup plotters, retired armed robbers, internationally acclaimed Insecurity in Nigeria:

Peoples power uses public fund in tom personal usage that led to public money only ended up in the pockets of the few that has produced and nurtured the Islamic sects they will want to abandon after training and using them. Of course, the skills they have acquired will have to be used to survive even if those that trained them no longer need their services. It has been the vehicle used to express their anger on the innocent and ordinary Nigerians. Boko

Haram insurgency is thriving in Nigeria especially in the northern parts of Nigeria because their governments have jettisoned their creator, is greedy and corrupt, embraced injustice and marginalization instead of justice and equity. The Nigerian elites (leaders, administrators etc) are known globally for their heartless greed and embezzlement of public funds, avarice and disdain for the common man. This grand larceny is common to all tiers of government in Nigeria.

Current security challenges in essentially post-Covid 19 Nigeria

Shock and outrage reverberated globally in 2014 when Boko Haram kidnapped almost 300 schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria. Such kidnappings have unfortunately persisted in recent years and, indeed, worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. Earlier this month, some 150 students were kidnapped near the northwest city of Kaduna, and more than 1,000 students have been abducted across Nigeria since December 2020. The security situation in Africa's most populous country is increasingly precarious. Communities in several regions of Nigeria that our global organization, Mercy Corps, works with report living with not one but "two worrisome pandemics" — COVID-19 and conflict (Adeola,2017). While the Boko Haram insurgency tends to dominate headlines, it is hardly the only active armed group competing for political, social, and territorial control. Lockdowns, border closures, and movement restrictions have contributed to increased armed group activity and worsening insecurity. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has clashed with Boko Haram and stepped up its attacks against Nigerian security forces in recent months. Since Boko Haram's leader reportedly killed himself by detonating a suicide vest earlier this year, it remains unclear how many new recruits ISWAP will gain as that conflict evolves.

Recent reports also suggest that Biafran separatists in Nigeria and Anglophone rebels in Cameroon may be forming an alliance to coordinate their respective movements. Gangs of "bandits," as they are known, have also proliferated in Nigeria, leading to a relentless rise in kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, cattle raids, theft, and looting. The tactics of these criminal gangs have evolved as the pandemic offers them time and opportunities "to strategize and plan

worse attacks," according to one community member in the Katsina region of northern Nigeria (Mark, 2016). Amid this violence, the pandemic and response measures have caused severe economic hardship and have exacerbated existing scarcity of basic resources, affecting communities in both urban and rural areas. As a community member in Plateau State in central Nigeria recalled, "The hunger people went through, as a result of the economic hardship they faced during the pandemic, forced many to resort to criminal means of generating income." Food insecurity steadily increased in the last few years in Nigeria but almost doubled between 2019 and 2020, with more than 10 million people estimated to be facing crisis-level food shortages currently. Of those, 4.4 million are concentrated in the northeast of the country, where more than 2.7 million people are displaced from their homes by violent conflict.

The security situation in Africa's most populous country is increasingly precarious. Communities in several regions of Nigeria that our global organization, Mercy Corps, works with report living with not one but "two worrisome pandemics" — COVID-19 and conflict (Avweromre,2014). While the Boko Haram insurgency tends to dominate headlines, it is hardly the only active armed group competing for political, social, and territorial control. Lockdowns, border closures, and movement restrictions have contributed to increased armed group activity and worsening insecurity. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has clashed with Boko Haram and stepped up its attacks against Nigerian security forces in recent months. Since Boko Haram's leader reportedly killed himself by detonating a suicide vest earlier this year, it remains unclear how many new recruits ISWAP will gain as that conflict evolves.

Recent reports also suggest that Biafran separatists in Nigeria and Anglophone rebels in Cameroon may be forming an alliance to coordinate their respective movements. Gangs of "bandits," as they are known, have also proliferated in Nigeria, leading to a relentless rise in kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, cattle raids, theft, and looting. The tactics of these criminal gangs have evolved as the pandemic offers them time and opportunities "to strategize and plan worse attacks," according to one community member in the Katsina region of northern Nigeria

(Omoyibo,2016). Amid this violence, the pandemic and response measures have caused severe economic hardship and have exacerbated existing scarcity of basic resources, affecting communities in both urban and rural areas. As a community member in Plateau State in central Nigeria recalled, “The hunger people went through, as a result of the economic hardship they faced during the pandemic, forced many to resort to criminal means of generating income.” Food insecurity steadily increased in the last few years in Nigeria but almost doubled between 2019 and 2020, with more than 10 million people estimated to be facing crisis-level food shortages currently. Of those, 4.4 million are concentrated in the northeast of the country, where more than 2.7 million people are displaced from their homes by violent conflict.

Conclusion

The presence of insecurity in any environment constitutes threat to lives and properties, hinders business activities, and discourages local and foreign investors, all of which stifles and retards socio-economic development of a country. In Nigeria there has been rising wave of insecurity since the country attained independence in 1960. This rising wave has not abated but has assumed a dangerous dimension which is even threatening the corporate existence of the country as one geographical entity. The elimination of these threats should be the number one goal of governments in Nigeria at all levels as the country cannot achieve any significant development amidst insecurity and violence.

Recommendations

Government needs to deals with prevailing social issues that are threat to stable security substance through use of modern methods of intelligence gathering, and intelligence sharing, training, logistics, motivation, and deploying advanced technology in managing security challenges. Government needs to work with private sector to provide massive employment opportunities to various sector of the society. Government also needs to work with community structure to fine turned security threat at local level to ensure peaceful society.

References

Achumba, I. C. (2016). Security Challenges in Nigeriaand the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 4(2), 79-99.

Achumba, O. S. Ighomereho,M. O. M. AkporRobaro (2018). Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 4(2):79-99.

Adagba, O., Ugwu, S. C., & Eme, O. I. (2015). Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria. Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 1(9), 77-99.

Adamu, A. (20015). True Federalism in the 21st Century Nigeria. A Lecture Delivered at University of Jos Alumni Association, Lagos, 24th March.

Adeola, G. L., & Oluyemi, F. (2017). The Political and Security Implications of Cross Border Migrationbetween Nigeria and Her Francophone Neighbours. International Journal of Social Science Tommorrow, 1(3), 1-9.

Adeleke Adegbami(2018). Insecurity: A Threat to Human Existence and Economic Development in Nigeria.

Ake, C. (2001). Democracy and Development in Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Akpobibibo, O. (2015). Confronting the Human Security Dilemma - Towards Building Sustainable Peace in Nigeria's Delta, A presentation at the ceremony in honour of Ms Insecurity in Nigeria: The Implications For Industrialization and Sustainable Development 16 International Journal of Research in Business. Akonbede Udama(2016). Understanding Nigeria Terrorism: Its Implications to national peace, security, unity and sustainable development. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 8(5), 100-115.

Avweromre, I.L, (2014). „Insecurity and Democracy in Nigeria"s Fourth Republic". A Seminar Paper for a Ph.D Award in Political Science. Unpublished.

Ali, A. D. (2013). Security and Economic Development in Nigeria since 1960. Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 2(6), 1-7.

Bladen, Vincent (2016). An Introduction to Political Economy. ISBN 978-1-4426-3210-3. OCLC 1013947543.

Beland, D. (2015). The Political Construction of Collective Insecurity: From Moral Panic to BlameAvoidance and Organized Irresponsibility. Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series 126.

Edeko, S. E. (2011). The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa: A Case Study of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Sacha Journal of Environmental Studies, 1(2), 55-80.

Eme, O. I., & Onyishi, A. (2011). The Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria: A Thematic Exposition.Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3(8), 172-184.

Ewetan, O. O. (2011). Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Performance in Nigeria. Ph.D Thesis, Covenant University, Department of Economics and Development Studies.
Ewetan, O. O. (2013). Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development: Perspectives on the Nigerian Experience. A lecture Delivered St. Timothy Anglican Church, Sango-Ota, Ogun State, .
Ezeoba, S. L. (2011). Causes and Effects of Insecurity in Nigeria. The National Scholar, 8(2), 28-38.
Global Peace Index (GPI, 2012). Global Peace Ranking. Institute for Economic and Peace, Retrieved From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Gwom, S., (2011). Source: War Against Terror in Plateau State: History of Kidnapping and Terrorism in Nigeria. Retrieved from: http:// www.causes.com/cause/559771-war-againstterror-in-plateau-state, on December 25, 2012.
Hazen, J. M., & Horner, J. (2007). Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective. Switzerland Small Arms Survey.
Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan, edited by J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 104.
Human Development Report (Various Issues).
Ibrahim, J., & Igbuzor, O. (2002). "Memorandum Submitted to the Presidential Committee on National Security in Nigeria".
Igbuzor, O. (2011). Peace and Security Education: A Critical Factor for Sustainable Peace and National Development. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 2(1), 1-7.
Iyare, T. (2008). Corruption and the Crisis of National Values in Oyovbaire (ed). Governance and Politics in Nigeria, The IBB and OBJ Years. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
Jega, I. (2019). Tackling Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria. Newsletter of Social Science Academy of Nigeria, September, 5(2), 35-38.
Krahman, E. (2003). Conceptualizing Security and Governance. Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, 38(1), 5-26
Mill, J, (2009). Principles of political economy: with some of their applications to social philosophy. Bibliolife. ISBN 978-1-116-76118-4. OCLC 663099414.
Mark Robbins (2016) "Why we need political economy," Policy Options
National Bureau of Statistics. (2009). Social Statistics in Nigeria. Abuja: The NBS Publication.
Olonisakin, F. (2015). "In the Line of Fire", BBC Focus on Africa, (April-June), pp19-23.
Oluwarotimi, A. (2012). US to use more Balanced Security Strategy to Fight Insecurity in Nigeria, Leadership Newspaper, Lagos.
Omoyibo, K. U., & Akpomera, E. (2016). Insecurity Mantra: The Paradox of Nigerian Growth and Development. European Scientific Journal, 8(15), 132-142

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AS A DRIVER OF NIGERIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Matthew Enenche OGWUCHE, PhD
Department of Political Science
National Open University of Nigeria
mogwuche@noun.edu.ng

and

Anthonia OKONYE
Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
National Open University of Nigeria
aokonye@noun.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

This study analyses economic diplomacy as a driver of Nigeria's national interest, with a view to determining challenges and prospects that emanate from the process. The main objective of the research is to examine the prospects for the adoption of Economic Diplomacy as Nigeria's foreign policy thrust, its challenges and measures to correct and improve on the said challenges. The methodology adopted was qualitative using secondary sources of data. Major findings from the study reveal that there is a significant relationship that exists between economic diplomacy and Nigeria's national interest, and amidst challenges like difficulty in the ease of doing business, lack of transparency, difficulty in getting approval or licenses, delay in registering investment and lack of assistance, the future of economic diplomacy as a driver for Nigeria's national interest looks bright if these problems can be heartily tackled and dealt with. Based on the findings, it is recommended that there should be the introduction of a pro-active foreign policy of economic diplomacy that will change the mindset of political and bureaucratic leaders in charge of foreign policy-making and implementation from laisse-faire to practical policies that will enhance sustainable development and also, the federal government should work assiduously to invest Nigeria's oil wealth into productive ventures that would stimulate economic development rather than continue to depend on illusive foreign inputs or hand-outs for her development needs.

Keywords: *Diplomacy, National Interest, Nigeria, Policy, Political Economy, Globalisation*

Introduction

The policy of economic diplomacy as a central plank in the correction of the imbalances in the political-economy of the Nigerian state may as well be written off, if one considers the ineffectiveness of the operators of the country in the period under discourse. However, for a keen observer and an objective researcher, the policy scored some measure of success between 1988 and 1993. Like in all human ventures, the gains of the 'new' economic diplomacy should be seen in terms of long and short-term perspectives. Policies at all levels take time to mature and in the case of the 'new' economic diplomacy, expectation of tangible and handsome results may be a tall dream, within a short period of five years that the General Ibrahim Babangida regime operated the policy. However, this observation does not suggest a complete failure of the policy.

Globalization has increasingly made economic diplomacy an indispensable factor in foreign policy. Foreign policy, though without any concise or an accepted definition, has been defined variously by scholars, Adeniji (1992) observed that foreign policy is "in fact a projection of the state's national interest into the transnational arena and the conquest interaction of one with the other". Wallace (1971) sees foreign policy as "that area of politics which bridges the all-important boundary between the nation-state and its international environment. Similarly, Olusanya and Akindele (eds,) (1986) stated that foreign policy is the "country's national interest in its interaction with the outside world and relationship with specific countries in the international system". Frankel (1975) defined it "as a dynamic process of interaction between the changing domestic demands and supports and the changing international environments". Ukeje (1999) noted that foreign policy constitutes an endless dialogue between the powers of continuity and the powers of change. For London (1965) foreign policy may be called the father of all things in international relations. Indeed, the fate of the world depends upon wise foreign policy. The above definition seems not to have taken care of the dynamics of contemporary international relations.

In our considered opinion, foreign policy is the policy thrust of states, geared towards

achieving the national interest of states in their relationship with states in international political environment. Foreign policy pronouncement is different from foreign policy implementation because the pronouncement is no more than an articulation of the general principles or policy that forms the basis of government decision maker's action in foreign affairs. In such foreign policy articulation, the decision makers declare national goals, interest and priorities which they consider to be of primary concern to them in international affairs.

Some realists like Lippmann (1943) states that a foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nations' power. These views indicate that what is imperative in a nation's foreign policy is the promotion and sustenance of her national interest. Although, national interest of a country is often not clearly defined in specific terms, yet, two broad views exist on the concept-the subjectivists and the objectivists. They maintain that national interest is not an objective truth that prevails whether or not it is perceived by members of a nation; rather, it is a pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change when the requirement and aspirations of the nation's member change.

On the other hand, Morganthau, (1962) who is of the later school, is of the view that the best interest of a nation is a matter of objective reality. Although the above view seems to underscore the nexus between foreign policy and interest of states at international arena, they failed to capture issues of economic diplomacy in the contemporary global economic relations. Meanwhile Harun (2008) correctly remarked that "economic globalization has made it increasingly difficult to draw a clear-cut distinction between what are domestic and what are international components of a product as economies of various countries are integrated". According to him economic diplomacy in the past was known as trade diplomacy concerned with economic policy issues. In his view, economic diplomacy "is the decision making, policy making and advocating of a country's business interest which requires the application of technical expertise that determine the effect of a country's economic situation on economic interest of other countries.

Asobie (1991) argues that "the term economic diplomacy may be discussed in one of these ways. First, it may be understood as the management of international relations in such a manner as to place accent on the economic dimension of a country's external relations; it is the conduct of foreign policy in such a manner as to give topmost priority to the economic objectives of a nation" A second and equally limited notion of the concept is that which sees economic diplomacy as "the application of economic instruments in negotiation and bargaining with other nations. Third, economic diplomacy may be seen as a "set of strategies and tactics formulated and applied for the achievement of fundamental restructuring of the existing international economic order. It consists of policies aimed at establishing a new international division of labour, targeted at bringing about a radical redistribution of the pattern of ownership and control of economic resources in the international system.

However, these scholars failed to appreciate that compromise has been and remain a very big tool in international politics because the ability to make a compromise implies a high level of political culture of those who actually make compromise in practice. Apart from this, they glossed over the fact that negotiation as well as compromise did not eliminate the struggle between the actors. Hence, in our considered view, economic diplomacy is a peaceful form of struggle engaged by foreign policy activist as a means of solving mostly economic problems in international arena. This struggle manifests through intrigues, maneuvering, and manipulation between and among ambassadors, envoys and foreign affairs ministers in the process of discussion and negotiations. In effect, "compromise do not make who will defeat whom irrelevant since it implies maintaining a certain equilibrium" (Lebedev, 1989).

As a corollary of the above, Sinclair (2007) argues that "economic diplomacy engages contacts in foreign and sending states institutions, businesses and international organizations to advance the sending states economic interest".

Hence, economic diplomacy is being pursed at different levels to achieve objectives of protection and projection of a country's major economic interest, multilateral trade and economic negotiations, regional and bilateral trade agreements, access to foreign resources,

promotion of experts and promotion of foreign investment. It is against this background that the study seeks to examine *economic diplomacy as a driver of Nigeria's national interest: challenges and prospects.*

Statement of the Problem

Prospects for Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy by 1963, Nigeria has shown commitment to use diplomacy as an important tool for the economic development of the African continent. Thus, in a speech at the African Summit Conference in May, 1963, Balewa maintained that Nigeria's position was that "African unity could be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific and cultural cooperation". In addition, although Nigeria endorsed the ideas of an African Common Market, it was of the view that for it to be practicable it must be based on certain groupings such as a North African grouping, a West African grouping, and an East African grouping. Thus, Nigeria was one of the advocates of practical approach to economic cooperation and integration in Africa, and this became the modus operandi of the Organization of African Unity, now African Union (AU), on economic matters. This was born out of the increasing realization that the newly won independence by African states was meaningless without concomitant economic development15. Nigeria's foreign policy has been geared towards improving the well-being of Nigerians. This is essential for protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state. It was in 1987 that the Babangida's administration used economic diplomacy as a major policy thrust of that regime.

Nations strive to promote their economic interests through diplomacy in order to attract foreign business, investments, technology and tourists. Economic diplomacy connects closely with political, public and other segments of diplomatic work.

Economic diplomacy not only promotes the state's prosperity but also, as occasion demands and opportunity permits, manipulates its foreign commercial and financial relations in support of its foreign policy – as in the case of sanctions against Iran. Accordingly, economic diplomacy is a major theme of the external relations of virtually all countries. At home, economic ministries,

trade and investment promotion bodies, chambers of commerce, and of course foreign ministries, are all participants in economic work. Current trends include increasing collaboration between state and non-official agencies, and increased importance given to WTO issues, the negotiation of free trade and preferential trade agreements, and accords covering investments, double taxation avoidance, financial services and the like. Abroad, embassies, consulates, and trade offices handle economic diplomacy.

Aims of the paper

Analyze the challenges facing economic diplomacy in Nigeria, examine the prospects for the adoption of economic diplomacy as Nigeria's foreign policy thrust and recommend measures to improve Nigeria's economic diplomacy and its external environment.

Conceptual Clarifications

Economic Diplomacy

As a prelude to knowledge of economic diplomacy, a conceptual definition of diplomacy becomes imperative at this juncture. By diplomacy we refer to the display of creative and intuitive power capabilities in government-to-government relations, through accredited national representatives. For the avoidance of doubt, diplomacy is not foreign policy, though it is often employed as a synonym for it. While foreign policy broadly represents the principles, objective and attitudes struck by one State towards another; diplomacy is a key instrument employed for conveying and giving effect to the spirit of foreign policy (Bridge, 2021).

Diplomacy is an instrument of conflict and conflict resolution. It would, however, be wrong to describe diplomacy as an instrument of conflict. To do so amount to placing it in the same category of secret intelligence, force, economic statecraft and propaganda. In its very character and essence, diplomacy expresses the idea that States have both competitive and cooperative values and interest, which need statecraft management.

National Interest

The ultimate objective of any nation's foreign policy is the pursuit and protection of its national interests. National interest, according to Obiozor (1998) is the beginning and the end of foreign

policy. It is employed to describe, explain or evaluate the source or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. It also serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies. National interest is actually examining what is best for the nation in particular instance, what is best for the nation in the foreign policy. The concept is rooted in the priority of national values. Every country of the world has its needs and priorities. Hence there are belief systems and sets of coherent ideas which every country uses in understanding and explaining its foreign policy as well as in ordering and regulating its affairs with other nations. The foreign policy of any nation is a reflection of its domestic reality. This begins with the identification and articulation of national interest. Yakubu (2011) submits that "national interest is the key concept in foreign policy, the foundation of any state's foreign policy, and the main reason or justification for foreign policy".

Ayeni - Akeke (2008) defines National Interest *as* "a mix of relatively stable and clear values, ideas, convictions, goals and concerns on which the authorities of a nation-state are likely to base their policies and actions toward other states and forces in its external environment". He further refers to it as the goals that the elite groups of each state think that their country should strive to achieve in its interactions with other states in the international arena.

Foreign policy and national interest are inseparable concepts in international relations and indeed, the foundation of a state's foreign policy is her National Interest which in turn directs the course of the foreign policy. The concept of national interest has continued to play a significant role in the foreign policies of sovereign states. A state's foreign policy is not operated in vacuum. The main policy instrument in the conduct of foreign policy is the promotion and pursuit of national interest. Ogwu (1986), thus defines national interest as the totality or the aggregate of interests of individuals and groups within a given nation state. She further stressed that, "national interest encompasses the various strategies employed in the international interactions of states in order to ensure the preservation of the stated goal of society".

Theoretical Framework

Two frameworks of analysis are considered for this work. The first is critical theory which,

according to Agubamah and Moveh (2016), is based on making a well-known issue better by pointing out its areas of weakness in order to strengthen it if well noted and acknowledged. The theory is a social theory oriented towards critiquing and changing nations as a whole in contrast to traditional theory oriented only to understanding or explaining it. This theory stresses the reflective assessment and critique of nations and their cultures by applying knowledge from the social sciences and humanities. Those who propound this theory includes Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, and Erich Fromm (Joseph,1960).

In both the broad and narrow senses, however, a critical theory provides the descriptive and normative bases for social enquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms. Horkheimer (1993) further stresses that a critical theory is adequate only if it meets three criteria: it must be explanatory, practical, and normative, all at the same time. That is, it must explain what is wrong with current social reality, identify the actors to change it, and provide both clear norms for criticism and achievable practical goals for social transformation.

The other theory considered for this study is the social constructivism. This is a theory employed in International Relations based on how actors define their national interests, threats to those interests and their relationship to one another. This puts International Relations in the context of broader social relations. It posits that states decide on what they want and need, not only based on material needs but social interaction. Therefore, this theory posits that what states do depends on what their identities and interests are, and it should be noted that identities and interests change (Weber, 2005). Constructivism also recognizes that power is not absent from the international system, but it focuses more on social interactions based on perception (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011). To this end, the Nigerian government decided to focus its foreign policy thrust on the one that places the welfare of its citizens over other sundry considerations. This new policy focus was described as “diplomacy of consequences” and was determined by concept of reprocity. It

called for the international community to take responsibility for its actions towards Nigerians whether favourable or adverse. The thrust evolved into what is referred to *as economic diplomacy*-the central focus of this study and Social Constructivist Theory is therefore chosen as its framework of analysis.

An Overview of Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is a blue print that gives direction to a country on how to interact with other nations. Obiozor (1998) posits that "foreign policy objectives are a range of actions as well as set of strategies adopted by sovereign actors within the international system". In this case, the ultimate objective of any foreign policy is to achieve long-range or short-term goals that ensure the survival of the sovereign state and all its cherished values. The objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy have, since 1960 been consistent both in aspiration and implementation. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, while addressing the parliament on August 20, 1960 identified certain fundamental objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy, the most prominent and on which others are anchored being "The promotion of the national interest of the federation and of its citizens". This in essence means that Nigeria's foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by her national interest.

Unfortunately, what constitutes the country's national interest was not clearly articulated; and both the Balewa administration and that of the two subsequent regimes of Ironsi and Gowon merely premised their foreign policies on their world perception of what they considered as Nigeria's interests. It was not until the inception of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime in 1975 that the broad-stand of Nigeria national interest were clearly addressed. Based on the commission's report General Obasanjo (who succeeded General Murtala) in June 1976 identified the elements of the national interest which also constitute the objectives of the country's foreign policy as follows: The defense of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defense of the independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the same time, foster national self-

reliance and rapid economic development).

Nonetheless, economic diplomacy was given accelerated and unmatchable attention in 1988 under the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (with Major-General Ike Nwachukwu as the Minister of External Affairs) during which it was consciously articulated, codified and policy". He further argued that "a deliberate effort would be made to shift the gear orientation in which an attempt will be made to use foreign policy instruments for the attainment of domestic economic objectives" (Nwachukwu, 1988 as cited in Ogwu&Olukoshi (1991). In the same vein, Major-General Nwachukwu argued that Nigeria's economic diplomacy is to be guided by the past...but should not neglect our changing national circumstances as well as adapt to the realities of a rapidly changing international environment. It is certainly not without justification that issues of international economic co-operation and development have featured prominently on the global agenda...and should be given priority attention in our foreign policy...This entails negotiations and utilization that will attract both foreign investments and other assistance required for the successful accomplishment of our required economic goals (Akinsanya, 1993 as cited in Eke, 2009) elevated as the objective basis upon which Nigeria's external relations were conducted. In a speech, Major-General Nwachukwu noted inter alia that "the Federal Military Government had decided to make 'economic diplomacy' a new, additional plank of Nigeria's foreign Nigeria's international relations from what seems exclusively political in focus.

In 2005, however, Nigeria's economic diplomatic drives led to the cancellation of US$ 18 billion worth of external debt by the Paris Club. The debt relief wiped off about 60 percent of national debt which resulted in the utilization of US$6 billion savings from the excess crude account (ECA) to buyback the rest of the debt at 25 cents on the dollar, after paying off accumulated interest arrears (Okonjo-Iweala, 2014). Hence, the total Paris Club debt of US$30 billion was wiped off. Moreover, between 2003 and now, Nigeria's external economic relations have been shaped and determined by the implementation of the Bretton Woods inspired National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) of

President Olusegun Obasanjo, President Umaru Yar'Adua's 7-Point Agenda and President Goodluck Jonathan's Transformation Agenda, Olusegun Obasanjo, President UmaruYar'Adua's 7-Point Agenda and President Goodluck

Challenges and Prospects of Nigeria's Economic Diplomacy Initiative

Following the democratic changes that have occurred in Nigeria since 1999, the general consensus was that political and economic changes are essential for the return to, or renewal of, Nigeria's stand in the international community. The employment of economic diplomacy became indispensable and the thrust of Nigeria's foreign policy was to regain respectability and relevance in the international community' and convert ,foreign policy activities into concrete achievements which are of direct benefit to Nigeria. The main objective is ,peace, security and prosperity through friendship' (Mohammed, 2001). Economic Diplomacy in this regard would mean the use of various economic techniques to implement foreign policy through peaceful means and the employment of official representative at various levels.

As the country became democratic, its international standing increased and positive and negative sides to Nigeria's external image emerged. Nigeria is a leading player in the African Union, Commonwealth, in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Between 1999 and 2007 Nigeria made vital strides in economic reforms and the fight against corruption. The economic reform efforts showed positive results which as noted by the Central Bank included a reduction in inflation which fell below 10 percent in 2006 from a range of 14 to 18 percent during 2001-2005, international reserves which reached about US$41.9 billion as of March, 2007; implementation of a bank consolidation program which strengthened the financial sector and enhanced its ability to provide credit to the private sector. Other positive signs of the reform efforts were a re-confirmation of Nigeria's credit rating (BB-) from Fitch and Standard and Poor's February 2007; liberalization of Nigeria's import protection regime and the adoption of the Common External Tariff which lowered the average tariff from about 29 percent to 12

percent; and Nigeria's successful negotiation of its foreign debt with both the Paris and London Clubs.

In terms of the debt overhang, in 1999, when the Obasanjo administration came into office, Nigeria owed N537.5 billion domestic debt and N633.1billion external public debt. These domestic and external debts were owed, in spite of the rise in Nigeria's crude oil prices from $16.5 per barrel in 1999 to $70.2 per barrel in 2005. The total stock of Nigeria's external debt totalled $35.9 million as the end of December 2004. Nigeria was paying about $3.2 billion annually to service its official domestic and external debt (i.e.: excluding domestic expenditure arrears). This compared with a combined health and education spending of the federal and state governments in 2004 of $2.4 billion. It also illustrates the scale of the debt burden and the huge diversion of resources away from much needed social expenditure for one of the poorest populations in the world. (Central Bank of Nigeria,2004).

For much of the 1990s, crisis of leadership and governance, gross human rights violations and pervasive economic mismanagement, as well as a confrontationist diplomatic stance, prevented Nigeria from engaging in any meaningful discussions with the international community on its debt problem. With the restoration of democracy and human rights in 1999, a window of opportunity emerged for re-engagement with the international community on a positive and constructive basis to address the debt issue Emphasizing the crucial linkages between debt, poverty, development and the survival of Nigeria's budding democracy, the Obasanjo administration attached priority to obtaining rapid and substantial external debt reduction, as a crucial component of its development strategy. The major planks of Nigeria's strategy included regularization of relations with the international financial community to pave the way for constructive engagement; negotiating favourable terms for debt rescheduling and restructuring under "traditional" debt relief mechanisms in the short term; and, building on that in the medium term, to secure deeper and more substantive debt reduction.

Nigeria also adopted in the tool of economic diplomacy with its attendant political and economic reforms to achieve her foreign policy goals. The emphasis on economic diplomacy

emanated from the perceived failure of past foreign policy endeavours to deliver in economic terms. In charting this foreign policy direction in Nigeria, Akinterinwa (2004) maintained that emphasis was to be placed on ,'the Nigerian' as the ultimate beneficiary of Nigeria foreign policy endeavours, the articulation of Nigeria's national interests in the existing identified concentric circles and on further making the Nigeria environment more conducive to the development of national capacity to meet the challenges of the current international conditions.

Despite these achievements, Nigeria continued to manifest a high degree of corruption, manifest in graft and inflation of contracts; advance fee fraud, notoriously known in Nigeria as '419' and drug trafficking. Other negative perceptions of Nigeria pertain to the lack of good governance, lack of transparency and accountability at all levels of government, high-risk business environment; high incidence of crime and a general insecurity of life and property; and inability to service her external debt or honour other obligations as and when due. The image of Nigeria in the foreign media was hardly positive. Moreover, Government completely imbibed the imposition of the ,Washington Consensus', propagated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in seeming oblivion of the understanding that no universal economic model like the Washington Consensus should be imposed on a country desirous of rapid economic growth. It offers very little or no support as a sufficient economic policy directive for serious people-oriented policies. It does not promote equitable income distribution, rapid economic growth or a decent economic and social environment.

Other factors which have made it difficult to establish a basis for economic growth and attract foreign direct investment include: over dependence on the oil sector; an import-dependent manufacturing base and the absence of export-oriented industries; a poor technological base and the absence of research and development in major economic sectors; grossly inadequate policies and strategies for exports; the arbitrary and unilateral abrogation of international business contracts; inconsistent and inadequate implementation of economic

policies; inadequate and unreliable infrastructure and public utilities; and the shortage of skilled manpower.

Economic diplomacy is dynamic and has to adjust to the contemporary realities. Unfortunately; Nigeria's foreign policy failed to re-align with the realities of a changing world order and has remained largely reactive rather than proactive conduct of foreign policy. Meanwhile, the international economy was becoming more and more competitive. With the rapid development of the Pacific Rim countries, and the opening to the outside world of the economies of such huge States as China and Russia, the world market has expanded dramatically, just as the number of economic actors.

Against this backdrop, Economic Diplomacy would mean the use of various positive and negative economic techniques to implement foreign policy through peaceful means and the employment of official representative at various levels (Muller, 2006). In this context, the commitment to a strong economic diplomacy is a necessity. The activities of the Nigerian government should be conducive to the rounding up of the economic and financial environment necessary for an accelerated carrying out reforms and for economic development.

Conclusion

This paper seeks to assess the economic diplomacy as a driver of Nigeria's national interest while examining its challenges and prospects. Social Constructivism therefore helps to give a platform for its justification in the sense that when a state is able to construct a perception of itself for another state to see, it then changes the nature of relations in the international system. In other words, when Nigeria is able to create a positive perception of itself to the rest of the world in the context of social relations, then the manner in which the rest of the world relates with Nigeria will change.

To this end, the Nigerian government decided to focus its foreign policy thrust on the one that places the welfare of its citizens over other sundry considerations. This new policy focus was described as "diplomacy of consequences" and was determined by concept of reciprocity. It called for the international community to take responsibility for its actions

towards Nigerians whether favourable or adverse. The thrust evolved into what is referred to *as economic diplomacy*-the central focus of this study, and social constructivist theory is therefore chosen as its framework of analysis.

Recommendations

The need for new economic order targeted through the application of foreign policy of economic diplomacy have been eliciting an avalanche of proposals as remedies for sustainable development from political economist, diplomats, policy makers, politicians, government officials and research institutions. This deluge of remedies is as captivating, and appealing to escape being acknowledged in a scholarly work of this rank. Introduction of pro-active foreign policy of economic diplomacy that will change the mind set of political and bureaucratic leaders in change of foreign policy making and implementation from laisse faire to practical policies that will enhance sustainable development.

The federal government of Nigeria should work assiduously to invest Nigeria's oil wealth into productive ventures that would stimulate economic development rather than continue to depend on illusive foreign inputs for her development needs. Rather than canvass for foreign investment which is usually attracted at concessionary terms, the government should invest more in the provision of infrastructural facilities as this would create the right kind of environment which would attract foreign capital investment without having to make too many concessions while at the same time stimulating domestic productive forces.

References

Abati, R (2009). "North Korea and Clinton"s Citizen Diplomacy" The Guardian, Friday August, 7.

Adejumo, A. (2007). "Re-OjoMaduekwe"s Citizenship Diplomacy". Available on INTERNET. http://209.85.129.132/search?q=cache:R5j9cuj4sj:www.nigeriasinamerica.com/articles/20.

Adeniran, T. (1993). Introduction to International Relations.Lagos:Macmillan

Agubamah, E. and Moveh, D. O. (2016)"Critical Assessment of Nigeria"s Citizen Diplomacy" Kaduna Journal of Political Science, Vol.3, No.1, June.

Agbu, O. (2007) "Nigerian Foreign Policy under President Umaru Musa Yar"Adua: Challenges and Prospects". Being a Paper Presented at the One-Day Seminar on Citizen Diplomacy Organized by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. November, 29.

Ajaebili, C. (2011) The Option of Economic Diplomacy in Nigeria"s Foreign Policy. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science.1:277-280.

Akinbobola, A. (1996) Foreign Policy Analysis: Issues and Trends in Selected Countries. Ibadan: Cohop Publications Nigeria Ltd.

Akinboye, S. O. (1999) "Nigeria"s Foreign Policy" in R. Anifowose and F.C. Enemuo (eds) Elements of Politics. Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publications.

Akinterinwa, B (2007) "Foreign Policy under the Yar"Adua Administration" THISDAY Newspaper.

Akinterinwa, B. (2014) Nigeria"s Foreign Policy Strategies and Techniques.InJ.Ayoade, A. Akinsanya, O, Ojo, The Jonathan Presidency (pp. 225-287). Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.

Alkali, R.A. (1996). Issues in International Relations and Nigeria"s Foreign Policy. Zaria: Bob Academic Press Inc.

Almond, G.A. and Lasswell, H.D. (1948) "The Participant Observer: A Study of Administrative Rules in Action" in Harold D. Lasswell (ed) The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An EmpiricalApproach. New York.

Amadi, S. (2008) "OjoMaduekwe and Nigerian Foreign Policy".Daily Independent, Monday, May 5.

Ayeni-Akeke, O.A. (2008). Foundation of Political Science. Ibadan: Ababa Press Limited.

Babayo, M. (2014). Economic Diplomacy and Nigeria"s Foreign Policy. Lagos: NIIA.

Bakare, W. (2007). The Punch, July, 31.

Bojang AS (2018). The Study of Foreign Policy in International Relations. J Pol Sci Pub Aff6: 337. doi:10.4172/2332-0761.1000337

Bumah, J. (2008). "Foreign Policy: Yar"Adua and the Diplomacy of Consequences".
The Punch, September 30.

Buenos de Mesquita, B. (2002). "Domestic Politics and International Relations" International Studies Quarterly, 46:1-10.

Brecher, M. and Eilkenfeld, J. (1997)A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Caprioli, M. (2000). "The Myth of Women Pacifism" in Taking Sides:Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in World Politics, Nineth Edition(ed) Rourke,J.T, Guilford, C.T.:McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.

Chidozie, F, Ibietan, J., Ujara, E. (2014) Foreign Policy, International Image and National Transformation: A Historical Perspective. International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences and Humanities Research.2: 49-58.

Childs, J.R (1948)American Foreign Service New York Holt.

Cohen, L. and Manion, L. (1980) Research Method in Education, London. Croom Helm. Constitutions of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 and 1989

Delancey, M.W (1963) "Nigeria: Foreign Policy Alternatives", in T.M Shaw and OlajideAluko (eds) Nigerian Foreign Policy, London.

Eke, O.A. (2009) Globalization Challenges and Nigerian Foreign Policy. Abakaliki: Willy Rose & Appleseed Publishing Coy.

Eze, O.C (2007) "Citizen Diplomacy, Legal Perspective, National/International Dimension".

Being a Paper Presented at the One-Day Seminar on Citizen Diplomacy Organized by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. November, 29.Presented at a Seminar on Citizen Diplomacy Organized by the Nigerian Instituteof

International Affairs, Lagos. November, 29.

Everts, P.andIsernia, P.(2001) ed. Public Opinion and the Use of Force. London: Routledge. Ferguson, N. (2004) "A World Without Power" in Foreign Policy, 143 (July/August):32-40 Frankel, J. (1963) The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1998)"Women and the Evolution of Politics in Foreign Affairs, 77/5: 24-40.

Gauba, O. P. (2003). An Introduction to Political Theory. Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd.

Gambari, I.A (1980). Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Nigeria under the First Republic. Zaria A.B.U Press.

Garba, J.N (1995). Fractured History: Elite Shifts and Policy Changes in Nigeria. Princeton N.J Sungai Corporation.

Gyong, J. E. (2012) A Social Analysis of The Transformation Agenda of President Goodluck Jonathan. European Scientific Journal, July edition, Vol. 8, No. 16 ISSN: e-ISSN 1857-7431. 95-113.

Horkheimer, M. (1993) Between Philosophy and Social Science, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Howell, W.G. and Eilkenfeld, J. C. (2005) "Presidents, Congress and the Use of Force". International Organisation, 59/1:209-232.

Ihonvbere, J.O (1985) The Rise and Fall of Nigeria‟s Second Republic. London: Zed Press.

Jackson, R. (1999) "T.I.Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape". Political Studies, 47:431-36.

Jackson, R. and Sorensen G. (2006) Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches.3rd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jaji, R. and Ayotunde, A.Y. (2016) The Contours and Depth of Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy Under Goodluck Jonathan. International Affairs and Global Strategy.Lagos: NIIA, Vo. 48. P13-17.

Jibrin, A. (2008) Obasanjo and the New Face of Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy, Kaduna-Nigeria: M.O.D Publishers.
Joseph, A. (1960) Perspectives of Critical Theory. Ibadan: Longman Nigeria.
Joseph C. Ebegbulem. (2019) "The Evolution of Nigeria's Foreign Policy: From the PreIndependence and Post-Independence Perspectives". International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies, 6(11), pp.1-12
Ka‟oje, U. M. (1994) ""Nigeria‟s National Interest and its Membership of Opec" Published in the Nigerian Journal of Political Science, Vol.7. No1. Department of Political Science, A.B.U.Zaria.
Khan, McNiven and MacKown (1970) An Introduction to Political Science. Princeton:NJ, Irwin Publishers.
Kissinger, H. A. (1982)Years of Upheaval, Boston: Little Brown
Leo Grande,W.M. (2002) "Tug of War: How Real is the Rivalry between Congress and the President over Foreign Policy?". Congress and thePresidency, 29:113-118.
Maduekwe, O. (2008) " Citizen Diplomacy And Nigeria‟s National Interest", a speech delivered at the Eleventh Orientation Course for Volunteers of the Technical Aid Programme for the 2008-2010 Biennium, Aminu Isa Kontagora Theatre Complex, Makurdi, Benue State, Monday, 19th May – Sunday 1st.
Mahmood, A. (2009) "What Manner of Citizen Diplomacy?" Available on INTERNET at: http//209.85.129.123/search?qchache:vikknolout:www.leadershipnigeria.com/index.php/c.
Mato, K (2009) "A Case for Citizens Diplomacy" Weekly Trust, November 6.
Mbachu, O. (2007), "Citizen Diplomacy: The Challenges for Nigerian Defence and Security in the 21st Century".
McDermott, G (1973). The Diplomacy and its Apparatus: London: Plume Press/Ward Lock Ltd.
Mingst, K. (2004). Essentials of International Relations (3rd Edition). New York: W.W.W. Norton & company.
Morgenthau, H. (1978). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5th Edition) New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Nigerian Tribune (2009) "Editorial: A Flood of Deportees", 19th November, Online.
Nwankwo, O. (2013) Shifting the Paradigm in Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy: Goodluck Jonathan and Nigeria‟s Vision 20:2020. Social Science, Science Publishing Group. 2:212 – 221.
Nwosu, N, and Adeniyi, O (2011) Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy. This Day Newspaper.P.19. Wednesday, June 15.
Obasi, I.N. (1999) Research Methodology in Political Science. Enugu: Academic Publishing Company.
Obiozor, G. (1998) "Nigeria‟s National Interest" in Nigeria and the Contemporary World (ed) Aderinto, A.A and Ubah, C.N. Nigerian Defence Academy, FASS.

Ogwu, J. (1986). Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Futures Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

Ogunbambi, R.O (1986) “Foreign Service: The Nigerian Ambassador and his Tasks”, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs 12 (1 &2).

Ogunsanwo, A. (2007) “Citizen Diplomacy: Challenges for Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy”. A Paper Presented at the One-Day Seminar on Citizen Diplomacy Organized by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. November, 29.

Okafor, E. (2004) Redefining Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy. Daily Champion Newspaper.Sept. 8.

Okocha, C. and Nzeshi, O (2007) “Nigeria to Adopt Citizenship Diplomacy”. Available on INTERNET at: http://209.85.129.132/search?q-chache:we189qw/wwwj:nigerianbronds.blogsport.can/2007/0.

Okoli, A. (2007) “Nigeria States and Conduct of External Relations with South Africa:An Appraisal”. Journal of International Politics and Development Studies, 3(1).

Olusanya, G.O and Akindele, R.A (1986) “The Fundamentals of Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy and External Economic Relations” in G.O Olusanya and R.A Akindele (eds), Nigeria‟s External Relations: The FirstTwenty-FiveYears. Ibadan: University Press Ltd.

Omoh, G. (2011) Economic Diplomacy Strategy Needed to Transform Economy. Vanguard, 13 June.

Omojuwa,K.A (2007) “Continuity Despite Change: An Appraisal of Nigeria‟s Foreign Policy in West Africa in the 1990s in Nigeria Journal of Political Science, January - December, Vol.11, Nos 1 & 2 A.B.UZaria.

Plischke, E. (1961) Conduct of America Diplomacy. Princeton, NewJersey: D. Van Nostrand Company Inc.

Rosenau, J. (1969). Linkage Politics: Essay on the Convergence of National and International System. New York.

Rourke, J. T. (2007). International Politics on the World Stage, Eleventh Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.

Saliu, H. A. (2010) Democracy, Governance and International Relations, Ibadan: CollegePress. Satow, Ernest (1966) A Guide to Diplomatic Practice: London. Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. Ubah, C.N (1998) “Strands in Nigeria‟s External Behaviour” in Nigeria and the Contemporary

World (eds) Aderinto, A.A and Ubah, C.N Nigerian Defence Academy FASS.

Umejei, E. (2014) Nigeria‟s FDI Fell 21.4% to $5.5b in 2013 – UNCTAD. Daily Independent, 6, February.

Varma, S. P. (1975) Modern Political Theory, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd.

Weber, C. (2005) International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge.

TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORISM ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

Arowona Abdulazeez LEKAN
Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution,
National Open University of Nigeria

and

Ameen ABDULKADIR, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Abuja
ameeniyi@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Terrorism remains one of the global security challenges. No nation or region is utterly free from the fear of terrorism. This paper examines the trends of terrorism and its implications on national development. Nigerian government has been responding to the threats posed by terrorism within the sphere of intelligence, education, counter-terrorism training, economic measure, sanction, legislation, effective law enforcement and military action. Rather than subside, the vehemence of terrorism has become recalcitrant in spite of the various measures beamed towards it by the Nigerian government. The genesis of the problem is explored, highlighting the convoluted interplay between socio-political, economic, and religious factors that contribute to the spread of terrorism. The study employs a secondary data approach, drawing from a diverse range of sources including literature reviews, academic journals, books, newspapers, and historical accounts. Through a thorough analysis of existing scholarship and empirical evidence, the paper unearths major trends associated with terrorism in the context of national development. The major findings underscore the pervasive and multifaceted nature of terrorism, which undermines governance structures, hampers economic progress, exacerbates social tensions, and poses significant challenges to regional stability. Recommendations are proposed to address the identified challenges, emphasizing the importance of holistic approaches that encompass socio-economic development, governance reforms, community engagement, and regional cooperation. Conclusions drawn from the analysis emphasize the urgency of concerted action to mitigate the impact of terrorism on national development and foster sustainable peace and prosperity.

Keywords: *Terrorism, National Development, Boko Haram, Counter-terrorism, Governance.*

Introduction

Terrorism remains one of the greatest threats in the contemporary world with obvious consequences on security of life and property. Terrorism refers to the threat or use of violence for political purpose by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to influence a target group other than the immediate victim or victims (Okereke, 2011). In the present century, the enormous danger of terrorism became a critical security concern to the international community after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States.

The major presence of terrorism in the African setting is the assortment of militia and insurgent groups. According to Ikelegbe (2010), these groups have been key players in the political violence that has severely impeded human security and the state competence needed to guarantee it. Post-colonial insurgencies have been witnessed in; Uganda through the National Resistance Army (NRA), Chad (Forces Armes du Nord/Armed Forces of the North, FAN), Al Shabaab, Ethiopia (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF), and the DRC (Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire/Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire, ADLF).

In Nigeria, terrorism continues to pose huge threat to peace and survival of the nation. Since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, ethnic and religious groups have significantly undermined the nation's security (Adeoye, 2005). The problem of mass unemployment, illiteracy, weak family structures, weak policing capability and porous border serve as enabler for the institution of terrorism, especially the Boko Haram. Accordingly, the Nigeria government has been responding to the threats posed by terrorism through various measures like legislation, public diplomacy and military operation. There is heavy military presence in the north east with counter-terrorism campaign, as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF) that also includes the mobile police and the Department of State Services.

Given this backdrop, this paper examines the trend and implications of terrorism on national security and development in Nigeria, just as it suggests way forward in the fight

against the menace. The study also acknowledges certain limitations, including the inherent complexity of the issue, data constraints, and the dynamic nature of terrorist threats. Despite these limitations, this conceptual discourse serves as a foundational framework for further research and policy deliberations aimed at effectively addressing the scourge of terrorism and promoting inclusive development.

The objectives for this study collectively aim to deepen the understanding of the complex interaction between terrorism and national development in Nigeria and inform more effective strategies for addressing this critical issue. Also, to analyze the trends of terrorism in Nigeria and their implications on various dimensions of national development, including governance, socio-economic stability, and human security. It also seeks to offer evidence-based recommendations for policymakers, practitioners, and stakeholders aimed at enhancing resilience, fostering inclusive development, and addressing the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria.

Conceptual Analysis

Terrorism

Terrorism is a form of coercive intimidation directed against individuals, communities and government in order to force them to concede to terrorist demands. According to Shafritz (1998), terrorism is highly visible violence directed against randomly selected civilians in an effort to generate a pervasive sense of fear and thus affect government policies or violence against representatives of a state (e.g. police, politicians, diplomats) by those who wish to overthrow its government. In analysing the same concept, Norton (1995) defines terrorism as a deliberate, unjustifiable and random use of violence for political ends against protected persons. Kuper and Kuper (1999) believes that terrorism consists of a series of acts intended to spread intimidation, panic and destruction in a population. This suggests that a common pattern is revealed in terrorism – fear created by force and intimidation having deliberately harmful objectives. Above all else, terrorism is a strategy for undermining confidence in a state ability to protect its citizens. Terrorism, therefore, is a crime and usually a politically

motivated violence. Although, it is not all crime or violence that is terrorism but all terrorism is crime and violence (psychological as well as physical).

National Security

The definition of national security is changing. By the term "national security" we mean both the security of the local (democratic) system of a country as well as the preservation of the social web as it is and the existence of civil society. According to Encarta Dictionary (2009), national security means protection of nation from danger, the protection of a nation from attack or other danger by maintaining adequate armed forces and guarding state secrets. It is the mission of the liberal state to guarantee security, prosperity and overall growth of its own part of the global society of citizens and civilians socially.

National Development

Development refers to the specified state of growth/advancement attributed to a country. In this context, development means positive transformation/change of the people's ways of living, attitudes, behaviours among others as a result of their accessing relevant, adequate and timely information services courtesy of the prevailing digital age. According to Olomola (1997), development is an advancement through progressive changes in economic, social, cultural, technological and political conditions of society leading to an improvement in the welfare of the citizens. No society can be regarded as developed if there is high level of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, mal-nutrition, child mortality, political instability, endemic corruption and inequality in income distribution. The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP, 1990), considers human development as a process of enlarging people's choices.

Theoretical Framework

The paper adopts Relational/Vengeance Theory**.** The Relational/Vengeance Theory originated from the work of Alozieuwa in 2012, drawn from sociological perspectives, looks into violent conflicts between groups by examining historical, cultural, economic and political relationships. It emphasizes how past conflicts breed negative stereotypes and influence group dynamics.

The theory is relevant to this study on trends and implications of terrorism on national development. This is based on the fact that it elucidates the cycle of violence seen in groups like Boko Haram. It underscores how retaliatory actions stem from perceived injustices, shaping the "we" versus "others" mentality, evident in the sect's responses to government actions, particularly the killing of the sect's founder, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009.

The belief is that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination (Faleti, 2006). Okereke notes that "sect members attracted several descriptions where they operated based on the perceptions of the local population. In some communities, where it existed, the sect and its members were described as terrorists and persons with psychiatric challenges".

The clarity of the relational/vengeance perspective is such that for a long time, it remained the plausible explanation for the terror campaign by Boko Haram terrorists as the death of their leader, Muhammed Yusuf in the police custody, and the hunting and incarceration of the members by the Nigerian security forces were seen to have fired the "we" and "others" psychology, and have been a major factor in the sect's resolve to avenge through the terror campaigns (Daily Sun, 2012). Jail-break operations to rescue incarcerated members and marrying of dead members' widows by living members, all sustain the theory.

Current Trends of Terrorism in Nigeria and Implications for National Development

Terrorism has been on the increase in Nigeria since the return to democratic rule in May, 1999. While several ethnic and religious groups have launched the campaign of terrorism in Nigeria, the violent acts by the Boko Haram (BH) groups become relevant here because of the justification which the groups always claimed in the name of Islam. Since 2009, Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for series of fatal and indiscriminate attacks using guns and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against religious and political leaders, security forces and the public at large (Ibrahim, 2011). The group became prominent in July 2009 due to the

violent clashes between members of the group and security forces. The group attacked police stations as part of their mission against anything western, which they see as evil and responsible for the predicament of Nigeria (Muhammad, 2010).

The Boko Haram which is predominant in the North Eastern part of Nigeria in states like Borno, Yobe and Adamawa has also spilled over into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger republic. Boko Haram continued to carry out kidnappings, killings, bombings, and attacks on civilian and military targets in northern Nigeria, resulting in thousands of deaths, injuries, and significant destruction of property in 2015. Attacks were also launched in Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Plateau, and Taraba states; and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Nigeria and its neighboring countries continued their military counter-offensive, forcing the terrorist group to abandon territories it had once controlled. In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); ISIL subsequently accepted Boko Haram's pledge. While Nigeria and regional partners have made progress in driving Boko Haram from much of the territory it held in northern Nigeria, the group kept control over some territory and maintained its ability to carry out asymmetric attacks. Boko Haram increased its use of suicide bombings against civilian targets, including places of worship, markets, and bus stations. Overtime, suspected Boko Haram members killed Nigerian security officials and civilians of both the Islamic and Christian faiths.

There is no disputing the fact that terrorism poses devastating consequences for national security and development. The violent attacks by the militants in the Niger Delta can be described as terrorist attack as it also accounted for colossal loss of human lives, especially in Rivers State. This confirms the report of African Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) which estimated that over 1,800 persons lost their lives since April 2004 in terrorism-related attacks in Rivers State (see Punch Editorial, June 2004:16).

Terrorism violates human rights, constitutes an attack against the rule of law and seriously undermines democracy and development in Nigeria. As a matter of fact, assassination, arson, hostage-taking and other domestic terrorist-related acts pose a breach of

peace and stability. The spate of suicide bombings by the Boko Haram are critical and potent force for insecurity. These acts portray the gross inadequacy and ineffectiveness of state security system in the face of terrorist outrages. Security of life and property could not be guaranteed. As such, failure to effectively protect human rights may create another round of image problem for Nigeria, which can be highly detrimental to development.

Terrorist acts are also patently counter-productive. The destruction of human lives and property through terrorist acts inhibit all ramifications of development and increase the level of poverty. The provision of relief materials by government for the victims of terrorist-related violence and the huge amount of funds invested in combating terrorism is usually a drain on the public treasury and the nation's economy. Therefore, instead of economy progressing, it is retrogressing. Besides, the climate of insecurity usually created by terrorist-related incidents in the country deters investments. There is no gainsaying the fact that an insecure and violence-ridden polity can never encourage both local and foreign investment. And where the polity does not encourage investment, development becomes stagnant and the dividends of democracy equally become an abstract.

Findings

Terrorism in Nigeria is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with deep-rooted social, political, and economic implications. A conceptual analysis of this issue requires an examination of various trends and their implication on different aspects of Nigerian society which constitute the findings of this work.

Ethnic and Religious Dynamics: Terrorism in Nigeria often intersects with ethnic and religious tensions. Groups like Boko Haram, for instance, exploit grievances among marginalized communities, particularly in the northeastern region where poverty and religious radicalization have created fertile ground for recruitment. The conflict between the predominantly Muslim north and predominantly Christian south exacerbates these tensions, leading to further polarization and violence.

Geographical Spread: Initially concentrated in the northeastern region, findings reveal that terrorism has spread to other parts of Nigeria, including the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta. This geographical expansion indicates the adaptability and resilience of terrorist groups, posing significant challenges to national security and stability.


Impact on Governance and Development: Persistent terrorist attacks undermine governance structures and impede development efforts in Nigeria. The government's response, including militarized approaches, emergency measures, and counterinsurgency operations, often exacerbates human rights abuses and deepens societal divisions. Latest findings show how the diversion of resources to counterterrorism efforts constrains investments in infrastructure, education, and healthcare, hindering long-term development.

Humanitarian Crisis: Terrorism contributes to a severe humanitarian crisis characterized by displacement, food insecurity, and widespread suffering. Millions of people have been displaced from their homes, creating overcrowded internally displaced persons (IDP) camps with inadequate resources and services. The resulting humanitarian catastrophe further strains Nigeria's already fragile social fabric and exacerbates inter-communal tensions.

Regional and International Implication: This paper also affirms that Nigeria's struggle with terrorism has regional and international implications. Cross-border attacks, arms trafficking, and the influx of foreign fighters exacerbate instability not only within Nigeria but also in neighboring countries like Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Additionally, Nigeria's status as Africa's most populous country and largest economy means that its internal security challenges can have ripple effects across the continent and beyond.

Economic Disruption: Terrorism disrupts economic activities, particularly in vulnerable sectors such as agriculture, tourism, and foreign investment. Persistent insecurity deters investors, undermines business confidence, and hampers efforts to diversify the economy away from oil dependence. The resultant economic downturn exacerbates poverty and exacerbates social grievances, creating a vicious cycle of instability and underdevelopment.

Counterterrorism Strategies put to question: Nigeria's response to terrorism has evolved over time, encompassing a mix of military operations, law enforcement measures, and community engagement initiatives. However, another point of call raised by this work is that, the effectiveness of these strategies remains questionable, as evidenced by the persistence of attacks and the resilience of terrorist groups. Concerns about human rights abuses, corruption, and governance failures undermine the legitimacy and credibility of counterterrorism efforts. The graphic below captures the statistics of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria from 2011 to 2023 in the most ravaged states.



States most affected by Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria between 2011 to 2023

Source: Statista**,** 2024**.**

Thus, relying on the findings, the study establishes the following:

i) The level of terrorism in Nigeria was very high between 2012 and 2015, with many reported incidents of suicide bombing.

ii) Terrorism has seriously undermined national security and development in Nigeria.

iii) Nigerian government has been combating terrorism through legislation, effective law enforcement, intelligence and military operation.

In driving home these points, terrorism in Nigeria is a multifaceted challenge with far-reaching implications for governance, development, security, and regional stability. Addressing this complex issue requires a comprehensive approach that addresses underlying socio-economic grievances, strengthens governance structures, fosters inter-communal dialogue, and enhances regional cooperation in combating terrorism and its root causes.

Discussion

Terrorism remains one of the most pressing global challenges of the 21st century, posing significant threats to peace, stability, and development across nations. The trends and implications of terrorism on national development have garnered increasing attention from policymakers, scholars, and practitioners alike. Understanding the complexities of this phenomenon is paramount, as it directly impacts various aspects of socio-economic and political life.

From a global perspective, terrorism has evolved into a transnational threat, transcending borders and affecting countries across continents. The proliferation of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram has reshaped the security landscape, prompting coordinated responses from the international community. These groups employ sophisticated tactics, including suicide bombings, kidnappings, and cyber warfare, to instil fear and destabilize governments.

Within the local context, nations like Nigeria grapple with the multifaceted challenges posed by terrorism. The rise of groups like Boko Haram in the northeastern region has precipitated a humanitarian crisis, leading to widespread displacement, loss of lives, and economic disruptions. The interplay between terrorism and ethno-religious tensions exacerbates social divisions, hindering efforts towards national cohesion and development.

The historical developments in the literature underscore the growing recognition of terrorism as a complex and dynamic phenomenon. Previous studies have explored various dimensions of terrorism, including its root causes, organizational structures, and ideological underpinnings. However, there remain notable gaps in our understanding, particularly

regarding the nuanced impact of terrorism on national development and the efficacy of counterterrorism strategies.

While existing research offers valuable insights, several gaps persist. Firstly, there is a need for better understanding of how terrorism intersects with broader socio-economic development agendas. Secondly, there is limited empirical evidence on the long-term implications of terrorism on governance structures, economic resilience, and social cohesion. Addressing these gaps is crucial for devising evidence-based policies and interventions to mitigate the adverse effects of terrorism on national development. The significance of addressing these gaps cannot be overstated. Effective counterterrorism strategies hinge on a comprehensive understanding of the underlying drivers and consequences of terrorism. By elucidating the intricate linkages between terrorism and national development, policymakers can craft targeted interventions that foster resilience, inclusivity, and sustainable peace.

Several theoretical and practical challenges underscore the complexity of studying terrorism and national development. Theoretical frameworks such as rational choice theory, and vengeance theory offer valuable perspectives on the motivations and behaviours of terrorist groups. However, translating these theories into effective policy interventions requires a critical understanding of local contexts and dynamics. For instance, scholars like Neumann (2013) highlight the importance of addressing governance failures and socio-economic disparities as root causes of terrorism. Similarly, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) emphasize the role of education and economic opportunities in mitigating radicalization and violent extremism. These insights underscore the need for holistic approaches that integrate security, development, and governance strategies.

Finally, the trends and implications of terrorism on national development represent a multifaceted challenge with far-reaching consequences. By examining this issue from a global and local perspective, identifying gaps in existing research, and engaging with theoretical and practical complexities, this study has contributed to a better understanding of terrorism and

informed evidence-based policy responses especially with the choice of recommendations offered.

Conclusion

Nigeria has experienced several forms of terrorism especially by the Boko Haram groups since the group capitalized on high illiteracy level and mass poverty among the people to preach an extreme version of religious teachings. Motivated by religious fanaticism, Boko Haram members have launched series of terrorist violence since 2004 but their attacks became prevalent between 2011 and 2021. The major findings accentuate the pervasive and all-around nature of terrorism, which hampers governance structures, slow down economic progress, aggravate social tensions, and poses significant challenges to national stability and development. This conclusion emphasizes the urgency of holistic approaches that encompass socio-economic development, governance reforms, community engagement, and regional cooperation to contain the menac**e.**

Recommendations

Development of early warning system needs to be employed to checkmate domestic terrorism in the country. There is need to develop effective early warning signal by the military intelligence. This will enable the public to be alerted on the potential threats of terrorist groups. Counter terrorism measures should involve de-radicalization programmes and raising the educational awareness of the public on the dangers of recruitment into terrorist formations. Security agencies should advance their strategies particular the use of modern AI tools to curtail terrorist acts like suicide bombing, kidnapping, sabotage/vandalism, ambush/barricade among others. There is need to strengthen the current counter terrorism measures through adequate funding and intelligence at both federal and state levels. Nigerian government should take appropriate measure to ensure that national legislation provides adequate framework for effective, definite and decisive legal measures against all forms of terrorism. This paper suggests that capital punishment be meted on all terrorist offences to serve as deterrence to others.

Nigerian government should strengthen anti-terrorism unit in all the security agencies i.e police, custom service, immigration, state security service (SSS) etc. This measure will help to intercept and obstruct terrorist incidents. Inter-agency collaboration on intelligence sharing and operations should be institutionalized. Nigerian authorities should also develop practical measures to control the proliferation of arms and explosives and, perhaps most important, tightening border security to prevent importation of weapons and encroachment of foreign militants into Nigerian territory. At the diplomatic front, government should intensify diplomatic engagement of other neighbouring West African countries. Diplomacy is the backbone of the counter-terrorism, collaborating with other nations to build political will, support and mechanisms that enable law enforcement, intelligence and military communities to act effectively is necessary. Terrorist operatives, cells and sponsors have been tracked, identified, arrested and prosecuted for their murderous activities. Besides, money is required to implement terrorism; government should intensify efforts to drain the sources of money of terrorist organizations. This measure will make it much difficult for terrorists to raise and move money. Channels of small arms proliferation and light weapons that is the window for supplying weapons to terrorists should be effectively neutralized to deny local terror groups the supply source of weapons.

References

Adeoye, M.N. (2005). "Terrorism: An Appraisal in Nigerian Context" in Ayinla, S. A. (ed.) Issues in Political Violence in Nigeria. Ilorin: Hamson Printing Communication.

Alozieuwa, S. H. (2012). Contending theories on Nigeria's security challenge in the era of Boko Haram insurgency. Peace and Conflict Review, 7(1), 1-8.

Daily Sun, online, January 23, 2012.

Dougherty E.J and Pfaltzgrate L.R. (1990). Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, second edition. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

Encarta (2009). Encarta Dictionary. USA: Microsoft Corporation.

Faleti, A.S. (2006). “Theories of Social Conflict,” in Best, G. S (ed). Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

Ibrahim, J. (2011). “Deepening Democracy: Boko Haram: Search for Resolution” 234next Newspaper, August 6.

Ikelegbe, A. (2001). “The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria” The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 39 No. 1.

International Crisis Group. (2021). Addressing the Root Causes of Terrorism in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities. Report No. 123.

Johnson, C. (2022). “Beyond Military Interventions: A Comprehensive Approach to Countering Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Terrorism and Political Violence, 34(1), 78-96.

Krueger, A. B., & Maleckova, J. (2003). “Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 119-144.

Muhammed, A. Y. & M. N. Adeoye (2008). “Terrorism and the Quest for Sustainable Democracy and Development.” In H. A. Saliu., Jimoh, I. S. Yusuf, N. and Ojo, E. O. (eds.) Perspectives on Nation-Building and Development in Nigeria: Political and Legal Issues. A Publication of Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Ilorin. 293-315.

Neumann, P. R. (2013). Joining al-Qaeda: Jihadist recruitment in Europe. I.B.Tauris.

Norton, A. R. (1995). “Terrorism” in Esposito J. L. (ed.) The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. New York: Oxford University Press.

O'Grady, W. (2011). Classical Sociological Explanations of Crime. In Crime in Canadian Context. Canada: Oxford University Press.

Okeke, U. (2011). “Terrorism and Global Security, Foreign Policy in Nigeria’s Democratic Transition”, Journal of Art and Contemporary Society, Vol. 3.

Okereke, N.C. (2011). “Implementing the Nigerian Defence Policy: Reflections on the Boko Haram Crisis,” in Mbachu, O and Sokoto, A. A. (eds), Nigerian Defence and Security: Policies and Strategies. Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Ltd.

Olomola, A. S. (1997). Social Cultural and Political Dimensions of Development in 21st Century Nigeria. In Ikpi, A. E. and Olayemi, J. K. (eds.) Government and Development in West Africa: Perspectives for the 21st Century. Arlington, VA: WIIAD.

Shafritz, J. M. (1988). The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and Politics. Chicago: The Dorsey Press.

Smith, A., & Jones, B. (2020). “The Socio-Economic Impact of Terrorism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Vulnerable Communities”. Journal of Conflict Studies, 15(2), 45-68.

UNDP (1990). Human Development Report 1990. New York: Oxford University Press.

CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND OPTIONS FOR POLICY ACTION

Silas Ayuba SAMAILA
Department of Social Science and Humanities,
School of General Studies.
Kaduna State College of Education, Gidan Waya, Nigeria

Sani Ibrahim SANI
Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social Sciences
Kaduna State University, Kaduna, Nigeria

and

Idris Yakubu HALIRU
Department of Local Government Studies,
College of Administration Social Sciences Studies (CASSS)
Kaduna Polytechnic, Kaduna, Nigeria

ABSTRACT
The security landscape in Nigeria has become increasingly complex, characterized by threats such as terrorism, insurgency, cybercrime, Kidnapping and ethno-religious conflicts among others. The country faces multifaceted security challenges that demand a robust and adaptive strategy to curb these challenges. In its effort to address the security challenges Nigerian Government in 2019 formulated National Security Strategy (NSS) which outlines the major security concerns of the nation and articulated how the government plans to deal with such. This paper seeks to examine challenges of National Security Strategy (NSS) in addressing the insecurity in the country, using qualitative approach. The findings revealed that of NSS is just a mere policy document that has not been effectively translated into action. Therefore, this study recommends that that addressing security challenges has to go beyond policy formulation but effective implementation of NSS is critical in curbing the challenges.

Keywords: *Security, Strategy, Policy and Implementation*

Introduction

The security landscape in Nigeria has undergone a profound transformation in recent decades, marked by a convergence of internal and external threats that have posed significant challenges to the nation's stability and development. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and its largest economy, has long grappled with various security challenges, including ethnic and religious tensions, political instability, and socioeconomic inequalities (Obi, 2019). However, in recent years, the security situation has become increasingly complex and volatile due to the emergence of new and persistent threats. One of the most prominent among these is terrorism, particularly perpetrated by the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern part of the country. Since its inception in 2009, Boko Haram has carried out numerous attacks, resulting in widespread casualties, displacement of populations, and humanitarian crises (Akande, 2020).

In addition to terrorism, Nigeria faces a range of other security threats, including ethno-religious conflicts, farmer-herder clashes, communal violence, cybercrime, and kidnapping for ransom. These challenges have not only jeopardized the safety and security of Nigerian citizens but also undermined economic activities, hindered investment, and eroded public confidence in the government's ability to maintain law and order (Eselebor & Nwobu, 2021). Moreover, Nigeria's geographic location, porous borders, and demographic diversity make it susceptible to transnational security risks, such as arms trafficking, drug smuggling, and cross-border terrorism. The interconnected nature of these threats underscores the need for a holistic and proactive approach to national security governance and policy formulation (Ali & Mustapha, 2018).

In response to these multifaceted security challenges, the Nigerian Government recognized the imperative of developing a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS) to address the evolving threat landscape and safeguard the country's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national interests. The NSS, unveiled in 2019, represents a concerted effort to articulate the strategic objectives, priorities, and policy directives necessary to confront and

mitigate security threats across various domains (Ahmed, 2021). Despite the formulation of the NSS and its stated objectives, the gap between policy formulation and effective implementation remains a critical issue. As noted by Okeke et al. (2020), the lack of coherence, coordination, and capacity within Nigeria's security apparatus has impeded the operationalization of the NSS and hindered progress in achieving its intended outcomes. Against this backdrop, there is a compelling need to critically evaluate the NSS, assess its effectiveness in addressing Nigeria's security challenges, and identify policy gaps and implementation barriers that must be addressed to enhance the nation's resilience and capacity to confront emerging threats.

Literature Review

Scholars such as Obi (2019) have documented the rise of Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria, highlighting its devastating impact on civilian populations and the challenges it poses to state authority and stability. Additionally, ethno-religious conflicts in regions like the Middle Belt have exacerbated tensions between different ethnic and religious communities, leading to mass displacement and loss of lives (Akande, 2020). Nigeria's security landscape is characterized by a diverse array of threats, including terrorism, insurgency, ethno-religious conflicts, communal violence, cybercrime, and transnational organized crime. Scholars such as Ahmed (2021) argue that the effectiveness of the NSS is contingent on its successful implementation, which requires political will, institutional capacity, and resource allocation. In response to these security challenges, the Nigerian government formulated the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2019, outlining its strategic priorities and policy objectives for enhancing national security resilience. The NSS identifies key threats and vulnerabilities facing Nigeria and articulates strategies for addressing them, including counterterrorism measures, conflict resolution mechanisms, and community engagement initiatives.

Okeke et al. (2020) highlight the challenges of coordinating security operations among different agencies and the need for enhanced collaboration and information sharing to improve

the effectiveness of NSS implementation. The effectiveness of NSS implementation in addressing Nigeria's security challenges has been a subject of debate among scholars and policymakers. While the NSS represents a comprehensive framework for addressing security threats, its impact on the ground has been limited by various factors, including institutional fragmentation, resource constraints, corruption, and lack of community engagement.

According to Eselebor et al. (2021) on their paper titled “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges”, the study examines the prospects and challenges of security sector reform (SSR) in Nigeria within the context of post-conflict peacebuilding. It highlights the progress made in SSR initiatives, such as capacity-building and institutional restructuring, while also identifying obstacles like institutional resistance and political instability. Recommendations include strengthening civilian oversight mechanisms and promoting inclusive dialogue to enhance SSR effectiveness.

Oluwafemi and Ademola (2020) examines the challenges and solutions related to cybersecurity and cybercrime in Nigeria. It outlines the inadequate cybersecurity infrastructure, regulatory gaps, and socio-economic impacts of cybercrime, while proposing solutions such as investing in cybersecurity infrastructure, enhancing awareness programs, and fostering public-private partnerships to combat cyber threats effectively. Ali and Mustapha (2018) examines security reform and conflict transformation in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges. The research explores the prospects and challenges of security sector reform (SSR) in Nigeria for conflict transformation. It identifies prospects like strengthening democratic governance and building trust between security forces and local communities, alongside challenges such as institutional resistance and socio-economic inequalities. Recommendations include strengthening legal frameworks, promoting inclusive dialogue, and mobilizing support for SSR programs. Obi (2019) examines the socio-religious and political dimensions of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It explores the origins, motivations, and tactics of the insurgency, highlighting its devastating impact on civilian populations and the challenges it poses to state authority and stability. Recommendations include addressing root

causes such as poverty, marginalization, and ideological extremism through holistic approaches to counterinsurgency and community engagement.

Okeke et al. (2020) investigates the challenges and lessons learned from interagency coordination in counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. It analyzes the complexities of coordinating security operations among different agencies and emphasizes the importance of collaboration, information sharing, and joint planning to enhance the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. Recommendations include improving communication channels, establishing clear command structures, and fostering a culture of collaboration among security agencies. In a study by Balogun (2019), the study examines the humanitarian crisis in north-eastern Nigeria resulting from the Boko Haram insurgency. It discusses the challenges faced by humanitarian organizations in delivering aid and protection to affected populations, including access constraints, security risks, and funding shortages. Recommendations include enhancing humanitarian access, strengthening protection mechanisms, and mobilizing international support to address the urgent needs of displaced persons and conflict-affected communities. According to Abubakar and Akangbe (2020), the research explores the linkages between youth unemployment, social exclusion, and insecurity in Nigeria. It discusses the socio-economic factors driving youth involvement in criminal activities and violent extremism, highlighting the implications for national development and stability. Recommendations include implementing youth employment programs, promoting vocational training, and addressing structural inequalities to empower young people and reduce their vulnerability to recruitment by criminal and extremist groups.

Oladejo (2021) in his paper titled “Gender Dimensions of Security Challenges in Nigeria: Implications for Policy and Practice”, examines the gender dimensions of security challenges in Nigeria, focusing on the differential impacts of insecurity on men and women. It highlights the unique vulnerabilities faced by women, including gender-based violence, displacement, and lack of access to resources and decision-making processes. Recommendations include integrating gender perspectives into security policies, enhancing

women's participation in peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts, and addressing gender inequalities to promote inclusive and sustainable security outcomes

Methodology

The assembly of the data for this research was mainly based on secondary source. The merit of this method according Creswell (2003) are: (1) It is a non-reactive method where information get from the document is not subject to possible distortion and interpolation, as the result of interaction between the interviewer and the interviewees (2) Document is cost effective because it has already been produced. And (3) it helps the researcher to study the past. In this regard, the assembling of data was through government documents, journals, published books, seminar presentations, unpublished materials., The research adopts contextual or document data analysis Evidences from the documents were presented to support the findings and conclusion of the study.

Challenges

The challenges in implementing NSS in Nigeria are multiple, however, the following are those challenges are deducted from the analysis;

Lack of Political Will and Leadership

One of the primary challenges in NSS execution is the lack of sustained political will and leadership commitment to prioritize security sector reform and allocate resources effectively. The political landscape in Nigeria is often characterized by competing interests, patronage networks, and short-term policy agendas, which may undermine the continuity and coherence of security policies (Ahmed, 2021). Without strong political leadership and consensus-building, efforts to implement the NSS may be susceptible to bureaucratic inertia, policy reversals, and partisan interference. Moreover, the politicization of security issues and the securitization of political agendas may divert attention and resources away from critical security challenges, undermining the effectiveness of NSS implementation (Akande, 2020). Addressing this gap requires sustained engagement and dialogue between political leaders,

security practitioners, and civil society stakeholders to foster consensus, build trust, and prioritize security sector reform.

Lack of Policy Coherence and Coordination

Another challenge in NSS implementation is the lack of policy coherence and coordination among various security agencies and government departments. Nigeria's security architecture is characterized by fragmentation, overlapping mandates, and interagency rivalries, which impede effective collaboration and synergy in implementing NSS directives (Ahmed, 2021). The absence of a centralized coordinating mechanism and clear lines of authority often leads to duplication of efforts, inefficiencies, and gaps in security governance. For instance, the coordination between military forces, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement bodies in counterterrorism operations is often hampered by bureaucratic obstacles and jurisdictional disputes. As a result, efforts to combat terrorist groups like Boko Haram may be undermined by information silos, communication breakdowns, and turf wars among security agencies (Okeke et al., 2020).

Resource Constraints

Another critical factor affecting NSS implementation is resource constraints, including limited budgetary allocations, inadequate infrastructure, and personnel shortages within security agencies. Despite the strategic priorities outlined in the NSS, the mismatch between policy ambitions and resource availability undermines the capacity of security institutions to execute their mandates effectively (Eselebor & Nwobu, 2021). The lack of adequate funding for training, equipment, and operational expenses hampers the ability of security forces to respond promptly and decisively to security threats. Moreover, corruption and mismanagement of resources further exacerbate the challenges of NSS implementation, as funds earmarked for security purposes may be diverted or embezzled, compromising the effectiveness of security operations (Akande, 2020). Addressing resource constraints requires not only increased budgetary allocations to the security sector but also improved transparency, accountability, and oversight mechanisms to ensure the efficient utilization of available resources.

Capacity Building and Training challenges

The effectiveness of NSS implementation is contingent on the capacity and readiness of security agencies to respond to evolving security threats effectively. However, capacity gaps and skill deficiencies within security institutions present significant challenges to effective implementation (Ali & Mustapha, 2018). The lack of specialized training programs, outdated equipment, and inadequate professional development opportunities hinder the ability of security personnel to adapt to emerging threats and employ best practices in their operational activities. For example, in the context of counterterrorism operations, the success of NSS implementation depends on the ability of security forces to conduct intelligence-led operations, engage with local communities, and counter extremist narratives effectively. However, the lack of training in community policing techniques, conflict resolution, and human rights protection may undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of security interventions (Obi, 2019).

Problem of Trust-Building and Community Engagement

Effective NSS implementation necessitates proactive engagement with local communities, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders to build trust, foster cooperation, and promote resilience against security threats. However, allegations of human rights abuses, extrajudicial killings, and excessive use of force by security forces undermine public trust and confidence in the NSS (Oluwafemi & Ademola, 2020). The breakdown of trust between security forces and local populations erodes the legitimacy of security institutions and undermines efforts to enlist community support in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Furthermore, the lack of meaningful dialogue and consultation with affected communities may exacerbate grievances and fuel resentment, leading to further alienation and radicalization (Eselebor & Nwobu, 2021). Effective community engagement strategies should prioritize dialogue, inclusion, and participatory decision-making processes to ensure that security policies and interventions reflect the needs and priorities of local stakeholders.

Prospects and Policy Options

Addressing the complex security challenges facing Nigeria requires a multifaceted approach that encompasses policy reforms, institutional strengthening, and community engagement. Drawing on the analysis of the National Security Strategy (NSS) implementation and identified gaps and challenges, the following recommendations are proposed to enhance the effectiveness of Nigeria's security governance and mitigate security threats:

Enhance Interagency Coordination and Collaboration

To overcome the institutional fragmentation and coordination challenges hindering NSS implementation, there is a need to establish a centralized coordinating mechanism for security agencies. This mechanism should facilitate information sharing, joint planning, and collaboration among security stakeholders, ensuring a coherent and integrated approach to security governance (Ahmed, 2021). Additionally, capacity-building initiatives should be prioritized to enhance the skills and capabilities of security personnel in interagency cooperation and coordination.

Strengthen Resource Allocation and Oversight

Addressing resource constraints and corruption within security institutions requires robust measures to enhance transparency, accountability, and oversight in resource allocation and utilization. Government authorities should prioritize adequate budgetary allocations to the security sector, ensuring that funds are allocated equitably and efficiently (Akande, 2020). Moreover, mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the use of resources should be established to prevent mismanagement, embezzlement, and diversion of funds.

Promote Rule of Law and Human Rights Protection

Efforts to combat security threats must be conducted within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. Security forces should adhere to international standards and norms governing the use of force, ensuring that operations are conducted in a manner that upholds human dignity and protects civilians from harm (Oluwafemi & Ademola, 2020).

Training programs on human rights, conflict resolution, and community policing should be prioritized to promote professional conduct and accountability among security personnel.

Foster Community Engagement and Trust-Building

Building trust and cooperation between security forces and local communities is essential for effective NSS implementation. Community engagement strategies should prioritize dialogue, inclusivity, and participatory decision-making processes, involving stakeholders in the design and implementation of security policies and initiatives (Eselebor & Nwobu, 2021). Moreover, efforts to address socio-economic grievances, promote youth empowerment, and provide alternative livelihoods can help mitigate the root causes of insecurity and foster community resilience. **Enhance Regional Cooperation and Partnerships**

Given the transnational nature of security threats, regional cooperation and partnerships are essential for addressing cross-border challenges effectively. Nigeria should strengthen collaboration with neighbouring countries, regional organizations, and international partners to enhance information sharing, intelligence cooperation, and joint border security initiatives (Obi, 2019). Joint military operations, capacity-building programs, and diplomatic initiatives should be pursued to counter regional threats such as terrorism, organized crime, and illicit trafficking.

Conclusion

The security challenges facing Nigeria are complex, multifaceted, and deeply entrenched, requiring a comprehensive and coordinated response from government authorities, security agencies, civil society organizations, and international partners. The analysis of the National Security Strategy (NSS) implementation and the identified gaps and challenges underscore the urgent need for policy reforms, institutional strengthening, and community engagement to address Nigeria's security vulnerabilities effectively. Despite the formulation of the NSS as a strategic blueprint for enhancing national security resilience and countering emerging threats, its effectiveness has been hampered by various factors, including institutional fragmentation, resource constraints, corruption, and lack of political will. The fragmented nature of Nigeria's

security architecture, characterized by overlapping mandates and interagency rivalries, has impeded effective coordination and collaboration among security stakeholders, undermining the coherence and impact of NSS implementation.

Moreover, resource constraints, corruption, and mismanagement within security institutions have compromised the capacity of ses to respond to security threats effectively. The diversion of funds, embezzlement, and abuse of power erode public trust and confidence in security institutions, further exacerbating the challenges of NSS execution.

Recommendations

Addressing these gaps requires concerted efforts to strengthen resource allocation, oversight mechanisms, and accountability frameworks, ensuring that funds are utilized efficiently and transparently. Furthermore, fostering community engagement, promoting rule of law, and protecting human rights are essential for building trust and cooperation between security forces and local communities. Dialogue, inclusivity, and participatory decision-making processes should be prioritized to ensure that security policies and initiatives reflect the needs and priorities of affected populations. Additionally, investing in long-term development, poverty reduction, and conflict prevention initiatives is crucial for addressing the root causes of insecurity and promoting sustainable peace and stability.

References

Abubakar, U., & Akangbe, O. (2020). Youth Unemployment and Insecurity in Nigeria: Implications for National Development.

Ahmed, M. A. (2021). Security Sector Reform in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects. African Security Review, 30(4), 365-382.

Akande, T. A. (2020). Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Implications for Peace and Security. International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Reviews, 10(2), 20-36.

Ali, A. Y., & Mustapha, B. (2018). Interrogating the Phenomenon of Herders/Farmers' Clashes in Nigeria. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, 24, 96-113.

Balogun, M. J. (2019). Humanitarian Crisis in Northeast Nigeria: Challenges and Responses.

Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches (2nd ed.). London: Thousand Oaks, CA Sage Publications.

Eselebor, J., & Nwobu, C. (2021). Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges. African Security Review, 30(1), 50-66.

Huysmans, J. (1998). Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier. European Journal of International Relations, 4(2), 226–255.

Obi, C. I. (2019). Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: A Socio-Religious and Political Dilemma. Covenant Journal of Politics and International Affairs, 7(1), 1-17.

Okeke, U. M., Agada, C. O., & Okoli, U. C. (2020). Enhancing National Security Strategy Implementation in Nigeria: Insights from the Boko Haram Insurgency. Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research, 20(4), 19-33.

Oladejo, M. (2021). Gender Dimensions of Security Challenges in Nigeria: Implications for Policy and Practice.

Oluwafemi, O. S., & Ademola, I. (2020). Cybersecurity and Cybercrime in Nigeria: Challenges and Solutions. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 14(1), 106-127.

Pierre, J., & Peters, B. G. (2000). Governance, Politics and the State. Macmillan International Higher Education.

Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests (3rd ed.). Sage Publications.

NIGERIA RELATIONS WITH THE EAST AMID THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

Daupamowei Henry, ASANEBI, PhD
Department of History and International Studies
Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State
daupa4real@gmail.com

Adebisi Babatunde ADENUSI
Department of History and International Studies
Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State
adebisiadenusi@gmail.com

and

Ikechukwu Gerald OPARA
Department of History and International Studies
Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State
geraldopara2015@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Nigeria, which is often referred to as the giant of Africa because of its gigantic population and economy, has enjoyed a long history of diplomatic relations with the East since her independence from colonial grip to the present era. The study examines Nigeria relations with the East in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine War and was guided by the core objectives of analysing (i) the main factors that have shaped Nigeria's diplomatic relations with the East in recent years, (ii) the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on Nigeria relations with the East, (iii) the historical context to Nigeria's ties with Russia, China, and Ukraine, (iv) Nigeria's relations with Russia, China, and Ukraine before and during the conflict, and (v) assessing the economic and geopolitical impacts on Nigeria due to the war, etc. In doing so, the theory of diplomatic realism was adopted to underpin the basis of the argument. The study methodology is historical and premised on the use of secondary data obtained from journals, textbooks, book chapters, and internet sources. Thus, the study contends that Nigeria has cautiously managed competing pressures by maintaining neutrality, aiming to preserve strategic interests with Russia and other nations. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced Nigeria into a delicate balancing act between its Eastern partnerships and Western ties. Conclusively, Nigeria's non-aligned foreign policy in an increasingly bifurcated global order should be sustained.

Keywords: *Nigeria, Ukraine, Russia, East, Diplomacy, Economy*

Introduction

Nigeria, which is often referred to as the giant of Africa because of its gigantic population and economy has enjoyed a long history of diplomatic relations with the East since her independence from colonial grip to the present era. According to Worldometer (2024) the population of Nigeria is 228, 047, 006 as of April 2024, while her economy with Growth Domestic Product (GDP) stood at $252.73 billion and GDP growth of 3.1% (IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2021 & 2024). As a young nation, immediately after independence, Nigeria adopted non-alignment in her foreign policy.

In recent years, Nigeria's diplomatic relations with the East have become increasingly significant due to a number of factors, including China's growing economic clout in Africa, Russia's military cooperation with African countries, and Nigeria's own need for diversification in its external relations. The defunct Soviet Union was a strong supporter of Nigeria's independence struggle and assisted Nigeria in her darkest period of history, during the Nigerian civil war in 1967–1970. For Russia and other nations of the East, Africa is a continent that they need to establish diplomatic ties with to ensure the East untie the grip of the West on the continent. In order to sustain this, Russia has focused on security and defensive alliances, supplying weapons to African countries with no strings attached and further presenting itself as a bulwark against armed insurgents on the continent.

Also, as a strategic and influential nation in West Africa, Nigeria has enjoyed a significant increase in bilateral relations in trade, investment, military, and education with Russia and other nations of the East which has earned her long-standing friendship and respect within and outside the continent. According to Ibeanu (2018), China is Nigeria's largest trading partner, and other East Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea, are also important economic partners. Nigeria has also benefited from significant Chinese investment and loans, etc in recent years.

The Russia-Ukraine war has created a complex and challenging environment for Nigeria diplomatic relations with the East (Adebajo, 2020). The war in Ukraine represents the

most serious European security crisis since the Cold War, with global ramifications. Russia's invasion sparked immediate condemnation from the United States of America (U.S.A.), the European Union (EU), and their allies. Nigeria condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and demanded that Russia stop its offensive and immediately withdraw all troops from Ukraine. This action was taken in a scurried, not putting the ties between Russia and Nigeria, the country's neutrality and non-alignment position into considerations. In April 2022, Russia warned countries that a yes vote or abstention on a U.S. push to suspend the country from the Human Rights Council would be viewed as an "unfriendly gesture" with consequences for bilateral ties, according to a note seen by Reuters on Wednesday (https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/522513-nigeria-neutral-in-un-vote-despite-russias-abstention-threat.html?tztc=1). Nigeria corrected her previous action by abstaining from voting at the United Nations alongside most African countries, thereby taking a neutral stance despite Russia's abstention threat. By abstaining, Nigeria is neither backing nor supporting Russia. She is only sustaining the economic, military, etc ties with Russia and her allies through this decision.

Nigerians' public response followed this trend, and this fresh stance attempted to balance Nigeria multidirectional foreign policy, which grew increasingly complex in the post-Cold War era. The nation's ability to keep good relations on all sides was tested by the Russia-Ukraine war. Mounting pressure from the West to isolate Russia diplomatically collided with its desire for continue Russian cooperation.

It is on the basis of the foregoing that the study became concerned with the objectives of analysing (i) the main factors that have shaped Nigeria's diplomatic relations with the East in recent years, (ii) the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on Nigeria's relations with the East, and (iii) assessing the economic and geopolitical impacts on Nigeria linked to the war.

The study also analyses Nigeria relations with Russia, China, and Ukraine before and during the conflict and how the war impacted Nigeria delicate balancing of the East against pressure from the West.

Conceptual Clarifications

Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Foreign Policy according to Holsti (1995) is the action of a state towards the external environment and the conditions usually domestic under which these actions are formulated. On his part, Karl Deutsch (1954) defined foreign policy as the search for the preservation of a country's independence, security, the pursuit and protection of its economic interest.

Thus, foreign policy can be seen as the totality of a nation national interest that results from the interaction of internal and external actors and non-state actors as expressed by the nation foreign policy decision-makers

The Nigeria's foreign policy consists of self-interest techniques chosen by the state to protect its national interest and succinctly accomplish its objectives within the international relations milieu. Historically Nigeria's foreign policy has been centered on African unity and liberation since its independence in 1960 (Ogwu, 2005). Nigeria was a prominent voice in the fight against apartheid in South Africa and supported anti-colonial movements throughout Africa under the country's first Foreign Minister, Jaja Anucha Nwachuku (Anyu & Ifedi, 2008). Non-alignment and non-interference guided Nigeria approach during the Cold War era as it sought to project African interests and values (Salami, 2021).

Furthermore, Nigerian foreign policy revolved around multilateralism, non-alignment, Africa - centered, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and legal equality of states. Since independence in 1960 the objectives that Nigerian foreign policy was designed to achieve have not changed. These objectives include; the protection of the territorial integrity of the Nigerian state, the promotion of economic and social wellbeing of Nigerians; the enhancement of Nigeria image and status in the world at large, the promotion of unity as well as the total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Nigeria and Africa, the promotion of the rights of the black people and others under colonial domination, the promotion of international cooperation, conducive to the consolidation of world peace and security, redressing the imbalance in the international power structures that has tended to

frustrate the legitimate aspirations of developing countries and the promotion of world peace based on the principles of freedom, mutual respect and equality of all persons of the world (Ade & Aderemi, 2013).

The nation international profile grew substantially in subsequent decades after independence as she emerged as a dominant economic, political, and military power in West Africa. Beginning in the 1990s, Nigeria pivoted towards a more pragmatic foreign policy that welcomed partnerships worldwide to attract trade and development assistance (Ogwu, 2005). This shift accelerated under former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who sought to boost ties with major powers like the U.S.A., Russia, China, and the EU (Akinterinwa, 2022). By the 2000s, Nigeria had firmly established itself as a leading voice for African interests globally.

Diplomacy

The term diplomacy originated from the ancient Greek word *diploma*, meaning "an object folded in two, a licence, or a chart." *A* diploma refers to a document allowing one to travel or be granted special privileges. In earlier times, diplomacy as a term was used much more unreflexively than it is today. Early modern usages since the seventeenth century generally referred to a process: the art of negotiation and how to use negotiating effectively to achieve the objectives of the state. But over the past century, diplomacy has come to be understood more broadly than as the practical art of representing the sovereign and conducting negotiations on his or her behalf (Pigman, 2013). According to Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, diplomacy is the art, the science, and the means by which nations, groups, or individuals conduct their affairs in ways to safeguard their interests and promote their political, economic, cultural, or scientific relations while maintaining peaceful relationships (https://www.cyber-diplomacy-toolbox.com/Diplomacy.html).

Sir Harold Nicolson, in his core text *Diplomacy*, endorsed the Oxford English Dictionary definition of diplomacy as the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomats (Nicolson, 1963).

Diplomacy can be defined as the conduct and maintenance of official relations between sovereign states, individuals, and groups. It remains an indispensable tool for interactions and the making of decisions by and amongst actors, especially state actors, in the pursuit of their national interests. Sovereign states establish a formal diplomatic presence through their country's representatives abroad for relating with other states as an instrument of advancing their national interests, a way of peaceful resolution of conflicts, and also for maintaining friends with common interests abroad. The actions of a diplomat are largely controlled by the government they represent.

On the importance and use of diplomacy, Kenneth Waltz (1959), a neorealist, argued that diplomacy was important for states to balance power and maintain stability in the international system. States should use diplomacy to build alliances and deter aggression from rivals.

For, Hans Morgenthau (1948), a classical realist, diplomacy was essential for states to manage their rivalries and avoid conflict. He further noted that diplomacy should be based on the principles of reason, self-interest, and power. While, Robert Jervis, a contemporary realist who has written extensively on the role of diplomacy in international relations, also argues that diplomacy is a complex process that involves both cooperation and competition between states.

Theoretical Perspective

The diplomatic realism theory of international relations was adopted to underpin the basis of the study. Diplomatic realism is a subfield of realism in international relations theory that focuses on the role of diplomacy in shaping state behaviour and international outcomes. Proponents of diplomatic realism argue that diplomacy is a key tool for states to achieve their national interests in a world of anarchy. The major proponents of the theory are; Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Robert Jervis.

The diplomatic realism theory, despite its strong relevance, has been criticised for being too focused on the role of power and for neglecting other factors, such as domestic

politics and international norms. Additionally, some scholars argue that diplomatic realism is too pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation between states. However, despite the criticisms, the diplomatic realism theory remains an influential theory in the field of international relations. It provides a useful framework for understanding how states use diplomacy to achieve their national interests in a complex and uncertain world. The following are key assumptions of the theory, they are:

1. State-centricity: States are the most important actors in international relations. In other words, states are the primary actors in the world, and they act in their own self-interest.
2. Anarchy: The international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes.
3. Rational egoism: States are rational actors who pursue their national interests. That is, rational actors always seek to maximise their power and security.
4. The centrality of diplomacy: Diplomacy is a key tool for states to achieve their national interests in an anarchic world.
5. The duality of diplomacy: Diplomacy can be used for both cooperation and competition between states.

The theory application can be seen from Nigeria relations with the East, particularly Russia and China that are shaped by a number of factors, including:

- Nigeria needs for security and military assistance. The nation is facing a number of security challenges, including terrorism, insurgency, and banditry. Russia and China are both major arms exporters and have a history of providing military assistance to African countries. Nigeria may therefore be drawn to closer relations with the East in order to meet its security needs.
- Nigeria economic needs. Nigeria is a developing country with a large and growing population. It is also a major oil producer in Africa. Russia and China are both large economies with a growing interest in Africa. Nigeria may therefore seek to deepen its economic ties with the East in order to attract investment and boost its development.

- Nigeria desire to maintain its strategic autonomy. Nigeria is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and has traditionally pursued a policy of non-alignment. This means that it has sought to avoid taking side in power struggles between the major powers. Nigeria may therefore be reluctant to become too closely aligned with either the East or the West.

The Russia and Ukraine war has added further complexity to Nigeria's relations with the East, as Nigeria initially joined the United States and western allies in condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This has put Nigeria at odds with Russia and could damage relations between the two countries, but the nation quickly reversed her stance by abstaining from voting at the 2022 United Nations general assembly meeting condemning and sanctioning Russia and has remained neutral on the invasion.

On the other hand, Nigeria is facing significant economic challenges as a result of the war, which could lead her to seek closer economic ties with China. Overall, diplomatic realism suggests that Nigeria relations with the East will be complex and fluid in the coming years. Nigeria will need to balance its need for security and economic development with its desire to maintain its strategic autonomy. The Russia-Ukraine war will no doubt play a significant role in shaping Nigeria relations with the East.

Relations with Russia – An Enduring Security Partner

Diplomatic ties between Nigeria and Russia were established in 1960. But early relations were limited, as Nigeria sided with the West during the Cold War and criticised communist activities in Africa (Animasawun, 2013). Despite these tensions, the Soviet Union supplied arms to Nigeria during the civil war in the late 1960s. This early military cooperation foreshadowed stronger future defence links. By the 2000s, bilateral relations saw rapid improvements, bolstered by increased state visits, oil and gas deals. Security ties deepened dramatically as Nigeria purchased billions in Russian military equipment’s over the last decade (Campbell, 2022).

This enabled Nigeria to diversify its defence procurement beyond its customary Western suppliers. Russia is also a major trading partner with Nigeria in wheat, fertiliser, and petroleum products, which constitute primary imports and exports. When the Ukraine crisis erupted, Russia had established itself as one of Nigeria's most important strategic allies in Africa.

Current Relations and Cooperation

Russia has become one of Nigeria's essential international partners, as annual trade, according to Paden (2022), exceeds $600 million as Nigeria imports large quantities of Russian wheat and fertiliser. Russia has also invested heavily in Nigeria's oil and gas industry, while Gazprom continues to negotiate a joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (Ajakaye, 2022).

Furthermore, Nigeria turned to Russia for security assistance; the nation purchased 12 Mi-35 helicopter gunships in 2021 to aid its fight against Boko Haram militants (Akinremi, 2022). Beyond arms deals, the two countries signed a military-technical cooperation deal in 2021 encompassing joint exercises and intelligence sharing (Oche, 2022). Just recently Russia while still in the battle with Ukraine donated fertilizers to Nigeria, as this kind gesture shows the smooth relations and ties both nations enjoyed. Again Nigerian government avoided criticisms of Russia as she evacuates her citizens from Ukraine. As Western influence waned in the post-

Cold War era, Russia filled a strategic gap for Nigeria's defence needs.

Be that as it may, Nigeria muted stance on Ukraine highlights the complexities of this alliance and the actions tried to balance these productive relations against demands from Western partners to condemn the invasion. Russia has been a major partner of Nigeria for many years, providing military and economic assistance, while many Nigerians have seen Russia as an educational tourist destination.

Nigeria, which initially condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, took a diplomatic neutral stance as she refrained from voting on the United Nations resolutions condemning Russia's actions and declined to join Western sanctions against Russia. The

nation-neutral stance has been criticised by many, who argue that Nigeria should support Ukraine at a time like this. The Nigerian government, in her response to the criticism, defended her position, stating that the decision was in the best interest of the country and that she is working with Russia and Ukraine to find a lasting diplomatic solution to the conflict.

Economic Cooperation with China – A Crucial Eastern Counterweight

Sino-Nigeria ties lagged during the early Cold War era but accelerated as China pursued partnerships with Africa in the 1990s and 2000s. Bilateral trade flows boomed, hitting $20 billion by 2022 (Jiangtao, 2022). Nigeria benefited from demand for her oil while sourcing cheaper Chinese machinery, electronics, and manufactured goods. China also became a major infrastructure financier and investor in Nigeria through state-backed funds and construction firms. These economic activities sparked criticism regarding corrupt practices and excessive debts (Okeke & Aniche, 2020).

China emerged as a leading arms supplier to the Nigerian military. It also endorsed Nigeria's aspirations for a permanent UN Security Council seat (Akinterinwa, 2022). As Western lending and aid to Nigeria declined in the post-Cold War era, China eagerly filled the voids through infrastructure loans, diplomatic support, and security cooperation. Trade with China and other Asian nations also enabled Nigeria to lessen its reliance on Western imports (Salami, 2021). Russia and China's importance only grew as Nigeria sought eastern alliances to balance its longstanding western relationships.

Ties with Ukraine: Opportunities amid Conflict

Compared to Russia and China, Nigeria partnership with Ukraine was more recent. But diplomatic relations from the 1990s strengthened, especially on security, with major defence contracts awarded to Ukrainian firms (Pasini, 2022). Nigeria initially condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and focused on evacuating her citizens from Ukraine with the assistance of the Ukrainian government. The nation's ties with Ukraine can be seen in education, economics, and the military. The nation relied on Ukraine for wheat imports, education destinations, arms, and defence supplies. In March 2024, in the midst of the Russia-Ukraine

war, Ukraine extended her hand of diplomatic friendship to cushion the effects of hunger and starvation in Nigeria by providing the nation with wheat. The Nigerian government and its citizens were delighted by the wheat donation from the Ukrainian government, as this act reanimated the ties between both nations. Many Nigerians, both home and abroad, have shown solidarity with Ukraine in the midst of the war as Ukraine opens its embassy to foreigners and volunteers willing to fight and defend her nation. These events clearly demonstrate Nigeria diplomatic ties with Ukraine are smooth and intact.

The Russia-Ukraine war highlighted Ukraine's importance, signalling opportunities ahead. Ukraine will require extensive post-war reconstruction, which Nigeria could support through loans, technical assistance, and its vast human resources. Boosting agricultural cooperation is also prudent given Nigeria's heavy food import dependence. Thus, while less developed than Russia or China ties, the turmoil sparked prospects for Nigeria-Ukraine relations.

Overview of the events that led to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine

The events that led to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine can be traced back to the 2014 Ukraine revolution, which overthrew President Viktor Yanukovych following his refusal to sign a planned association agreement with the European Union in 2013, which stimulated demonstrations in the capital of Kyiv that later turned violent in early 2014. Yanukovych was ousted by protesters who were demanding closer ties with the European Union. Russia opposed the revolution and viewed it as a threat to its interests in Ukraine, particularly in the Crimean Peninsula, which had historical and strategic significance for Russia (Gvosdev, 2022).

After the collapse of the power sharing agreement on February 22, 2014, President Yanukovych disappeared from Ukraine, and a pro-western government was installed by the Ukrainian parliament, which was seen by Russia as a direct threat to its interests. In response to that, in March 2014, Russian troops annexed Crimea from Ukraine, which sparked international condemnation and sanctions against Russia. Consequently, Russia justified the

annexation by arguing that it was protecting the rights of ethnic Russians in Crimea, who make up the majority of the population. Many analysts viewed the annexation as a violation of international law and a breach of Ukraine's territorial sovereignty.

The annexation of Crimea was followed by a separatist movement in eastern Ukraine, which was supported by Russia. The separatists declared the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, respectively. Thus, the conflict escalated into a full-scale war, with Ukrainian forces fighting against separatists and Russian backed troops.

The war has resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of people in Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a military action in Ukraine, with forces crossing into the country from Belarus in the north, Russia in the east, and Crimea in the south, citing the need to protect Russian-speaking populations in eastern Ukraine. According to President Putin, "it was a special military operation" intended to protect the people of the Donbas and to demilitarise and degasify Ukraine". He denied that Russia planned to occupy Ukrainian territory or to "impose anything on anyone by force".

In October 2022, Russia launched a full-scale assault on the country and signed annexation treaties recognising Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia as part of the Russian Federation, even though those regions are not totally under Russian control. In response to Russia's military invasion, Ukraine, with Western military aid, has been conducting a major counteroffensive to secure territories annexed by Russia (Kofman & Rojansky, 2022). The Russian military intervention marked a significant escalation in the conflict and sparked international condemnation from the United States of America and European nations by responding through new sanctions imposed on Russia and providing military aid to Ukraine.

Nigeria’s position on the war and its diplomatic relations implication with the East

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has had a significant impact on global diplomacy, including Nigeria's relations with Russia (in particular), the East (in general), and the West. Nigeria has

a long history of close ties with both the East and the West, but the war has put the country in a difficult position. Thus, the nation has taken a diplomatic neutral stance in the conflict after reminiscing that her previous stance of condemnation would deteriorate the ties between her, Russia, and the Eastern bloc. Nigeria refrained from voting on the United Nations resolutions condemning Russia's actions and declined to join Western sanctions against Russia. On the other hand, Nigeria is reluctant to alienate Russia, given its importance as a strategic economic and security partner.

According to Osuntokun, (2022) in an interview noted that Russia and Ukraine were helping Nigeria with the Ajaokuta steel company and the Ikot Abasi aluminum complex, despite the wheat the nation imports wheat from them.

The Russia-Ukraine war has presented Nigeria with a number of challenges and opportunities in its relations with Russia and the East.

- The war has made it more difficult for Nigeria to balance its relations with Russia.
- Nigeria, which quickly corrected her initial condemnation stance on the Russian invasion of Russia, has been under pressure from Western countries to condemn and take a more forceful stance against Russia.
- Nigeria faces a great challenge in balancing her relations with the East (particularly Russia) in the wake of the war. Consequently, the country faces the dilemma of maintaining neutrality in the conflict.
- Another challenge is to manage the impact of the war on Nigerian economy. According to studies, the war has caused energy prices to rise, which has put a strain on the Nigerian economy.
- The war compelled Nigeria to preserve friendly relations with Russia and other Eastern bloc nations due to their Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) membership and observers' status.
- The war has disrupted global supply chains, which has made it more difficult for Nigeria to import goods and services from Russia, Ukraine, and the East.

- The war creates new opportunities for Nigeria in its relations with Russia, Ukraine, and the other nations of the East since these nations are increasingly looking to Africa for new markets and investment opportunities. Nigeria could benefit from this trend by deepening its economic ties with the East.

Economic and Geopolitical Consequences for Nigeria

The Russia-Ukraine war exacerbated Nigeria weakened macroeconomic conditions. As a major food importer, rising wheat costs fueled by the war stoked already high inflation (Mohammed, 2022). However, Nigeria, an energy exporter, benefited from the oil price surge. Geopolitically, managing pressures from both Russia and Western allies tested Nigeria balancing credentials. Failure to back Western condemnation of Russia risked its ambitions for global leadership and closer U.S. and EU ties. But preserving neutrality aimed to sustain its strategic Russian defence relationship.

Domestically, this ambiguous stance drew some criticism as well (Ogundipe, 2022). Overall, the crisis showcased how major power competition in a fragmented world threatens the viability of Nigeria non-aligned foreign policy. Nigeria must adroitly engage the East, Russia, and Ukraine amid the ongoing war or risk increasing isolation from them.

Conclusion

The foregoing discourse has examined Nigeria relations with the East amid the Russia-Ukraine War. Nigeria diplomatic relations with Russia and the East are complex and challenging, as the Russia-Ukraine war has made it even more cumbersome for Nigeria to balance its relations with these two major powers. The nation of Nigeria has a number of opportunities if she deepens her relations with the East in the wake of the war. By carefully managing its relations with Russia and the East, Nigeria can maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of the current geopolitical landscape.

Recommendations

Conclusively, Nigeria's non-aligned foreign policy in an increasingly bifurcated global order should be sustained. In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, which distorts global peace and

security, the paper recommends therefore that states and international institutions should not act selfishly in resolving conflict in the international system, and the approach to conflict resolution should not always be aggressive but more diplomatic.

References

Ade, I. & Aderemi, O. (2013) Overview of national interest, continuities and flaws in Nigeria's foreign policy, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 3, (1).

Ahrens, J. (2018) Neoliberalism, liberalism and the Ukraine crisis, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 21, No: 1.

Akinremi, D. (2022) Nigeria refuses to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Retrieved from Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/nigeria-refuses-to-condemn-russias- invasion-of-Ukraine, on the 31st December, 2023.

Akinterinwa, B. A. (2022) China's support for Nigeria's UN permanent seat, Retrieved from https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/01/10/chinas-support-for-nigerias-un-permanent-seat/ on the 31st December, 2023.

Animasawun, G. A. (2013) The military and bilateral relations: Russia-Nigerian cooperation. Africa Spectrum, 48, (2).

Anyu, J. N. & Ifedi, J. P. (2008) Nigeria in international institutions: The dawn of a new era, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Bukkvoll, T. (2018) Security interdependence revisited: EU–US relations after the Ukraine crisis, Journal of Common Market Studies, 56, (4).

Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox Retrieved from https://www.cyber-diplomacy-toolbox.com/Diplomacy.html on the 2nd January, 2024.

Deutsch, K. W. (1954) Political community at the International level: Problems of definition and measurement, Garden city: N.V. Double day.

DW News. (2022) Russia pushes military diplomacy in Africa amid Ukraine War, Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/russia-pushes-military-diplomacy-in-Africa-amid-Ukraine-war on the 2nd January, 2024.

Hans, J. M. (1948) Politics among Nations, New York: Knoff.

Holsti, K. J. (1995) International politics a framework for analysis, New Jersey: Prentice hall.

Ibeanu, O. (2018) Nigeria-China relations in the 21st Century: A Review of the Literature, Journal of African Studies and Development, 8, (1).

IMF (2021) World economic outlook database estimation

IMF (2024) World economic outlook database

Kenneth W. N. (1959) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press

Kofman, M. & Rojansky, M. (2022) The US, Europe, and the Russian Intervention in Ukraine, Survival, 64, (2).
Makinda, Samuel M. (2014) Russia and the African Union: A new partnership in the making, African Affairs, 113, (452).
Oche, M. (2022) Non-Alignment in Nigeria's foreign policy: Issues and prospects, Global Affairs, 8, (1).
Ogundipe, T. (2005) Nigeria's Foreign Policy. Amfitop Books
Okafor, C. (2022) Nigeria neutral in UN vote despite Russia's abstention threat, Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/522513-nigeria-neutral-in-un-vote-despite-russias-abstention-threat.html?tztc=1, on the 2nd January, 2024.
Onuorah, M. (2021) Nigeria's Afrocentric foreign policy, Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/459309-nigerias-afrocentric-foreign-policy-by-martins-onuorah.html on the 2nd January 2024.
Osuntokun Jide interview conducted by Okafor, C. (2022) Nigeria neutral in UN vote despite Russia's abstention threat, Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/522513-nigeria-neutral-in-un-vote-despite-russias-abstention-threat.html?tztc=1, on the 2nd January, 2024.
Paden, J. N. (2022) Why is Nigeria distancing itself from the West over Ukraine? The conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/why-is-nigeria-distancing-itself-from-the-west-over-ukraine-179480 on the 2nd January, 2024.
Research Gate. (2023) Exploring the Russo-Ukrainian crisis and Its Impact on African Countries: A Cross-Regional Analysis.
Ryan, A. A. (2014) Machiavelli and the cyclical theory of constitutional change, The Review of Politics, 76, (2).
Salami, O. R. (2021) The African Agency in Nigeria–China Relations, Afrique Contemporaine.
Sayers, S. (2013) Marxism and human nature, London: Routledge
Shively, W.P (2005) Power and choice: An introduction to political science, New York: McGrew Hill Publishers.
Wendt, A. (1992) Anarchy is what States make of it: The social construction of power politics, International Organization, 46, (2).
Worldometer (2024) Elaboration of data by United Nations department of Economic and Social Affairs, population division: World population prospects: The 2022 revision.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS (CSOS) EFFORTS IN PEACE BUILDING PROCESS IN JOS METROPOLIS, PLATEAU STATE

Moses NWAN
Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution,
National Open University of Nigeria
mosesnwan@yahoo.com

Moses Etila SHAIBU, PhD
Department of Political Science,
National Open University of Nigeria
mshaibu@noun.edu.ng

and

Adeniyi T. ADEGOKE, PhD
Department of Criminology and Security Studies,
National Open University of Nigeria
dradegokeadeniyi@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The study examined the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the Peacebuilding process in Jos metropolis since 2001. The study finds that several peacebuilding groups exist in Jos; some of which include the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD); Search for Common Ground; Justice Peace and Development Caritas; These CSOs contributed to the peacebuilding process in Jos through the following ways: reconciliation of the warring communities; facilitating dialogue between the warring groups; empowering the victims or residents; building capacity for conflict management through seminars and workshops; getting the communities to sign peace accords among others. The peace-building efforts became necessary because of the failure of the government to stem the tide of conflicts in the area from 1994 – 2015. These conflicts have led to the loss of lives and property worth billions of naira. The study recommended that the CSOs could become more effective in their peace-building efforts if an internal source of revenue is devised rather than dependency on external donors. If this is achieved, the CSOs would be sure of secured sources of revenue which would allow them to execute their peace-building initiatives to the latter. CSOs could become more effective in the peace-building process by cooperating more with each other. Lastly, the CSOs could achieve more in the peacebuilding efforts if the resolutions of the organizations are legally backed.

Keywords: *Election, Leadership, Recruitment Process, Implication National Development*

Introduction

The vicious cycle of violence on the Jos Plateau which has its roots in 1994 appears interminable such that a feeling of insecurity became a persistent plight of the people as the violence became more frequent and even deadlier in the following years. (Moses & Tele, 2023). Jos North and Jos South experienced a series of violent conflicts from 7th September 2001 to 2015. The conflict between Christians and Muslims in Jos has led to the destruction of lives and properties. (Best & Hoomlong, 2011). The cumulative impact of the conflict has exacted a massive toll on the people's economic, political and social development of the state. While there is no accurate data on the total number of fatalities recorded, modest estimates, however, put the figures at over 7,000 lives. (Nnabuihe, 2020).

Human Rights Watch argues that more than 4,000 people were killed in several cycles of violence between 2001 and 2010 and during the 2008 crisis at least 700 people were killed in riots. (Odidi, 2014). Be that as it may, suffice to state here that, the numbers of casualties may not be too accurate, but lives were lost and property destroyed. Besides, the massive internal displacement of people and immeasurable destruction of infrastructures, livelihoods and homes, there has been a growing sense of fear, anxiety, depression, mutual suspicion and intolerance among those who have witnessed or were directly affected by the violence. (Plateau Peacebuilding Agency, 2016).

Peacebuilding processes are central in every society, community, state or nation that is transiting from violent conflict. (Arya et al, 2012). It is as a result of this that CSOs serve as mediators between conflicting parties in Jos North and Jos South, where ethno-religious conflict broke out and became recurrent on several occasions between 2001 and 2015. The works of civil society organizations such as the League for Human Rights, Humanitarian Dialogue, CAN and JNI and their impacts on peacebuilding in Jos metropolis have remained unstudied by scholars, besides their dialogue and peacebuilding process across the violent conflict periods, these organizations have equally carried out humanitarian assistance and awareness campaign in both Christian and Muslim areas of Jos. (Dickson, 2019).

Peacebuilding involves a multidimensional range of measures to reduce the risk of a lapse or relapse into conflict by addressing both the causes and consequences of conflicts. Violent Conflicts are a great challenge for any country's development. They do not only result in loss of lives, physical and psychological injuries, and substantial damaged to infrastructure, they also compromise development efforts and worsen poverty (Cheng-Hopkins 2010 in Iroye 2024) According to Kaigama (2012), Nwam (2023) and Usiju (2023) Plateau State is faced with lots of crisis that has bedeviled its progress at different perspective. The crisis has been caused by different factors, perhaps, political issues, fear of domination and perceived injustice in policy formulation and implementation are the contributing factors of the crisis.

Prior to (2001) there is relative peace in plateau state except for the minor clashes over grazing areas between farmers and pastoralist, and land ownership tussles. But between September 2001 and now was the lid off for subsequent crises in Plateau State. Armed Conflicts were experienced and many lives and properties were lost. Concerted effort was made by Federal/State and Local Government to ensure peace through peach building process, but things got from, bad to worst hence the involvement of CSOs to fill the gap.

Research Questions

i. How has the CSOs helped in Peace Building in Jos Metropolis?

ii. What have been the achievements and challenges of CSOs in Peace Building in Jos metropolis between 2001 and 2015?

Literature and Conceptual Review

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Peacebuilding Efforts

It would be wholly plausible to assert that CSOs have played the most prominent role in peacebuilding in Jos North and Jos South LGAs. This is however not to undermine or relegate the efforts of other spheres such as Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), Cooperate Societies or state agencies in the peace-building efforts. (Tongeren, 2009). These agencies have also contributed immensely to the search for lasting peace in Jos over the last decades, but the impacts of NGOs/ CSOs in pursuance of the same course can never be overemphasized.

The government has contributed to the peace-building efforts through the promotion of inter-faith dialogue and cooperation for peace between the two major religious groups in the State and Nation at large, (Plateau Peacebuilding Agency, 2017). The aim was to promote interaction and tolerance and forestall the outbreak of violence. The government's decision to establish the Nigerian Inter-Religious Committee (NIREC) – which is jointly chaired by the Chairman of the National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) and the incumbent chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) to help promote interaction between the two religion groups, could be seen as a peace-building effort.

Civil Society Organizations are also referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hence we shall use the two terms interchangeably or side by side. Kwaja (2011) described Civil Society as:

> Sphere of voluntary action that is district from state, political, private and economic spheres, keeping in mind that in practice, the boundaries between these sectors are often complex and blurred. It consisted of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations competing with each other and oriented to a specific interest that is not purely driven by organisation, and interact in the public sphere. Thus, Civil Society is independent from the state and political sphere (Kwaja, 2011).

Implicitly, CSOs are autonomous organizations, which are set up for purely humanitarian purposes and not for economic purposes. CSOs do not possess any form of religious colouration, hence they are different from Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) and their activities transcend the prejudice of religion. NGOs, as captured above have areas of specialization ranging from health, gender, religious rights, or peacebuilding/conflict resolution. (Ghan and Yalwa, Abdulahi, 2022). We shall focus more on peacebuilding CSOs in the Jos metropolis; and their roles in building lasting peace in the town. It is instructive to add that some NGOs are locally based while others have international affiliations hence, they are known as International Non - governmental Organizations (INGOs). NGOs may generate funding from governmental donations, philanthropic donations or internally.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

The study adopts Functionalism theory as a theoretical frame work of analysis. Functionalism is a theoretical perspective that focuses on the functions performed in society by social structures such as institutions, hierarchies and norms, within this theory function refers to the extent to which a given activity promotes or interphases with the maintenance of a system. Functionalism emerge in the early 20th Century and is associated with authors such as Emile Dukheim, Talcot Parsoms, Herbert Spencer and Robert Mirton who dominated American Social Theories in the 1950s and 1960s. This study focuses on the application of the Functionalist Theories to the study of the effort of Civil Society Organisations in Peace Building in Plateau State.

Impacts of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Peace Building in Jos. CSOs have recorded significant success in their efforts to achieve peaceful coexistence among the ethnic and religious groups in Jos. This progress is evident in the peace-building stride embarked upon by the organizations both during the pre-conflict period (to prevent an outbreak) and during the post-conflict period to prevent the situation from degenerating. In January 2010 for example, the Institute for Governance and Social Research (IGSR) began a programme Breaking the Cycle of Violence in Jos Plateau State. (Oral Interview, Yusuf, 2022). The program featured several activities such as workshops, inter-faith dialogues involving religious leaders, skill acquisition and even seminars for security agencies and agents on the best practices to prevent and manage conflicts. (Uwaizie, 1999). These programmes and activities culminated in youths interacting with one another across religious divides and security agencies learning fresh conflict management techniques. During the conflict that later broke up in December 2010 and January 2011, the skills learned came in handy. This is evident in the fact that the damages of the 2010/2011 conflicts were comparatively lesser than in 2008. Youths who learned various skills became self-employed.

Unlike faith-based organizations, CSOs were able to earn the trust of the warring communities through their activities which was a major success. After the 2010/2011 conflicts,

NGOs, /CSOs such as YARAC, Justice Development and Peace Caritas Commission (JDPC), Search for Common Ground and the Humanitarian Dialogue engaged in outreaches to the violence-struck communities, supporting the victims through the supply of relief materials, foodstuffs, toiletries among other items. (Justice Development and Peace/Caritas, 2022).

Challenges of CSOs in Peace Building

Despite the obvious achievements of CSOs in the peace-building efforts in Jos as documented in the preceding sections above; CSOs face a plethora of challenges which limit their performance in the search for lasting peace. Although the CSOs have recorded considerable success in establishing contacts in the local communities, there is a lack of coordination among the CSOs, a lack of adequate funding and corruption among some of them has affected their cardinal aim and objectives. The CSOs lack readily available structures in the communities to report to the organizations on developments such as growing hostility or agitation in real-time. This has generally affected the time in which the CSOs get information on the conflicts. More so, this affects the validity of data available to the CSOs since there is no ready source of data.

CSOs have also achieved massive success in the area of Early Warning Systems, emergency management and conflict prevention. Implicitly, the CSOs were able to sensitize the communities on how to handle emergencies during conflicts. The Justice Development and Peace Caritas (JDPC) established the Emergency Preparedness and Response Training which trained participants on the best possible ways to respond during conflicts and after conflicts. The CSO's predictions about the inevitability of violence mostly proved true. Center for Peace Initiative and Development (CEPID) and the search for Common Ground had informed the State Government about the inevitability of violent conflict breaking out by March 2001 albeit the government failed to act. (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

Civil Society Organisations and the Peace Building Process in Jos Metropolis

Several Commission of Inquiry were set up by both the Federal government and State government after experiences of the conflicts. For example, the Justice Okpere Commission of Inquiry was set up by the Federal government to examine the causes of violent conflicts in

North Central Nigeria. (Best, 2011). In 2001, the Niki Tobi Commission was set by the government to examine the 2001 crisis. In 2002, the Plateau State government established a committee on peace with the then COCIN president, Rev. PandamYamsat and Sheikh Yahaya Jeengre as members. (Best, 2011). These have been some of the government efforts *Inter alia* to ensure peace in the local government. FBOs such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and her sub-groups such as the Catholic Women Organization of Nigeria (CWO), COCIN Women Fellowship (CWF), and Christian Foundation for Social Justice and Equity (CFSJE). Juma'atu Nasri Islam (JNI) and her subgroups: Federation of Muslim Women of Nigeria (FOMWAN), *Jama'at Izalat al Bid'a Wa Iqamat as Sunna* (JIBWIS) and Rahutul Islam. The CWO and CWF have initiated peace-building efforts such as supplying relief materials, to victims of conflicts including foodstuff, toiletries, building materials, and monetary donations among others.

After the 2001 conflict, the COCIN Women Fellowship (CWF), through the Women Peace Building Network (WIPNET) helped COCIN women affected by the violent conflicts. (Best & Hoomlong, 2011). After the 2008 conflicts, JNI distributed over 30 bags of rice, clothing and over 2.3 million Naira cash to victims of the violence through JIBWIS. (Oral Interview, Aliyu, 2022). Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) have contributed to peacebuilding; however, their efforts were mostly ephemeral and one-sided as they only focused on their members, hence, the results of the peace-building effort were somewhat limited, compared to that of CSOs.

Non–governmental organisations (NGOs) have played instrumental roles in peacebuilding in Jos since the experience of the first conflict in 1994; their activities have won the confidence of both religious groups because of their neutral outlook. According to official reports by the Plateau Peace Building Agency (PPBA), there are 28 NGOs/ CSOs actively engaged in building peace in Jos metropolis including *Inter alia:* Justice Development and Peace Caritas Commission (JDPC), Humanitarian Dialogue, Displaced Women and Children Foundation, Solomon Dalung Foundation, YARAC, and Search for Common Grounds.

(Peacebuilding Agency, 2022). Our focus in his study will be on three CSOs that have been actively involved in peace building efforts in Jos metropolis. Their activities are analyzed below:

Youth Adolescent Reflection and Action Center (YARAC)

YARAC is one of the leading CSOs in Jos committed to peacebuilding. The CSO was created in 1999 and over the past two decades, YARAC has worked assiduously toward achieving lasting peace on the Jos Plateau; the activities of YARAC extend to neighbouring States such as Nasarawa and Bauchi. (Uzeuegbunam, 2013). YARAC's activities or peace-building efforts focus on youth because youths are mostly the foot soldiers utilized by politicians during violent conflicts. The organization reaches out to youth and enlightens them on peace ideals; training youths on interactive activities and building inter inter-communal networks. In a collaboration effort with DFID and Action Aid International YARAC established the Human Security Network in 2005. (Ayeyeye, 2018). The Human Security Network (HSN) was established to serve as a synthesizer of communities affected by violent conflicts. Implicitly, the HSN was to bring together communities where future occurrences may be forestalled to achieve lasting peace. Between 2005 – 2009, the communities of Tudun Wada, Jenta, Gangare, and Angwan Rogo were part of this network. Youths from these communities were collectively asked to discuss with counterparts how best to tackle the issue of insecurity and the incessant reoccurrence of violent conflict. (Best & Hoomlong, 130).

YARAC, in pursuing her peace-building efforts have over the years received significant support from German organizations namely: German Cooperation and Giz Deutsche Gesellschaft for international Zusammenarbeit. The CSO liaises with the International Committee of the Red Cross (IRCC) in areas relating to the protection and assistance of victims of violent conflicts. Post-2008 conflict in Jos, YARAC, in collaboration with the Red Cross, assisted over 500 victims of the violent conflicts. YARAC also engaged in neighbourhood sensitization campaigns in Angwan Rogo, Tudun Wada and Vanderpuye wards. (Oral Interview, Mangai, 2022). On 1st October 2021, YARAC organized a town hall

meeting with over 400 attendees cutting across religious lines. The topic of the town hall meeting was: Insecurity and Injustice a Threat to Nigeria's Unity. (Best & Hoomlong, 2011). Since the creation of the Plateau Peace Building Agency by the Lalong administration, YARAC has collaborated massively to ensure that youths are sensitized and equipped with the necessary skills to keep them busy. The two organizations have organized several seminars and programmes to engage the youths in anti-violence discourses.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)

The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) commenced peacebuilding work particularly the inter-communal dialogue and conflict meditation project in Jos in January 2013, though it has existed since 1999. (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2022). The CSO's approach to peacebuilding is unique as it intends to make the process of building peace a continuous process rather than a one-off. The Humanitarian Dialogue projects are supported by the Canadian Government and other states. (Oral Interview, Onyeachom, 2022). Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is a Swiss-based private diplomacy organization which was founded to promote the principles of humanity, morality, neutrality and armed conflict resolution through confidential and Focus Group Discussions (FDGs) involving the warring parties. (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2022). The HD charter adopted in 2013 captures the vision of the organization which is to work towards peacebuilding globally. HD receive her funding from state and individual donors including Canada, Australia, the Swiss Government, the E.U., Germany, Norway, the UK, the USA etc.

HD also receives funding from foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Bosch Foundation, the Hoffman Foundation etc. which are committed to the course of global peace in 2017, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue recorded revenue of 38 million French Francs. (Dahoro, 2022). The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue Peace-building efforts transcend Plateau State; their peace-building activities spread to States such as Nasarawa, Benue, Kaduna and Abuja. (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2016). HD achieved significant success in its peace-building efforts in both Northern and Southern Plateau State, Kaduna (Zangon Kataf), Benue and other warzones. This was demonstrated through the

signing of the Declaration agreeing to commitment to peace. In the case of Jos, between August 2013 – June 2014, a series of dialogue sessions were organized by HD which culminated in the signing of the Declaration of Commitment to Peace in December 2014. (Hamza, 2022). Signatories to the declaration were legitimate representations of their various groups. The signatories agreed to among other things; i. respect the perspective and concerns of other communities, ii. sincerely cooperate with other communities in pursuit of peace; iii. acknowledge the suffering caused by repetitive violence and destruction; iv. assume responsibility for our actions and actions of our communities; v; cooperate with government, Traditional Authorities and Religious leaders to pursue and sustain peace; vi. to implement the recommendations of the Forum dialogues.

The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue played a very prominent role in peacebuilding in both the Northern and Southern Plateau. The peace-building agency specialized in organizing Focus Groups Discussions with delegates from communities, ethnic groups and religions cutting across the various warring parties particularly prioritizing youths, women, men, traditional rulers and other groups. They were engaged by HD in the discussions aimed at finding solutions to the violent conflicts and ensuring peaceful inter-communal living. (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2022). HD categorized the Focus Groups Discussions (FDGs) into: women and men steering committees, local Government steering committees, chair of chairs and youth steering committees and personal discussions

In Northern Plateau State alone (which includes our area of study), the organization organized over 6 Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) between 2013 and 2020. On 12th November 2020 Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) organized or Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with the Women Steering Committees in Jos. The attendees of the FGD included: Dr. Sumaya Hamza (the chair) Mrs. Chundung Dahoro, and Evang. Jane Egbo, Binta M. Kabir, Cynthia Onyeachom, Ana Yakubu and Zainab Yakubu represent various groups. (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2022). Cynthia Onyeachom represented the Igbo community; Evang. Jane Egbo represented the South–South region; Binta M Mohamad Kabir Represented the Hausa

Community. The women discussed issues arising from their constituencies and which may constitute a possible threat to the existing peace. (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2022). The FGD resolved to hold dialogue sessions with women in areas which had been most affected by the conflicts. The women's steering committee also carried out enlightenment campaigns through community visitations; HD visited Angwan Rogo in 2017 and sensitized youth on the need for peaceful co-existence.

On 12th, December 2020, humanitarian Dialogue (HD) organized a Focus Groups Discussion (FGD) with youths in Jos to discuss ways to find lasting peace in the area and the Northern Plateau senatorial zone as a whole. As is the custom, youth attendees represented various groups: Christopher Pwajok represented the Berom; pastor Ayoka Peter Represented the Igbos; Daniel Uno represented the South-South; Ayodele Adeniyi represented the Yoruba; Daniel Sani represented the Anaguta; Peter Azi Magaji represented the Afizere; Wayo Ndong represented the Atakar; Song Muru represented the Aten; Ahmed Baba represented the Hausa and Ahmed Mua'zu represented the Fulani. (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2014)

The dialogue sessions made the following recommendations: i. trust building; ii. rebuilding places of worship; iii. Access to public service and public spaces; iv. renaming places and addressing traditional rulership issues; v. Issues of indigeneship and settlers; vi. Addresses issues of land annexation, cattle rusting etc; vii. Issues of compensation to victims. (Humanitarian Dialogue, 2022).

Search for Common Grounds

Search for Common Ground is an International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) which played a very important role in peacebuilding and has worked to end violent conflicts in Jos. Search for Common Ground was founded in 1982 by an American, John Marks. (Best and Hoomlong, 2011). Search for common ground, with headquarters in Washington DC and Brussels is rated as the biggest peace-building agency globally with active cells in over 30 countries. (Search for Common Grounds, 2022). Search for common ground has its unique approach to peacebuilding known as the common ground approach. In this approach, the

search for common ground invites the warring groups together, mediates between them to understand their different needs, identify the problems which trigger the violent confrontations and find a solution to the problems. Search for Common Grounds works to grow trust among the communities or groups. (Oral Interview, Hamza, 2022).

Since its inception, the role of Search for Common Ground in Peacebuilding in Jos cannot be over-emphasized. The agency has maintained a long-term presence in the Jos metropolis and its environs during and after the conflicts. Search for Common Ground engaged to reduce conflicts in communities. In 2017, Search for Common Ground came up with an initiative that considers more youths in the peacebuilding process in Jos known as "the Collective Impact Methodology for Youth Inclusiveness. (Search for Common Grounds, 2022). The methodology was adopted to allow the communities that are mostly affected by the violent conflicts to interact among themselves and come up with decisions. The methodology involved different groups such as government agencies, CSOs, religious and community leaders and academics. This initiative led to the establishment of a network known as the Jos Stakeholder's Center for Peace (JSCP) which was unprecedented. Search for Common Ground was the facilitator of this creation. (Oral interview, 2022).

Half of the members included in the inclusive decision-making and JSCP were youths or representatives of youth organizations. Search for Common Ground supported the JSCP leadership in its mobilization and enlightenment strides. Another peace initiative of SFCG in Jos was a collaboration for a violence prevention project which allows communities monitored by SFCG. Search for Common Ground worked with the drug laws agency, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to help curb drug abuse in communities such as Rukuba Road, Kabong, Tudun Wada, Garba Daho, Gangare etc. because of the impact of the substance in triggering violent conflicts in Jos. (Oral Interview, Agwom, 2022). SFCG organized sensitization workshops for youth in such areas.

The early warning mechanism and a wide range of contacts including the JSCP informant allow her to predict the outbreak of violence. Before the outbreak of the September

7th, 2001 crisis, Search for Common Ground and the Center for Peace Initiatives and Development (CEPID) predicted that if proactive steps were not taken, violence may break out by March 2001. No step was taken by the government despite the growing tensions and in September, the crisis erupted. (WAYE Foundation, 2018).

The CSOs did not consider the victim's faith or religious affiliations. Communities such as Gangare, Rikkos, Tudun Wada and parts of Bauchi Road benefitted from the programme. The dialogue sessions initiated by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) gained acceptability among the religious groups because of its neutral outlook. This culminated in the signing of various Declarations to peace first in December 2014 by the chairmen of the steering communities followed by the women steering Communities signing a similar accord in 2017. This accord represented a huge success as the communities affirmed their commitment to live in peace and harmony. (Ostein, 2009).

The role of the CSOs in calming nerves in post–conflict was a great achievement. Between 2013 – 2017, HD embarked on a campaign to rebuild houses and structures that were destroyed during previous conflicts. For example, Sardauna Memorial School, Cherubim and Seraphim School and several mosques and Churches were reconstructed by HD as a peace-building initiative (Oral Interview, 2021).

Conclusion

This work has exhaustively examined the role of CSOs in peacebuilding in Jos Metropolis, the study was necessitated by the fact that CSOs played a major role in the search for lasting peace in Jos. The agencies or organizations contributed to the peacebuilding process in ways such as reconciliation of the warring communities; facilitating dialogue between the warring groups; empowering the victims or residents; building capacity for conflict management through seminars and workshops; and getting the communities to sign peace accords among others. The CSOs achieved considerable success, particularly in the immediate post-conflict period in halting the spread of violence and managing the impact. However, the poor coordination of the CSOs, dependency on donors and inability to implement the resolutions

of dialogue sessions as well as the poor management structures of the organization were limitations of the organizations in the peace efforts. This final part is very important because it summarizes the findings of the research, concludes with the data analyzed and proffers solutions on ways to stem the tide of violent conflicts.

Recommendations

The contributions of the CSOs to peacebuilding in Jos North and South have been adequately documented above. Here, we proffer solutions and make recommendations on how peace could be achieved in Jos Metropolis and most importantly how CSOs could be more effective in their peace-building efforts. The CSOs could become more effective in their peacebuilding efforts if an internal source of revenue is devised rather than dependency on external donors. If this is achieved, the CSO would be sure of secured sources of revenue which would allow them to execute their peace-building initiatives to the latter. It would also mean that the CSOs take control of the process and not necessarily dance to the tone of their financers. Furthermore, for CSOs to achieve this, they must initiate entrepreneurial ideas and pursue them with their main objectives of peacebuilding. In this case, the revenue occurring from the ventures is deployed to the course.

The CSOs could become more effective in the peace-building process by cooperating more with each other. Several CSOs were engaged in the peace-building process in Jos North and South; yet, there was hardly a joint effort or synergy among the CSOs. If there is a joint effort among the organizations, there might be greater achievement or impact instead of different organizations pursuing a single course. Finally, the CSOs could achieve more in the peace-building efforts and in the long run, there could be more peace if the organisations' resolutions are legally backed. If there is clear legal backing to the activities of the organizations, the NGOs/CSOs could implement the resolutions of the peace accords signed by the stakeholders. This would be a step toward peace in Jos metropolis.

References

Adeyeye, M.M., Obieguo, I.K. & Ogu, E. (2018). "Non-governmental organization activities and peace building" in Sub Urban Journal of Development; Vol. 14, No. 2, 1 – 8.

Alubo, O. (2006). Ethnic conflict and citizenship crisis in the central region. Lagos: Eddy Assa Press.

Anheier, H. Glasius, M. & Kaldor, M. (2001). "The rise and fall of translational civil society", in Journal of International Globalization; vol. 1.

Arinze, Dickson. (2019). "Effects of ethno-religious conflicts in Jos north; a case study of Tudun Wada, 1991 2008", BA Project Submitted to the Department of History and International Studies, University of Jos, 1-3.

Aryal, A. Kafle, B. Khatri, B.B. Tamang, D. Sharma S. & Dhungana, S.K. (2012). Theories of change in peace building: learning from the perspectives of peacebuilding initiatives in Nepal. Nepal: Care Publication.

Avruch, K. & Mitchell, C. (2013). Conflict resolution and human needs. London Wear set Publishers.

Bagudu, N. (2003). The challenges of ensuring peaceful coexistence. Jos: League for Human Rights.

Bagudu, N. ed. (2003). Linguistic minorities and inequalities in jod Nigeria. Jos: League for Human Rights.

Bagudu, N. ed. (2003). Linguistic minorities and inequalities in Jos, Nigeria. Jos: League for Human Rights.

Best, G.S. & Naanzoem, H.K. (2011). Faith-based organizations and post-conflict transformation in Nigeria. Nigeria: John Archers.

Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, About our works, (2022). http/www.hdcenter.org. Accessed 20/8/22

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue," 2014 agreements", (2015). http/www.hdcenter.org. Accessed 20/8/22

Cruz, Santa U.C. "University library", Accessed January 9, 2022 http/guides.library/UCSC. Edu. http/searchforcommonground. Org. Accessed 22/8/22

Dakyen, M.M and Dang, S.M. (2014). "The role of civil society in promoting and sustaining Nigeria's fledgling democracy", in Initial Relations Quarterly Review; Vol. 1, No. 2, 16 – 26.

Ehi, Blessing. (2021). "Elections and ethno-religious conflicts in Jos, 1991 – 2019". BA Project Submitted to the Department of History & International Studies, University of Jos.

Ekpele, Aluforo, (2011), Challenges and solutions to ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria: a case study of Jos Crises", In Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa; Vol. 13, No. 5, 78 – 80.

Felix, Osaraman Trene and Samuel, Majekoduumi. (2017) "Civil society organizations and conflict management: the Nigerian experience", in International Journal of Arts and Humanity; Vol. 6, No.1, 188 – 207.

Fwatshak, S.U and Dagya, V.S. (2011). "Conflict and cooperation in politics of Jos north LGA of Plateau State, 1991 – 2008", in Nasarawa Journal of General Studies; Vol. 1, No. 1, 55 – 59.

Ghan, M. & Abdulahi, Y. (2022) "The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in post conflict peacebuilding in North Eastern Nigeria" in Arts and Social Science Journal; vol. 9, no.5 (2015), 231-272 http/www.omicsolin.org/achieves.

Human Rights Watch Report (2005). Revenge in the name of religion: "the cycle of violence in Plateau and Kano States"; Vol. 17, No. 8.

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, (2003). Strategic conflict assessment (sca) report (Abuja: IPCR, 2003)

Iroye, S. O(2024) Topical Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Abuja. A Publication of the Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja.

Odidi, I. (2004). "Ethno conflicts in plateau state, the need to eliminate the indigene settler dichotomy in Nigeria", in Human Rights Brief; Vol. 12, issue 1, 18 – 21.

Justice Development and Peace/Carita Advocates, (2022). "Our work", Peace Insight, Accessed 26/8/22

Kevin, Idumamga, (1999). "The role of civil society organizations in promoting good governance" in Journal of Social Science and Political Development; Vol. 2, No. 1, 33

Kiagama, I.A (2003) Peace, not war a decade of interventions in the Plateau State Crises 2001-2011 Jos, Print Villa

Krause, J. (2011). A deadly cycle: ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat/Small Arms Survey.

Kwaja, C. M.A. (2011). "Government and civil society efforts in promoting peace in Plateau State" in Oluwafemi J. Para Mallam ed. Finding durable peace in Plateau State. Ilorin: Haytee Press.

Lederach, J.P. (1999). Building peace: sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1997 Lexington Publishers.

Mancha, Thomas. (2013). Empowering youths as peace: ownership capacity building and attitude \change. Berlin: MBH Press.

Nnabuihe, O. E. (2020), "Communal conflict in Jos, north central, Indian Quarterly, Vol. 74 no. 4, 535-551.

Nwan, M (2023) The challenges of Internal Security on Post-Conflict Peace Building in Nigeria; A case study of Jos North and Bassa LGAs. A Ph.D Seminar Series, Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution. National Open University Abuja.

Otite, O. and Albelt, (2011). I. O. Community conflicts in Nigeria management transformation and Para Mallam, J. ed. finding durable peace in Plateau. Kuru: NIPSS Press.

Pafenholz, Thania. (2015). “Civil society and peace building”, in Development Dialogue (2015) 11-42.
Paffenholz, Thania and Spurk, Christopher. (2008). “Civil society, civil engagement and peacebuilding, Social Development Papers, Paper No. 36 / October.
Philip.O. (2009). Jonah jang and the jasawa: “ethno religious conflicts in Jos, Nigeria”, Muslim –Christian Relations I Africa Journal; Vol. 1, 7 – 12
Popoola, J. (2020). “Civil society organization and post conflict reintegration in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Open Journal of political Science, vol2, no1, 34-67. http//www. Script/Journalist.
Popoola, M.A. (2011). “Democratic consolidation in Nigeria: the role of civil society” in Mandyeng Journal of Central Nigeria Studies,Vol. 3, no.2, (2011) 45 – 61.
Ramsbothan, O. T and Mial, H. (2006). Contemporary conflict resolution. Cambridge Polity Press.
Salek, L. (2018). Working in conflict: a faith-based toolkit for islamic relief. Birmingham: Islamic.
Search for Common Ground, (2022). Collective impact and peace: Jos, Nigeria.
Tongeren, P.V. (2009). The role of civil society in the prevention of armed conflicts. London.
Usiju, L.M (2003) Effects of Internak security on Tertiary Institution in Plateau State, Nigeria 2012-2022. A Ph.D Seminar Series Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution National Open University of Nigeria Abuja.
Uwazie, E.E., Albert, I.O. & Uzoigwe, G.N. (1999). Inter-ethnic and religious conflicts resolution in Nigeria Lanham: Lexington Publishers,1999.
Uzuegbunam, A. (2013). “Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) conflicts and peace in Nigeria”, in Open Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 3, No.1, 207 – 212.
Wara, Y.A. (2010). “The role of civil society in fighting terrorism: a comparative analysis between Nigeria and Tunisia”, in Journal of International Lingual and Educational Sciences; Vol. 6, No. 2, 167 – 183.
WAYE Foundation, 2018 Annual Report.

Oral Interviews

Oral Interview, Ahmed Yusuf, Gangere, 22/6/22
Mohammed Aliyu, 49 years, Male, Trader, Bauchi Road, 1/08/2022
Oral Interview, Adam Hamza, Tudun Wada, Jos, 13/4/22
Oral Interview, Azi Atsen, ECWA Staff, Jos, 16/4/22
Oral Interview, Dang Agwom, Tudun Wada, Jos, 17/4/22

SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRENDS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN NIGERIA'S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC: APPLICATION OF NON-VIOLENCE RESOLUTION PRINCIPLES

Felix AYENI
Department of Political Science and International Relations
University of Abuja, Nigeria
felixayeni02@gmail.com

and

Adeyinka Samson ADENIJI
Department of Political Science and International Relations
University of Abuja, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This paper examined the Socio-Economic Trend and Conflict Resolution vis-a-vis Non-Violence Resolution Principles in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Besides, the paper assessed conflict resolution mechanism in industrial relations and identified non-violence resolution principles that are being exhibited towards attaining industrial peace and harmony in Nigeria. Systems theory as propounded by David Easton was adopted for the paper as the basis of analysis. Secondary method of data collection was employed for this work. The findings revealed that inconsistency in priority setting, concerning critical sectors of the Nigeria's economy vis-à-vis the terms of negotiations in industrial relations; is responsible for the outcome being experienced by both sides of the divide in the negotiating table. The findings also suggest that insincerity in governance with respect to the refusal in putting the record straight is the bane of conflict resolution in Nigeria industrial relations. The paper concluded that where there is trust deficit amongst the parties involved in a negotiation process over a conflict, the possibility of having an easy breakthrough in resolving the conflict is quite slim. Therefore, the paper recommended that stakeholders in industrial relations as a matter of urgency, should consider sending a bill to the National Assembly on the use of traditional religion approach in swearing in elected candidates into public offices in order to checkmate instantly the insincerity in governance in Nigeria. Secondly, the paper recommended that consistency in governance especially with respect to the mode at which any agreement is reached during negotiation should be held high by both parties in a conflict; if conflict resolution is anything to go by.

Keywords: *Socio-Economic Trend, Non-Violence, Resolution, Conflict, Principles*

Introduction

Without the people, there cannot be politics. Globally, politics is people centred, no doubt. It is being practiced by people living in a given environment. The act of governance vis-a-vis politicking cannot be over emphasized. In the absence of governance, the state of anarchy reigns; and to avoid anarchy in the system, politics must be able to occupy space in the scheme of things. Ever since, politics is tied to conflict and conflict resolution. Over the years, the justice system has been set up by the respective countries of the world to address disputes or conflicts in their domains. Boyles (2009) states that nonviolence resistance has tremendous potentials. It is useful in the areas of labour management, industrial relations and cooperate ethics.

So much gain has been harvested from the use of non-violence resistant principles in many countries of the world, ranging from India, South Africa and United States of America (USA). The gain being realized from the use of non-violent resolution principles is based on give and take model approach in the process of negotiations amongst the two parties, the government and labour. According to Glasened (2010) Ford workers in Russia used non-violent resistance in 1980 to pressure management to grant their demand for higher wages; and in 2008, the sub-workers in Michigan, USA were able to peacefully demonstrate and force management to review its policy. However, in third world countries like Nigeria, the use of non-violence resolution principles has suffered setback with regards to conflict resolution.

The absence of various catalysts in the process of negotiations such as consistency, trust, priority etc may not have given room to the effectiveness in the use of non-violent resistant principles vis-à-vis conflict resolution in Nigeria. Ordinarily, non-violent resolution principles should bring up to speed the arrival at laudable agreements to be implemented in good time. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case in Nigeria. This is a gap which this work seeks to close. Could it be that there is insincerity amongst the warring factions during the process of negotiations? This study intends to identify the causes of insincerity if any; as the possible bane of conflict resolution in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarifications

Socio- Economic Trend refers to a pattern of change in the social and economic aspect of a society over a period of time. It involves shift in societal values, behaviour and economic conditions that impact various aspect of people's lives.

Conflict Resolution is the process of ending a dispute and reaching an agreement that satisfy all the parties involved. Conflict has always been part of being human; hence making it difficult to avoid disagreement between man and his fellow man, thereby requiring the needed resolution.

Non-Violence Resistance Principle is the practice of not causing harm to others or not destroying lives and properties under any condition. It is abstention from violence as a matter of principle.

Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of illustrating the theoretical framework of this paper, David Easton's diagram of political system is hereby adopted below:




Fig.1: David Easton's Diagram of Political System

David Easton's Model of System Theory was adopted for this paper as the basis of assessing non-violence resistance principles. Therefore, the diagram in figure 1 above is used as an aid of illustration. The theory states that there is an existence of a link between politics and socio-economic life. This indicates that there is a close relationship between the political system and the environment. This theory is applicable to any given socio-economic formation and its interconnecting linkage with its various components such as inputs, outputs and feedbacks.

Most times, the Nigerian people, ably represented as the environment, make political or economic demands; for instance, the demand for the reduction in fuel hike occasioned by fuel subsidy removal; as ordered by President Bola Tinubu on his inauguration of 29th May, 2023 calls to mind. Away from that, any demand made by the environment finds its way into the political system as input. Inputs are deliberated upon by the political system, decisions are reached and sent to the environment as outputs in form of policies which are processed into feedbacks by the environment; paving way for another form of inputs for the political system to be deliberated upon.

In a situation whereby the outputs are positive or favourable to the environment, the political system being the authority in the state, continuous with the implementation of the political or economic policies such as foreign investment drive and subsequently improves on them. However, in an event that the outputs are negative or unfavourable to the environment, the inputs; this time, as feedbacks are transferred to the political system.

In the context of this study, the feedbacks from the environment (the people) are accompanied with non-violence resolution principles such as civil disobedience, peaceful protests etc in expressing displeasure over the policies and decisions made by the political system (the authority). When the feedbacks from the people get to the authority in form of demands or support, government evaluates them and takes decision either to consolidate on the policies or to discard the policies. The reactions over the outputs released to the

environment by the political system are equivalent to the feedbacks that are sent back to the political system.

However, in the event that the environment is pleased with the initial policies being implemented by the political system, the non-violence resolution principles are put on hold as there will be no basis for these. The support of the outputs (decisions and policies) is based on the level of satisfaction. Such situation creates stability in the polity. Nevertheless, a situation whereby outputs fail to command support, such situation leads to support-erosion; and to this end, any of the non-violence resolution principle takes precedence. An instance of this kind of scenario is the non-implementation of the 2009 Federal Government of Nigeria-Academic Staff Union of Universities (FGN-ASUU) Agreement.

Literature Review

Former Nigerian President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as reported in Punch Newspaper of Friday, 15th September, 2023, opines that a democratic system bedeviled by insecurity, unemployment and other Socio-Economic Challenges trending within the system must be ditched. Furthermore, any democratic governance that nurtures poverty, lack of peaceful co-existence etc has failed in its responsibility; hence, it should be thrown overboard. Therefore, democratic dividend must involve security of lives and properties, stability, prosperity, wealth creation, employment, industrial peace through various principles vis-a-vis respectable negotiations and the wholesomeness of the society.

Bayer et al (2016); Chenoweth and Stephen (2011) state that non-violent resistance is more effective not only in deposing dictators but also in improving long term democratic governance relative to top-down liberations. Hadjar (2003) argues that non-violent resistance was inherently democratizing by transformative historical events such as the mostly peaceful transitions in Eastern Europe at the end of the cold war. Therefore, non-violence resistant campaigns have induced transitions from autocracy to democracy and influenced political development through conflict resolution.

Ackerman and Karantnycky (2005), Johnson (2010) state that with regards to the relationship between non-violent resistance and conflict resolution in democratization, many countries of the world have improved in terms of political rights and civil liberties; more importantly after button-up non-violent transitions as compared to top-down or violent transitions approach. Chenoweth and Stephen (2011) assert that nonviolent resistance campaigns have significantly increased the degree of democracy dialogue and conflict resolution in sovereign states. Shock (2005) opines that participation in civil resistance is open to much larger segments of the society regardless of age, gender and physical ability; and to this end, participation advantage helps non-violence resistance to achieve success through exacerbating the states material basis of support.

Nazareth (2006) posits that nonviolence resistance always seeks to propose mutually acceptable agreements of power over the opponent. It is a transformation of relationship towards peaceful transfer of power. Minor (2003) states that the non-violent resistance tagged salt Satyagraha was highly moral and ethical towards the achievement of civil disobedience; in protest against oppression, injustice and exploitation. Its focus was on truth; and on educating the opponent. It could be described as the most civilized and ethical form of socio-political and economic device or instrument which was able to achieve an emotional chord in the opponent's camp, thereby, increasing the chances of its success.

Hearts and Minds (2006) opines that non-violent resistance (Satyagraha) could be used in the contemporary organizations. The oppressed group could first generate media attention; then, non-violently persuade the other party to agree to its demands. Reddy (2008) asserts that non-violent resistance (Satyagraha) should not be approached as a passive philosophy but on action-oriented attitude. Satyagraha principles are inherent human tendency. This means that everyone wants to avoid conflict to achieve peace and harmony with self and others. Baird (2003) posits that non-violent resistance (Satyagraha) had the potential to rally the oppressed and suppressed the masses with a rejoined sense of hope of accomplishing a civilized form of warfare over powerful opponent in a highly ethical format.

In his writings, Mahatma Gandhi translated nonviolence as Satyagraha. Furthermore, Satya means truth and holding onto truth though nonviolence resistance to evil by refusing to submit to the wrong is termed as satyagraha. Besides, holding onto Satyagraha will lead to the ideal state of India as Sarvodaya. Again, he states that nonviolence is a weapon of the strong as truth and nonviolence are inseparable and presupposed one another. Hence, nonviolence resistance offers a better option out of either political or economic or industrial quagmire in the state. Moving on, he asserts that nonviolence resistance is a positive concept which meant love for selfless service with the mindset of man freeing himself and his fellow man from oppressive governance.

Also, he states that those that participates in nonviolence resistance should have the quality of the goodwill otherwise known as Agape for the people in the state. In his writings against apartheid, Nelson Mandela states that there is great power in nonviolence hence its enhancement to bring about an end the strategy of segregation in order to give way to and integrated society. He posits that the meaning of nonviolence in its deepest meaning frustrates the opponent such as those at the helms of affairs in the state. In addition, it expresses its moral defence, weaknesses and morale work on their conscience. Besides, he opines that the practitioners of nonviolence resistance have the capacity to endure the suffering inflicted by the opponent for a period of time with the confidence of meeting physical force with soul force towards achieving the objectives(s) of the struggle. In addition, Nelson Mandela asserts that nonviolence resistance is a strategy employed by the forces of liberation against the forces of domination; hence, the temporary collision between the two forces.

Nigeria-Industrial Relations in the Fourth Republic: Selected Conflicts in Nigeria

The herders-farmers clashes, the FGN-ASUU face-off and the FGN-NLC controversy are amongst the major conflicts begging for resolutions in Nigeria. Each of these conflicts would be discussed one after the other below:

FGN-NLC/TUC Industrial Conflict

Over the years, the news revolving around the removal or the non-removal of fuel subsidy has lingered on for so long at the inception of the fourth republic in 1999 between the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) under the leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo and the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC)/Trade Union Congress (TUC) which is being supported by Civil Societies, Non-Government Associations and other groups in Nigeria. The ovation against the removal of fuel subsidy sounded loud and clear under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's administration when different forces of opposition stood very firm; in spite of lobbying the members of the National Assembly to see reason in the implementation of the policy.

Consequently, in the year 2011, non-violent resistant principles in form of civil protest took place in major Nigerian cities such as Abuja and Lagos of the opposition forces ranging from Political Parties, Civil Society Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations mounted high magnitude pressure, protesting majorly in the streets of Abuja and Lagos to press home demand against the removal of fuel subsidy in they argued that Nigeria as at then was not ripe for the removal. The government as at that time bowed to pressure and accepted their demand. This is being acknowledged as an achievement of conflict resolution through non-violent resistance principle (Civil protest) and by extension an output from the political system into the environment with reference to David Easton's systems theory.

During President Muhammadu's Buhari's administration, the situation looked bleak with respect to the removal of fuel subsidy with no clear direction, until the coming of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu when he suddenly removed the fuel subsidy on 29th May, 2023. However, the President was criticized by Nigerians of putting the cart before the horse in the sense that palliatives ought to have been placed on standby before the removal of fuel subsidy; in view of the untold hardship which has been brought upon the Nigerian people as a result of the decision causing unprecedented crack on the Nigerian economy.

Nigerian workers have always demanded for general upward review of wages especially as it concerns minimum wage. Even though, government is quite aware that in every five years, the national minimum wage is expected to be adjusted button-up through the Acts of legislation, but successive governments seemed not to be comfortable with such arrangement and to this end, are hesitant in doing the needful. The federal government of Nigeria always sets up ad-hoc committees to consider wage adjustments during the period of labour unrest through the use of non-violence resistance principles such as embarking on strike action. Strike is often embarked upon when agreement arrived at based on collective bargaining fails to be honoured. At the inception of President Tinubu's administration, the organized labour has not rested in deploying nonviolence resistance principle (negotiations) to demand for a new national minimum in line with the persistent economic realities.

Recent development in Nigeria's political and economic dispensation has shown that in view of the removal of fuel subsidy as announced by Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu on his inauguration as President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the 29th, 2023, paved way for a proposed show down as declared by the organized labour through non- violence resistance principle in form of protest; if the government fails to withdraw the policy. This development warranted the Federal government to invite the representatives of Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and Trade Union Congress (TUC) to the negotiating table; to avert the strike through dialogue over the issue to chart a way forward. Consequently, on Tuesday the 2nd of October, 2023, the two parties, FGN and the organized labour signed a 15-point Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) based on the following agreements were reached:

i. #35,000.00 wage award was granted to the Federal workers for six months in the first instance and until a national minimum is signed into law.
ii. A minimum wage committee is to be inaugurated within one month from the date of agreement.

iii. Suspension of Value Added Tax (VAT) on diesel for six months from October 2023 by the federal government.

iv. The acceptance by the federal government to vote the sum of #100billion for the provision of high capacity CGN buses for mass transit in Nigeria; to mention but, a few.

Therefore, after hour-long meeting with the federal government, the NLC and TUC suspended its planned nationwide strike for 30days in line with nonviolence resistance principle (dialogue/negotiations) and as it is today, the #35,000.00 wage award has been paid to the federal workers for six months.

Again, in the spirit of nonviolence resolution principle vis-à-vis industrial relations as propounded by Martin Luther King Jnr., which says, that practitioners of nonviolence resistance do not retaliate against violent attack from the opponent; likewise, Mahatma Gandhi who viewed that nonviolence resolution principle against opponent physical attack, destabilizes` and frustrates the opponent in a psychological manner; thereby making the opponent to think of the way forward in no distant time; hence, members of the NLC and the TUC remained calm as they did not result into violence act in the wake of the molestation of the NLC President, Joe Ajaero in Imo state during a working visit; rather, the organized Labour, wrote to the federal government of Nigeria to address the issue in its entirety. Consequently, the government through the National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribado agreed to look into it.

FGN-ASUU Industrial Conflict

Collective bargaining is a mechanism for resolving conflict at workplaces between management and Labour Union (Ayim, et al, 2011). Kester (2006) states that the implication of government's action with respect to not honouring the principle of collective bargaining and the implementation of agreements is the emergence of industrial disputes and work stoppage. This brings to mind the lingering non-implementation of the 2009 FG-ASUU Agreement which has given rise to industrial dispute.

The indifference of government towards collective agreement reached with ASUU in 2009 was demonstrated by the regime of President Muhammadu Buhari's decision to review the agreement. The reviewed agreement was reached two years of negotiations between the reviewed negotiation between ASUU and the FGN. This agreement contains conditions of service for the university lecturers, funding of universities, university revitalization, university autonomy and academic freedom. Unfortunately, the 2009 FG-ASUU reviewed agreement was not implemented before the Buhari administration sets up a team to renegotiate the agreement, (Musari, 2009).

According to Anyim et al 2001) non-implementation of agreement reached by FG and ASUU undermines the relevance of collective bargaining in industrial disputes as government is not willing to be bound by the agreement. This is because of the mistake it makes in entering industrial negotiations without weighing the financial implication of their proposals. And according to the vanguard newspaper, (2011) although, non-strike clause was imputed into the FG-ASUU agreement but government is not willing to implement agreed terms in order to avoid the strike situation. Therefore, government's inefficiency and insensitivity have resulted to the increase in industrial conflict that has not given the desired impetus towards resolving the incessant conflicts in Nigeria.

In view of the development in 2020, the FGN-ASUU industrial relations met with a waterloo when ASUU embarked on a nationwide strike in February of that year to press home its displeasure for its enrolment into the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System (IPPIS) payment platform by the federal government; and demanded to be removed from the payment platform and substituted with an alternative emoluments payment platform known as University Transparency and accountability Solution (UTAS) through the use of nonviolence resistance principle until in October, 2022 when the strike was suspended in obedience to a court order. Consequently, the government withheld ASUU 10nths salary based on no work no pay policy until that government headed by President Muhammadu Buhari exited the political scene.

ASUU, not resting on its negotiations and lobbying strategy in line with nonviolence resistance principle, the federal government of Nigeria under the leadership of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu agreed to pay four out of the eight months' salary arrears owned to members of ASUU and this has since been paid.

Farmers-Herders Conflict

The farmers-herders conflict is a recurring decimal in recent time within the Nigerian state. This conflict is prevalent in the northern part of the country especially in Benue state and the southern part of Kaduna state. Overtime, the conflict has spread to other parts of the country.

For instance, the farmer-pastoralist conflicts were witnessed in some parts of the federal capital Territory (FCT), Abuja especially at Gadabiyu Community in Kwali area council as a result of grazing of farmland which has affected rice farming. There was a destruction of rice farm in Gadabiyu with 40% estimated loss in yield leading to an attack by farmers on cattle. This episode led to a conflict between the pastoralists and the farmers. Consequently, a committee was set up with the aim to settle the issue. Below is table 1 for illustration:

Table 1: Animal Hazard in Rice Farm

Type of Hazard	Location of incidence	Severity	Estimated Loss in yield	Control Measure undertaken
Destruction of rice farm and cattle attack	Gadabiyu	Heavy	40%	Conflict Resolution committee was set up.

Source: F.C.T Agricultural Performance, 2011

However, whether a political will would be deployed by government to address the incessant breakdown of law and order as a result of farmer-herders clashes across the country is yet to be seen. Another thing yet to be seen is the display of non-violent resolution principle by the Nigerian people to inspire government towards resolving farmers-herders conflict in its entirety.

It is no longer news that the farmers-herders conflict in recent time is predominantly in the north central region of Nigeria particularly in plateau state. This has come as a shock to some Nigerians who had witnessed for many years the co-existence between the farmers and the herders in that part of the country; hence, the question surrounding the reason for this conflict. Several factors became fundamentally responsible for the volume of crises being experienced incessantly. One of such factors is not far-fetched. It is linked to global warming which has kept food security at bay and at the same time, has given rise to stiff competition over land resources such as farmland, water etc. thereby, paving way for unimaginable crises that has led to massive killings.

A typical example was the mass killings carried out by unknown gunmen as a result of the attacks allegedly linked to herdsmen in Bokkos and Barikin Ladi local government areas of plateau state on Christmas eve, Monday 25th of December, 2023 in which close to 30 communities suffered horrific attacks in the two local governments leaving more than 150 people dead. (Punching-com>outrage-as-plateau.27 Dec.2023). Against this background and to avoid reprisal attacks in line with nonviolence resistance principle, government at all level expressed worry over the unfortunate incident and had brought stakeholders in the conflict to the negotiation table for a possible resolution of the conflict.

However, in the past, government had made frantic effort to address the issue of farmers-herders conflict by making moves to set up Ruga settlements across the country; enact the water resources bill into law; reawaken the colonial cattle routes; establish cattle colony; and the move to establish of cattle ranching. But, all these efforts, to no avail as they were in futility because of fear of the unknown as expressed by Nigerians.

Impact of Non-Violence Resolution Principles

Non-violent resistance (Satyagraha) remains the active philosophy in freedom struggles through- out the world. Gandhi's actions inspired human rights movements around the globe including those of civil rights leaders like Martin Luther king jr. of the United States of America and Nelson Mandela of South Africa. (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013).

Gandhi's Non-Violent Resistance Principles include the followings: i Civil disobedience; ii Street protest; iii Non-cooperation; iv Economic boycott; v Sit at home strike; and vi Hunger strike

Erin (2020) states that after the return of Mahatma Gandhi to India from south Africa, he won concession from the white authority by organizing a calculated non-violent street protest and non-cooperation with respect to helping Champaran farmers. On the other hand, in line with economic boycott, Gandhi embarked signature campaign in which peasant farmers pledged non-payment of taxes. Eventually, white controlled government relaxed the conditions of payment of revenue tax after much struggle in resolving the conflict.

According to India Today web Desk, New Delhi (2018), Gandhi launched the quit India movement in 1942 through the delivery of a formidable speech over British rule. This resulted to the arrest of the entire members of the Indian national congress and were subjected to trial and imprisonment. However, the struggle continued in form of civil disobedience, street protest, sit at home strike and economic boycott across the country. To this end, thousands of prisoners were released. This immensely contributed to Indian freedom and in a way compelled the British colonialists to grant political independence to India.

Martin Luther king jr.'s Principles of Non-Violence Resistance are presented below: i Non-violence resistance: ii Seeks to win friendship and understanding; iii Seeks to defeat injustice; iii Frowns at retaliation; iv Seeks courage; v Discards hate; and vi Resists violence of the mind. Martin Luther king jr. saw racial discrimination in the United States as a social problem. Then, he had a dream that one day, such injustice will be dismantled. Therefore, he took action through the use of non-violence resistance principles to resolve the conflict. As a civil right activist in the 1960s, he was instrumental to Memphis sanitation workers' strike; the Motgomery bus boycott sparked by Rosa parks and the march on Washington with kindness and love as opposed to hate and violence.

Martin Luther king Jr. fought against injustice and achieved mandatory equal voting in the United States for blacks and whites as well as equal treatment in restaurants for people

of of all race. As a result of non-violent peaceful demonstrations by Martin Luther King Jr. and his followers, they were able to convince the US government and the world that segregation was an illegality, thereby achieved its abolition. As it is today, it is no longer legal to discriminate against skin colour in the United States; and by extension, a standard was set for all nations of the world to treat everyone equally regardless of skin colour. These days, racism has reduced drastically in the globe in view of the enormous contribution of social activism by Martin Luther king Jr. (Jason and Steve, 2022).

Nelson Mandela's Non-Violence Resistance Principles are as follows: i Strike; ii Protest; iii Civil disobedience; and iv Boycott. While growing up, Nelson Mandela frowned at the unjust laws of apartheid and as a result identified with the African National congress (ANC) non-violence resistance policy. Since then, he fought against apartheid and requested for equal right for all citizens irrespective of the race one is born into. Mandela recognized non-violence protest as the right way to achieve the stoppage of apartheid in South Africa vis-à-vis the achievement of full citizenship for every single South African.

In the spirit of non-violent resistance, Mandela mobilized the people for action through the use of strikes, civil disobedience, boycotts etc. He travelled around the country leading series of protests to acquire equality for the black race. However, later in life, he embraced armed struggle to augment non-violent resistance and fought apartheid across the country. Consequently, Nelson Mandela was arrested by the white led minority government and was charged and sentenced to life imprison. In the prison, Mandela smuggled out statement of criticism against the obnoxious apartheid policy instituted by the then South African white minority government. This encouraged his followers to keep on with the struggle for freedom. The development eventually led to his release after 27 years behind bars. Ultimately, apartheid was halted when he became South Africa's president in 1994. This pointed to the fact that conflict resolution was attained.

Findings

The findings of this study revealed that there is inconsistency in upholding to non-violent resistance principles vis-a-vis collective bargaining in negotiations process. For instance, strikes are suspended and sometimes they are called off even when the process of negotiation is abused by one of the parties involved in the struggle. This has given advantage to a party in the negotiation to demand for a review or renegotiation of agreement already reached.

A case in point is FGN-ASUU industrial conflict. The FGN-ASUU 2009 agreement was reviewed at inception of the Buhari's administration. Later, it was negotiated upon. The agreement was renegotiated and the government is asking for another renegotiation of the agreement since ASUU embarked on strike on the 14th of February, 2020.

The findings also revealed that agreements between successive governments and unions are not being implemented. For instance, the FGN-Resident Doctors Agreement over the improvement of condition of service is yet to see the light of the day. On the other hand, the FGN-NLC Agreement over the payment the #30,000.00 minimum wage has not been implemented by some state governments across the country. However, six months wage award meant to cushion the effect of the removal of fuel subsidy by President Bola Tinubu led government has been paid to federal government workers through negotiations vis-a-vis non-violence resolution principle employed by the organized labour, the NLC and the TUC.

Antagonism is very glaring with regards to industrial relations. For instance, members of the Academic staff union of university (ASUU) were antagonized by registering them into the controversial Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System (IPPIS) without their consent, after an agreement was reached that ASUU has been exempted from IPPIS. Suspicion in industrial relations has been noticed on both sides; for example, while government officials may suspect that a union may not suspend an ongoing strike soon, the union may suspect government of falsehood.

Propaganda is another factor that serves as an impediment to industrial relations. Imagine a situation whereby a statement of fact is painted black and released to public space.

This would only trigger uncertainty in the process of industrial relations amongst the negotiating sides. For instance, a propaganda that says ASUU is on leave when ASUU is actually on strike destroys the smoothness in industrial relations. All the factors discussed above are responsible for the use of non-violent resistance principles with the aim of achieving conflict resolution in Nigeria.

However, after a continuous fire brand consultation technique and negotiations strategy in line with nonviolent resolution principle employed by ASUU, the Bola Tinubu led-federal government paid members of ASUU four months out of the eight months-salary arrears as a result of ASUU 2020 nationwide strike over its enrolment into the IPPIS payment platform amongst other issues.

Conclusion

To keep body and soul together, man has not departed from daily struggles to earn his daily bread. In the process of doing this, he is being confronted with various conflicts which needed to be tackled through certain channels. The choice of non-violence resistance for conflict resolution by notable social activist like Mahatma Gandhi of India, Martin Luther king Jr. of the United States of America and Nelson Mandela of South Africa cannot be overemphasized. Each of these men, have had tremendous achievements for their respective countries through the use of non-violent resistance principles. For instance, Gandhi fought the British colonialists and earned political independence for India. Martin Luther King Jr. fought against racial discrimination and equality for all citizens of the United States. Nelson Mandela fought the white minority government in South Africa against the apartheid policy and won freedom for the black race.

In Nigeria, non-violence resistance principles have not done significantly well because of trust deficit amongst the parties involved in negotiation process. For instance, in industrial relations; most often than not, government does not trust the union. On the other hand, the union does not trust government; thereby creating room for suspicion and this has resulted to poor remuneration for workers in the country. For example, the #7,500.00

minimum wage approved by former President Olusegun Obansanjo, the #18,000 minimum wage approved by former president Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and the #30,000 approved by former President Muhammadu Buhari ran very short of what was negotiated upon by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) owing to suspicion vis-a-vis trust deficit; and above all, the utmost disregard for collective bargaining principle especially on the side of government.

Recommendations

Consistency in the use of non-violence resolution principles should be the watchword towards achieving conflict resolution in good time. Government should weigh her economic prospects before reaching an agreement and signing same with any lab our union. Insincerity and propaganda are twin-evil and should be avoided as much as possible in industrial relations to pave way for conflict resolution. Since antagonism does not respect collective bargaining principles, non-violence resistance principles should be employed to oppose the abnormality (antagonism). Trust should be imbibed by both parties during and after the process of negotiations; in order to push suspicion far away from industrial relations. Government officials should employ honesty in their daily administrative dealings so as to place priorities in proper perspective. More importantly, to avoid negligence of critical sectors of the economy such as education and works for less important areas.

References

Ackerman, P., Karatnycky, A. (2005). How Freedom is won: From Civil Resistance to Durable Democracy. New York: Freedom House. (Pp. 67-89).

Anyin, F.C., Elegbede, T. & Sherrif, G. (2011). Collective Bargaining Dynamics in Nigerian Public and Private Sectors, Australia Journal of Business and Management Research: 1(5). (Pp. 63-70).

Baird, R. (2003). Convergence of distinct worlds: Nehru and Gandhi in H. Coward (ED.), Indian critiques of Gandhi: Albany: State University of New York press. (Pp. 19-40).

Bayer, M., Bethke, F. S., Lambach, D. (2016). The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance. Journal of Peace Research 53 (6). (Pp.758-771).

Boyles, G. (2009). Climate Satyagraha: made in India? Retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.org/indianblog/climate.

Canadian Museum for Human Rigths. Retrieved 5th July 2022.

Celetino, M.R., & Gleditsch, K.S (2013). Fresh Carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies. Journal of Peace Research. 50(3). (Pp.385-400).

Chandler, M. J. (2018). Civil resistance mechanism and disrupted democratization: the ambiguous outcomes of unarmed insurrections in Egypt 2011-2015. Peace and Change. 43(1). (Pp. 90-116).

Chenoweth, E. & Ulflerder, J. (2017). Can structural conditions explain the onset of nonviolent upsprings? Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(2). (Pp.295-324).

Chenoweth, E., Stephen, M. J. (2011). Why Civil Resistance works: The Strategic Logic of Non-violent conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. (Pp. 95-122).

Chenoweth, E; Lewis, O.A. (2013). Unpacking non-violent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. Journal of Peace Research. 50(3). (Pp. 415-423).

M. Leader M. &. Conway A. (2011). Civil and Political Rights: Star Trek and Human Rights. Journal of Peace Research. 40(5). (Pp. 54-70).

Day, J., Pinckney, j., & Chenoweth, E. (2015). Collecting data on non-violent action: Lessons learned and ways forward. Journal of peace Research 57(1). (129-133).

Encyclopedia Britainnica. (2016 August sv, 'March) on Washington, the Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. (Pp. 67-80).

Gandhi, M. (1965). Gandhi on Nonviolence. African Library. (Pp. 67-90).

Gandhi, M (1986). The Struggle for my Life. Call Number. African Library. DT779.95.M26A57 (Pp. 64-72).

Gandhi, M. (1994). Let Freedom Reign. The words of Nelson Mandela. African Library. (Pp. 35-54).

Gassebner, M., Lamia, M.J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2012). Extream bounds of democracy. Journal of conflict Resolution 57(2). (171-197).

Gibson, J. L. (2006). The contribution of truth to reconciliation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(3). (Pp. 409-32).

Glaster, T. (2003). n.d Article summary of self-limiting conflict: The Gandhian style by Paul Wher. Retrieved from www.beyondintractability.org article summary/10613. (Pp. 115-130).

Gleditsch, K.S (2002). Expanded trade and GDP data-Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(5). (Pp.712-724).

Hadjar, A. (2003). Non-violent Political protest in East Germany in the 1980s: protester church, opposition groups and the people. German politics 12(3). (Pp.107-128).

Hearts, D. and Minds, S. (2006). Sweatshops: Harsh Conditions create public pressure for Reforms to take place. Retrieved from www.heartstandminds.org/articles/sweat.htm. November 2009. (Pp. 35-45).

Herr, H. & Kazandziska, M. (2011). Principles of minimum wage policy-Economics, Institution and Recommendations, International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland. (Pp. 89-115).
https://castle.eiu.edu/wow/ classes
https://www.britianca.com>martin
https://www.youthforthhumanrights.org>.....
India Today (2018 November 8). Web Desk, New Delhi. (Pp.45-64).
International Day of Happiness (2020 December, 2013, 5). 9:55 pm UTC By Alastrair Jamieson, staff writer, NBC NEW. (Pp. 89-119).
Jason P. and Steve M. (2022). Human rights promotion: Collective rights. (Pp. 93-120).
John R. D. (2011). Aviatim Branch History Office. (Pp. 67-75).
Kester, K.O. (2006). A Perspective on wage Determination in Nigeria, Ibadan: John Acher publishers. (Pp. 45-60).
Lawson, G. (2015). Revolution, non-violence and Arab Upsprings Mobilization: An International Quarterly 20 (4). (Pp. 453-470).
King, M. L. (1958). Stride Towards Freedom. New York Press. (Pp. 23-40).
Mandela, N. (1994). Long Walk to Freedom. Cape Town Press. (Pp. 79-93).
McRae, M. (2022). Civil and political rights: The story of Nelson Mandela, a will that could not be contained. (Pp. 66-80).
Musari, A. (2017). FGN-ASUU to renegotiate 2009 agreement as Buhari sets up team. The GuardianNews. Retrieved in (2018, September 7). from www.guardian.ng. (Pp. 23-40).
Nazareth, A. P. (2006). Gandhi's and Satyagraha: Validity and Relevance, paper presented at Satyagraha centenary conference, New Delhi, India. (Pp. 69-78).
Nepstand, S.E. (2011). Non-Violent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the late 20th century, NewYork: Oxford University Press. (Pp. 90-116).
New world Encyclopedia, 2014 April s.v. Rosa parks, World Encyclopedia contributors. (Pp. 88-109).
Nwadiro, E.C.C (2011). Collective bargaining and conflict resolution: The Federal Government of Nigeria and Nigeria Labour Congress impasse; retrieved on (2018 September 9) from http://moreciteseerxist.psu.edu. (Pp. 56-78).
Obasanjo, O. (2023, Friday September 15). Punch Newspaper, lnauguration of internal roads in Iseyin, Oyo state, Nigeria (Pp. 4-5).
Obserschall, A (2001). Social movements and the transition of democracy Democratizations 7 (3). (Pp. 25-40).
Reddy, S. (2008). Gandhi's and Satyagraha: Validity and Relevance, paper presented at Satyagraha Cetenary Conference, New Delhi. (Pp. 185-186).
Schock, K. (2005). Unarmed insurrections. People power movements in Non-democracies Minneopolis, M.N: university of Minnesata Press. (34-55).
Sharp, G. (2005). Waging Non-Violent Struggle. Boston, M.A: Porter Sargens. (Pp. 86-112).

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: ANALYSES FROM HERDSMEN AND FARMERS' CONFLICT IN BENUE STATE: 2014-2016

Eze Marcel ONYEMA, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
National Open University of Nigeria
meze@noun.edu.ng

Basil IBEBUNJO, Ph.D.
Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
National Open University of Nigeria
bibebunjo@noun.edu.ng

Patrick EKWUFE
National Productivity Centre,
Benin, Edo State, Nigeria.
and

Felix EBO
National Productivity Centre,
Benin, Edo State, Nigeria

ABSTRACT
Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation have been the primary source of conflict in almost every part of the globe. These weapons 'usage has taken a heavy toll on human lives, with women and children accounting for nearly eighty percent of the causalities. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons affects the intensity and duration of violence and encourages conflicts rather than their peaceful resolution. Perhaps most grievously, we see a vicious circle in which insecurity leads to a higher demand for weapons with greater insecurity today. The study adopted the aid of failed state theory to observe that there are linkages between arms proliferation and the upsurge of herdsmen and farmers' conflict in Benue State. Secondary source materials were utilised. We recommend that government should be more proactive in enforcing anti-small arms and light weapons proliferation policies to control the menace in Nigeria.

Keywords: Arms Proliferation, Ethnic Conflicts, Farmers, Fulani Herdsmen, National security

Introduction

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is adjudged the most immediate security challenge to individuals, societies, and states worldwide, fuelling civil wars, organized criminal violence, insurgency and terrorist activities posing great obstacles to sustainable security and development (Malam, 2014**)**. This has attracted violent internal conflicts accompanied by unprecedented civilian casualties and gross violations of human rights at an alarming rate. The diffusion of small arms, particularly from the industrialized nations to the developing world has played a decisive role in the escalation and intensification of those conflicts. Its impact today is unenhanced security, virulent internal conflicts accompanied by unprecedented civilian casualties and gross violations of human rights in the present Nigerian society.

According to Kpoghul and Ityonzughul, (2016) "in the North Central Nigerian States since the early 1980s, there had been communal conflicts between ethnic groups, in the likes of Jukun-Tiv and others in Wukari, Taraba and Sardauna local governments in Taraba States. Others described as intra-ethnic conflicts occurred, as among the Ebira of Kogi, ethno-religious conflicts, as in Zangon-Kataf and Kafanchan in Kaduna State, and several parts of Plateau States, and the spread of these conflicts into the neighbouring urban areas". Bonat, (2017) observed that by the turn of the 21st century, pastoralists-farmers conflicts are becoming more violent, with the increasing use of modern sophisticated weapons by the pastoralists, leading to some farming community members also organizing to defend themselves. Today, violent conflicts between pastoralist and farmers have become widespread in the North Central Nigeria area especially Benue State.

Benue State was created on February 3, 1976. It was one of the seven new states created by the military administration headed by the late General Murtala Muhammed, which increased the number of states in the federation from twelve to nineteen. The state derived its name from the River Benue which is the second largest river in the country. Benue State is the nations acclaimed Food Basket because of its rich agricultural produce which includes yams,

rice, beans, cassava, potatoes, maize, soya beans, sorghum, millet and cocoyam. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, engaging over 75% of the state farming population. The State also boasts of one of the longest stretches of river systems in the country with great potential for a viable fishing industry, dry season farming through irrigation and an inland water highway. The vegetation of the southern parts of the state is characterized by forests, which yield trees for timber and provide a suitable habitat for rare animals**.** These resources of river and forage attract herdsmen to the Benue Valley where they settle to easily feed their flocks with arms to protect themselves and their flocks.

Unfortunately, these arms are now used against farmers who protest against the destruction of their crops and farmlands. Illicit arms transfer is not a particular country's problem nor does the spread of violent conflict that attracts its usage stop at national borders. Guns and small arms are no longer the preserves of militaries and police forces but have fallen into the hands of ordinary criminals, terrorists, ethnic militias and death squads around the world. Events today have changed the records of happy lives of men as society is at war with each other. The causes of these conflicts are numerous and diverse. However, in nearly all these conflicts, the diffusion of small arms has played a decisive role in the escalation and intensification of these conflicts. This study is designed to examine small arms and light weapons proliferation and ethnic conflict in Nigeria with a focus on herdsmen and farmers conflict in Benue State, Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the theory of failed state. According to Anyanwu (2005) the term "failed state" is often used to describe a state perceived as having failed at some of her basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. A failed state is one that has shattered social and political structures. It is characterised by social, political and economic failure. Common characteristics of a failing state is when a central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory, non-provision of public utilities or services, widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary

movement of populations, and sharp economic decline. Anyanwu (2005) notes that failed states are invariably the product of a collapse of the power structures providing political supports for law and order, a process generally trigged and accompanied by anarchic forms of internal violence.

It is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted; and experienced officials are killed or flee the country. The utility of this theory will unravel the incapacitation of Nigerian state in using her security operatives to control the proliferation of small and light weapons and the consequent use of arms and light weapons in the endemic conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Benue state.

Proliferation of Small Arms, Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria

The impact of proliferation of small and light weapons on ethnic conflict in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. "Although Nigeria's problem with small and light weapons is not new, its increasing availability in the last decade has helped stoke a wave of insurgencies, ethno-religious conflicts, cross-border banditry, kidnapping, armed robbery and other violent crimes. Arms build-up has fuelled violence in different parts of Nigeria, especially communal clashes and ethno-religious conflicts" (Osimen and Akintunde 2015:17). Between 1999 and April 2010, Nigeria recorded at least 187 ethno-religious conflicts, leading to the death of several thousands of people. These weapons helped to prolong conflicts, induced huge internal population displacement, undermined social peace and devastated the economic livelihoods of individuals and communities.

As a result, Nigeria is faced with the herculean task of responding to a fluctuating but always sizeable number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Between 2000 and 2002, for instance, an estimated 1,713,306 persons were displaced by ethno-religious conflicts and, by June 2013, some 1.6 million Nigerians are estimated to have been internally displaced. The January 2010 crisis in Jos displaced over 40,000 persons. Situations of internal displacement

undermine human security at individual and community levels. IDPs are usually vulnerable to violent crimes like robbery and rape, and are prone to contracting contagious diseases, due to poor sanitary conditions at the re-settlement centres. The impact of Nigeria's SALWs problem on human security is also evident in financial losses induced by conflicts. About 10 major ethno-religious conflicts between 1999 and 2004 cost the Nigerian government over 400 million naira (US$2.86 million). Besides, the amount of money that governments spend on security during such crises and their aftermath are huge. In the aftermath of the Jos crisis in early 2010, the federal government assisted the Bauchi State government with ₦135 million (US$900 000) to help resettle or integrate about 30,000 IDPs from neighbouring Plateau State seeking refuge in Bauchi State.

These scarce resources could otherwise be used for the provision of basic services that promote human security and development, such as clean water, education and healthcare, among others. Beyond the cost to government, individuals lose property and family members. The loss of property compounds the problem of poverty and deprivation of the affected population. Through the death of family members, arms-induced conflicts lead to a deep fracturing of kinship and family structures as many children have been left without parents, husbands without wives, and vice versa. When a family unit is dismantled, children suffer and their future well-being is often bleak, as they are denied good parental care. Many end up as social miscreants who contribute to violent crimes.

Thus, for every person killed or injured in conflict and crime involving the use of SALWs, there are many more who must cope with the psychological, physical and economic effects that endure in the aftermath. In this context, women and children are invariably the hardest hit. In recent times, SALWs proliferation has led to an increase in violent crimes that undermine human security such as rape, cultism, armed robbery and kidnapping, in most parts of the country. The Fulani- Farmers conflict in Benue State has recorded many deaths and internally displaced people.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Fulani Herdsmen versus Farmers Conflict in Benue State

The availability and use of small and light weapons by disputants have led to increased casualties recorded after conflicts in Nigeria, unlike those days when crude implements like cutlasses, spears and arrows and Dane guns were employed. The use of weapons such as AK 47 riffle, Rocket launchers, Hand Grenade e.t.c has made killings easier for combatants involved in the conflict. The farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue state is not an exception. Farmers' and Fulani nomads' conflicts have various implications for the two groups. Beginning in 2010, the invasion and occupation have become a regular phenomenon. In the process, a lot of people are displaced in the name of seeking for safety of their lives.

Contributing to this matter Varvar (2017) argues that:

related to ethnic conflicts has been the third factor of farmers/herdsmen crisis. The period from 2010 to the present has witnessed sustained brutal attacks on the rural farming communities of the Benue Valley area, leading to loss of lives and displacement of populations. Central Nigerian farmers have seriously been affected as agricultural and socio-economic activities have been crippled in some of the affected area. Many of the Tiv migrant farming communities have been displaced and forcefully taken over by herdsmen. In discussing the same matter Idyorough (2017) was particular on the Benue situation. He notes that during the invasion and occupation of some LGAs in Benue State, the killings, displacement and loss of valued property were the order of the day.

Table 1: Killings, displacement and loss of valued property in 2014

S/No	LGA	Numbers of Persons Killed	Number of persons displaced	Value of property
1.	Guma	142	6544	128,246, 220.00
2.	Gwer-East	15	253	53,226,541.00
3.	Gwer-West	168	4543	592,043,493.00
4.	Katsina-Ala	20	1679	4,066,003,560.00

5.	Kwande	+	3199	132,523,130.00
6.	Logo	54	4088	9,631,291,525.00
7.	Makurdi	484	3018	16,884, 800,000.00
	Total	883	23324	31,488,134,469.00

Source: Mzough U Tiv (MUT), May 2016.

Table 2: Killings, Displacement and Loss of Value Property in 2015 and 2016

S/No	LGA	Numbers of Persons Killed	Number of persons displaced	Value of property
1.	Buruku	28	6650	8,335,664,000.00
2.	Logo	58	+	+
3.	Tarka	15	+	+
4.	Ukum	+	+	+
	Total	101+	6650+	8,335,664,000.00

Source: Mzough U Tiv (MUT), May 2016.

Table 1and 2 above shows that within the period of three years (2014-2016) the Tiv have lost over 1,000 persons killed by herdsmen, over 294,974 persons were internally displaced (excluding figures for Logo, Tarka and Ukum LGA that were yet available), and N39,823, 789,469 = (again excluding estimated losses from Logo, Tarka and Ukum LGA not yet available). Some districts in these LGAs were occupied by the marauding herdsmen. The local crop farmers have been displaced from their farm land and are helpless, food crop production in some of these areas has stopped and the local communities have become dependent.

Table 3: Fulani Herdsmen/Farmers Clashes in Central Nigeria (2015/2016)

S/No	Date	Nature and Place of Incident	Number of Death	Other Effects
1.	7-04-2015	Fulani herdsmen attack community in Benue State, injured many, sacked three (3) communities	28	
2.	27-04-2015	Suspected Fulani herdsmen attacked Benue Community; Adeke, Mbadiwan; in Gurua	21	

		District of the Local Government. Injure many		
3.	10-04-2016	Fullani herdsmen attacked Dori and Maisuma village	1	
4.	31-03-2016	Herdsmen attacked Agasha community in Guma L.G.A	7	
5.	24-01-2016	Fulani herdsmen ambushed police officers including Division Police Officer as a revenge over the feud between the Local farmers and herdsmen	31	
6.	21-04-2016	Ten communities were razed while many killed by herdsmen in Agatu, Benue State	Not fewer than 500	
7.	13-12-2015	Fulani herdsmen attack Kwata Community in Southern Jos	22	
8.	08-02-2016	Fulani herdsmen attack Benue Village at TOM-Anyi in and Tom Ataan Communities of Mbaya, Tombu in Buruku L.G.A	10	Over 300 people have been displaced
9.	24-04-2016	Fulani herdsmen kill many in Benue State.	35	Many displaced
10.	24-04-2016	Kwata, Zawanara of Jos South few kilometres from NIPPS at about 8:30pm Sunday night in Plateau was attacked killed mainly women and children	14	Burnt houses
11.	14-03-2016	Many were fired and killed as Fulani herdsmen invaded Agatu. The attacks lasted for days according to Vanguard Newspapers	300	Burnt houses, slaughter many and displaced people
10.	07-05-2016	Gunmen attacked Fulani camp at Enjema Community in Ankpa LGA of Kogi State.	41 Cows Killed	300 cows missing
		Total	**1,010**	

Source: Authors compilation from *Daily Trust*, April 15, 19,24, May 31, January 24, Punch April 21, Sunday Trust December 13, vanguard February 8, Today online media April 24, Sahara Reporters January 24, the Guardian May 3, Daily Trust May 7, Vanguard May 8.

Table 3 graphically presents the random statistics of causalities in the affected areas. The table shows the locations and nature of attacks and the aftermath. A total of 1,010 civilians (many women and children), Nigeria Police Force personnel, and several cattle were killed in the act of conflicts in the affected areas. Aside from the death toll, properties worth millions of naira were destroyed. This is as a result of houses, shops, and markets burnt in the act of violence by the herdsmen while many civilians in the farming communities have been displaced. This situation suggests that the affected areas are under siege and if care is not taken, it could result in food scarcity due to economic and social backwardness of the attacked areas.

In addition to the killings and displacement, Wegh (2017) argues that the Central Nigerian farmers – Fulani nomads conflict led to the destruction of crops by the herds, affected food crop production and supply, the main occupation of Benue people, and it led to food insecurity. Crops such as yams, cassava, rice, guinea corn, millet, ginger, watermelon, oranges, mangoes, tomatoes, spinach, pumpkin, and pepper that are produced in commercial quantity are destroyed.

Even though statistics are scanty, it should be noted that apart from the sufferings imposed on the Central Nigerian farmers in central Nigeria, the Fulani herders also suffered from the conflict. For instance, the nomads also lost their cattle and relatives in most of these conflicts. Commenting on the effects of farmers-nomadic conflicts in Gwer-West Local Government in Benue State and elsewhere in the country, Igbahenah (2016) discloses that on the side of the nomadic cattle herders, they have gained additional land for grazing, but they are not free from the psychological torture, as they also live in fear and carry large arms to scare the people in case of any eventuality. Previously, the nomads would come with their wives and children, but after the February 2011, crisis they stopped bringing their families, instead, they came more in groups, armed with guns and swords. They also suffer losses especially, when they have to flee their settlement (s) and abandon some of their animals after igniting embers of crisis.

The citation above depicts that both farmers and nomads in central Nigeria suffer from these conflicts, in terms of demographic, political and economic devastation. Relatedly, Kato (2017) discusses the impact of the herders – farmers conflict in central Nigeria emphasizing on disability of children, illness, rape and prostitution for subsistence, moral and spiritual impacts, psychological sufferings, injury, social and cultural losses, and child soldiers. Nonetheless, it has created fear among the native farmers to the extent that they are afraid of going to the farm. Indeed, these herders adopted a clandestine approach of fighting, especially hit-and-run tactics; this has put a lot of farming communities under perpetual fear. Lamenting on this matter, Suega (Oral interview 2017) of Logo Local Government said she was reluctant to continue with her farm activities, saying, "I keep a reasonable amount of money to send to my parent's home to help coordinate my farm work but I contemplated whether herders will still attack our community". This implies that herders constituted a scourge to agricultural activities in Benue State and elsewhere in central Nigeria.

With the aid of sophisticated weapons by the farmers and herdsmen, injury and death recorded in the conflict are noticeable. Kato (2017) discloses that many children who survive attacks on farming communities escaped with various degrees of injuries; a toddler suffered severe burns in the last attack on Southern Kaduna; another had a head injury from a machete. Thousands of children have lost their lives in the herdsmen-farmers conflict; casualties of a situation they know nothing about. These children are either civilian casualty or direct combats caught up in the crisis. Also considered here is disability; children have been disabled in this crisis, many of whom have grossly inadequate access to rehabilitation services. A young man from Kaninkon chiefdom had to go under the knife last month to amputate his leg which had become cancerous; fund had to be solicited and to date, no plans have been made towards the purchase of prosthetics for the amputate, there are many more like him (Kato,2017).

Another effect is that the condition for maintenance of the child health have deteriorated in areas affected by the herders-farmer crisis –nutrition, water safety, sanitation, housing, access to health services. There may be loss of immunity to diseases vectors with

population movement. A day-old baby in the Apa camp where displaced people from Agatu camped last year had no cloths on him and was born without any form of health care (Kato, 2017). His mum held him in an unsanitary classroom where people struggled for relief materials and almost trampled on both mother and child. Leaving that camp, I had little hope for the health of that new born. Displaced children are particularly vulnerable to the deadly combination of malnutrition and infectious illness; the IDP Camps in the North Central are barely recognized by the government thus eliminating their chances of getting relief materials and proper health care which includes immunization thus increasing figures of illnesses and child morality (Kato, 2017).

Pastoralists and farmers' conflict paved the way for rape and prostitution for subsistence; many children from the middle belt have been trafficked for survival. These are issues we have not even acknowledged in this crisis, before we even begin to look into the issue of statistics and tracing of trafficked children. Many young girls particularly from affected villages in Benue and Kaduna have been sent off to Lagos and other cities to work as underage maids, many have been conscripted into prostitution rings by people who promised to take care of them; most of the affected children are orphans. All these leave lasting physical impacts in sexually-transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, psychological impacts and changes in life trajectory (Najwa, 2014).

It should be noted that the said violence led to social and cultural losses, and child soldiers. Many children in the middle belt have lost their communities during the crisis. Some have not been able to return for years; this displacement has also cost many their culture. Displaced people are often stripped of their social identities; the children in the middle belt are no different. It is estimated that tens of thousands of young people under 18 years serving as militias in about 60 communities; children (especially boys) in the middle belt are no different (Caitleen, 2014). I was caught up in the Jos crisis of 2008 and many boys under the age of 18 had to go out and protect their communities; no boy above ten years old was allowed to stay indoors with the women and under children, they were outside guarding with the dead

of the night, some were initiated into traditional, village cults for protection; Yes! These are child soldiers (Caitleen, 2014).

Many young men who have neither formal nor psychological training in warfare are growing up to see war as a way of life. It should be noted that an 11-year-old Plateau boy of 2008 is now a 20-year-old man who has grown up unchecked in a war zone and has fought in this war for 8 years, losing friends and family along the line. Many young children caught up in the crisis of the early 2000s are now in their 20s; they have grown up with the stress of living in a war zone and have experienced severe psychological repercussions as adults still in war zones (Caitleen, 2014).

Conclusion

Conflict is a part of human nature, hence, the solution is to strive for the resolution of conflicts or its amicable settlement whenever it arises. Since the extinction of conflict seems impossible, all the society needs are mechanisms for sustainable conflict management and control. Conflict is inevitable because it can originate in individual, ethnic and group reactions to situations of scarce resources, to division of function within society and differentiation of power and resultant competition for scarce supplies of goods, states, valued roles and power as an end itself. This is a replica of farmers-herdsmen conflict in Benue state where the struggle over farmlands for agricultural and forage farming is in context today with the use of small and light weapons.

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation facilitates and exacerbates conflicts and promotes banditry. The Nigerian state should perform its primary duty, which includes the provision of social and economic security and development for their citizens.

Recommendations

We recommend that Nigerian government should encapsulate, strengthen institutions and processes of governance to enhance social provisioning for its citizens, who are becoming increasingly frustrated over governance failure. The proposed establishment of a National Commission on the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NATCOM) should be fast-

tracked to lead this effort, involving collaboration with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), National Taskforce (NATFORCE) and other stakeholders. Nigeria state should also be more pro-active in enforcing anti-small arms and light weapons proliferation policies to control the menace in Nigeria.

References

Anyanwu, U. (2005) "Failed States in Africa: The Nigerian Case since 1960" American Journal of International Politics and Development Studies (AJIPDS) Vol.1, No. 1.

Bonat, Z.K.A. (2017). Analysing Violent Pastoralist Conflicts in the Central Nigeria States: The Unfolding Situation in Southern Kaduna, 2010-217, in A. S. Ihuah (ed.), Herdsmen and Farmers Conflicts in Central Nigeria: Learning from the past (conference proceedings), Makurdi: centre for Research Management, Benue State University, Makurdi.

Caitleen, T. (2014). The Psychological Effect of War on Children, Retrieved from the Borgen Project at http://www.borgenmagazine.com/psychological-effects-war-children/

Eze, M.O (2018) Local Migrants and Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State, Nigeria 2015-2017, Paper Presented at African Heritage Institution 2018 Annual Conference Organized by African Heritage Institution Enugu held from 28th-29th June.

Global Terrorism Index (2015), Institute for Economic and Peace.

History of Benue State extracted on 08/05/2024 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benue_State.

Idyorough, A.E. (2017). Pastoralists invasion and occupation of farmlands in Central Nigeria: The attacks, plunder and occupation of some Local Government Areas in Benue State. In Ihuah, A.S (ed.) Herdsmen and Farmers Conflict in Central Nigeria: Learning from the past (Conference Proceedings), Makurdi: Center for Research and Management, Benue State University, Makurdi.

Igbahenah, F. (2016) "A History Perspective of Tiv/ Fulani Crisis in Gwer-West Local Government Area of Benue State, 1960-2002",in Ukase,P.I, and Ugbegili, S.I (eds.) Tyoshin in Historical Perspectives. Vol.1, Lagos: Integrity Publishers.

Kato, N. (2017). "The Germination of the Conflict Generation: Effects of Obsolete Nomadic Practices and Weakened Borders on Children", in A. Ihuah (ed), Herdsmen and Farmers Conflicts in Central Nigeria: Learn from the Past (Conference Proceedings) Makurdi: Centre for Research and Management, Benue State University, Makurdi.

Malam, B. (2014) Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Its Implication for West African Regional Security, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 4, No. 8; June.

Osimen G. U. and Akintunde B. A. (2015) Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and Problem of National Security in Nigeria. Journal of International Affairs and Global Strategy (Online) Vol.29.

Oral Interview with S. Ako, C. 37, Makurdi, on 05.06.2017.

Oral Interview with Suega, J. C. 26, Ugba, on 05.06.2017

Najwa, M. (2014). Children and Emergencies in 2014: Facts and Figures. UNICEF.

Varvar,T.A (2017) "Towards the Utilization of Migrant for Increased Agricultural Production: the Case of Tiv Rural Migrants in the Benue Valley"… A Paper Presented at the 5th General Conference of the Association of West Africa Universities held at Iniversite AbdouMoumouni, Niamey, Niger Republic, September 17th -21st.

Weigh, E.S. (2017). "Challenge of Fulani – Herdsmen Attacks to Tiv Survival and Wellbeing" in A.S. Ihuah (ed) "Herdsmen and Farmers Conflicts in Central Nigeria: Learn from the Past" (Conference Procedings) Makurdi: Centre for Research and Management, Benue State University, Markurdi.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN IN POLITICS AND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: A PERSPECTIVE ON FEMALE ACTIVISM IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY (FCT), NIGERIA

Chinenye Attracta IFIOK, PhD
Department of Political Science,
National Open University of Nigeria
cifiok@noun.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relationship between women in politics and corruption in Nigeria (a diagnostic view of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria). Two research specific objectives were adopted as philosophy to unravel the gap discovered in the course of the study, such as the examination of the relationship between women in politics and the level of economic development measured by per capita (GDPC), to identify the relationship between women in politics and the level of democracy measured by political rights (POLR) and/or civil liberties (CIV). Data were obtained using descriptive survey methods that enabled the use of questionnaire surveys and key informant interviews in FCT., Abuja, Nigeria was selected as a proxy for the study. The population size was strictly based on the number of women living in Abuja metropolis, purposively 3000 women were adopted as proxy that represented the total population of women. From the total population selected, the sample size which was scientifically conducive for the work was calculated using Taro Yamane's formula of 1967. In addition, the Chi-square and SPSS econometric computation were utilized in the data analysis. The seminar concluded that Women in politics exert strong significant influence on political rights (POLR) or civil liberties also, that Women in politics exert positive influence on the per capita income also known as (GDPC). It was based on the findings, that the recommendations such as, women in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, detested corruption and advocated for the political right of women in politics, it was recommended that government and policy makers should take the essence of women in politics very serious because they served as a panacea for a reduced corruption in the place under study.

Keywords: *Politics, Corruption, Women, Activism*

Introduction

The growing debate by scholars and intelligentsia about the role of women in politics globally is an issue that has generated serious controversies rather than resolving the perceived gender inequalities in terms of participation in politics of nation states, be they advanced or developing. Several arguments have cropped up about the place of women in politics over the years. Thus, while the conservative theorists (Arowolo and Aluko, 2010) argue that the actual role of women and in fact, female folks generally end in the kitchen, the liberalists (Yetunde, 2003; Agbalajobi, 2010 and Erunke, 2009), have variously opined that women's political process as those of their male counterparts, and hence, such responsibilities cannot be washed away in the societal scheme of things.

Opinions are however divided on whether the role of women is predominantly in the home fronts or whether women can also engage meaningfully in other socio-economic and political activities like their male counterparts, thereby contributing their own quotas in the sequence and development of the polity. This trend of high-level inequality on the potential role of women in shaping the direction of politics in the Nigerian society from time immemorial constitutes a broader gender question of this research paper which the authors intend to address. This gender bias in Nigeria's political system is often traced to the onset of colonialism in Nigeria. Thus, the western cultural notion of colonialism woven around male superiority reflected in their relations with Nigerians. Agbalajobi (2010) and Yetunde (2010) have agreed on the subjugation of women by colonialists when they wrote that the 1922 Sir Hugh Clifford Constitution which was widely believed to have introduced the first elective principles in the precolonial Nigerian society disenfranchised women and limited the participation of adult male to the wealthy. This is not to say that, argues Agbalajobi, there was no existing element of gender inequality in traditional state and stateless societies in Nigeria but the colonial order made gender discrimination more pronounced.

For example, in traditional Yoruba states, women held high political offices like the Iyalode, Iyaloja, Iyalaje and even the office of the Oba, and their political impacts in such

societies were variously felt. But after the establishment of the colonial order, women became estranged to these rights politically, but could however still perform their traditional roles as in case of Yoruba Kingdom earlier mentioned. Generally speaking, and from contemporary perspectives in Nigeria, it would appear that women had never been influential in the realm of Nigerian politics. In the past, and even in the present democratic dispensation, there has been and there is still some fair share of recognition of the increasing role of women in the Nigerian society, be they social, economic or political. Falola and Fwatshak (2003) wrote that the place of women in politics during the pre-colonial period is sufficiently familiar.

Thus, the exploits of legendary women like Queen Amina of Zazau in Zaria, Iyalode Efunsetan Aniwura of Ibadan, Princess Moremi of Ife, Princess Inikpi of Igala and Emotan of Benin readily comes to mind. During the colonial period, women asserted and expressed themselves politically. Some women who make political marks at that period included Mrs. Margaret Ekpo of the famous Aba women riots of 1929, Madam Tinubu of Lagos and Egba land; Mrs Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti of the Abeokuta Women Union of 1948 and Hajia Swaba Gambo of Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) to mention but a few. It is however worthy of mention here that though women enjoyed higher level of authority in Southern Nigeria, men have always been dominant in the political structure with women playing sedentary roles as inferior and subordinate partners (Erunke, 2009).

Thus, the question of equality of representation and clear-cut democratization of the Nigerian democratic space to accommodate women in line with the dictates of the 35% Affirmative Action specifications is of growing concern to this paper. Even when women are deeply involved in the highest level of decision making in Nigeria, their involvement is superficial, grossly inadequate and lacks the moral justifications for effective representation.

Democratic government is predicated upon freedom, justice and equal treatment of all citizens– men and women alike, by the society (Nwabueze, 1993:2). This is because democracy presupposes equal opportunity platform for political participation and decision-making process (Sodaro, 2001:27). Since equal political participation is sin-qua-non to

democracy (Anifowose, 2004), a society cannot be truly democratized without the full and active participation of women who constitute about 50% of the population of each country. Incorporation of gendered perspective in policy making process is thus imperative for sustainable democracy. Gender equality is globally accepted as a requisite for achieving development and democratic governance that give men and women equal voices in decision-making, policy implementation and attaining MDGs (Ezeilo, 2008).

Despite widespread democratization in most countries and the struggle by the feminist movements for the integration of gender balancing in the national politics of countries over the world however, women who constitute about 50% of Nigeria population still remain systematically alienated from politics and decision-making process in the country (Agbalajobi, 2010 & Arowolo & Aluko, 2010).

The phenomenon of women low participation in Nigeria's politics became worrisome following the demise of military rule and then the transfer of power to a civilian democratic administration in 1999. Nigerian Government in its efforts to tackle this phenomenon of low women's political participation ratified some national and international instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1989 and adopted a National Policy on Women in 2000 (replaced by a National Policy on Gender Equality in 2007 and Platform for Action, the National Committee on Affirmative Action, the Additional Protocol to The African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 2003, The African Union Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality 2004, The National Gender Policy 2006, etcetera (Akiyode-Afolabi & Arogundade, 2003; Ajayi, 2007).


Aims of the Paper

- Examine the relationship between women in politics and the level of economic development measured by per capita (GDPC)

- Identify the relationship between women in politics and the level of democracy measured by political rights (POL) and/or civil liberties (CIV) with emphasis on the FCT

Conceptual Clarification

Dependent Variable Decomposed



Ifiok, C.A. (2024) Model

A conceptual framework explains relationships between interlinked concepts and explains the connections between the concept of women gender in politics WGPOL variables (Smyth, 2004). The paper conceptualizes the linkage between Corruption (COR) and Women gender in politics in Nigeria, variables such as, Gross domestic Product per capita GDPC Political rights POLr. Or Civil liberties CIV etc. Were the variables decomposed from the depended variables. The investigator adopted WGPOL as the independent variable while, Corruption COR was adopted as the dependent variables. The independent variable influences the dependent variable as illustrated in Figure 1. They directly interact or exerts influence with the roles played by women gender in politics in Nigeria.

The 1999 Constitution and the Place of Women in Nigeria Politics: Matters Arising

The right to democratic governance is an entitlement conferred on all citizens by law. The Nigerian 1999 constitution (as amended) spells-out this privilege very clearly in section 40 viz: Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular, he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests: provided that the provisions of this section shall not derogate from the powers conferred by this constitution on the Independent National Electoral

Commission with respect to political parties to which that commission does not accord recognition. Similarly, section 42(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) stated interalia that: A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person be subjected to any form of discrimination.

The foregoing analysis shows that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which of course is the reference point for social co-existence amongst groups and persons has not by any means discriminated against anyone, man or woman in the socio-political scheme of things. It is therefore unjustifiable for men to want to dominate the Nigerian political scene and hence, push women to the corner.

Factors Militating against Women Participation in Nigerian Politics

Several factors have been proved to stand on the way of women, thereby preventing them from active participation in politics, especially in the African/Nigerian context. Some of these include, but are not limited to the following:

(a) Region/Cultural Belief System

Most societies in Nigeria, just like in many other African states prohibit women from taking part in active politics based on religious beliefs. Politics in this part of the world is seen as dirty game and sacrilegious and so, has the capacity to defile any spiritual individual who is conscious of eternity, considering that there is life after death. There are however very many uncanny things that go with politics in underdeveloped societies such as vote buying, ballot box stuffing, arson, assassination of political opponents, violence and the like. Therefore, engaging in this kind of misdemeanours by adherents of true worshipers of God is a bad process. It therefore becomes a critical element in scaring away persons or groups from politics.

(b) Virility Deficiency Syndrome

Politics generally is a game of wit and the strong appears to take it all in the political gaining that follows. It therefore follows that man by nature are stronger and virile enough

to play the game of politics. As earlier pointed out in this paper, women are physically weak and hence, have no ego to compete favourably with men in the turbulent activities. Agbalajobi (2010) opined those winning public elections in Nigeria is a matter of force or "do-or-die" affairs. Therefore, those who possess physical stamina and strength to use brutal force are men. Hence, women would have to give way for the men to take whatever is available by force.

(c) Lack of Finance

The dominant philosophy in Nigerian politics is money. The 'money' factor plays very vital role in the conception, mobilization and winning of political offices either at the presidential, governorship, senatorial, local council elections and even age grade meetings. Money is very critical in the shaping, making and unmaking of public office which is supposed to be on trust. Thus, the higher and larger one's financial muscle is in Nigeria, the greater one's chances of winning public office. Tor and Terkula (2011) opined that the system of corruption that has infiltrated the Nigerian system has practically put women on edge and everything seems to be working against them (women) in favour of men. Women generality appear to have little or no financial backing.

(d) Lack of Effective means of implementation of Affirmative Action According to Agbalajobi (2010) affirmative action is usually a measure intended to supplement non-discrimination. It is a broad term encompassing a host of policies that seek to support weak groups in society, especially women. They include policies where deliberate action is used to stop discrimination. Thus, a policy process of this kind, according to him allows for rules that have the objective of enhancing equal opportunity for individuals and the improvements in the situation of marginalized groups. Accordingly, argues Agbalajobi (2010) the United Nations General Assembly in 1979 adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

Gender Relations in Nigeria's Politics

Throughout the history of Nigeria, there has been varying levels of women's political participation. In pre-colonial Nigerian societies though women's political participation was not equal to that of men, the position of women in traditional political governance was complementary rather than subordinate (Mba, 1982:37; Nwankwo, 1996:20 & Ikpe, 2004:23; Akinboye, 2004:236; Ajayi, 2007; Awe, 1992:11). The complementarity role was however embedded in sex segregation, which determined gender position, status and power in the society and provided women their own spheres of operation and control (Olojede, 1990:82). The advent of colonial administration however, destroyed the traditional systems of women's political participation in Nigeria (Allen, 1972; Omotola, 2007; Lewu, 2005:65; Mba, 1982; Ikpe, op.cit:30).

What is Political Corruption?

Political corruption is the use of powers by government officials or their network contacts for illegitimate private gain. Forms of corruption vary, but can include bribery, lobbying, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, parochialism, patronage, influence peddling, graft, and embezzlement. Corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, though it is not restricted to these activities. Misuse of government power for other purposes, such as repression of political opponents and general police brutality, is also considered political corruption.

Over time, corruption has been defined differently. For example, in a simple context, while performing work for a government or as a representative, it is unethical to accept a gift. Any free gift could be construed as a scheme to lure the recipient towards some biases. In most cases, the gift is seen as an intention to seek certain favours such as work promotion, tipping in order to win a contract, job or exemption from certain tasks in the case of junior worker handing in the gift to a senior employee who can be key in winning the favour.

Corruption is a difficult concept to define. A proper definition of corruption requires a multi-dimensional approach. Machiavelli popularized the oldest dimension of corruption as

the decline of virtue among political officials and the citizenry. The psychologist Horst-Eberhard Richter's modernized version defines corruption as the undermining of political values. Corruption as the decline of virtue has been criticized as too broad and far too subjective to be universalized. The second dimension of corruption is corruption as deviant behavior. Sociologist Christian Höffling and Economist J.J. Sentuira both characterized corruption as social illness; the latter defined corruption as the misuse of public power for one's profit.

Consequences of Corruption on the Economy

In the private sector, corruption increases the cost of business through the price of illicit payments themselves, the management cost of negotiating with officials and the risk of breached agreements or detection. Although some claim corruption reduces costs by cutting bureaucracy, the availability of bribes can also induce officials to contrive new rules and delays. Openly removing costly and lengthy regulations are better than covertly allowing them to be bypassed by using bribes. Where corruption inflates the cost of business, it also distorts the field of inquiry and action, shielding firms with connections from competition and thereby sustaining inefficient firms.

Corruption may have a direct impact on the firm's effective marginal tax rate. Bribing tax officials can reduce tax payments of the firm if the marginal bribe rate is below the official marginal tax rate. However, in Uganda, bribes have a higher negative impact on firms' activity than taxation. Indeed, a one percentage point increase in bribes reduces firm's annual growth by three percentage points, while an increase in 1 percentage point on taxes reduces firm's growth by one percentage point.

Corruption also generates economic distortion in the public sector by diverting public investment into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. Officials may increase the technical complexity of public sector projects to conceal or pave the way for such dealings, thus further distorting investment.] Corruption also lowers compliance with

construction, environmental, or other regulations, reduces the quality of government services and infrastructure, and increases budgetary pressures on government.

Economists argue that one of the factors behind the differing economic development in Africa and Asia is that in Africa, corruption has primarily taken the form of rent extraction with the resulting financial capital moved overseas rather than invested at home (hence the stereotypical, but often accurate, image of African dictators having Swiss bank accounts). In Nigeria, for example, more than $400 billion was stolen from the treasury by Nigeria's leaders between 1960 and 1999.

Theoretical Framework

Institutional Theory

Institutional theory has been discussed in many research and literatures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker,1996; Scott, 2001). However, the rationalization of corruption research has shifted from the competitive marketplace to the state and professions. As for isomorphic process, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) had identified three mechanisms namely: coercive, mimetic and normative that could influence organizations guest for change. Coercive isomorphism describes organizational change as a result of a political decisions introduced by the authority. In public sector, an organization often must implement new regulation(s) initiated by the government.

Mimetic isomorphism refers to environment uncertainty and ambiguous goals that lead organizations to imitate others. In normative isomorphism, organizations and professions are subjected to change as a result of pressure from peers. Tolbert and Zucker (1996) explained that based on individual interests, they would accept and follow social norms unquestioningly, without any critical reflection or resistance. For instance, corrupt environment would lead individuals to behave corruptly as they considered it as a common norm.

Methodology

Survey research design method was adopted for the study. The choice of the survey design was considered appropriate because the required data was sourced based on questionnaires.

The area covered by this study is FCT., Abuja, Nigeria. Abuja is the headquarters the Federal capital of Nigeria.

Population Size

The population of the study was conducted in the FCT., Abuja Nigeria. The population size of Abuja Metropolis was used for the target total population. The target population consisted of 2000 purposively.

Sample Size

It was impracticable to study the whole population, therefore the study settled for sample size using Taro Yamane formula as stated below. 2000 thousand people was randomly or purposively selected as target population.

n =N/(1+(e)2)

where

n = signifies the sample size

N= signifies the population under study

e= signifies the margin error (0.05)

n= 2000/1+ $N(0.05)^2$


n= 2000/ 1+ 2000 (0.0025)

n= 2000/1.5

n= 333

Approximately n = 333

Data Analysis and Results




Source: Field Survey, 2024

75% of the respondents were women, while 25% of the respondents were men displayed in the pie chart above.

Age Group Demography

AGE GROUP	FREQUENCY IN PERCENTAGE
20 -29 YRS	15%
30 -39YRS	35%
40 -49YRS	20%
50 YRS AND ABOVE	10%

Source: Field Survey, 2024



Source: Field Survey, 2024

Data Presentation

Table 1: Women in politics exert an influence on the level of economic development measured by per capita (GDPC).

5-POINTS LIKERT SCALE	STRONG POINTS	NOT STRONG POINTS	VERY STRONG POINTS	NOT VERY STRONG POINTS	NO IDEA
RESPONDENTS	100	20	130	20	19
PERCENTAGE	35%	7%	45%	7%	6%
SCALE	1	2	3	4	5

Source: - Field Survey, 2024

Very Strongly Agreed point (VSA) from the respondents are 45% on scale number 3, while, the strongly agreed points (SP) from the respondents on scale number 1 are 35%, however, 17% on the scale number 2 from the respondents strongly disagreed (SDA), 7% of the

respondent on the scale number 5 said no idea and finally 7% on scale number 6 disagreed. Since, the very strongly agreed points and the agreed points outweighed the disagree point on the Likert scale measurement, the investigator adopted that, Women in politics exert an influence on the level of economic development measured by per capita (GDPC)**.**

Tab.2: Women in politics exert influence on the level of democracy measured by political rights (POLR) and/or civil liberties (CIV).

5-POINTS LIKERT SCALE	STRONG POINTS	NOT STRONG POINTS	VERY STRONG POINTS	NOT VERY STRONG POINTS	NO IDEA
RESPONDENTS	70	5	180	30	4
PERCENTAGE	24%	1%	62%	10%	1%
SCALE	1	2	3	4	5

Source: - Field survey, 2024

Very Strongly Agreed point (VSA) from the respondents are 62% on scale number 3, while, the strongly agreed points (SP) from the respondents on scale number 1 are 24%, however, 1% on the scale number 2 from the respondents strongly disagreed (SDA), 10% of the respondent on the scale number 5 said no idea and finally 4% on scale number 5 disagreed. Since, the very strongly agreed points and the agreed points outweighed the disagree point on the Likert scale measurement, the investigator adopted that, Women in politics exerts influence on the level of democracy measured by political rights (POL) and/or civil liberties (CIV).

Conclusion

This study is a theoretical expression of the role of women in Nigerian politics in relation to the problem of marginalization and inadequate representation. The paper has examined the scholarly debates that have been going on for decades on the place of women in politics generally. While most scholars argued that women are best suited in the domestic activities of

society, others and precisely, the liberal scholars are of the opinion that women play very vital role in the society's development process, and so, should be given equal representation as partners in progress. The most critical element of this discourse is however that women are, and have been side-lined in the political scheme of things in Nigeria and this state of affairs spells a dangerous omen for the Nigerian system which is now literally dominated and controlled by men. In the past, experience has shown, of course as demonstrated in the study, that women's political roles have contributed immensely in the shaping of the Nigerian politics not only in democratic governance; but also, during the pre-colonial era. So, it will be unthinkable to wish away the critical efforts of women in the making of Nigerian state while arrogating political powers to the male folk. It is also unhealthy to ascribe political powers strictly to men in this era of globalization where the role of women in global politics is considered to be relevant in overall world peace, tranquility and mutual co-existence.

Recommendations

The Government and the policy makers in Nigeria should take note of the essence of the effect of corruption among the women as a panacea for a reducing participatory chance of women gender as a result of much corruption among them. The Government should also take into cognizance that, political right of the women should be enshrined or the civil liberties of the women coupled with per capita economic measurement be enculturated to ensure adequate monitoring strategy that role away corruption antics among the women in politics in Nigeria.

References

Abu, N. (2015). The effects of corruption and political instability on savings: The case of the Economic Community of West African States (An unpublished PhD Thesis submitted). Othman Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia.

Abu, N. (2017). Does Okun's law exist in Nigeria? Evidence from ARDL bounds testing approach. Contemporary Economics, 11(2), 131–144. doi:10.5709/ce.1897-9254.23

Abu, N. (2019). Inflation and unemployment trade-off: A re-examination of the Phillips curve and its stability in Nigeria. Contemporary Economics, 14(1), 1–20.

Abu, N., & Karim, M. Z. A. (2015). The causal relationships among corruption, political instability, economic development and foreign aid: Evidence from the Economic

Community of West African States. Contemporary Economics, 10(1), 20–33. doi:10.5709/ce.1897-9254.159

Abu, N., Karim, M. Z. A., & Aziz, M. I. A. (2015a). Low savings rates in the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS): The role of corruption. Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development, 36(2), 63–90.

Abu, N., Karim, M. Z. A., & Aziz, M. I. A. (2015b). Corruption, political instability and economic development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Is there a causal relationship? Contemporary Economics, 9(1), 45–60. doi:10.5709/ce.1897-9254.159.

Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1997). The new economics of corruption: A survey and some new results. Political Studies, 45(3), 496–515. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00093

Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition and corruption. American Economic Review, 89(4), 982–993. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.982.

Agbalajobi, D.T. 2010. "Women's Participation and the Political Process in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects", African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4(2) pp 75-82

Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic analysis of corruption: A survey. Economic Journal, 113, 632–652.

Aidt, T. S., & Dutta, J. (2001). Policy compromises: Corruption and regulation in a dynamic democracy. Working Paper, University of Cambridge.

Akinpelu, Y. A., Ogunseye, T. O., Bada, O. T., & Agbeyangi, B. A. (2013). The socio-economic determinants of corruption in Nigeria. European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 19(1), 923–938.

Alhassan, A. L., & Fiador, V. (2014). Insurance-growth nexus in Ghana: An autoregressive distributed lag bounds cointegration approach. Review of Development Finance, 4(2), 83–96. doi: 10.1016/j.rdf.2014.05.003.

Ali, A. M., & Isee, H. S. (2003). Determinants of corruption: A cross-country comparison. Cato Journal, 22(3), 449–466.

Anifowose, R. 2004. Women Political Participation in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects in Akinboye, S.O. (eds) (2004). Paradox of Gender Equality in Nigerian Politics; Lagos: Concept publications.

Arowolo, D. 2000. "Women and Political Participation in Nigeria." European Journal of Social Sciences, 14 (4).

Erunke, C.E. 2009. "The Nigerian politics, Women Rights and the Challenges of the Affirmative Action: A Historical Periscoping", Journal of Law and Diplomacy, 6(2) pp. 29-33

Erunke, C.E. 2012. "Consolidating Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Analysis and Suggestions", African Journal of Social Sciences 2(2) pp. 67-73 London, United Kingdom.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF HERDSMEN AND FARMERS CONFLICT IN BENUE STATE, NIGERIA

Chuks O. ODIEGWU-ENWEREM, PhD
Department of Mass Communication,
National Open University of Nigeria
chuks_enwerem@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

Herdsmen and farmers conflicts in Benue State and some other parts of Nigeria have been attracting media attention for its associated socio-political and economic implications, and citizens' need to know. Public understanding and perception of the crises depend to some extent, on the mass media portrayals and framing of issues and could as well point the way to its resolution. As information disseminators, the media report these disputes and potentially create multiple impressions in people's minds. The objectives of this paper are to: examine how the public perceive media coverage and portrayal of herdsmen/farmers conflicts in Benue State; determine how the exposure impacts their understanding of as well as their attitude to the hostilities; determine the extent to which media content clarifies or properly explains the true nature of the issues involved and, to ascertain public's understanding/views about the hostilities. Survey method was adopted and 115 copies of questionnaire were administered to respondents randomly within Benue State targeting corporate offices, institutions and educational outlets. Out of these, one hundred and five (105) copies were properly filled and returned while data was analyzed using simple frequency tabulation and percentages. The agenda setting theory was the theoretical basis for the study, supplemented with the framing theory. Results show a direct relationship between media exposure and citizens' perception of the crisis. Many of the respondents believe that the portrayals by the media reflect the true nature of the issues. The media are consequently encouraged to remain steadfast in objectively reporting events in the society.

Keywords: Benue State, Newspaper Coverage, Herdsmen and Farmers Conflict, Media exposure, Perception, Portrayals

Introduction

Conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in many states of Nigeria, presents challenges for the federal, state and local governments, on the one hand, Nigerian citizens in general and the respective states indigenes in particular. The media assist the citizens to understand occurrences between the herdsmen and the indigenes through the process of information, analysis and commentaries. As they inform, educate enlighten, sensitize and advocate, they invariably set the public agenda as people perceive the issues differently. Thus, disseminating information on these conflicts they have the potential to create (either positive or negative) impressions in people's minds by their manner of coverage and reportage of the issues. What role the media play; how citizens perceive them, in relation to herdsmen/farmers' conflict, is the main objective of this study.

On a global scale, conflicts are a cause for concern for everybody as it remains a major threat to development; the United Nations reports disturbing outcomes of these conflicts and says that fragile and conflict-affected countries typically have the highest poverty rates. According to the World Bank, the prevalence of fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) continues to rise globally. The number of forcibly displaced people worldwide has more than doubled since 2012, exceeding 74 million in 2018, estimating that by 2030 up to two-thirds of the global extreme poor may be living in FCS. It is, therefore, evident that without intensified action, the global poverty goals will not be met, thereby increasing struggle for limited resources and consequently conflicts which will arise as a result of poor management of diversities mainly because of competing interests of social groups (UN-DESA, n.d.).

It is to be noted that in all the interaction that takes place between and among persons and groups, citizens get their information and understanding of occurrences in large part through media reports, analysis and commentaries (Esman 2004). In reporting these events, the press is expected to uphold the tenets of social responsibility theory by giving priority attention to news reporting through professional standards of truth, accuracy and fairness

(Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1963). In that vein, Owolabi (2017) believes that media report should reflect and respect society's diversity and plurality while avoiding actions that could cause violence and general breakdown of law and order.

Statement of the Problem

The media contribute to the promotion, pursuit and achievement of national development aspirations of nations through their traditional functions - information, education, advocacy and entertainment of the public (Littlejohn and Foss, 2011). They also set the public agenda which invariably drive and affect society positively, negatively or both, (Asemah, 2011). With regard to the herdsmen and farmers conflicts, the need arises to determine how citizens perceive the issues through their exposure to the media and how that has contributed in shaping their understanding and perception of the conflict in Benue State. This is achieved by investigating their understanding of media coverage and reportage of the conflict and what impact it has on the general understanding of the issues involved.

Objectives of the Study

The overarching objective of this paper is to examine people's perception of herdsmen and indigenes conflict arising from their exposure to and understanding of media reports on the crisis in Benue State of Nigeria and other relevant areas. In specific terms the objectives are:

1. To determine the overall exposure of citizens to media reports of herdsmen and indigenes conflicts in Benue State.
2. To determine if and how the reports are understood and perceived by the citizens
3. To determine if and how their exposure to the media determine their perception of the conflicts
4. To ascertain which of the media that citizens are more likely to rely upon for information on the conflict

Conceptual Clarifications

The following terms which appear in the paper are clarified:

Cattle Breeders: These are individuals engaged in breeding and rearing cattle in a commercial scale; they make up the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, the cattle breeders' voice in Nigeria (Bello, 2013).

Cattle rustlers: Cattle rustlers refer to individuals who steal cattle from herdsmen. It is a term that has gained traction within the period when herdsmen and indigenes engage themselves in deadly attacks, leading to the deaths of many and loss of property on both sides (Bello, 2013).

Conflict: Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, as cited in Chuks-Enwerem (2020), defines conflict as deepening political cleavages, economic distress, and growing inequalities, which in worst case scenarios can lead to the erosion of government legitimacy, a breakdown of law and order, and escalating 'ungovernability.'

Crisis: Crisis is a situation of intense difficulty or danger requiring a difficult or important decision to be made at such a time (Odiegwu-Enwerem & Chuks-Enwerem 2021). The term is synonymous with catastrophe, calamity, disaster, turning point or climax, etc. Though conflict and crisis may appear similar in nature, this paper dwells on conflict and not crisis and does not use the two interchangeably.

Ethnic identity: Ethnic identity is the degree to which one feels attached or part of a group. Eaigwu (2005) defines identity as a process located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of these two identities.

Indigene-ship/Settlers 'Indigene' is used to confer some originality and power to some people by virtue of their being the first to settle in an area and by such power and recognition, they see others as settlers and by that virtue, intruders who should not lay claim to the natural resources of their land (Gatawa (2013).

Herdsmen: According to Bello (2013), herdsmen are individuals who rear cattle by moving them from point to point. It is generally and commonly believed that they are not the real cattle owners.

Historical and geographical contexts of Benue state

Benue State is one of the states in the North-central Nigeria, otherwise called the middle belt region of Nigeria. It has a population of 4.3 million people (NPC, 2006) and is inhabited predominantly by two major tribes: the Tivs and Idomas, who speak separate languages respectively. There are also other 12 minor languages in the state (Benue State Government, 2019). With its capital in Makurdi, Benue State is rich in soya beans, guinea corn, cassava, yam, sesame and rice, among others. The state is bound by Kogi State (which until 1991 was part of it), in the North-central, Ebonyi and Enugu States in the South-eastern region. The majority of the citizens practise farming, hence their dependency on farmlands for their sustenance. Not surprisingly, it is that same land that herdsmen also lay claim to and compete for with them that eventually leads to conflicts (Baca, 2015).

Media exposure: Media exposure, according to Nagler (2017), is the extent to which individuals encounter specific media messages or content. Remarkably, despite media exposure's centrality to the study of effects, there has been little scholarly consensus on how to measure it.

Perception - Perception is the process of selecting, organizing, and interpreting information. It includes the perception of select stimuli that pass through our perceptual filters, which are organized into our existing structures and patterns, and are then interpreted based on previous experiences (Payne, 2001). Although perception is a largely cognitive and psychological process, how we perceive the people and objects around us affects our communication.

Portrayal: This means a depiction of someone or something in a work of art or literature; a picture. For instance, "a realistic portrayal of war," suggests how war is made to look like in the minds of the audience. According to Britanica, portrayal means to describe (someone or something) in a particular way, or to play (a character) in a film, play, or television show ((Klein, 2000)

Literature Review

Herdsmen and farmer' conflicts, especially in Benue state, are traceable to the 1980s when the Federal Government Nigeria, at different times, introduced 'Green Revolution' and 'Operation Feed the Nation'; both programmes renewed citizens' interest in farmland thus setting the stage for contestations, IPCR & UNDP (2012). The conflicts then made a few headlines, but subsided until 2015 just as the present government was coming into place, when it escalated to a crescendo. Before the herdsmen and indigenes conflicts, however, there were other conflicts in such places as Ilorin, Kwara State, North-central Nigeria; Kafanchan, Kaduna; Funtua, Kano and Zaria, in Northern Nigeria; other places were Zango-Kataff, Agege, Funtua, Kano, Zaria and Ile-Ife, among many other places, Elaigwu (2011). The nature and causes of the conflicts vary but there are underlying common factors of resource inadequacy and social inequality among citizens.

Conceptually, conflict is seen essentially as a disagreement or struggle between two or more parties. According to Coser (1989), conflict is a struggle over values and claims to scarce resources, wielding of power and authorities at the expense of the opponents. Amakiri (2007), defines conflict as competitive, antagonistic, confrontational and destructive in nature. The Pew Forum (2007) observes that in Nigeria, besides religious dichotomies which have heightened tension in the land, ethnic divisions have also been identified as equally, if not more lethal. Studies on herdsmen and farmers conflict or related crises have been documented. For instance, Udomisor (2002) and Eti (2009) recognize objectivity as important in conflict reporting. Umar (2002) avers that radio is a potent force for shaping people's perceptions; Owens-Ibie (2002) says that socio-cultural considerations are factors in conflict reporting in Nigeria. Thus, in Nigeria's multi-ethnic and multi-tribal differences and regional specifics society with numerous tribal, ethnic and religious fault lines, conflicts easily become part of the regular occurrences (Omojola 2014). Botes (1996) cited in Owens-Ibie (2002) observes that the media naturally gravitate towards conflict, hence, (2002:32) "Conflict is the bread and butter of journalism" and affirms that in journalism, conflict sells. Galadima (2002)

summarizes the aims of conflict reporting: to create awareness of such conflict so that it does not escalate; to generate ideas on how to resolve or reduce the conflict; and to publicize the plight of the victims of violent conflicts for necessary assistance. Reportage on violent events from negative angle is considered more newsworthy than from positive, peaceful angles. This is perhaps so because standard journalistic news values tend to encourage the escalation of conflicts through incitement, stereotyping and fomenting bias against the peace process (Fawcett, 2002; Wolsfeld, 2004; Bratic, 2006; Galtung & Lynch, 2010).

Waisbord (2002) in Eti (2009) argues that news media especially the television establishes "culture of fear" which they perpetuate by portraying "a vast array of threats". He argues that the media's obsession, with war-related occurrences is a major concern for many stakeholders, including conflicting parties, peace researchers as well as media practitioners. Severin and Tankard (1992) state that conflicting parties resort to propaganda to legitimize their pro-war stances and to win public support. Many studies on war reporting have found that media often become parties to conflicts and do not remain a simple "mirror" of events and detached, objective commentator (Lynch, 2008; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Kempf, 2007). The media's capacity to promote peace is quite high and recognized; however, Blasi, (2004) observes that this potential opportunity appears largely understudied by researchers. The reason for this limited interest may perhaps arise from the notion that audiences crave for negative news is higher than that for peace-related events. Nonetheless, Siraj (2006) posits that the media in Nigeria as elsewhere, should consider themselves ethically and socially responsible to the society nay Nigeria Hence they are urged to report conflicts in context; by, for instance, paying attention to the underlying causes of conflicts as well as attempting to proffer suggestions for peaceful resolution (Galtung, 2002; Kovorik, 2007).

Empirical Review

Pate and Bashir (2012), in their work, "Media institutions and the process of democratization in Nigeria: Perception, responsibility and challenges," assert that "believability of media messages largely depends on their credibility rating by the public which in a way is a function

of individual and collective perception of the content, behaviour and quality of the outlets," (pg. 31). Understanding the general perception of the Nigerian media among Nigerians is important in determining the possible perception of the public about herdsmen and indigenes conflict as reported by the media.

According to Pate and Bashir (ibid), noting the perception index of Nigerians, state that broadcast media organizations, particularly those owned by state governments are believed to be hardly objective in their reports especially in matters that involve their states and their ruling political parties. They further state that foreign broadcast stations are perceived as being more reliable in providing credible information about events and personalities in the country. Furthermore, they posit that the poor, rural people and the female gender are considered peripherally involved in the media as they are treated merely as receivers than partners in the entire process and finally that the current commercialization of the society has deeply crept into the media arena thereby severely restricting access by the public and subverting the ideals of news, stifling the spirit of investigative journalism and devaluing the content of programmes and news on radio and television stations.

In a paper titled, "The role of the media in shaping public perception in pastoralists, insecurity, peace building and conflict resolution," Adeniyi (2014) states that it has been empirically established that the media play a big role in what people think about, how people think, how people behave, and how they perceive reality. Consequently, the media is more than a constituency; it is a channel to many other critical constituencies. In regard to the pastoralists and farmers conflicts, (Tukur 2015) avers that media perception has not been good; people create myths and sensationalize things that are not even there and gloss over the real things."

Theoretical Framework

This paper is anchored on agenda-setting theory and supplemented with framing theory and perception theory. Agenda setting theory is an effort to explain how the media create and transfer salient issues into the public sphere and thereby enable a discussion, deliberation, or

debate to be carried out on them. McCombs and Shaw (1972) explain that when editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters choose and display news, they play an important part in shaping reality. The media, by their actions, help their audiences to learn about a given issue as well as also goes ahead to determine how much significance to attach to them. Some key ways to achieve this is by determining the amount of information in a news story as well as its position in addition to other parameters (Odiegwu-Enwerem, 2020). As the media reflect on what newsmakers say at events, they determine the important issues, thereby setting the agenda of the debate (Severin & Tankard, 2001).

Framing theory refers to the tendency of the media to package and present messages to the consuming audience, by highlighting certain events and then placing them within a particular context thereby leading towards certain interpretations. In this way, the media exercises a selective influence over how people view reality (Odiegwu-Enwerem, 2020) in Arde´vo-Abreu (2015) and Scheufele (1999). Developed by Gregory Baton in (1972) the theory is premised on the notion that the media highlight certain events and then place them within a particular context to gain or achieve certain intended interpretations. Framing is sometimes referred to as second-level agenda-setting theory because of their close relationship. This theory will assist in illuminating understanding of the herders and indigenes conflicts in Benue and Enugu States in relation to how and why people perceive the problem. Critics of the theory have, however, observed that news selection is influenced by many factors such as news values, editorial policies, and interaction with various layers of the society (not only journalists' own personal idiosyncrasies).

Perception theory according to Cantril (2002) in Olijo (2015) states that interpreting messages is a complex process, although Lahlry (1991) clarifies it as the process by which we interpret sensory data which come to us through our five senses. There are two types of influences on our perception, namely, structural and functional. Structural influences occur at the physical level, where, for instance, the closer a number of dots are in a series, the more they are perceived to be forming a line. On the other hand, functional influences occur at

psychological levels and influence the way people view things. In this way, some level of subjectivity is inevitable in the process. The notion of perception theory indicates that public perception may after all be subject to external influence which can manifest in many ways.

Methodology

The study adopted survey method used a semi-structured questionnaire and in-depth interview and asked respondents (sampled from members of the public) in Benue State, to determine their opinion based on their exposure and understanding of media content regarding the herdsmen and indigenes conflict in the relevant state. One hundred and fifteen (115) randomly sampled individuals from six out of 23 local government areas of the state were administered with the questionnaire. Thie administration of the questionnaire was done in the ratio of 20 copies for Makurdi with 365, 000 population, Katsina-Ala with 325, 500 persons, Agatu with 166, 900, Gboko with 456, 000 (the largest LGA) and Kwande with 359, 000 population and Gwer-West, 176, 600 people was administered with 15 copies. The respondents were considered sufficiently enlightened and exposed to the media, and were reasonable media consumers/newspaper readers, and were consequently administered with the questionnaire Most of the respondents were selected based on their capacity to discuss trending issues such as the herdsmen and farmers' conflict. The choice of this area was made considering the proximity to the local governments' theatre of conflict in the state and could easily avail the researcher access to a good number of respondents that also meet the characteristics required.

Out of the total number of 115 copies of questionnaire, 105 (one hundred and five) copies (91.3%) got properly filled and returned for analysis. Consequently, the analysis of the survey is based on the returned copies of the questionnaire as presented below.

Presentation of data

Table 3.1: Knowledge of herdsmen and farmers' conflict

Level of Knowledge	**%**
Very knowledgeable	**85.00**
Knowledgeable	**10.00**
Slightly Knowledgeable	**5.00**
Total	**100** **(n=105)**

Source: Field survey, 2024

Eighty-five percent of the respondents to the question, "Have you heard of the herdsmen and indigenes conflicts in Benue State" confirmed that they know/have very good knowledge of the conflicts. Ten percent said they are knowledgeable while 5% said they are slightly knowledgeable. It can be concluded therefore that all of the respondents (100%) have adequate knowledge of the conflict. To determine the role of the media in their knowledge of the conflicts, the next question was posed, and the following was the response presented in table 2 below

Table 3: 2: What was your source of information on herdsmen and indigenes conflicts?

Source of information on the conflict	**%**
Media	**85**
Word of Mouth	**15**
Total	**100** **(n=105)**

Source: Field survey, 2024

Most of the respondents indicated that they got their information about the conflict from the media including television, newspaper, radio and social media. Just about 15 percent mentioned word of mouth as their source. This confirms that the media is the key source of information in the society. According to Hoffman (2006), in Nwuneli and Olimma (2015),

without the media's coverage, the impact of the act of (terrorism), and by implication, any other social development is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack or event, rather than reaching the wider 'target audience' at whom the terrorists' violence or event is actually aimed at. Given the level of exposure of the public to news media in Nigeria, the outcome was expected.

Table 3.3: Media most used by respondents

Media source of information	**%**
Television	45
Newspaper	25
Internet/social media	15
Word of Mouth	15
Total	**100% (n=105)**

Source: Field survey, 2024

Table 3.3 above shows that out of all the media options provided, three were indicated by the respondents as the most used. Forty-five percent said they got their information primarily from television; twenty-five percent said they got their information from newspapers while 15 percent got theirs from the Internet/social media. The respondents also mentioned other less important sources as word-of-mouth, cable television and politicians which totaled 15%.

Table 3.4: Respondents perception about the conflict

Perception about the conflict	**%**
There is a feeling of insecurity among citizens	**60**
It is seen as any other kind of crisis	**15**
The issues are well clarified and understood	**15**
The issues are not properly clarified	**10**
Total	**100 (n=105)**

Source: Field survey, 2024

The above table is a presentation of responses to the research question, *"From what you learnt from the source, what is your opinion of the information?*" As shown, 60 percent said the information they got from the media gave them a feeling of general insecurity while 15 percent of them said they saw it as just like any other kind of crisis. Another 15 percent said the issues involved were clear as reflected in the media while 10 percent opined that the issues involved were not properly clarified for better understanding. The overall takeout from this is that the public believes what they read/see in the media as a reflection of reality, especially in respect of the herdsmen and indigenes conflict in Benue State.

Demographics of respondents

Social-economic status	**%**
Very high class	**15%**
High class	**20%**
Low class	**35**
Very low	**30%**
Total	**100 (n=105)**

Age of respondents	**%**
18 – 27 years	**30%**
28 – 37 years	**30%**
38 – 47 years	**25**
48 – 58 years +	**15**
Total	**100 (n=105)**

Findings

Findings from this study indicate that the herdsmen and farmers conflict in Benue State received and perhaps, continues to receive media coverage on which the public rely to understand and interpret what is happening. The findings further suggest that television is the main source of information for the people on the conflict followed by the newspaper and the

Internet in that order. This shows that despite the rave in social media, citizens still rely on the mainstream media – television and newspaper – to satisfy their thirst for hard core news.

The findings also show that citizens believe the information they get from the media, which raises the credibility rating of the Nigerian media. This is important given that most people rely on the media for information on the day-to-day occurrences in the society. The implication of this is that the news media should not rest on their oars in giving accurate and factual information to the public in the discharge of their mandate. The overall perception of the public about the herdsmen and farmers conflict indicate that the news media's coverage and reportage of the conflicts have helped in the formation of opinion by the people concerning the conflict. This agrees with extent theories, such as Framing theory and Agenda setting, which postulate that the news media help in directing people on what to think, and how to think.

The study confirms that Nigerians rely on the mass media for information about developments in the polity; they believe what they read/hear/see from the media and based on that, they make up their minds about issues. This is not surprising given that the country is made up of over 200 million people scattered all over the country, made up of 36 states and one federal capital. As Omojola (2012) asserts, Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo are Nigeria's three largest ethnic groups. In a modern state, it is only the mass media that can keep these people informed of activities and developments within and around the polity. How the media decide to frame or present the issues to the people is of paramount importance given that the majority of the people rely on these media to make informed decisions about their lives.

It is also indicated that despite the seeming popularity of the social media, the conventional media still rank high as the sources of information on a subject matter as herdsmen conflict. It is noteworthy to state that this study did not look at social issues, such as entertainment-related matters, where social media expectedly would probably dominate (Gberevbie, Ayo, Oni and Folarin, 2014). As findings of the study further indicate, Nigerians believe strongly and assert that the herdsmen, as portrayed in the media are not just the

aggressors, but they are also seen to be wicked, destructive and dangerous. These are not media constructs or portrayals alone but people actually believe that this is a mirror of the reality.

The question about the public's ability to discern from the media content who the actual aggressors are showed that the majority (75 percent) said they were able, from the reports, to discern who the aggressors are, although twenty-five percent (25 percent) claimed it was not easy to identify the aggressors. By implication, media consumers can easily point to who the aggressors are between herdsmen and farmers in their conflict. In terms of determining how citizens characterize the two conflicting groups, forty-five percent believe that the herdsmen are destructive and dangerous; 35 percent believe that the herdsmen are wicked while 20 percent said the herdsmen are stubborn. To determine whether the public have an idea about the media's orientation towards peace or war, 60 percent said the media were neutral in their reports; 30 percent said they were pro-peace while 10 percent claimed the media leaned towards war in their reports. This implies that people see the media as tending towards peace.

` In the final analysis, based on their understanding of media portrayals, 60 percent of the respondents believe that the conflict was largely avoidable; 25 percent claim that it was unavoidable while another 15 percent said they cannot tell or were undecided.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the paper believes that the media remain the mirror of the society as shown in the report and should therefore continue to serve this purpose without fear or favour. Furthermore, it is hereby suggested that further studies should involve a content analysis of the various media to: understand what they have reported, how and why they have reported them, and subsequently compare these analyses with public perception. By so doing, we would be able to see or determine if there is a point of convergence between what the media say, and how the public perceive it. Besides, another study would be necessary to work with a larger sample size that can be easily generalized to the larger population. With such a study, it would

be possible to gain a deeper insight into the ability of the media to cause opinion shift and to determine public perception of issues in the society.

Recommendations

To the extent that the mass media's role in the society remains important in disseminating important information to citizens; findings that citizens of Benue state relied on the media for information on the developments around them, hence the paper recommends stronger ties and relationship between the media and society in the state. It is also recommended that citizens should deliberately expose themselves to media reports of herdsmen activities and other important developments in the area in order to remain well informed at all times and avoid becoming victims of ignorance and unprovoked aggression. It is also recommended that citizens improve on their media literacy in order to be able at all times, analyse and synthesize the media and information content to their own advantage especially in the face of multiple news sources with dubious messages and contents. Finally. the citizens should endeavour to choose the right media to expose themselves to as much of their decisions reflect their exposure to the media. Exposure to the wrong media content could spell doom to the average citizen' perception of reality around him/her.

References

Adeniyi, O. (2014). The media and public perception in the season of insecurity. Paper presented at conference with the topic: The Role of the Media in Shaping Public Perception on the Pastoralist Insecurity, Peace Building and Conflict Resolution, at Kaduna, Kaduna State.

Arde´vo-Abreu. (2015). Framing theory in communication research in Spain: Origins, development and current situations. Revista Latina de Comunicación, Social, 70, pp. 423 - 450

Adisa, R. M., Mohammed, R. B. & Ahmad, M. K. (2016). Issues and consequences of newspaper framing on ethnic conflicts: qualitative study of ethnic group leaders' conflict frames. Malaysian Journal of Communication 32(2), 294-316

Akpan, F. U., Ering, S. O. & Olofu deoye, A. (2013). The role of the media in stemming religious unrest International Journal of Asian Social Science, 3(11), p.184 – 196

Akpoghiran, I. P. & Otite, E. S. (2012). Television news perspective of conflict reporting: The Nigerian Television Authority as reference point. Journal of Media and Communication Studies 5(2) 12-19.

Asemah, E. S. & Edegoh, L. O. (2012). Mass media agenda and conflict resolution in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. AFREV IJAH 1(4) 112 -129

Ashong, A.C.& Udoudo, A. (2010). Communication and ethno-religious rifts among the peoples of Nigeria. Annals of Humanities, 1(1), 23-36

Avraham, E. and Ketter, E. (2008). Media strategies for marketing places in crisis improving the image of cities, countries and tourist destinations. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Auwal, A. M. (2015). Communication and conflict in Nigeria: What role for the media? Global Advanced Research Journal of Education and Review, 4(8) 154-160

Akpunonu, C. (2010). Radio television broadcast messages: Production and presentation. Abuja: Virtual Contact Limited.

Amakiri, A. A. (2007). Conflict reporting and propaganda: Challenge of objective journalism. In A. U. Pate and L. Oso (eds.), Multiculturalism, Diversity and Reporting Conflict in Nigeria. Ibadan: Evans Brothers (Nigeria Publishers) Limited.

Anup, S. (2005). War propaganda and the media. Retrieved from: http://www.globalissues.org

Arsenault, A, Himelfarb, S. & Abbott, S. (2011). Evaluating media interventions in conflict countries. Peaceworks: United State Institute for Peace.

Auwal, A. M. (2015). Communication and conflict in Nigeria: What role for the media? Global Advanced Research Journal of Educational Research and Review 4(8) pp 154-160.

Ayantayo, J K. (2009). Religious factors in the Nigerian public sphere: Burdens and Prospects. Africa Development, Vol. XXXIV, Nos. 3 & 4, 2009, pp. 93–109.

Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Baca, M. W. (2015). Farmers-herders clashes amplify challenges for beleaguered Nigerian society, Global Observatory, Vienna, Austria

Bello, A.U. (2013). Herdsmen and farmers conflicts in Northeastern Nigeria: Causes, repercussion and resolutions. Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies. 2(5), 129-139.

Botes, J (1996). Journalism and conflict resolution. Media Development, 43(4), 6-10.

Britannica(201). www.britannica.com

Bryant-Davis, T. & Ocampo, C. (2005). Racist incident-based trauma: Counseling Psychologist. 33. 479-500.

Chuks-Enwerem, C. U. (2020). Principals' Conflict Management Strategies and Teachers' Job Performance in Public Senior Secondary Schools in Lagos State. (Unpublished PhD. Thesis) submitted to University of Benin, Benin City

Odiegwu-Enwerem, O. C. & Chuks-Enwerem, U. C. (2021). Mass communication education in Nigeria: A critical examination of historical and contemporary issues. In B. Mutsvairo & N. T. Ekeanyanwu (Eds.), Media and communication in Nigeria: Conceptual

connections, crossroads and constraints (pp.223 – 236). London and New York: Routledge Contemporary Africa Series.
Elebek, E. (2010). Identity crisis: Who really are Nigerians? Vanguard, May 11, 2010.
Elaigwu, J. I. (2013). Security and Peace: The imperatives for national development. Paper delivered at the 7th FRCN Annul October Lecture at Yar'Adua Centre, Abuja, 2013.
Elaigwu, J. I. (2005). The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria. Jos: Aha Publishing House.
Galadima, D. J. & Olaniyi, R, (2009). The mass media and conflict in Plateau State, 2001 – 2002, Frankad Publishers for Friedrich Eberth Foundation.
Galtung, J. (2002). Galtung, Violence, and gender: The case for peace studies/Feminism alliance. Peace and Change 31(3).
Galtung, J. & Lynch, J. (2010). Reporting conflict: New directions in peace journalism. Brisbane: The University of Queensland Press.
Gatawa, M. M. (2013). Inter-group relations in historical perspectives: A case study of Yoruba and Hausa communities of Agege, Lagos, Nigeria. African Journal of History and Culture, 5(9), 171-177.
Gberevbie, D., Ayo, C., Oni, A. and Folarin, S. (2014). The role of information and communication technology on transparency, trust and good governance in Nigeria. Proceedings of the14th European Conference on eGovernment. Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Legal and Administrative Sciences: Braşov, Romania.12-13 June 2014, pp.109-117.
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. Revised and expanded edition. Columbia University Press.
Hoveland, R, and Wolburg J. (2014). Advertising Society & Consumer Culture (Eds.). London: Routledge.
Kempf, W. (2007). Peace journalism: A tightrope walk between advocacy journalism and constructive conflict coverage. Conflict & Communication Online, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2007
Klein, N. (2000). No Logo: Taking aim at the brand bullies. Picador.
Laswell, H. (1948). The structure and functions of communication in society. The Communication Ideas. New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies
Littlejohn, S. W. and Foss, K. A (2011), Theories of human communication (10th ed.). Long Groove III: Waveland Press.
Lynch, J. (2008). Debates in peace journalism. Sydney: University Press
Lynch, J. & McGoldrick, A. (2005). Peace journalism: What it is; How to do it. Transcend. University of Australia Press
McComb, M. E. & Shaw, D. L (1972). The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media.http//oxfordjournals.org
McQuail, D. (2015). Journalism and Society, London: Sage.
Nagler, R. H. (2017). Measurement of media exposure. In J. Matthes (Ed.), The International Encyclopedia of communication research methods (pp.1–21) Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Odiegwu-Enwerem, O. C. & Chuks-Enwerem, U. C. (2021). Mass communication education in Nigeria: A critical examination of historical and contemporary issues. In B. Mutsvairo & N. T. Ekeanyanwu (Eds.), Media and communication in Nigeria: Conceptual connections, crossroads and constraints (pp.223 – 236). London and New York: Routledge Contemporary Africa Series.

Omojola, O. (2014). Exploring the impact of Google Igbo in Southeast Nigeria. In. Lekoko, R. N. & Semali, L. M. (Eds.). Cases on Developing Countries and ICT Integration: Rural Community Development. Pp.62-73.

Owens-Ibie, N. (2002). Socio-Cultural Considerations in Conflict Reporting in Nigeria. In U. A. Pate (Ed.), Introduction to Conflict Reporting in Nigeria (pp. 30-44). Lagos: Frankad Publishers

Owens-Ibie, N. (2002). Communication and Conflict in Nigeria: What role for the media. Global advanced Research and Review Journal of Education Research and Review. 4(8)154-160

Payne, B. K. (2001). "Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (2), 181–92.

Siebert, F. S, Peterson, T. & Schram, W. (1963), Four theories of the press. Chicago: Springfield

Severin, W. J. & Tankard, J. W. (2001), Communication theories: methods and uses in the mass media (5th edition). Addison Wesley: Longman Inc.

Tuchman, G. (1978). Making news: A study in the construction of reality. Contemporary Society, 9(99). DOI.10.2307/2065604

Wilson, C. C., Gutierrez, F. & Chao, L. (2003). Racism, sexism and the media: The rise of class communication in multicultural America (3rd Ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Waisbord, S. R. (2002). Antipress violence and the crisis of the state. International Journal of press/politics. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1081180X0200700306

ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMINANT POLITICAL COMMUNICATION TOOL IN USE IN LAGOS STATE DURING THE 2023 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Prof. Jonathan E. ALIEDE, Ph.D.
Department of Mass Communication, National Open University of Nigeria
jaliede@noun.edu.ng

Gloria E. NWODU, Ph.D.
Department of Mass Communication, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University Igbariam Campus, Anambra State
ge.nwodu@coou.edu.ng

Ndidiamaka OPARA, Ph.D.
Department of Mass Communication, Federal Polytechnic, Nekede, Owerri, Imo State
heopara@yahoo.co.uk

Chinelo OKOYE, P.D.
Department of Mass Communication, Federal Polytechnic, Oko, Anambra State
amazonelo27@gmail.com

Oyeyemi O. OYELAKUN
Department of Mass Communication, National Open University of Nigeria
oyelakunoyeyemi@gmaili.com

ABSTRACT

The study assessed the domineering political communication tool among the many applied in the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria and how effective it was in motivating Lagos State voters. Survey design was adopted with structured questionnaire for sourcing relevant data. The tool was administered on four hundred (400) randomly selected residents of Lagos State, the main recipients of the media political messages. The findings revealed high application of the mass media for political communication during the election especially the social media. They further showed that majority of the respondents' choice of presidential candidates during the 2023 presidential election was influenced by the use of social media. It was thus concluded that social media have redefined the landscape of political communication in Nigeria and should continue to be used in future elections in Nigeria. It was, among others, recommended that there should be consistent training and retraining of political stakeholders and media practitioners to equip them with the necessary knowledge and skills for optimal effectiveness of the application of social media in political communication. Users are also enjoined to act responsibly, be more sensitive to public needs and expectations and adopt a self-censoring practice and fact-checking the accuracy and appropriateness of the political information they share and disseminate online.

Keywords: *Election, Mass media, Politics, Political communication, Presidential election,*

Introduction

Elections in democratic sittings across the world have become the standard and acceptable procedure for changes in democratic leadership and constitutional governance (Jendele, 2011 & McChesney, 2015). In the process, voters democratically elect their preferred leaders who, in return, serve them for a specified period of time depending on the constitutional term limit in their respective countries. The media are given a significant amount of attention during elections. In point of fact, it is not an exaggeration to state that a transparent election in Nigeria and elsewhere is impossible if there is no media present to cover it. This is because the media are expedient channels that are utilised for informing, educating, socialising, motivating, mobilising, monitoring, correlating and evaluating the election for the benefit of the electorates. (Arijeniwa, Nwaoboli, Ajimokunola & Uwuoruya, 2022; Nwaoboli, 2022). The reason for this may be found in the fact that the media are very effective in bringing about behavioural and attitude change. Indeed, they are agents of social engineering (Aliede, 2012 and Aliede & Kenechukwu, 2015), hence the high premium placed on them in selling the candidacy of political aspirants, party manifestos, programmes and ideologies, massively using television, radio, newspapers, magazines, billboards, posters, handbills, tracks, souvenirs, like branded t-shirts, caps, bags, etc.

Omoera (2010) agrees with the above assertion when he states that the Nigerian press have always been useful as vehicles for constructing the political landscape of the country, avenues for agitation and proper political leadership. To express this in another way, it can be said that the Nigerian press have always been useful as vehicles for structuring the country's political landscape. This illustrates mass media's important role in the electoral process of any democratic government which is indisputable and crucial in its own right. As elections take place in all democratic and civilised nations, the media focus on their outcomes, as a key aspect of their social responsibility to their reading, listening and viewing publics.

In Nigeria's 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023 electioneering campaigns, presidential candidates went out full swing to mobilize voters, leaving nothing to chance. They

deployed various strategies to persuade voters to cast the ballot in their favour during the highly competitive political campaigns. Massive use of political advertisements in television, radio, posters, billboards, vehicular and aircraft paintings were utilised to mobilize and inform voters of various contenders for different public offices. Cognizant of the important role of the mass media in electoral processes, the contest saw political contenders deploy massive resources to sell their agenda and manifestos through news, political talk-shows or advertisements in the mass media (IEBC, 2012). Extensive use of the mass media as effective communication tools is usually more pronounced during political campaigns, just as their coverage and diversity change as social contexts have made them functional instruments of social mobilization. The mainstream media - television, radio, newspapers and magazines, among other different forms are mostly used in political mobilization during the electioneering periods (Akpor, 2013; Jendele, 2011; Ngugi, 2014). Politicians have adopted political advertising in particular as a form of wooing their supporters and are applied to oppose or support candidates for elections to public offices, according to Edegoh, Ezebuenyi & Asemah (2013). While television is the medium of choice by politicians in the developed world, radio is dominantly used in many developing countries (McChesney, 2015; Myers, 2008). This is largely because of their reach. In Africa, for example, over 80% of its population listen to radio because of its geographical distribution, cost effectiveness, portability and communal living pattern (Myers, 2008).

However, the influence of new communication technologies in political communication across the globe cannot be overemphasized. In recent times, apart from the traditional media, the social media are playing dominant roles in political mobilization, participation and electioneering in both developed and developing countries. It is on record that since President Barrack Obama's of the United State of America efficient use of the social media in 2008, there has been growing use of these technologies in facilitating political communication. Obama's victory in that election was largely attributed to the massive deployment of social media by his campaign organization which provided inspiration to other

world leaders. For instance, during the just concluded presidential election, political parties and candidates employed the use of social media to execute their political campaigns. Throughout history, political campaigns have evolved around the advancing technologies that are available to political candidates. As technology advances, politicians are able to apply them to facilitate the dissemination of their manifestos and programmes (Emruli & Baca, 2011).

In Nigeria, the 2011 general elections were the first litmus test of the use of social media by political parties, political candidates, and the civil society organizations. The election was historic in the sense that it was the first time ever that new media technologies like Facebook, Blogs, LinkedIn and other social networks facilitated political communication and participation in Nigeria (Dagona, Karick, & Abubakar, 2013). Since the 2011 general elections, subsequent elections in the country have also made extensive use of the social media for political communication purposes. Thus, these new media technologies have redefined methods of political communication in contemporary times and thereby led to significant shift towards the utilization of these modern tools in the electoral process. This new paradigm shift has challenged previous methods used for political communication where television, radio and newspapers dominated coverage of political campaigns, and thus became the primary source of election-related information. However, today, the social media have become a major avenue where political parties and candidates connect with the electorate to share vital information about their policies, programmes and manifestos. As a result of the ease, reach and speed associated with the social media, they have proved to be the tools for revolutionizing the field of political communication. This is a phenomenal change and it is on this paradigm shift in the field of communication that this study attempted the identification of the most dominant political communication tool used in the 2023 presidential election of Nigeria.

The history of elections in Nigeria generally has afforded us the golden opportunity of assessment of the divergent and indispensable roles of the mass media in Nigeria's political process within the framework of our national political goal, their familiar functions since the

country's political history, according to Aliede (2003). Nigeria held its presidential election in February 2023, which provided an opportunity for voters to elect the president that would pilot the affairs of the country for the next four years. The election was the seventh in the series of presidential elections held since Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999. Apart from the conventional media of communication like radio, television and the newspapers available to political candidates and political parties, the major stakeholders in the electioneering process, to communicate their messages to the electorate, social media platforms were also massively deployed for political communication during the election.

It is an incontrovertible fact that new media have also become integral tools of political communication on a global scale, just like the conventional media. They are gradually becoming dependable instruments for influencing and changing the opinions and behaviour of the public. In cognisance of their huge benefits derivable from social media as tools of political communication, Nigerian politicians and other political stakeholders embraced and exploited them for political communication during the 2023 presidential election. Hence, social media were dominantly used in the process. However, it is yet to be fully comprehended how this new form of media was applied or facilitated as well as impacted political communication in Nigeria. This study, therefore, was embarked on to investigate the most dominant political communication tool during the 2023 presidential election.

Conceptualizing Political Communication

According to Agudosi (2007), political communication is the dissemination of information about the functioning of a political entity in order to influence the behaviour of the audience in a variety of ways. He went further to state that it is also the interactive process concerning transmission of information among politicians, the news media and the public. In the same vein, Graber & Smith (2005) opine that political communication involves the construction, sending, receiving and processing of messages that potentially have significant direct or indirect impact on politics. Political communication is an increasingly important area in communication and media studies. A study by Okoro & Diri (2009) has shown the importance

of the media in contributing significantly, creating public awareness and mobilizing participation in the political process. The media, therefore, assist citizens to reach informed decisions about what course of action to take and also offer the populace the platforms of political information, education and socialisation. It is on this premise that Rush & Althoff (1972) claim as cited in Akasoro (2011) that political communication is: The process by which politically-relevant information is transmitted from one part of the political system to another and between the social and political systems. It is a continuous process involving the exchange of information between individuals and groups of individuals at all levels of society and includes not only the expression of the views and wishes of members of society, but also the means by which the views and proposals of those in power are transmitted to the society and the latter's reaction to those views and proposals.

According to McNair (2011), political communications is purposeful communication of politics, hence a popular arm of communication as people get involved in political communication both consciously and unconsciously. It also involves a process of extracting information from people unconsciously; hence underscoring the importance of the mass media in modern politics, which further energises public interest in political issues, events, actions, activities and programmes to the delight of the general public. Political communication is of immense significance for the following three points: (a) Political actors use different forms of communication to attain specific goals and objectives. (b) Non-politicians including columnists and voters, use different forms of communication to address these political actors. (c) Communication regarding political actors and their activities are done through columns, news reports, features, editorials and many other forms of media debate of politics (McNair, 2011). These highlight the interface between the mass media and political communication.

Political communication developed into an academic field of inquiry with foundations in theories and methods from communication, political science, sociology, psychology, marketing, management, history, rhetoric and other fields. Its multidisciplinary nature explains the difficulty in finding its straight forward definition. However, it is certain that political

communication focuses on interaction between political actors, the media and the citizens, marked by its persuasive and strategic character. The question posed by Lasswell (1927) on the effects of propaganda: "Who says what, to whom, via which channels and with what effects?" is shared by a great deal of research in the field of political communication. It brings to mind the need for meticulous focus while involved in the political process and packaging political communication messages. Practitioners must be articulate about the 'who', the communicator who controls the information; the "what and media analysis", the medium like posters, leaflets, editorials, opinion pieces in newspapers or on television - the channels used in the communication process. Studies on media effects like political electioneering/campaigns, on "whom", the media audiences, reveal the impacts of the communication process on audiences and as well focus on voting behaviour during elections, for instance during polls.

Experts present divergent views and opinions about political communication contingent on their different professional backgrounds and observations. For example, Negrine (1996) defines political communication as a result that has a political nature, if it is emphasized on results. Meanwhile, if political communication is defined by emphasizing its function in the political system, it is then the communication that occurs within a political system and its environment. Meanwhile, according to Almond & Powell cited by Khosravi & Fard (2016), political communication is a political function that has other functions, namely aggregation, articulation, recruitment and socialization within a political system. It is a prerequisite to fulfilling other political functions. In summation, political communication is critical in meeting the needs of a democratic society, obligations met as the mass media effectively convey political information and at the same time educate and socialise the electorates. According to Aliede (2015), with these platforms, the masses, voters or electorates are equipped to take informed electoral decisions, thereby acting or behaving maturely, rationally and responsibly.

Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To determine the media that was most dominant as applicable political communication tools in the 2023 presidential election.
2. To assess the influence of the media on political communication during the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria.
2. To find out whether the popularity of the presidential candidates during the 2023 presidential election had any significant relationship with their use of the media.

The study is very significant for so many reasons. Being a relatively new field in the ever-dynamic field of communication in Nigeria, the study will provide additional knowledge on the subject matter. It is also hoped that the study in its practical value will aid the education of politicians, political parties and other political stakeholders on the importance of the media in contemporary political communication, as all media tools are yet to be fully explored for political campaigns in Nigeria. Besides, the study will provide insights into how best the government, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), political parties, politicians and civil society organizations would choose, design, apply and evaluate political communication instruments and programmes. It would, too, highlight the most dominant media/medium – whether mainstream, new media (internet or social media) – that was used in canvassing for votes and exposure by the presidential candidates in the 2023 presidential elections in Nigeria. Lastly, the findings will serve as a springboard for future researches in the suitability and credibility of media usable in the field of political communication.

The Place of Social Media in Political Communication

The influence of the mainstream or traditional media and currently social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Skye, Zoom, LinkedIn, MySpace, Telegram, Yahoo, Google, to name a few, in shaping political discourse and election campaigns are enormous (Stietglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012) and (Emeka, 2021). Political organizations seemingly cannot afford to ignore the significance of social media in political communication

(functions the new media are also playing in other facets of our national life like in education, businesses, health, industry, telecommunication, banks, agriculture, military), especially during election campaigns. It is their claim that politicians get community supports during campaigns and learn about public opinion on legislation and political viewpoints through political communication. Globally, politicians use social media to connect with voters, have one-on-one conversations and steer public discourse. It is increasingly crucial for politicians to have presence on social media due to the platform's ability to facilitate two-way communication with the public and pique the interest of first-time voters and younger voters (Stieglitz & DangXuan, 2012).

Before, the advent of social media, the internet held sway as the tool at the disposal of politicians for campaigns due to their potentials and effectiveness. At the same time the internet has the capacity to undermine or outwit authoritarian attempts to use their powers in favour or against one particular group or the other in the society. Indeed, the internet has the potential to serve as the largest meeting place for the formation of interest groups and one of the most effective medium for the dissemination of ideas. It also enables a two-way conversation necessary for political mobilisation, discourse and social engineering, functions that have expanded beyond that of simply keeping in touch with friends and family members.

Meanwhile, social media provide unimaginable opportunities for unfettered discourse, dialogue, interaction and feedback on political and other issues with government, political and local leaders and non-governmental organizations. Most elected officials employ social media for both campaigning and communication purposes, keeping in touch with the press and their potential voter bases (Howard, Savage, Saviaga, Toxtli & Monroy-Hernandez, 2016). As a result, it is no surprise that alongside regular conversations, today's social media channels are rife with political discourse. In order to reach out to people on message delivery and other purposes like fundraising for political campaigns, politicians today frequently rely on social media platforms and among other specific goals of using social media are:

1. The use of social media in political campaigns has increased both their efficacy and efficiency: They engender more precise and efficient reach out to potential voters. There is empirical evidence that social media can be used to supplement traditional campaign methods. The 2008 U.S. presidential election was a defining moment in the effective use of social media. Barack Obama relied heavily on various forms of online communication to spread his message during the 2012 election. Obama used fifteen different social media sites in addition to his website during his 2008 presidential campaign (Effing, Hillegersberg & Huibers, 2011) and his use of these sites helped him win the presidency.

2. Politicians are more accessible to voters through social media: As opposed to the intermediary role played by the mainstream media, social media platforms place the public squarely in the hands of politicians and their constituents. This interaction can occur wherever, anytime and for any purpose. They provide first-hand information for that political leadership who cares for updated and unadulterated information from the followership he/she cares for.

3. Broader political discourse is facilitated by social media: Politicians' ability to reach a wider audience of different nationalities and languages is enhanced by the wide use of social media as they are effective platforms at regional political elections like in the European Union. Also at both national and local levels, candidates and political parties take advantage of the unique communicative opportunities provided by social media to reach their heterogeneous publics.

Founded on the concept of Web 2.0, it is conclusive that social media have become an alternative communication instruments and channels and thus, substitutes to traditional media. They are characterized by a number of distinctive qualities that distinguish them from the mainstream media. Additionally, by playing a significant part in political discourse, social media platforms are significant contributory factors to the advancements being made in deepening democratic culture, enhanced diplomacy and peace across the world ((Effing, *et al*, 2011).

Theoretical Framework

Framing and Agenda Setting theories suit further illumination of the study. Mass Communication Theory (Online) (2017) notes that Framing is related to the agenda-setting tradition, but expands the theory research by focusing on the essence of the issues at hand rather than on a particular topic. The basis of framing theory is that the media focuses attention on certain events and then places them within a field of meaning. The major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations. Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about it. Shah, Watts, Domke & Fan (2002) assert that, a frame in communication promotes particular definitions and interpretations of political issues. The relevance of the theory in this study is that it explains the salience and core of issues and their implications which is in furtherance of the role or function of the mass media in determining issues in the political space and their perspectives in political communication before, during and after elections.

According to Zhu & Blood (2007), it is the process whereby the mass media lead the public in assigning relative importance to various public issues. Through their roles, the mass media influence people's perception of what is important, acceptable, or desirable; attention is drawn to certain aspects of reality and away from others, thus, influencing people in terms of what to think of/about.

Expressing his position on this, Folarin (2013) notes that "Agenda setting implies that the mass media predetermine what issues are regarded as important at a given time in a given society". He further submits that the mass media through its educative and enlightenment functions bring to light different issues of importance during political communication. Elections are paramount to the success of any democratic engagement in any country. Different media are usually employed by politicians, civil society groups, electoral bodies, governments and their agencies in the quest for successful political communication and elections. The rationale behind adopting the Agenda Setting Media theory in this study is

because it explains the impact, role or function of the mass media in determining public agenda and political communication, before, during and after elections. It further describes the influence of the mass media in communicating, mobilizing, moulding and shaping the opinion of the public towards some topical issues such as politics, of which election is paramount. In fact, the main trust of the agenda setting theory is that the mass media set agenda on topical issues like politics to the front burner for public discourse.

Methodology, Data Presentation and Analysis

Survey research design method was used to execute the study, utilizing the instrument of questionnaire to collect data. Primary and secondary sources were used. The questionnaire contained structured questions.

The study population was made up of 12,550,578 people who are resident in Lagos State, according to National Bureau of Statistics (2016). Lagos State residents from four local government areas namely: Ikeja, Ikorodu, Lagos Mainland and Lagos Island were selected as the sample frame. The simple random sampling technique was used in the administration of copies of the questionnaire to respondents in the four local government areas. Convenience sampling was also used to reach the respondents in the local government areas. A total of 400 copies of the questionnaire were distributed to the respondents in the selected four local government areas (100 copies each). The sample size was calculated using Taro Yamane formula for estimating sample size as presented below:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where n = Sample size

N = Population of the study

e = Tolerable error (5%)

1 = A constant

$$n = \frac{12{,}550{,}578}{1+12{,}550{,}578\ (0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{12,550,578}{1+12,550,578\ (0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{12,550,578}{1 + 31376.445}$$

$$n = \frac{12,550,578}{31377.445}$$

$$n = 399.98$$

Of the four hundred copies of the questionnaire administered in the four local government areas selected for the study, 386 copies were appropriately filled, returned and found usable, representing a 96.5% response rate. 62.4% of the respondents were males, 37.6% were females, as the least possible age of the respondents was 18 and the highest was 65, while the modal age rang was 26-35 years. All the respondents have had various levels of tertiary education and all of them (100%) were currently civil servants.

Table 1. Administered questionnaire return rate

Local government areas	**No. of questionnaire distributed**	**No. of questionnaire returned**	**Percentage of returned questionnaire**
Ikeja	100	99	24.75%
Ikorodu	100	94	23.5%
Lagos Mainland	100	96	24%
Lagos Island	100	97	24.25%
Total	**400**	**386**	**96.5%**

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

The above table indicates that the revel responses to the questionnaire were very high, indeed, in all the four local government areas it was administered.

Table 2: Accessibility to social media platforms by the respondents

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	386	100%
No	0	0
Total	**386**	**100%**

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

Table 2 shows that all the respondents had access to one social media platform or the other.

Table 3: Respondents' access to conventional media platforms

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	386	100%
No	0	0
Total	**386**	**100%**

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

The available data indicate that all the respondents have access to the conventional media platforms.

Table 4: Respondents' exposure to political messages on the various media platforms

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	386	100%
No	0	0
Total	**386**	**100%**

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

The data on Table 4 reveal that all the respondents are exposed to political messages on the various media platforms that they have access to.

Table 5: Major information source of respondents on the 2023 presidential elections

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Social media	198	51.3%
Television	88	22.9%
Radio	54	13.9%
Newspaper	46	11.9%
Total	**386**	**100%**

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

From Table 5, a greater number of respondents affirm that social media was their major source of information on the 2023 presidential election. This implies that most of the respondents used social media to source for political information about the election.

Table 6: Dominant social media platforms in use for political communication in the 2023 presidential election

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Facebook	108	27.9%
WhatsApp	82	21.2%
X(Twitter)	90	23.3%
Instagram	28	7.3%
Others	78	20.2%
Total	**386**	**100%**

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

Table 6 reveals that Facebook, WhatsApp and X(Twitter) were mostly used for political communication during the 2023 presidential election.

Table 7: Influence of political campaign messages on social media on the voting preference of respondents than those disseminated in the conventional media

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	53	13.7%
Agree	254	65.8%
No opinion	0	0
Disagree	79	20.5%
Strongly disagree	0	0
Total	**386**	**100%**

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

Table 7 shows that a larger percentage of the respondents agreed that political campaign messages on social media influenced their voting preferences than those on the conventional media.

Table 8: Impact of use of social media for political communication on the popularity of presidential aspirants in the 2023 presidential election

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	64	16.6%
Agree	273	70.7%
No opinion	0	0
Disagree	49	12.7%
Strongly disagree	0	0
Total	**386**	**100%**

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2024

Table 8 confirms that majority of the respondents affirmed that the popularity of the presidential aspirants was enhanced by the utilisation of social media for political communication during the 2023 presidential election.

Findings/Conclusion

This study found that Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, X(Twitter), Yahoo Messenger, YouTube and Google+ were the widely applied social media platforms for political communication during the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. This finding is consistent with the position of previous studies, for instance, Omotayo & Salami (2018) and Yang & DeHart (2016), who confirmed that Nigerians are active users of social networking media. These results are also consistent with previous studies by Gil de Zuniga, Jung & Valenzuela (2009) and Valenzuela, Kim & Gil de Zuniga (2012) showing that the use of such social media has positive influence on political communication and citizens' political participatory behaviours. It, thus, affirmed the popularity of the social media among Nigerians, as all the respondents admitted to have used, at least, one of the various Web 2.0 based platforms for communication, with Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter being the most frequently applied platforms. This is also in tandem with other previous studies like those of Ajayi & Adesote (2015) and Akpoghiran & Erubami (2019).

The popularity of the social media could be linked to their peculiar traits of convenience, interactivity, affordability and universality which allow geographically detached users to connect among themselves on the virtual space and to do so with little or no restriction on the contents of communication. As arenas where citizens share information and discuss public affairs, social media serve as resources for engaging in political activities, playing positive roles and providing useful avenues to reinvigorate participatory democracy (Gil de Zuniga, *et al*., 2012 and Kim, Shin & Kim, 2011). Our study, therefore, establishes that Nigerians engaged social media to participate in politics more than other media platforms in the 2023 presidential election. Regarding the specific contributions of the social media to political participation processes, our result showed that the respondents perceived online platforms to have positively contributed to the advancement of democracy by facilitating the unrestricted flow of political information at reduced cost and without needless censorship.

Inadvertently, the social media have also stimulated public interest in the activities of government, political parties, groups and individual politicians; enhanced public understanding of political events; provided a citizens-government interaction and feedback mechanism; as well as enhanced citizens' capacity to hold public officers accountable for their actions and inactions. Evidently, the information power shift made possible by the social media remains one of the notable contributions of online communication media to politics and democracy in Nigeria. The alteration of the conventional top-down communication paradigm typified by the mainstream media has, therefore, taken the world some steps closer to the ideals of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), (Aliede, 2004).

Thus, social media have redefined the political communication landscape in Nigeria, a phenomenal change occasioned by their platforms and the internet. Given the growing popularity and penetration of social media and the way they influence peoples' private and public lives, the study additionally shades light on citizens' motivation and preference for social media as major tools for political engagements. The political class' embrace of these platforms in attracting the electorates during elections stem from their effectiveness, user-friendly qualities, freedom and unlimited access, availability and room for sense of belonging, contribution, participation, involvement and moreso, feedback mechanism and interactivity. All these inform their massive choice as a major political communication tool in the Nigerian 2023 presidential election.

Recommendations

Some level of regulation is advocated for that should not infringe on the unfettered performance of practitioners and can indirectly be done by the NBC initiating some kind of intensive reorientation of all stakeholders in political communication to equip them with the necessary knowledge and skills on the best use of social media for optimal effectiveness in political communication and as well assist in developing a more workable and functional political broadcasting policy for the country, whose strict adherence will translate to more serious professional and ethical observance of the provisions of the code. In addition, an

independent monitoring body, consisting of representatives of all the political parties should be constituted by the NBC at both federal and state levels to monitor the compliance of broadcasting stations to the National Broadcasting Code before, during and after political campaigns and the elections proper.

Nigerian political class and stakeholders should continue to use the social media as viable tools for political communication in engaging Nigerians who are avid users of the platforms and also ensure the positive application of the appliances. With the identification of Facebook and XTwitter) as the most utilized social media platforms by the presidential candidates, further study should be undertaken to ascertain the viability of others like YouTube, Instagram, WhatsApp and blogs. Social media users should act responsibly, be more sensitive to public needs and expectations and where possible, adopt self-censoring practices to check the accuracy and appropriateness of the political information they share and receive online. Future studies are recommended to expand the understanding of how the usage of social media influences political communication especially in political terrains like ours.

References

Agudosi, F. I. (2007). Mass media and the promotion of healthcare in rural communities. In Sooola, E. (ed.) Communication Conference Proceedings. Ibadan: ACCE.

Ajayi A. I. & Adesote S. A. (2015). The new social media and consolidation of democracy in Nigeria: uses, potentials and challenges. Journal of Good Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa, 2 (4), pp. 47-58.

Akasoro, O. G. (2011). News Agency of Nigeria as a channel for political communication in Nigeria. In Oso, L & Umaru, P. (Eds.). Mass Media and Society in Nigeria. Lagos: Multhouse Press Limited.

Akpoghiran, I. P. & Erubami, J. A. (2019). Analysis of students' preference for social and mainstream media as platforms for information gathering. Journal of Social and Management Sciences, 14(1), pp. 13-20.

Akpor, E. (2013). Mass media and grass roots mobilization in Nigeria. Journal of Communication and Culture, Volume 4, Number 3, December. Pp. 22-32.

Aliede, J. E. (2012). Public opinion, mass media and an informed citizenry. In Aliede, J. E. (ED.) Today's Readings in Mass Communication: Issues, Insights and Perspectives. Enugu: Prime Targets Limited. Pp. 148-164.

Aliede, J. E. & Kenechukwu, S. A. (2015). Mass media, political communication and entrenchment of participatory democratic culture in Nigeria. In Aliede, J. E. (ED.) Studies in Communication, Mass Media and Society: Discourses and Debates. Lagos: PR-MIX. Pp. 135-148.

Aliede, J. E. (2004). Quest for the New World and Communication Order (NWICO) as a failed attempt in international conflict management. In I. E. Nwosu & Wilson, D. (EDs). Communication, Media and Conflict Management in Nigeria. Enugu: ACCE/Prime Targets Limited. Pp. 51-102.

Aliede, J. E. (2003). Mass media and politics in Nigeria: A historical and contemporary overview. POLIMEDIA: Media and Politics in Nigeria. Enugu: ACCE/Prime Targets Limited. Pp. 16-37.

Anibueze, S. (2015). Advertising and political communication: A game of euphemisms, lies and myths. In J. E. Aliede (ED.) Studies in Communication, Mass Media and Society: Discourses and Debates. Lagos: PR-MIX. Pp. 149-160.

Arijeniwa, F. A., Nwaoboli, E. P., Ajimokunola, P. & Uwuoruya, D. (2022). Social media, cultural commodification and the promotion of synthetic values in Nigeria. In E. S. Asemah, D. O. Ekhareafo & T. Santas (Ed.). Discourses on Communication and Media Studies in Contemporary Society. Pp. 291-300. Jos University Press.

Dagona, Z. K., Karick, H., & Abubakar, F. M. (2013). Youth participation in social media and political attitudes in Nigeria. Journal of Sociology, Psychology and Anthropology in Practice. 5(1), Pp. 1-7.

Edegoh, L., Ezebuenyi, E. & Asemah, E. (2013). Television as a medium of the political advertising elections in Anambra State, Nigeria. Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities. Vol 2, No.3, August. Pp. 375-385.

Effing, R., Hillegersberg, J. V. & Huibers, T. (2011). Social media and political participation: are Facebook, Twitter and YouTube democratizing our political systems?. In International Conference on Electronic Participation (pp. 25-35). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

Emeka, G. N. (2021). Digital Age: The Birth of a New Approach to the Practice of Public Relations. Project Submitted to the Department of Mass Communication, National Open University of Nigeria, Abuja for the Award of BSc in Mass Communication.

Emruli, S. & Baca, M. (2011). Internet and political communication- Macedonian case. International Journal of Computer Science Issues. 8 (3), 154-163.

Folarin B. (2013). Theories of mass communication: An introductory text. Link Publication, Abeokuta, Ogun State.

Gil de Zuniga, H., Jung, N., & Valenzuela, S. (2012). Social media use for news and individuals' social capital, civic engagement and political participation. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 17, 319–336.

Graber, D. A. & Smith, J. M. (2005). Political communication faces the 21st Century. Journal of Communication, 55 (3), 479-507.

Howard, P. N., Savage, S., Saviaga, C. F., Toxtli, C., & Monroy-Hernandez, A. (2016). Social media, civic engagement, and the Slacktivism hypothesis: Lessons from Mexico's "El Bronco". Journal of International Affairs, 70(1), 55-73

Jendele, H. (2011). Talking to the Polls: Power, Time and the Politics of the Representation in Two South Africa's Radio Talk Shows. African Studies, Vol. 70, P.3.

Khosravi, A. M. & Fard, S. S. (2016). The ruling elite political culture in contemporary Iran. Open Journal of Political Science, Vol.6 No.3, 274-283.

Kim, K. K., Shin, H. K., & Kim, B. (2011). The role of psychological traits and social factors in using new mobile communication services. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 10(4), 408-417.

Mass Communication Theory (Online). (2017, January 31). Framing Theory. Retrieved from Mass Communication Theory: https://masscommtheory.com/theory-overviews/framing-theory/

McChesney, R. W. (2015). The personal is political: The political economy of the non-commercial radio broadcasting in the United States. Monthly Review.

McNair, B. (2003). An introduction to political communication. London: Routledge.

Myers, M. (2008). Radio and Development in Africa. A Concept Paper Prepared for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada.

Negrine, R., Mancini, P., Holtz-Bacha, C. & Papathanassopoulos, S. (eds.) (2007). The professionalization of political communication. Bristol: Intellect.

Ngugi, P. & Kinyua, C. (2014). The concept and philosophy of community radio station in the Kenyan context. Journal of Mass Communication Journalism, Vol. 5, p. 233.

Nwaoboli, E. P. (2022). Use of celebrities in social media advertising and customer purchasing decision: An analysis of Helen Paul's Hypo Bleach advertisements. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Approach and Studies. 9 (6), 77-88.

Okoro, N. & Diri, C. (2009). Public sphere and civic journalism: A fulcrum for effective political communication in Nigeria. Journal of Political Economy. 3(1&2), Pp. 296-312.

Omoera, O. S. (2010). The import of the media in an emerging democracy: An evaluation of the Nigerian situation. Journal of Social Science, 22(1), 33-38.

Omotayo, F. O. & Salami, M. O. (2018). Use of social media for knowledge sharing among students. Asian Journal of Information Science and Technology, 8(2), 65-75.

Shah, D. V., Watts, M. D., Domke, D. & Fan, D. P. (2002). News framing and cueing of issue regimes: explaining Clinton's public approval in spite of scandal. Public Opinion Quarterly. 66:339–70.

Stietglitz, S., & Dang-Xuan, L. (2013). Social media and political communication: A social media analytics framework. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 3(4), Pp. 1277-1291.

Valenzuela, S., Kim, Y., & Gil de Zuniga, H. (2012). Social networks that matter: Exploring the role of political discussion for online political participation. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 24(2), 163–184.

Yang, H. C. & DeHart, J. L. (2016). Social media use and online political participation among college students during the US election 2012. Social Media + Society, 2(1), 1-18. doi: 10.1177/2056305115623802.

Zhu, J. H., & Blood, D. (2007). Media agenda setting theory telling the public what to think about, In G. Kovacic (Ed.) Emerging Theories of Human Communication. Albany NY: Sunny Press.

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION'S HANDLING OF 2019 ELECTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION OF LAGOSIANS

Chuks O. ODIEGWU-ENWEREM, PhD
Department of Mass Communication,
National Open University of Nigeria
chuks_enwerem@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

Voting decision is a fragile issue requiring consistent and ongoing measurement. The influence of the media in driving voter decision has been well documented, but no so much on the attitude of voters towards the electoral umpire. As much as the media influence voting patterns of electorate, the same needs to be established of the perception of the electoral umpire by the voting public in respect of the agency's ability to be fair and reliable. This paper examined the relationship between media exposure patterns of voters and their attitude towards Independent National Electoral Commission, (INEC) in the handling of 2019 general elections, focusing on Ikeja Local Government Area, Lagos state. The study used survey to obtain data using questionnaire as instrument administered to selected respondents in the selected areas of study. Result showed that INEC's handling of 2019 general election received considerable reportage from the media and it formed the basis for rating the general public's attitude to INEC hence holding INEC in high esteem for conducting an acceptable election. The success of every public institution, no doubt, is reflected, in some parts, on what it does or fails to do; and in other parts, on what the public think about it. If people's attitude or feeling about an organization is negative, this could snowball into an issue if not addressed in good time. The ability of the organization to understand the soft issues which can lead to reality, will in turn, enable such an organization to take into account such people's feelings and therefore look forward to providing solution to their needs. The paper therefore recommended that INEC and similar public institutions should endeavour to always maintain a good reputation and image before the public through adequate fair media appearances.

Keywords: *Attitude, Perception, Media exposure*

Introduction

So much has been written and spoken about the actual or presumed effect, impact or influence of mass media on individual's level of social, political, and even economic awareness,

knowledge and beliefs in political developments, ideologies, his intention to vote or not to vote; whom to vote for and why; as well as his view or perception of the political institutions involved in conducting elections. Theoretically speaking, on media effects, the world has experienced rapid or consistent transition from an all-powerful media effect theories (which originally viewed the media as capable of making people behave as desired) - to minimally powerful effect (which ascribes but a slight power to the media), and then to no effect at all. There is, however, no denying the fact that opinions are formed, held or dropped by individuals progressively as they get in contact with different types of media channels, including newspapers, radio television and outdoor media. It is self-evident that every day, every living person is exposed to one form of channel of media of information or another. This is without discounting the power of face-to-face, peer-group, family and other forms of contact that can influence behaviour and decisions.

Much like other social institutions, the school, the church and the family, etc., the media are indeed a very distinct feature of the modern state. This paper examines the relationship between media exposure of electorates and their views or attitude of the electoral umpire in Nigeria during the 2019 general elections. Its goal is to identify the real pattern of media exposure by studying a sampled population, with a view to determining if and where such exposure had an impact on their perception of the electoral umpire in the 2019 general election in Nigeria, among other things. It is to be noted that elections and electoral processes, shape the fate and nature of the modern state. For instance, elections provide the medium by which different intervening variables and interest groups within the polity can stake and resolve their claims to power, through periodic peaceful voting exercises.

As political actors navigate the political waters and terrain, the media in the country play the role of creating the awareness between and among the citizens, throw light on the contestants and above all, dissect and discuss the electoral umpire. The media, in their characteristic manner, will go to any length to expose and divulge whatever is necessary for the benefit of the citizens. Through informed commentaries, news analyses, breaking news or

personality interviews or the like, the media continuously serve the people with updates about upcoming events or events as they occur. Furthermore, the mass media undertake the responsibility to educate the masses on their roles and responsibilities, as well as their power to decide the fate of a politician, hold their rulers and leaders accountable and so on.

In Nigeria, through various channel of news, commentaries, spotlight interviews, informed analysis and political advertising, the media create the needed awareness in the polity, sufficient enough to enable the electorate make informed choices and decisions as well as place their trust or doubt on the electoral judges. The public attitude to the electoral watchdog significantly affects the conduct of the elections, readiness to accept results and readiness to work for the general interest of the masses.

One of the expected fallouts of an orchestrated media campaign during any election year, is for the electorate to act in one way or the order, that is to say, from the information gathered principally from the media, the citizens are expected to either change their views, hold on to them or at best, modify them. In the light of the general elections in Nigeria, 2019, the electorate were also treated to a deluge of media activities, through the radio, television, newspapers, handbills, posters and even billboards, across the country. Additionally, the mainstream media, other avenues were also employed to transmit political, and sometimes, partisan information to the citizens.

Elections are the centerpiece of democracy. Through voting, people can voice their opinions, hopes and aspirations, discipline their leaders and ultimately control their nation's destiny. Through elections, the public muster their power. To use its muscle effectively according to a democracy theory, the public has to know sufficiently about the activities, the actors and their potentials and capabilities. But beyond that, they must also know about the umpires and their capacity to be trusted, and relied upon to deliver on their mandate. This trust element determines the citizens' overall push to participate or not to participate in election; and by extension, to accept or not accept electoral outcomes.

It is expected that both the umpire and the people running for official positions, those serving in one capacity or another during the election period, must at one point or the other, state their positions on issues, their capability, or even their agenda for the people to evaluate. The umpires also present themselves for examination and close scrutiny. The mass media then take it from there, explaining, interpreting, criticizing, and amplifying – for the general public to be aware and get better understanding and therefore act in knowledge. This is the major role the media have to play in these crucial times. This is very crucial because whatever voters or the citizens know about the electoral process, elections, the umpires, the candidates, the rules of the game, and so on, comes to them almost entirely mostly from the key media channels: television, newspapers, magazines, radio, etc.

Conceptual Clarifications

Attitude: Bohner, Gerd; Wanke, Michaela (2011) define attitude as a summary evaluation of an object of thought. They further state that an attitude object can be anything a person discriminates or holds in including beliefs emotional responses and behavioral tendencies. In the classical definition an attitude is persistent, while in more contemporary conceptualizations, attitudes may vary depending upon situations, context, or moods (Bohner et al. 2011).

Media Exposure: According to Nagler (2017), media exposure is the extent to which individuals encounter specific media messages or content over a period of time. There has been little scholarly consensus on how to measure it despite media exposure's centrality to the study of effects.

Perception - Perception is the process of selecting, organizing, and interpreting information. It includes the perception of select stimuli that pass through our perceptual filters, which are organized into our existing structures and patterns, and are then interpreted based on previous experiences (Payne, 2001). Although perception is a largely cognitive and psychological process, how we perceive the people and objects around us affects our communication.

Statement of the Problem

The media are believed to play an active role in shaping people's opinions about institutions, organs and even individuals. The ability of the media to exert such influence also depends on the pattern of people's exposure to the media. Media commentaries, as well as stakeholder opinions could be a reliable barometer to measure the likely direction of public opinion in a given situation. This, however, is an assumption which can only be tested through an empirical study.

Research Objectives

1. To determine if media coverage of 2019 general elections in Nigeria provided the vital information that enabled the electorate to make up their minds about INEC' handling of the elections.
2. To determine if the media exhibited professionalism and social responsibility in their coverage of the 2019 general elections.
3. To determine if the media attitude to INEC was as an unbiased and impartial umpire or not, in its handling of the elections
4. To determine if people's media consumption pattern affected their attitude to INEC's conduct of 2019 general election.

Literature Review

Mass Media and Exposure Patterns

The term mass media, according to Mcquail (2000) is a means of communication that operates on a large scale, reaching and involving virtually everyone in a society to a greater or lesser degree. He further describes the media as an organized means for communicating openly and at a distance to many receivers within a short space of time. The media are presumed to affect perceptions and behaviour in a distinctive way. They can affect society and vice versa. The mass media are modern means of public communication and much of their importance lies in the fact that they are a major cause of whatever modes of perception, thought, public discourse and political action that occur in society.

Considering their size and the large number of people they reach; the mass media have tremendous impact on society. The impact of mass media is aptly described by Murphy as oil, glue and dynamite.

Media Exposure Patterns: This means the frequency, direction and intensity of contact with the media – radio, television, newspaper/ magazine, billboard, posters/handbills, in such a way that the consumer takes away something of importance to him. Media exposure measures the frequency, direction and intensity with which a person interacts with the media. Exposure patterns include: *physical exposure* which is the most foundational criterion for exposure. A person must experience some proximity to a message in order for exposure to take place. Physical exposure means that the message and the person occupy the same physical space for some period of time. Thus, space and time are regarded as barriers to exposure. The second pattern is *perceptual exposure* referring to a human's sensory bandwidth or the ability to receive appropriate sensory input through the visual and auditory senses. There are, however, limits to a human's sense organs. For example, human sensitivity to sound frequency extends from around 16 Hz to 20,000 Hz, but sounds are heard best when they are between 1,000 Hz and 4,000 Hz (Metallinos, 1996; Plack, 2005); and *psychological exposure*; for psychological exposure to occur, some trace element must be created in a person's mind. This element can be an image, a sound, an emotion, a pattern, and so on. It can last for a brief time (several seconds in short-term memory, then cleared out) or a lifetime (when cataloged into long-term memory).

Classification of the Media

In broad terms, the mass media are of two categories: the print and the broadcast media. In Nigeria, as in other modern societies, the print media use a mechanism that depends on printed items of information which has as part of its features, the quality of being permanent and of good storage value. They include: newspapers and magazines. Newspapers come under another kind of classification: Tabloid and Standard size. While tabloids describe such common types of newspapers found in Nigeria – The Sun, The Nation, The Guardian, the

standard size are twice as large as the tabloid and are found more in the US and UK and other advanced countries of the world. Electronic media, on the other hand, use devices that can transform or change sound or light waves into electrical signals which are then reconverted to audible sounds and visual images to be heard on radio and seen on Television. The broadcast media are said to be the most powerful medium today in the world for affecting the minds, emotions and even actions of mankind.

Whether the print or electronic/broadcast media, they in various ways - including information dissemination, education of the citizenry, providing entertainment, transmission of cultural heritage, surveillance and status conferral, among others – and these altogether confer on the media the power of exerting far reaching changes in perception, attitude and behaviour in the lives of people who are exposed to them. This however depends also on what pattern, how consistently and for what purpose the exposures occur.

Brief History of Elections in Nigeria

In time past, several electoral events in Nigeria have tended towards an unpleasant outcome for several reasons as always published in the media and some that are physically witnessed by the people directly. For the records, we can recall that the controversial elections of 1965 produced the coup d'état of January 1966. Again, the flawed elections of 1983 produced the coup of December, 1984. Yet again, General Ibrahim Babangida's flawed elections of 1993 produced Abacha palace coup of that year and paved the way for his ignoble dictatorship. It can safely be said that the media played significant roles in all these developments by identifying and exposing the ills of these negative developments in our country even though the consequences of such mass awareness would be huge on the psyche of the people.

Expectedly, emerging from this political reality, the electorate has evolved a certain mindset in matters concerning elections in the country knowing that most flawed elections had their roots in crooked electoral processes that cause genuine anxiety and concern among the public. For these and many other reasons, the general attitude of Nigerians towards any electoral body and by extension, the conduct of the registrations, has always been that of

pessimism, sometimes sarcasm and outright doubt about the possible outcome of the entire process, in most cases in response to their exposure to and consumption of media messages.

The overt expression of doubt among the electorate is not without reason: the general experience of Nigerians regarding the Electoral Commission's processes and procedure in the elections has always tended towards disappointments, giving rise to a sustained culture of pessimism and palpable doubt towards the electoral outcome. "In previous elections, the Independent National Electoral Commission in Nigeria (INEC) did not enjoy widespread confidence of Nigerians and political parties and contestants in the past have expressed their unpreparedness to accept any result declared by INEC." This declaration came as a result of what the people perceived about INEC and its ability to conduct a credible election.

There is usually a correlation between widespread perception and eventual actions taken or refused to be taken about a particular cause or event. This is true considering that the media mirror the society in different ways and give the people what to think about at all times, thus helping to set the agenda.

An understanding of people's attitude and perception of INEC's handling of 2019 general elections will, therefore, give an indication of how the public would respond to INEC and the general elections in the future. Here in lies the role of media in shaping the perception of the public towards a given person, institution or movement. The media, through their treatment of issues and developments, help influence what issues voters or electorate should care about in elections and electoral processes and what criteria they should use to evaluate candidates or officials and institutions.

In the tripartite government-media-public inter-relationship the government plays a major role in dictating the media's content through the media's regular use of public officials as news sources; the media, on the other hand, help set the political agenda by focusing on specific issues and influencing what the government and the people should be concerned with. Perception is the prevailing attitude shown towards a person, organization or idea; it follows therefore, that whatever be the direction of popular perception as dictated by the media, in the

same manner, will affect people's real actions, reaction or no action at all, towards the given entity.

Some of the factors responsible for forming or holding an opinion about an electoral process include the perceived openness and transparency or otherwise in the handling of crucial aspects of an election, as well as how the general public perceive the umpire to be neutral. Again a proper and acceptable voter registration is no doubt a bedrock of credible elections. On the other hand, a poorly handled and unprofessionally coordinated exercise gives room for several insinuations which affect the general outcome of elections. Above all, the direction and intensity of media works and activities on the election, its processes as well as expositions on the umpire, become major factors for the electorate in deciding how to evaluate an organization.

To understand the public perception of INEC's handling of the 2019 general elections and perhaps the causative factors, a look at history and profile of INEC would be a necessary backgrounder.

Theoretical Framework

The framework of this study flows from the uses and gratification theory as well as the individual differences theory, which in recent years have gained support through empirical evidence (DeFleur, 1970, p122) lending support to the assertion that media effect varies from person to person. Accordingly, it is believed also that such differential in media effects results from the variations in social-economic backgrounds, education, employment experience, beliefs and selectivity in their attention and perception.

While the world is witnessing a progressive increase in the exposure to the mass media, there is a corresponding increase in the volume of studies on the impact of the mass media on individuals and groups. In coming to grasp with these unfolding realities, social scientist try to seek theoretical framework in finding some order or symmetry in the effects of mass media exposure. Considerable changes have occurred in the general thinking concerning the actual or presumed impact of the mass media. According to DeFleur, (1970 p.119), 'this

change has for the most part been a continuous and cumulative discovery of important intervening processes between media and mass, that is between the stimulus and the response sides of the S-R equation'.

Within a short period in history, there has occurred a huge change in thinking about what mass media can in themselves accomplish. For instance, at the earliest stage of the thinking, the magic bullet theory of mass communication believed that a message works as efficiently as a bullet; but this fizzled out in the 1950s following the clearer understanding that people did not necessarily fall over when bombarded by a message. What followed was the trickle-down theory (Schramm, 1964), which has also received the same treatment given to bullet theory. There is, instead, a major skepticism in the belief that we can accomplish quite a lot just by talking to the people at the grass roots level from the centre and top and telling them how to develop and grow. This theory was prevalent during 1962, when the great experts in the capital cities, the government, the universities, among others, would go on radio, television or even newspapers and deliver a message or talk to the village people about how to and how not to be more prosperous, healthier or self-reliant. Schramm, in 1977 believed that though this was the case in the 1960, the pattern of thinking has long radically changed…'what we found out in these last fifteen years, rather painfully, is that important as communication from top to bottom is, more important is communication at the bottom - that is communication between the people at the same level' (Schramm 1977. P3)

Progressively, in recent years, more and more research evidences emerged to support the individual differences theory of mass communication effect (DeFleur, 1970, p. 122) which states that the effects of mass media could be seen as varying from person to person because of their variations in social-economic background, education, employment, experience beliefs among others. These individual differences are now considered to be very important intervening mechanisms entering the stimulus-response bullet theory and have been advanced in order to better explain the differential effects of mass media exposure.

Research Method

The study adopted the survey method and the population of study were residents of Ikeja Local Government of Lagos State. A sample of 500 people were chosen randomly for the study covering the five (5) wards in Ikeja, namely: Anifowose/Alausa; Oregun/Olusosun; Ipodo/Serki Aro; Oke-Ira/Aguda and GRA/Police Barracks. The sample size was selected using the Taro Yamane formular, n= N/ (1+N (e) 2), where: n is the sample size N the population under study while e is the margin of error (it could be 0.10, 0.05 or 0.01). Questionnaire copies were administered to the sampled respondents in the places of interest and 457 (91.4%) copies were returned completely filled for analysis.

Results

Demographic Questions

The demographics of the respondents in the study show a number of features. For instance, according to the age distribution of the population, respondents between ages 18 and 25 years were 21.1%; those aged 26 and 34 years were 22.5%; those who were aged 35 to 44 years were 24.3%. Also, those who were aged 45 to 54 years accounted for 20% while those who were above 55 years were 13.1%. The bull's eye was 35 to 44 years. In terms of religious affiliation, there were more Christians (54.5%) than the Muslims (44.4%) and 1.1% were practicing traditional religion.

Respondents' ethnic background showed that Yorubas were more with 49.3%; Hausas were 9%, Igbos were 15.7% and another 28% accounted for other ethnic groups in the country. The ethnic categories – Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo were selected ostensibly because these are the dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria usually chosen for such exercises with a chance of achieving results that can be applied across board.

Academic attainment of the respondents showed those who had no formal education were 14.3%; primary school leavers were 17.1%; SSCE/NECO/GCE holders were 34.1%; OND/NCE holders were 11.3%; those who held B.Sc. or its equivalent were 7.3% and the

remaining 2.3% had Master's Degree while 13.6% of the respondents had other types of education and academic attainment.

Research questions

Research question one: What expectations did Nigerians have of INEC before and during the elections?

Table 1: Expectations of Nigerians of INEC before and during the 2019 elections

Expectations of Nigerians	**Percentage (%)**
Expected to perform their civic duty	11.8
Felt I will be able to have a say in how I am governed	13.7
Happy that I can now choose who governs me	10.3
Doubt whether my vote will count this time around	2.5
Doubt whether INEC will do a good job	58.8
Others	3.0
Total	100% n=457

Source: Researcher's survey, 2024

Table 1 contains the expectations of Nigerians concerning INEC before and during the 2019 general elections. As shown by the table, 11.8% of the respondents said they expected INEC to perform their civic duty; 13.7% said they felt they will be able to have a say in how they were governed; 10.3% said they were happy that they will be able to choose who will govern them; 2.5% of them said they doubted whether their vote will count this time around; 58.8% doubted whether INEC will do a good job and those who chose other expectations accounted for 3.0%. This outcome shows that most of the people sampled expected INEC to mess the 2019 general elections up like its predecessors.

Research question 2: What were the noticeable differences between the INEC that conducted 2019 elections and the previous umpires?

Table 2: Response to noticeable difference between the INEC that conducted 2019 elections and the previous umpires

Noticeable difference	**Percentage**
No difference	23.4
The appointment of INEC Chairman and other national commissioners	51.3
The support given to INEC	10
President Muhammadu Buhari	5.2
Others	10
Total N	100% 457

Source: Researcher's survey, 2024

Table 2 above presents findings produced by research question two on the noticeable difference between the INEC that conducted 2019 general elections against the previous umpires. In the table, the majority of the respondents (51.3%) said the appointment of INEC Chairman as well as those of his national commissioners was the noticeable difference between INEC that conducted the 2019 general elections and that of the past. This group is followed by 23.4% of people who said there was no difference; 10% said the support showing to INEC was like never before and the same percentage (10%) said other difference were noticeable.

Research question 3: Did Nigerians believe that INEC would deliver a credible election in 2019?

Table 3: Do Nigerians believe that INEC would deliver a credible lection?

Whether Nigerians believed in INEC's ability to deliver	**Percentage**
Yes	12.4
No	71.1
I don't know	16.5
Total	100% n=457

Source: Researcher's survey, 2024

Table 3 above shows that 12.4% of them said they believed that INEC would deliver a credible election in 2019; 71.1% said they never believed that INEC would deliver a credible election in 2019 while 16.5% said they "don't know" whether INEC would deliver a credible election. This shows that the image of INEC in the past greatly affected people's perception of INEC and its capacity to conduct a credible election as witnessed in 1993. Perception is everything as they say and that was why people ostensibly could doubt INEC's ability to conduct a credible election. But in this case, perception could mislead people to believe that INEC would fail in the task assigned to it. Nevertheless, empirical studies of this nature are important to regularly determine the people's views and attitudes towards national service institutions like INEC as a barometer of their outward performance evidenced from citizens' media exposures.

Research question4: How did the media coverage of 2019 general elections in Nigeria provide the vital information that enabled the electorate to make up their minds about INEC' handling of the 2019 elections?

Table 4: Media coverage and the electorate decisions on INEC's handling of election

Variables	**Percentage**
Media provided vital information	30%
Media information helped in decision on INEC	35%
Media information on INEC was not helpful	15%
Did not rely on media to make decision	10%
Attitude to INEC is informed by media content	55%
Total	**100 n=457**

Source: Researcher's survey, 2024

Table 4 describes the various levels to which the respondents believed that their exposure to the media informed their attitude to INEC's handling of the 2019 general election. There is a

general belief among a majority of the respondents (55%) that media content informed their attitude to INEC's handling of the 2019 general election. This is doubtless so because 65% already indicated that media provided the vital information they required during the election as well as suggesting that the information from the media helped them in making their decision. Ten percent did not rely on the media for their decisions on INEC's performance while 15% said the did not rely on the media. It is possible that these few individuals may be relying on opinion leaders, peer groups or family members as well as other non-traditional means for information on the INEC's handling of the election. This, possibility, however, is fraught with some level of danger including access to unverified and unreliable information and the possibility of spreading such information through the same channel that is not verified – also known as grapevine sources.

Discussion

The study set out to determine the perception of voters about INEC's handling of 2019 election, bearing in mind the relationship between perception and reality. The study found that in respect of the voters' expectations from INEC, before and during the 2019 general elections was neutral: the expectation was simply for INEC to perform their civic duty. More than INEC performing their duties, citizens expected that they would be able to have a say in how they were governed, which means that they expected the umpire to guarantee a level playing field which would enable every citizen to choose their leaders by themselves. Without undue interference. However, there were pockets of doubts among the respondents regarding whether INEC would allow them to choose who will govern them while saying that they doubted whether their vote will count this time around. From this finding, most of the people sampled expected INEC to mess the 2019 general elections up like its predecessors.

The study also found that many (about 71%) did not believe that INEC would deliver a credible election in 2019 while only 16.5% said they "don't know" whether INEC would deliver a credible election. Invariably, this shows that the image of INEC in the past greatly affected people's perception of INEC and its capacity to conduct a credible election as

witnessed. Perception is everything as they say and that was why people ostensibly could doubt INEC's ability to conduct a credible election. With a hindsight, one could now tell whether the expectations were true or not…it would also suggest to us whether perception could mislead people to believe that INEC would fail in the task assigned to it. Nevertheless, empirical studies of this nature are important to regularly determine the people's views and attitudes towards national service institutions like INEC as a barometer of their outward performance evidenced from citizens' media exposures.

It is common knowledge that people's perceptions and realities sometimes are shaped by past experiences (Snow, 2023), hence the question as to any noticeable difference between the INEC that conducted 2019 general elections against the previous umpires, showed no noticeable difference in terms of key operational procedures that could affect INEC's performance. What is of prominent consideration is usually the change of guard which many believe could make a whole world of difference especially where the appointment of INEC Chairman and national commissioners were of the essence – these were recorded as significant developments that could tilt the balance. Nevertheless, another fraction (23.4%) of the respondents replied that there was no difference between the 2019 INEC and the previous ones, which means that there is no noticeable difference between INEC that conducted the 2019 general elections and that of the past. However, a small number believed that (10%) believed that INEC of 2019 was like never before, which means that they demonstrated above average performance over and above the previous ones. This shows the individual differences theory playing out – the idea that various people may perceive the same thing from their individual lenses which may differ from one another.

The also found that respondents believed that their exposure to the media informed their attitude to INEC's handling of the 2019 general election. For instance, the majority of the respondents (55%) agreed that their attitude to INEC's handling of the 2019 general election was a function of what they got from the media. In the same vein, most of them (65%) also indicated that media provided them with vital information they required during the

election as well as suggesting that the information from the media helped them in making their decisions. Although 10% said they did not rely on the media for their decisions on INEC's performance and another 15% said they did not rely on the media for their decision, it goes without saying that these few individuals (though significant) may be relying on opinion leaders, peer groups or family members as well as other non-traditional means for information on the INEC's handling of the election. This alternative source of information, however, is fraught with some danger such possibility of access to unverified and unreliable information which can also be subjected to unrestrained spreading through grapevine with the attendant implications.

Conclusion

The study has been able to suggest that a relationship exists between a people's perception and their expectation from an institution such as INEC. The study further found that despite what pretenses organisations may put forward, citizens build their frame of reference from previous actions of the institutions and such could affect overall perception. The study also found that INEC is considered central to the successful conduct of elections in Nigeria and many Nigerians believe that failure to deliver a credible and fair election is a misnomer for INEC and this could alienate the majority of the people. Above all, the study also established the position of the media in constructing the reality in the minds of the people, hence the need for INEC and other similar institutions to be mindful of their actions as is related to public image. The tripartite relationship between INEC, the media and the people is made manifest showing the mutual dependency of one another in the scheme of things. While INEC takes responsibility for conducting elections, the media report the events while the people keep records, reflexively invoking their perception on the situation when it is needed.

Recommendations

INEC's attention should be drawn to the fact that Nigerians always have expectations from the electoral body and therefore, they should understand these expectations and strive to live up to them in the interest of Nigerian citizens. INEC and other key institutions of state should

note that citizens expect them to always improve on their past performance and for that reason, it is recommended that the institution should learn from their past performances with the view to making a difference at all times. It is important that citizens express their belief and trust in institutions of state such as INEC but above all, the institutions should strive to uphold the trust reposed in them by the people. Media-INEC relationship be strengthened for mutual benefits as citizens have demonstrated that they depend on the media to make up their minds on crucial issues. INEC should endeavour to revise and improve on their media engagement and handling strategies aimed at earning them a favourable public image and perception.

References

Adetulo, V. (2008). Money and Politics in Nigeria. Abuja: Petra Digital Press

Akinfeleye, R. A. (1988). Contemporary Issues in Mass Media for Development and National Security. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Akinfeleye, R. A. (2003). Fourth Estate of the Realm or Fourth Estate of the Wreck: Imperative of Social Responsibility of the Press. Lagos: UNILAG Press.

Akintoye, S.A. (1971) Revolution and Power Politics in Yorubaland 1840-1893. London: Longman

Anifowose, R. (2004) Urban Violence in Nigeria: The Case of the O'odua People's Congress (OPC) Militia in M.O.A Adejugbe (ed.), Industrialization, Urbanization and Development in Nigeria,1950 – 1999, Lagos: Concept Publication Ltd.

Anifowose, R. and Babawale, T. (2003). 2003 General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Lagos: Fredrich Ebert Stiftung

Babbie E. (1986). The Practice of Social Research, Belmart, California, Wadsworth Publishing Co

Babbie, E.R (1973). Survey Research Methods, Belmont, California: Wardworth Publishing Company, Inc.

Bethinghaus, E.P. (1968) Persuasive Communication, Sanfransisco, Rinehert Press

Bohner, Gerd; Wanke, Michaela (2011). Attitudes and Attitude Change. Frontiers of Social Psychology (1 ed.). London: Taylor and Francis.

Doi:10.4324/9781315784786Demas, D. P. and Nicholas, S (1987) Precision Journalism, A Practical Guide, Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc

Kerlinger, NF. (1964) Foundation of behavior research. Toronto. Holt, Rinehert and Winston Inc.

Lamidi, K., Oyedele, K., Fagbohun, Francis, O., Ihemeje, Godwin, Carmen (2014). Exploring the character of political parties, civil society organizations, security agencies, traditional institutions and the press in the Nigerian electoral processes. 8(1) 10.5897/AJPSIR2013.0619, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations

Lasswell, H.D (1971). The Structure and Function of Communication in Society, in Schram W. and Roberts D.F., (ed.), The Process and Effects of Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, London: Sage Publication

Liza, MP Munoz (2023). Great Expectations: How Our Prior Experiences Shape Our Reality. Cognitive Neuroscience Society. Retrieved from www.cogneurosociety.org

Oduko, S. (1992) Guide to Students' Research: A Bibliography of Mass Communication. Lagos. VDG Press Limited.

Oduko, S. (1992). Guide to Students' Research, Lagos: VDG Press Limited: Lagos.

Osuala, E. C (1982) Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences, Lagos: African-Feb. Publishers Limited

Simon, J. E. (1986) Basic Research Methods in the Social Sciences, New York: Prentice Hall Inc.

Sobowale, I. S. (1983). Scientific journalism: What tools for the Precision Journalist. Ikeja: John West Publishers.

Wimmer, R. D. and Domenick J. R. (1987) Mass Media Research: An Introduction, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Inc.

ASSESSMENT OF A DECADE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE IN NIGERIA, 2014-2024

Yusuf Garba MANJO, PhD
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
Al Hikmah University, Ilorin, Kwara State
gamjiyusuf@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The issue of safe school environment has become a global matter, particularly in Nigeria, which has experienced increasing terrorism and banditry in Nigeria from 2009 till date. This necessitated the launch of the safe school initiatives to combat the menace of incessant attacks on schools. This paper assessed the level of safety and security components in place, for students and teachers in the school environment during the ten years of implementation of the safe school initiative in Nigeria. Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory is adopted by the study as the theoretical framework for explaining why safety and security needs of teachers and students are of paramount importance to the country's educational advancement and overall development. The theory emphasis the important of safety needs and security of human being in any environment. Therefore, this paper discussed elaborately the concepts of safe school and safe school initiative, historical dimension of safe school initiative in Nigeria, incidences of unsafe school environment in Nigeria, and benefits of safe school to children's access to basic education. The study further examined the targeted interventions areas at inception by the initiative vis-a-vis the impact of the initiative in schools across Nigeria in the last ten years from its inception in 2014. The study therefore recommended among others, the adoption of hybrid security measures and the full involvement of school stakeholders and host communities in ensuring the security of the lives of students, teachers, and non-teaching staff in schools across Nigeria.

Keywords: Security, Safe School, Assessment, Implementation

Introduction

Boko Haram terrorist group have carried out violent attacks in the northern parts of Nigeria from 2009 till date, in which thousands of Nigerians have been killed and many more have been forced to flee their homes. Schools have been the primary target of their attacks. Since

2011, Boko Haram, whose name means "Western Education is forbidden", has expanded its direct or targeted attacks to schools, resulting in the killing and abduction of hundreds of teachers and students and the destruction of school buildings and teaching materials. An example is the kidnapping of 276 Nigerian girls at Chibok, Borno state in 2014 and the frequent and violent attacks of terror against girls and boys across schools in the northern part of the country, which generated a call for the International Community. In fact, the abductions of the 276 girls from Chibok touched the nerves of Nigerians and the global community, and resulted in to social media initiatives like "Bring Back Our Girls."

As a response to the several attacks on schools, the "Safe Schools Initiative" was launched by the UN Special Envoy for Global Education, Gordon Brown, alongside Nigerian Global Business Coalition for Education and Private Sector Leaders at the World Economic Forum for Africa in Abuja. The objective of this initiative is protection of students and teachers in the school environment, so that education can continue and to ensure that the right to education without discrimination becomes a reality for all Nigerians. The Initiative was set up in the wake of growing incidence of violent attacks on the right to education in Nigeria and to ensure "A World" at School. The Safe Schools Initiative therefore provides a programmatic response for the protection of schools and prevention of future attacks on schools. In short, the "Safe Schools Initiative" entails a combination of: school-based interventions; community interventions to protect schools; and special measures for students at-risk populations (GCPEA (2022) and UNICEF, 2016)

The Safe School Initiative was premised on the best practices from global standards and it encapsulated in the Safe School Declaration (SSD). Since the commencement of the Initiative in 2014, Nigeria only endorsed the Declaration on 29th May 2019, thus making her the 37th country to join the Safe School Declaration framework. Prior to the endorsement, the Federal Executive Council approved the Memorandum on Mainstreaming and Implementation of the SSD Laws and Policies in Nigeria, which paved the way for the domestication of SSD on 20th March 2019. Subsequently, on 31 December 2019, President Muhammadu Buhari

signed the Safe Schools Declaration Ratification Document signalling the country's commitment to ratify and uphold the principles of the SSD (FMOE, 2021).

Concomitantly, the Federal Ministry of Education in collaboration with related Ministries and other stakeholders spearheaded the process of formulating a comprehensive National Policy on Safety, Security and Violence-Free Schools (NPSSVFS), which integrated and harmonized two existing policy proposals on Violence Free Schools and Safety and Security in Schools in August 2021. Following the approval of the NPSSVFS by the National Council of Education, the Federal Ministry of Education in collaboration with Education in Emergencies Working Group in Nigeria (EiEWGN) developed the Minimum Standard for Safe Schools to provide implementation roadmap and principles for NPSSVFS. The Minimum Standard lays out the guideline based on the Safe School Common Approach (SSCA) that earmarks the activities and roles of each stakeholder to keep school users, teachers, learners and the school safe and violence-free (FMoE,2021).

Indeed, there are also questions on whether sufficient resources are available to sub-national levels to ensure effective implementation of the Initiative. Lastly, one of the controversial issues concerning the implementation of the SSI in Nigeria is the degree of transparency and accountability particularly in relation to the management of the fund earmarked for the Initiative. Questions have been asked on the modalities for the disbursement of fund especially the utilization of the USD10milion pledged at the launch of SSI. In fact, there were specific calls for the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice to open an inquiry into the alleged mismanagement or diversion of the USD 30million budgeted for the Safe School Initiative. The controversies surrounding the utilization of the fund meant for SSI was not limited to media and civil society. Equally, the House of Representatives and the Senate have passed resolutions demanding probe largely because transparency and accountability in the implementation of SSI have been very limited (NILDS REPORT, 2021). In the light of the foregoing, this paper is aimed at appraising the implementation of the SSI.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptual Review

The study reviewed some related literature on the causes of insecurity in school environment, gave an overview of the genesis of the safe school initiative, and benefits of safe school initiative as follows;

i. Concepts of Safe School

According to California State PTA (2016), Safe School is a school environment in which students and staff are free to learn and teach without any threat of physical and psychological harm. In essence, a safe school provides surroundings that are non-violent with clear behavioural expectations and disciplinary policies that are consistently and fairly administered, and which confer recognition for positive behaviour. Safe school has an established policies for proactive security procedures, emergency response plans and the timely maintenance, cleanliness and attractive appearance of the campus and classrooms. Also, a safe school environment has a crisis response plan in place to deal with unforeseen emergencies.

The term safe school has also been described by James (2011) as one where teaching and learning are not distracted; disruptions are minimized; violence, drugs, bullying and fear are not present; students are not discriminated against; expectations for behavior are clearly communicated; and consequences for infractions are consistently and fairly applied. In practical terms, safe school environments can be threatened by internal threats, such as bullying, corporal punishment and gang recruitment while external threats, such as attacks on schools and environmental threats like natural disasters, have the potential to significantly decrease students' academic performance. In short, safe school connote the process whereby the school environment is made free from all forms of violence, bullying, harassment and substance use. It promotes the protection of staff and students from violence, exposure to weapons and threats, theft, bullying and the sale or use of illegal substances.

ii. The Concept of Safe School Initiative

According to Chester (2015), safe schools initiative is a response to children and schools affected by militants in the North Eastern states of Nigeria. Basically, the safe school initiative entails a combination of: transfer of secondary students to other states; support to education in internally displaced persons' camps; and pilot safe schools models including community mobilization. Safe school initiative is an intervention aimed at ensuring that every child is offered a safe place to learn, play and realize their full potentials especially for children in emergencies and conflict. In essence, the intervention is to protect Nigeria children in schools from the insurgent attacks in form of kidnapping, hostage taking, rape and outright killing by the hoodlums. Safe schools which offer supervision, services and teaching can save children's lives in the short term, and help them to develop in the long term.

According to the United Nations Development Programme (2018), there are three management approaches adopted for operation by safe school initiative. These are the school based management or interventions, community based interventions to protect schools and the special measures for some risk populations. The management approach of safe school initiative in schools across Nigeria involves a synergy approach between the school authority, community members, parents, government and other stakeholders in the school system.

iii. Factors accounted for Insecurity in School Environments in Nigeria

Generally, the following factors are majorly responsible for insecurity in school environments across Nigeria:

Firstly, inadequate funding of the schools by government is one of the factors that aids insecurity in the school environment. Confirming this assertion is the study conducted by Nnorom (2020,) on security management practices in the 21st century for improved university administration.

Secondly, stakeholders' negligence is another factors responsible for insecurity in schools. An evidence to support this is the Research carried out on "Managing School Safety in Thailand: Assessing the Implications and Potential of a Lean Thinking Framework" by

Srichai (2013). Seven managerial obstacles to effective safety in Thai schools were identified by this research. These obstacles include: time, money, leadership, culture, dedication, communication, and stakeholder awareness. Some of these seven obstacles on effective safety in Thai schools may also apply to the management of schools in Nigeria too in terms of managing safety in the school environment.

Another factor that accounted for insecurity in schools is that the terrorist and bandits regarded schools in any community in Nigeria as representations of the State. In fact, Alimba (2018) opined that schools may be the only buildings and its teachers the only government workers in the rural locations, fulfilling a variety of learning functions. Hence, attacks on schools, teachers and students is perceived as attacks on State by these terrorists and bandits.

Lastly, another primary cause of the extension of insecurity to schools is that the perpetrators of school attacks perceived it to be a liberating institution from the shackles of ignorance, dogmatism and blind followership. People are transformed by education to the point where they are freed from ignorance and acquire the critical thinking skills necessary to evaluate and confirm ideas before accepting them.

iv. ***Overview of Safe School Declaration and Safe School Initiative in Nigeria***

The foundation for the Safe School Declaration (SSD) was led by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), an inter-agency group dedicated to addressing the problem of targeted attacks on education during conflict. After series of preliminary consultations, engagements and activities, the Safe Schools Declaration was launched on 29th May 2015 in Oslo, Norway. The Safe Schools Declaration is a multi-stakeholder coalition that guarantees political commitment to protect students, teachers and schools from the worst effects of armed conflict. It highlights the broad impact of armed conflict on education and outlines a set of commitments to strengthen the protection of education and ensure its continuity during armed conflict. Countries that endorse the SSD are expected to develop guidelines that stipulate a set of actions that parties to the conflict can take to reduce the military use of schools and to minimize the negative impact such use may have on students'

safety and education. As at 2021, 113 countries have joined the SSD network since its establishment till date (GCPEA, 2022).

The Safe School Initiative was launched at the World Economic Forum on Africa (WEFA) which took place in Nigeria by a coalition of business leaders, working in collaboration with the United Nations Special Envoy for Global Education, former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown. It was set up in the wake of growing incidence of violent attacks on the right to education in Nigeria and "A World'' at School. The Initiative was premised on the best practices from global standards and encapsulated in the Safe School Declaration.

Following the approval of the NPSSVFS by the National Council of Education, the Federal Ministry of Education in collaboration with Education in Emergencies Working Group in Nigeria (EiEWGN) developed the Minimum Standard for Safe Schools to provide implementation roadmap and principles for NPSSVFS. The Minimum Standard lays out the guideline based on the Safe School Common Approach (SSCA) that earmarks the activities and roles of each stakeholder to keep school users, teachers, learners and the school safe and violence-free (NILDS Report,2021).

v. Benefits of Safe School Environments

The importance of building safe school environments for students is something that cannot be over emphasized. While it is true that every student learns a bit differently from the next, the environment itself plays a significant role in their development. Safe school environment translates into comfortable learning environment. This is because in surroundings where students are willing to open their minds and actually listen to what teachers have to say, they can be empowered to achieve their highest potentials (Jack, 2019).

According to Applebury (2010), keeping schools safe allows children to look forward to being in an encouraging environment that promotes social and creative learning. Promoting school safety creates an open space for kids to explore, learn and grow. Therefore, safe school initiative promotes the protection of students from violence, exposure to weapons and threats, theft, bullying and the sale or use of illegal substances on school grounds. Safety school is

linked to improved student and school outcomes. In particular, emotional and physical safety in school is related to academic performance. At the same time, students who are victims of physical or emotional harassment or who are involved in the sale or use of illegal substances on school grounds are at risk for poor attendance, subject failure and dropout (Agaptus, 2018).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The paper adopts the Abraham Maslow Hierarchy of Needs theory as its theoretical framework. The Hierarchy of Needs Theory, which was propounded by Abraham Maslow in the United States between 1940 and 1954, is still useful today for the understanding of motivation in people, organizational development, and personal growth. Maslow's theory of the Hierarchy of Needs is about the obligation of employers to provide an atmosphere at work that supports and encourages individuals to realize their full potential or self-actualization (Mubita, 2018). The basic needs are at the bottom of the hierarchy, and more advanced requirements are at the top. These include physiological needs and safety needs, which are typically categorized as basic wants, as opposed to the secondary or higher needs of love, esteem, and self-actualization (Maslow, 1954). According to Maslow, when a lower need is met, the next highest need takes precedence and the person's attention shifts to meeting this need. As people go up the hierarchy of demands, psychological development occurs, however this is not always a linear progression. Even momentarily, the lesser needs remain motivators, and people frequently return to previously satisfied demands.

This theory serves as a crucial foundation for explaining the topic of this study because it recognizes the significance of safety and security requirements for the smooth operation of academic activities in school environment. The stakeholders (students and teachers) in the school needed assurance that their safety needs would be met after the physiological demands had been met. Therefore, it is essential that school administration promotes safe conditions to ensure teachers and students' safety and encourages improved student enrollment, retention, and completion and, as a result, the achievement of quality education. Maslow defines safety as the need for order as well as the pursuit of security, stability, reliance, and protection as

well as the liberation from fear, anxiety, and disorder. This suggests that a person yearns for safety, making it a crucial survival need and a crucial desire of people in the Nigerian school environment.

TARGETED INTERVENTIONS BY SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

Based on best global practice in the protection of schools and available records, the NILDS REPORT (2021) revealed that the targeted interventions of Safe School Initiative for the individual school-level to consider to be a "Safe School" are as follows:

a. school based targeted interventions

The SSI's school based targeted interventions includes;

1. Reinforced school infrastructure: Bolstering the physical protection of schools is the first target to shield staff and students and provide a means of self-defense. As recommended by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, this involve the use of boundary walls and the installation of barbed wire as basic and cost-effective mechanisms. This target is informed by the result from the construction of boundary walls to thwart attacks and abductions was implemented in 8,327 Afghani schools with first priority for girls' schools. The safe school initiative's target is therefore drawn from the success achieved in Afghanistan in this regard.

2. Armed guard(s): This is the second target. Provision of armed guards, in collaboration with law enforcement or military personnel for schools. These include the military or state-assisted paramilitary, police, or privately hired security. Armed guards is to repel attacks and intimidate would-be attackers as being commonly practice in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, where school districts employ private armed security to thwart attacks.

3. Training of staff as school safety officers: Staff at each school is to be trained on security measures including procedures for evacuation of school buildings and communicating with security officials. Selected safety officers in schools is also to ensure each classroom has an emergency pack containing supplies that must accompany each class when an evacuation

occurs. All safety officers must have a way to communicate with local authorities should a school come under attack.

4. School counselor visits: Counselors is to be appointed in each school to carry out regular school visits in several communities to assist students who have experienced attacks in addressing trauma so that they are able to refocus on learning. Counselors may also help students cope with the perceived militarization of their schools that can occur with the presence of armed protection, as it is shown to decrease student learning if left unaddressed.

5. A school security plan: The SS's target is to design security plan for each school with guidance to be provided by local authorities. Each school is to have a safety plan so that all students know what to do in the case of an emergency. All staff and students is to familiarize with the plans and corresponding procedures.

6. A rapid response system: When schools are attacked, there will be a response unit for quick repair or rebuilt, and replacement of destroyed education materials. A senior official is to be designated in each state to oversee the rapid response system and is to ensure that education is made available at alternative locations until schools are rebuilt and secure conditions ensured.

b. community-based targeted interventions

Safe School Initiative also planned some additional measures to involve the community in the protection of schools in line with the example provided by Global Coalition for Protect Education from Attack. The safe school initiative agreed at inception to adopt these community-based programs and adapted them to the Nigerian context. Relevant community-based interventions that were proposed to be part of the Safe Schools Initiative include:

1. Community Education Committees: As communities have specialized knowledge about their particular context and conflict dynamics, and may even know the individuals involved, they may be the best suited to devising practical solutions for protecting education from attack and for helping negotiate schools as peaceful zones. Community Education

Committee have been successful in Somalia in curtailing attack, hence SSI planned to adopt same in Nigeria.

2. Teacher-Student-Parent Defense Units: By fostering these units, members work together to protect education, so that parents warn teachers of imminent attack. Parents also get involved in school affairs, making inquiries of the administration about student participation in political camps at schools. All members work together to try to remove militia camps from school grounds as implemented in Zimbabwe, where students and community members formed voluntary groups in several schools. The SSI planned to replicate same in Nigeria.

3. Religious Leader Engagement: Engagement of religious leaders in the promotion of education has had a significant impact in reducing attacks. The Safe Schools Initiative in Nigeria also plan to focus on engaging religious leaders to speak about the importance of education as implemented in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia.

4. SSI also plan the Community-driven negotiations to develop and agree to codes of conduct for Zones of Peace. As practiced in some communities, collaboration among diverse political and ethnic groups in widely publicized and mass meetings can lead to the development of "Safe School Zones." As in countries such as Nepal and the Philippines, arrests is not allowed on school grounds in order to minimize violence, school closures and the politicization of schooling.

5. In some of the most at-risk locations, the Safe Schools Initiative also plan to advocate for special provisions with the government to improve overall security and ensure special provisions are in place particularly for schools in high-risk areas:

6. Consolidate schools through zoning. Consolidating schools ensures targeted and efficient use of available resources to maximize protection and prevention of attacks through:

a. Zone by Local Government Area (LGA): Consolidated schools is to be made available in each LGA to facilitate access to schools for teachers and students.

b. Explore the use of shifts: With consolidation, there will be a dramatic increase in the number of students and teachers, using select school infrastructure. Utilizing a shift-based system of schooling, is to involve teaching a group of children in the morning and another in the afternoon, to minimize a strain on resources. Also, the SSI targeted to adopt this.

c. Position consolidated schools in safer areas: Consolidated schools is to be located in low-risk areas, preferably away from thick bushes that can compromise security efforts.

7. SSI planned to provide security guidelines for private schools. Private schools, which are largely responsible for their own security, is to be provided with security guidelines that must be followed to ensure the safety of their staff and students. Regular inspections is to be carried out to ensure these guidelines are obeyed.

Reported Incidences of Attacks on Schools in Nigeria

Despite the SSI's targets and operation of safe school initiative, there are several reported incidences of attacks on schools. In May, 2014, in response to the mass abduction of school children in the North Eastern States of Nigeria, the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) programme was launched by the Government of Nigeria and the UN Special Envoy for Global Education, Gordon Brown, alongside with the Nigerian Global Business Coalition for Education and Private Sector Leaders in Abuja (GCPEA, 2022). However, in spite the operation of the initiative, the North-eastern and North-western parts of Nigeria had witnessed an unprecedented level of insurgency and banditry from 2014 to 2024, leading to a declaration of a "State of Emergency" in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States in 2013. The first four months of 2014 saw a further escalation of the security situation in the north east. It is estimated that out of the 11 million Nigerians who live in the three states under a state of emergency, up to six million was affected by the insecurity, with four million people in Borno state alone. As many as 1,500 individuals, including women and children, were killed in the first three months of 2014. Access by people and organizations to the affected communities become difficult and, as a result, the populations mostly affected are often not reachable (Shaba, 2015).

The militant group, Boko Haram, carried out violent attacks in the northeastern parts of Nigeria. Thousands of Nigerians were killed, and many more were forced to flee their homes. Schools have been the primary target of the attacks. Since 2011, Boko Haram, whose name means "Western Education is Forbidden'' has expanded its attacks to the direct target of schools. It has resulted in the killing and abduction of hundreds of teachers and students and the destruction of school buildings and teaching materials. As a result of increased attacks on education, all schools in Borno State were closed from the 14th March 2014, and roughly 253,000 children were out of school in the 2013-14 school year (Borno SUBEB, 2015). By the end of 2014, Adamawa, Yobe and Borno State Universal Basic Education authorities have reported a total of 338 schools destroyed, 196 teachers and over 314 learners killed and more than 276 Learners abducted. The situation was further fuelled the perception of schools as "danger zones'' and thus continue to threaten the gains achieved by targeted school enrolment drives in northern Nigeria.

It is unfortunate that since the implementation of the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) programme, public schools have been continuously attacked and several students were kidnapped. Since 2014 till 2024, there have been series of attacks and kidnappings of students. For instance, the first major attack on school was in April 2014, when 276 schoolgirls were abducted by Boko Haram insurgents in a boarding school in Chibok, Borno State. Secondly, in 2018, another 110 schoolgirls were also abducted from their school in Dapchi, Yobe State. Thirdly, in 2021, over 300 students were abducted by armed bandits from a girl's secondary school in Zamfara State. Fourthly, the Government Science College, Kagara in Rafi Local Government Area of Niger state also witnessed another on February 17th 2021, when 42 persons were abducted from the school and an additional twenty-seven students, three staff and 12 members of their families abducted. Fifthly, in December, 2021, it was the attack of Government Science Secondary School, Kankara, in Katsina, northwest, Nigeria, where 350 boys were also kidnapped by gunmen at night.

In summary, the attacks recorded in schools across the North in 2021 alone as provided by UNICEF (2022) includes; 25 schools attacked; 1,470 learners abducted, 200 still missing, over 1 million children experienced shock and were afraid to return to schools; 11,500 schools closed in 2021 due to attacks, of which schools in the Northwest accounted for 76% of attacks; armed banditry in Northwest resulted in 1,446 Learners and 24 personnel abducted in 2021; organized armed groups in Northeast resulted in 108 head teachers hit by bullets, shells, or shrapnel; 51 schools experienced armed attacks and 64 schools (10% of assessed) targeted by suicide bombing in 2021; and communal clashes and climate change in North central also led to 1,254 persons (627 children) displaced due to multi-dimensional crisis in in the region in 2021

In all, for 2021 alone, over 11,500 schools were closed and 5 million children lost a quarter academic session, which resulted in increased school dropout; all due to increased actual and potential violence, with direct impact particularly on the girls, poor teacher concentration and capacity to cope, especially female teachers, overstretching of school resources and inability of the system to cope with influx of IDP learners , life-long emotional distress, affecting the wellbeing of children especially the girls (health issues, unwanted pregnancy, stigma), and about $3.4 billion lifetime economic loss (UNICEF, 2022)

Assessing the Effectiveness and Impact of the Safe School Initiative in Nigeria

Assessing the performance and impact of safe school initiative since its inception, Leadership Newspaper (2021) observed that the programme which was set up in response to the growing number of attacks on the right to education after the abduction of over 300 school girls in Chibok community, Borno State, have not been effective with many of the schools, especially in Northern Nigeria, still under severe attacks in the last ten years. Equally, Allafrica (2021) disclosed that after seven years of implementing the initiative, the lack of safety measures in schools have ignited fear in the lives of thousands of Nigerians with so many schools coming under attacks. The programme, which was set up in response to the growing number of violations against the right to education after the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls, has

apparently not been yielding the expected results with many of the schools, especially in Northern Nigeria, having come under attack by Boko Haram terrorists and, lately, by bandits. One of the most important promises made by safe schools initiative is safety of the students and teachers while they are in the school or within a stipulated set of hours. But unfortunately, the safety of schools can no longer be guaranteed going by the attacks directed at school by terrorists, hoodlums, thieves and most worrisome is the fact that schools do not adequately benefitted from public security as expected (Youdeowei & Iruoma, 2015).

Since the abduction of the "Chibok girls", the educational sector of the country most especially in the North East and West geo-political zones has remained highly vulnerable to attacks. School and colleges, students and teachers have remained soft targets. They are injured, killed or abducted and their facilities destroyed. The most unfortunate aspect is the fact that the conflict and insecurity situation in the affected areas have often had a direct and compounding negative impact on children's access to education, the availability of educational spaces and materials and the ability of teachers (Amalu, 2015).

This target on schools as captured in the report of Education in Emergencies Working Group Nigeria (2018) has led to cumulative effects. For instance, an estimated 1,400 schools have been destroyed since 2014, with over 1,280 casualties among teachers and students. The crisis has further devastated the education system and children, teachers and schools are on the front line of the conflict. Recorded attacks, reported damage to schools and universities from bullets, shells or shrapnel. Schools have been deliberately set on fire and looted. Likewise, the cumulative effect of attacks, looting and wanton destruction of schools, climatic degradation, and the impact of occupation of schools by armed groups or the use of schools as shelter by IDPs has left the education infrastructure in a catastrophic state.

Apart from the North-East geo-political zone of Nigeria being the epicentre of crisis in Nigeria relating to the safety of schools, several attacks on education most specifically, the violence against students and education personnel has been reported in other areas of the country. Attacks recorded ranges from "hoodlum attack'', break-in and vandalism of school

properties by hoodlums and drug addicts to attacks involving burning schools or killing, injuring, kidnapping, detaining or torturing students, teachers and academics"(Education in Emergencies Working Group Nigeria, 2018). One of such attacks in the South-West geo-political zone happened on January 13th, 2017 when pupils of the Nigerian Tulip International College (formerly Nigerian Turkish International College), Isheri, Ogun State, were attacked by armed kidnappers who took away three pupils and five employees of the institution (Goni, 2018).

CONCLUSION

In the light of the series of attacks on schools in the north as revealed above, it is the conclusion of this study that the school environment especially in the Northern part of Nigeria is still being threatened by insecurity despite the safe school initiative, and parents are preferring for their children stay back home and take to skills than accessing basic education which exposes them to kidnapping, molestation and other forms of threats in schools. All the attacks on schools and their resultant effects pointed out the fact that the safe school initiative had not achieve it desired objectives and the targeted interventions had not achieved its desired results in the last ten years of its operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The stakeholders should be sensitized across the States, especially in communities, to pay regular attention to security matters in schools in their areas.
2. The School Communities should improve synergy among themselves, especially on matters of security consciousness, and they should try to build same among students, with funding supporting from SSI to create security awareness in communities.
3. The SSI and Government should provide funding to reinforce most school fencing and fit it with razor wire, strong gate and escape route or emergency doors at various strategic points.
4. The SSI funds should support States in providing and installing electronic security gadgets like CCTV, security-alarm and long-range censor-alert activation systems that are in tune with the current state of technology of the day.

5. The Safe School fund can also support State Governments on the possibilities of beefing or complimenting the current local night watchmen with trained security personnel from the vigilante or private security personnel, particularly around schools.

6. The Nationally Assembly should support State Governments in establishing, recruiting, and redeploying the State Constabulary Police Officers to serve in the boarding schools.

7. On the physical safety front, government response to attacks should be rapid and information-sharing mechanisms should be improved upon.

References

Agaptus, J. (2018). Security awareness as a panacea for effective management of safe schools initiative and students' academic achievement in unity schools in Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences, 6 (8), 755-762.

Alimba, N. Chinyere(2018) Acorrelation Sudy on Conflict Management Styles and Teachers Productivity in Public Secondary Schools in Nigeria, in African Research Review. Vol. 12. No. 1,March 20th, 2018.

Allafrica (2021) Nigeria: 7 Years after Launch - States Yet to Get $30m Safe School Fund https://allafrica.com/stories/202104260061.html

Amalu, N.S (2015) Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Human Security in Nigeria Global Journal of Social Sciences. Vol 14, pp.35-42.Retrieved

Applebury, G. M. (2010). Why is school safety important? Retrieved from www.ncbi.nlm Benson, A.L. (2015). Management of safe school initiative in north east Nigeria. Abuja: Ekesi Press.

California State PTA (2016). Safe school environments. Community Concerns Commission.

Chester, S. (2015). Introducing the safe schools initiative in Nigeria. Retrieved from www.icn.pascalobservatory.org.

Education Emergencies Working Group Nigeria's Report(2018)

Education For All Document(2000-2015)

Education under attack 2020; A report from GCPEA

Federal Ministry of Education (2021). Minimum Standards for SSD (2021 https://education.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/MinimumStandards-for-Safe-Schools.pdf

Federal Ministry of Education Nigeria (2021). National Policy on Safety, Security and violence free School. https://education.gov.ng/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/National-Policy-on-SSVFSN.pdf

GCPEA (2022) The Safe Schools Declaration https://ssd.protectingeducation.org/

Global Coalition to Protect Education From Attack (2019) Safe Schools Declaration Endorsements. Retrieved fromhttp://protectingeducation.org/guidelines/support

Goni, Bukar-Lawal (2018) Motion on urgent public importance to bring the plight of the Daphci School Girls to the attention of the House of Representatives by Member representing Dapchi community.

Jack, T. (2019). Safe learning environment translates into comfortable learning environment. London: JP limited.

James, H. (2011). Sexual violence/sexual harassment: A handbook of resources. Cape Town: African gender institute.

Leadership Newspaper (2021) Stakeholders Pick Holes In Management Of Safe School Initiative https://leadership.ng/stakeholders-pick-holes-in-management-of-safe-school-initiative/

Maslow, A.H.(1954) Motivation and Personality.New York.Harper and Row.

NILDS REPORT(2021) A Joint Research of National Institute For Democratic and Legislative Studies(NILDS) and Development Research and Project Centre(dRPC).November,2021)

Nnorom,U. Stanley(2020). Security Management Practices in the 21st Century for improved University Administration, in IEEE-SEM, Vol. 8. ISSUE 7. July,2020.ISSN 2320-9151.

Shaba, C. (2015) The Safe School Initiative (SSI) in Nigeria http://lcn.pascalobservatory.org. /pascalnow/blogentry/associate-features/introducing-safeschools-initiative-ssi-nigeria

Srichai, Pachernwaat(2013) Managing School Safety in Thailand: Assessing the implications and potential of a lean thinking framework, in SAGE Open, April-June,2013:1-17. DOI:10.1177215824401348998 5.Sgo-sagepub.com

UNICEF (2015). Safe school in safe territories. Panama City: UNICEF.

UNICEF (2022) SBMC Effectiveness Monitoring Report (2021)

United Nations Development Programme (2018) Nigeria Safe Schools Initiative Multi-Donor Trust Fund: Overview. Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office), Bureau for Management Services, United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved fromhttp://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/NGA00.

United Nations International Children's Education Fund (2016). Introducing the safe school's initiative in Nigeria. UK: UNICEF.

World Education Report (2015) Final Report.

Youdeowei, T and Iruoma, K (2015) Safety in Schools: Matters arising . Vanguard Newspaper October, 22,2015.Retrieved from http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/NGA00 https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/10/safety-in-schools-matters-arising/